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STREET RAILWAYS-NOT NEGLIGENCE TO ATTEMPT TO OPERATE CARS DURING STRIKE OF EMPLOYEES-Fewings v. Mendenhall, Supreme Court of Minnesota, 86 Northwestern Reporter, page 96.Action was brought by Fred J. Fewings against one Mendenhall, the receiver of the Duluth Street Railway Co., to recover damages for injuries sustained by him while a passenger on one of the cars of said road during the progress of a strike of its employees. In the district court of Saint Louis County, Minn., the plaintiff recovered a judgment and the defendant appealed the case to the supreme court of the State, which rendered its decision May 17, 1901, and reversed the judgment of the court below.

The opinion of the supreme court was delivered by Chief Justice Stark, and from the syallabus of the same, which was prepared by the court, the following, showing the principal point of the decision, is quoted:

A street railway company is not, as to its passengers, guilty of negligence in attempting to operate its cars during a strike of its employees, unless the conditions are such that it ought to know, or ought to reasonably anticipate, that it can not do so and at the same time guard from violence, by the exercise of the utmost care on its part, those who accept its implied invitation to become passengers.

STRIKES POWERS OF COURT OF EQUITY TO ISSUE INJUNCTION Underhill v. Murphy et al., Circuit Court of Kenton County, Kentucky.-A petition was filed in the above-named court by John T. Underhill against Walter Murphy and others, asking for the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from the commission of certain acts. The decision in the case was recently rendered by Judge James Pryor Tarvin, who held the court, and the injunction was refused. The text of this decision is obtained from a number of the Typographical Journal of date of August 15, 1901, being published therein on pages 174 and 175, and a letter from the clerk of the court of recent date states that the publication is "an accurate statement of the text of the decision but not an exact copy." Owing to its great interest this decision as published, and which contains a statement of the facts in the case, is reproduced below:

John T. Underhill . Walter Murphy, etc.: This cause is submitted on a motion for a temporary injuretion.

The plaintiff, John T. Underhill, is a master plumber, engaged in his business in the city of Covington for many years, and has built up a large and lucrative trade, and established a valuable good will in Covington and vicinity. The defendants, Murphy and others, were the employees of Underhill, and joined in a strike, and have since occupied the position of strikers in relation to Underhill and other master plumbers. These defendants belong to a union of plumbers, an organization created and existing for the protection and benefit of labor, and

that union has conducted the strike.

At the time his employees quit him Underhill was under a number of contracts in his line of business, and in order to perform his work thereunder he employed a number of plumbers not belonging to the union, and not participating in the strike, to take the place of the union and striking plumbers.

The defendants thereupon undertook to prevent the nonunion men from performing the work, and to that end followed them and the plaintiff from place to place about the city, and assembled about the shop of plaintiff, denouncing and threatening the plaintiff and his workmen, and interfering with them in every way practicable, and several of the defendants assaulted one of the nonunion workmen. This line of action has been followed by the defendants since the beginning of the strike.

The action of defendants amounted to an attempt by them to violently and forcibly compel the nonunion employees of Underhill to quit his employment, and said defendants are now threatening to so compel said employees to quit, by force and violence, and to assault and beat plaintiff and said nonunion employees.

The plaintiff, by his petition as amended, asks this court of equity to enjoin the defendants from the further commission of said acts, and from the execution of said threats; and the question on this submission is as to the right and power of a court of equity to apply the process of injunction in such case.

The plaintiff contends that the business and good will established by Underhill constitute a property right, and that the law and courts ought to protect that right. The plaintiff is right in this contention. The business and good will do constitute a property right, and the law and the courts of this State will vigorously and adequately protect that right. The question is, how will the law and courts afford this protection, and by what method will the facts be ascertained and the remedy afforded?

The plaintiff insists that that protection and remedy must be afforded by process of injunction, which means that a judge-one individualsitting in equity, must hear the evidence, determine the facts, convict the defendants, and then, by fine and imprisonment, enforce his judgment; that no jury shall intervene, and that no barrier and no safeguard shall stand between the will of the judge and the liberty of the defendants.

