number but 319, or 15.5 per cent, resulted in claims being carried before the courts for decision.

Up to December 31, 1899, 47 compensation schemes had been certified in England and Wales by the registrar of friendly societies, affecting 130,704 employees. These were distributed among the following industries: Railways, 2 schemes, affecting 41,174 employees; factories, 17 schemes, affecting 16,365 employees; mines, 27 schemes, affecting 72,695 employees; quarries, 1 scheme, affecting 470 employees. One scheme for Government employees was also certified in 1899. In Scotland 2 schemes have been certified, both in 1898. They were both for factories, and affected 2,750 employees.

ITALY.

Relazione sull'applicazione della legge 11 febbraio 1886 sul lavoro dei fanciulli nelle fabbriche e nelle miniere, dal 1° luglio 1896 al 31 dicembre 1898. Camera dei Deputati. Presentata dal Ministro di Agricoltura, Industria e Commercio. 51 pp.

The present report on child labor in Italy was made by the minister of agriculture, industry, and commerce to the Italian chamber of commerce, in accordance with the requirements of the law of February 11. 1886.() The information contained in this report is mainly such as is usually found in reports of factory and mine inspectors, showing the number of factories and mines visited, the cases of violation found and prosecuted, etc. It also contains statistics showing the extent of child labor employed in certain industrial establishments and in the mining and metal industries. The report covers the period from July 1, 1896, to December 31, 1898.

The following table gives statistics showing the number of children employed in the mines and factories inspected in 1896, 1897, and 1898:

CHILDREN EMPLOYED IN MINES AND FACTORIES, 1896–1898.

The above table shows an increase in the number of children employed in mining and metal industries during the period, although the proportion of children to total employees shows a decrease from 1896 to 1897. The number and proportion of children from 9 to 10 years, as compared with other age groups, show an increase each year. The number and proportion of children in the other industries considered show a considerable decrease from 1897 to 1898. The proportion of children from 9 to 10 and from 10 to 12 years of age shows a decided decrease, while the proportion from 12 to 15 years shows a corresponding increase from 1897 to 1898.

NETHERLANDS.

Verslagen der Kamers van Arbeid over 1899. 95 pp. (Published by the Ministry of Waterstaat, Commerce, and Industry.)

This is a compilation of the material contained in the first annual reports made by the local councils of labor established by royal decree in accordance with an act passed May 2, 1897. (a) It comprises a list of 60 councils of labor organized up to January 1, 1900, showing the date of the royal decree, the date of organization, and the industry for which organized, in each case. Lists and tables compiled from 27 councils reporting, show, in addition, the names and occupations of the members on December 31, 1899, an alphabetical arrangement of the industries represented, the number of persons on the voting lists and the number who voted at the elections, and the number of meetings held by the councils and by the governing boards. Extracts, in text form, from the individual reports are also given.

a For an account of this law showing the purposes, organization, etc., of these councils of labor see Bulletin No. 30, pp. 1046–1051.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, ind cated when short by quotation marks and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, immaterial matter, needed simply by way of explanation, is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CITY ORDINANCE, ETC.-CONTRACTOR TO EMPLOY NONE BUT MEMBERS OF LABOR UNIONS-EIGHT HOURS TO CONSTITUTE A DAY'S LABOR-Fiske v. People ex rel. Raymond, Supreme Court of Illinois, 58 Northeastern Reporter, page 985.-This was an. application by the people, on the relation of S. B. Raymond, against · David E. Fiske, for a judgment of sale for a special assessment for a street improvement. From a judgment for relator, rendered in the county court of Cook County, Ill., the defendant appealed the case to the supreme court of the State which rendered its decision December 20, 1900, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

The question of the constitutionality of an ordinance of the city of Chicago, providing that the successful bidders for the doing of any public work or making of any public improvement must agree to hire no employees who were not members of labor unions, was raised in this case as was also a question as to the constitutionality of a provision in the specifications attached to the particular contract in the case to the effect that the contractor must not allow his employees to work more than eight hours in any one day, and that if he should do so his contract should be forfeited.

The court decided that, for certain reasons, these questions had no bearing upon the facts of the case and no influence upon the decision, yet it did state that both the ordinance and the provision of the specifications referred to were unconstitutional and void and on this point the language of the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Magruder, is as follows:

Undoubtedly the ordinance of October 17, 1898, is unconstitutional and void. The requirement that the bidder for doing the work on a public improvement shall agree to hire only members of labor unions in the performance of such work, and that, in all contracts executed by the commissioner of public works on behalf of the city, the contractor shall agree to hire only members of labor unions, amounts to 351-No. 37-01

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a discrimination between different classes of citizens, and lays down a rule which restricts competition and increases the cost of work. Under our constitution and laws, any man has a right to employ a workman to perform labor for him, whether such workman belongs to a labor union or not; and any workman has a right to contract for the performance of labor, irrespective of the question whether he belongs to a labor union or not. Such ordinances and contracts as the ordinance of October 17, 1898, have been recently held to be unconstitutional and void, in the cases of Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill., 194, 52 N. E., 314, and Holden v. City of Alton, 179 Ill., 318, 53 N. E., 556. These eases are conclusive as to the invalidity of this ordinance.