This would seem a strong and harsh doctrine, and to support it, and as a guide and a light to this court, plaintiff's counsel quotes and relies upon the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated case of In re Eugene Debs, reported in 158 U. S. Supreme Court Reports, page 564.

Counsel for plaintiff also quotes and relies upon the case of Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 51 Federal Reporter, 260, in the opinion in which case it is held that "equity would not interfere to prevent the commission of a crime. But when an attempt to injure constitutes acts or words which will operate to intimidate and prevent the customers of a party from dealing with him or laborers from working for him, the courts have, with nearly equal unanimity, interposed by injunction." The court in this case went so far as to enjoin the proprietor of a newspaper from encouraging the defendants in their lawless acts.

In the Debs case the Supreme Court says that, "As a general proposition, it is true that a court of equity can not enjoin the commission of a crime, and that a chancellor has no criminal jurisdiction.' But the court goes on to say that where there is an interference, actual or threatened, with property rights or rights of a pecuniary nature, a court of equity can interpose by injunction.

It occurs to me that a very large proportion of criminal acts affects property or rights of a pecuniary nature. Under the doctrine announced in the Debs case a court of equity might properly enjoin the commission of burglary, or embezzlement, or highway robbery. It appears from an examination of the authorities that the contention that a court of equity can interfere by injunction in criminal cases was never made until the arising of contests between labor and capital in the form of strikes.

The assumption of such jurisdiction by courts of equity would probably seem strange to the makers of the National Constitution and to those who framed our Government.

The courts of this land constitute a place of last resort, and, as is the case in all things, some degree of confidence and trust must at least be necessarily placed in the individual, and in the case of courts that confidence and trust must be placed in the judges. The powers of courts, it seems to me, are clear and their limitations well defined, and within these limits their powers ought to be exercised and their orders enforced on all occasions and at any cost; but it is equally true that the utmost care should be taken to avoid, in any instance, passing beyond these limitations.

To carry out the doctrine contended for by counsel for plaintiff in this case would mean the substitution of judges for juries. It simply means to vest in one man the right to try, convict, and punish without the intervention of a jury.

It is hard to see the reason for applying such a doctrine as this in cases of contest between organized capital and organized labor and not in other cases of a criminal nature. Organized capital has its clear, certain rights, which the courts of this land are bound to respect, enforce, and protect, and which they do enforce, respect, and protect, and organized labor has likewise rights and is entitled to the same respect and protection. But when it comes to enforcing or protecting the rights of one or the other, I can see no reason for departing from the established practice in criminal cases, and see no reason for depriving the persons accused of a violation of these rights of the constitutional methods of trial. There is nothing more dangerous than an arbitrary judiciary. There is nothing more injurious than to place in the hands of judges the right to exercise the power of a jury. There is nothing that should be so jealously enforced as the restrictions and limitations upon the powers of the courts of this country, national and state.

It does not require one learned in the law to see, and to some extent estimate, the results that would necessarily flow from giving to a judge the right to pass upon the facts in a criminal prosecution. It would vest in him an absolute arbitrary power, never contemplated by the Constitution, and utterly out of place in a government framed as this. Courts were originally established to afford a remedy for wrongs committed, and to enforce rights. They were not originally

constituted for the purpose of enabling a judge thereof to direct men what they should or should not do. The process of injunction, which amounts to that, finally became a part of the law in its equity branch, by necessity, but it never was intended that it should be used except in extreme cases. It was never intended that it should be used where any other remedy existed. It was never intended to be used except to prevent irreparable injury, and it was always intended that it should be used with extreme caution and only in extreme cases.

In case at bar the property rights of Underhill have been violated. A wrong has been committed and is being committed upon him. He is entitled to a remedy for the wrong done, and is entitled to have the commission of the wrong stopped. The law of this State affords him a remedy, full and complete. The remedy lies in the criminal branch of the judiciary. It is not a case for the interposition of equity. It is not within my power, and I hope never will be within the power of any judge in Kentucky, to hear the evidence, convict and punish a man for wrongs such as these. Before any penalty should be inflicted upon him, twelve men ought to hear the evidence and bring in a verdict of guilty.

The court of appeals of this State has never accepted the doctrine contended for by plaintiff's counsel in this cause. It has never substituted a judge in the place of a jury. It has not converted a chancellor into an inquisitor. It has not undertaken to indefinitely and obscurely extend the powers and widen the authority of the judges of this Com monwealth. There is nothing in the law of Kentucky which renders it obligatory upon me to here use the process of injunction. I will not undertake to usurp the powers and prerogatives of a jury and to exercise arbitrary power by means of the process of injunction until the law in this State on the subject becomes so plain as to make it my duty so to do.

There is filed with the petition a poster, addressed to the citizens of Covington, and making this statement: "The following-named master plumbers are unfair to organized labor: J. T. Underhill"-and others not necessary to here mention. This poster was issued by these defendants, and it is here made a subject of complaint. The allegations of the poster amount to a conclusion or an opinion on the part of those issuing it. They had a right to issue it, and if untrue and a damage to the plaintiff, then those issuing it must bear the consequence.

In the light of these views, and after a careful examination of all the authorities accessible relied on by plaintiff, I am of the opinion that the petition as amended does not present a state of case justifying the process of injunction, and the motion for temporary injunction is therefore overruled.

LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR ENACTED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1896.

[The Second Special Report of the Department contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor in force January 1, 1896. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin from time to time as published.]

ALABAMA.

ACTS OF 1900-1901.

ACT No. 236.-Public printing to be done within the State, etc.

SECTION 1. Section 3395 of the Code of 1896 [shall] be amended so as to read as follows: The printing and binding embraced in class 4 must be done at the seat of government, and all other printing and binding enumerated in classes 1, 2, and 3 must be done within the State of Alabama: Provided, however, That if the owners of printing establishments in this State should at any time combine or agree together for the purpose of preventing competition for bids under this act, then in such event this act shall not be binding, and the printing of the State may be let to the lowest bidder, whether such bidder is a resident of this State or not. Approved, December 13, 1900.

ACT No. 311.-Incorporation of the Southern Industrial Institute.

SECTION 1. S. H. Shinn, Lyman Ward, L. A. Trimble, Mistress Athalia Johnson Irwin, M. M. Teague, R. A. Credille, R. J. Ownes, Thomas Chapman, Daniel B. Clayton, H. E. Newberry, and George M. Slaughter and their associates, are hereby incorporated under the name of the Southern Industrial Institute, and by such name shall have perpetual succession, may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded as natural persons; may have, use and change a corporate seal, acquire, receive, own and hold real and personal property by gift, purchase, devise or bequest, to hold and use the same for the benefit of said Southern Industrial Institute; said corporation may sell, lease, or mortgage its real or personal property, stocks, bonds or choses in action, and may borrow or lend money: Provided, That in making conveyances of real estate the deeds shall be signed by the president and countersigned by the secretary of said corporation.

SEC. 3. The purpose of said corporation shall be the establishment, organization and maintenance of an institution of learning of high grade for the education of the youth in industrial and manual training in all the useful industries, in the mechanic's arts, also to give training in literature, science and arts, to be located at Camp Hill, in Tallapoosa County, Alabama.

SEC. 5. The said board of trustees, in connection with the faculty of said institute, shall have authority to grant certificates of proficiency to those students who have creditably completed the prescribed course of study.

Approved February 8, 1901.

ACT No. 483.-Laborers' contracts, etc.

SECTION 1.-Any person who has contracted in writing to labor for, or serve, another for any given time, or any person who has by written contract leased or rented land from another for any specified time, or any person who has contracted in writing with a party furnishing the lands, or the lands and the teams to cultivate it, either to furnish the labor, or the labor and teams to cultivate the land, with stipulations,

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