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It is contended by counsel for appellant in his argument that a provision in the specifications attached to the contract made between the contractor and the city of Chicago for the doing of the work upon the improvement in question is illegal, as limiting the number of hours in each working day. The provision thus referred to is as follows: "In the prosecution of the work under these specifications, eight hours shall constitute a day's labor; and any contractor or contractors who shall compel or allow laborers or employees to work more than eight hours in one day shall be liable to have this contract forfeited, as provided by section 1687 of the Revised Code of the City of Chicago: Provided, however, that in case of emergency the contractor or contractors may, by and with the written consent of the board of local improvements, allow laborers and employees to work extra time."

That part of this clause in the specifications which makes the contractor liable for a forfeiture of his contract if he allows laborers or employees to work more than eight hours in one day is unquestionably void and unconstitutional. It infringes upon the freedom of contract, to which every citizen is entitled under the law. It is true that a legislative act which prescribes the length of time amounting to a day's work, when no special agreement upon the subject is made between the parties, is a valid act. But any statute providing that the employer and laborer may not agree with each other as to what time shall constitute a day's work is an invalid act.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-MECHANICS LIEN LAW-Barrett et ur. v. Millikan, Supreme Court of Indiana, 60 Northeastern Reporter, page 310.-This action was brought by one Millikan against Charles E. Barrett and wife to enforce a lien for materials furnished for and used in the repair of a dwelling house erected on a lot owned by Barrett in the city of Indianapolis, Ind. In the superior court of Marion County, Ind., a judgment in favor of Millikan was rendered, and Barrett appealed to the supreme court of the State, calling in question the constitutionality of the act generally known as the Mechanics" Lien Law." [Burns's Revised Statutes, 1894, §§ 7255-7259.] The supreme court rendered its decision April 23, 1901, sustaining the judgment of the superior court and declaring the act in question to be a constitutional and valid law.

The following is a quotation from the opinion of the supreme court, which was delivered by Chief Justice Dowling:

The six objections [made by the appellant, Barrett, to the validity of the Mechanics' Lien Law" may fairly be reduced to three, viz: (1) The act authorizes the appropriation of the property of the landowner without due process of law; (2) it impairs the obligation of contracts; (3) it grants to one class of citizens privileges not granted upon the same terms to others.

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The

The judgment in Jones v. Hotel Co. (C. C. S. D., Ohio), 79 Fed., 477, referred to in appellant's brief, was overruled by the circuit court of appeals (86 Fed., 370, 30 C. C. A., 108), Lurton and Taft, circuit. judges, and Clark, district judge, sitting. The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Lurton, who fully reviewed the Ohio statutes on the subject of mechanics' liens, and said: "The validity of such statutes, however, need not be rested upon mere authority. They find sanction in the dictates of natural justice, and most often administer an equity which has recognition under every system of law. That principle is that everyone who by his labor or materials has contributed to the preservation or enhancement of the property of another thereby acquires a right to compensation. legal effect of the contract is to give a lien to all who at the instance of his contractor shall be employed to furnish labor or materials for the work which he has let out. So far as such a statute is limited to future contracts, it can not be said to impair the obligations of a contract. If the law be subject to no other objections, it impairs no contract, for all thereafter made are entered into upon the basis of the law. Neither can the owner be said to be thereby deprived of property without due process of law. He has voluntarily made a contract, with the law before him. He has thereby subjected his property to liability for certain debts of the contractor. His own voluntary consent is an element in the transaction. He knows what the law is, and makes a contract under the law. It is idle to say that under such circumstances he is deprived of his property without due process of law."

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The question of the constitutionality of this act was thoroughly examined and emphatically decided by this court in Smith . Newbaur, 144 Ind., 95; 42 N. E., 40, 1094; 33 L. R. A., 685. It was held in that case that the act was not objectionable on the ground that under it the owner might be deprived of his property without due process of law; that the owner contracts in contemplation of the statute, and that the statute does not restrict the ability of the owner to contract. These views we think are sound, and upon similiar grounds statutes of the same kind have been sustained in most of the States of the Union.

The last objection to the statute taken by the appellants-that the act favors a particular class of citizens to the exclusion of other citizens is not sustained either by reason or authority. The classification is just, natural, and reasonable. It is open to all, and it applies equally to all the citizens of the State who bring themselves within the remedial scope of this act.