CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN FRANCE ON MARCH 29, 1896.

Of 207,195 persons, the cause of whose unemployment was reported, 38.90 per cent were out of work on account of sickness or invalidity, 30.96 per cent on account of dullness of season, and 30.14 per cent on account of inability to secure work for other reasons. Of 250,234 reporting age, 25.97 per cent were 24 years of age or under, 66.55 per cent were between the ages of 25 and 64 years, and 7.48 per cent were 65 years of age or over. Of those 65 years of age or over whose age and cause of unemployment were reported, over two-thirds were out of work on account of sickness or invalidity.

In enumerating establishments, all cases were included where two or more persons were working together, either as coworkers or as employers and employees. The following table shows the number of establishments in each group of industries, classified according to the number of employees in each:

NETHERLANDS.

Verslagen der Kamers van Arbeid over 1900. 252 pp. (Published by the Ministry of Waterstaat, Commerce, and Industry.)

This is the second annual compilation of the reports made by the local councils of labor established by royal decree in accordance with an act passed May 2, 1897. (a) According to regulations made in pursuance of this law, each council is required to make a report to the ministry of waterstaat, commerce, and industry on or before April 1 of each year, showing the membership, names of officers, and number of meetings held, and giving a review of labor conditions, a statement of the advice given and of the authorities advised, copies of agreements or regulations made, information regarding labor disputes brought to the attention of the councils, the proceedings of boards of conciliation whenever appointed, etc.

The present compilation of these reports includes tabular statements showing, for each council reporting, the date of organization, the location and membership of the council, the industries represented, the number of employers and employees on the voting list, the number who voted at the last election, the number of meetings held by the councils and by the governing boards, and other information. The tabular statements are followed by extracts in text form from individual reports of 45 councils, covering a wide range of topics. On January 1, 1901, 79 councils had been authorized by royal decree, of which 58 had been organized. Of these 47 reported to the ministry, 22 making returns for the first time.

a For an account of this law, showing the purposes, organization, etc., of these councils of labor, see Bulletin No. 30, pp. 1046-1051.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks, and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

CIVIL SERVICE-REMOVAL OF HONORABLY DISCHARGED SOLDIER— CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Stutzbach v. Coler, Court of Appeals of New York, 61 Northeastern Reporter, page 697.—In this case it appeared that the relator, Stutzbach, was an employee in the department of finance of New York City, and that, on a reduction of the appropriation for that department, Coler, city comptroller, was compelled to dismiss a number of employees. Fourteen men were selected for dismissal, among whom was Stutzbach, who was a veteran of the civil war, of which latter fact the comptroller was ignorant. Chapter 370, sec. 21, acts of 1899, provides that "no person holding a position [in the civil service] by appointment or employment who is an honorably discharged soldier shall be removed from such position or employment, except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated charges, and with the right to such employee or appointee to a review by a writ of certiorari."

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Under this law Stutzbach applied for a peremptory writ commanding his reinstatement. This was denied in special term, and the question was taken to the appellate division, which reversed the court below, giving Stutzbach his position. Defendant Coler then brought the case to the court of appeals of New York. Further facts appear in the remarks of Chief Justice Parker, who delivered the opinion of the court, from which the following is quoted:

Lack of information justified the act of the comptroller in attempting to discharge him [Stutzbach]; but, if his removal was illegal because he was a veteran, it became the duty of the comptroller, when the fact came to his knowledge, to reinstate the relator."

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*The purpose of this proceeding is to compel reinstatement, which we think the relator is entitled to, provided his removal was not in compliance with the law. Stated charges were not made against this relator for incompetency or misconduct, and a hearing

given to him thereon upon due notice; and hence his removal was, according to the letter of the statute, illegal. The comptroller's return to the writ indicates that he was selected for discharge because he was the least competent man in his bureau, but it is not a sufficient compliance with the statute to discharge a man for incompetency. Before the dismissal takes place, the charge of incompetency must be made, notice given, and the hearing had.

It is now urged that, in so far as the statute extends preference of veterans beyond that accorded to them by the constitution, it is void. The constitution only provides for a preference of veterans in appointments and promotions in the civil service within the State, and does not, in terms or otherwise, provide that they shall be continued in the public service in preference to other appointees; and the contention is that the legislature can not go further and give a preference beyond that declared in the constitution. * * * Now while the legislature can not enact laws repugnant to this provision of the constitution, it may legislate further in that direction from time to time, if in its judgment it shall seem wise to do so. And so it was within its power to place a limit upon the removal of persons employed in the public service, as it has done by section 21.

Reinstatement should be affirmed with costs.

RAILROAD COMPANIES-PAYMENT OF WAGES TO DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES PENALTY FOR NONPAYMENT WHEN DUE-Fordyce et al. v. Gorey, Supreme Court of Arkansas, 65 Southwestern Reporter, page 429.-Gorey brought suit in the circuit court of Polk County to recover wages due him by Fordyce & Withers, receivers of the Kansas City, Pittsburg and Gulf Railway Company, and to assess the penalty accruing under the statute. Section 6243, Sand. & H. Dig. (1894), provides that wages of discharged employees of railroad companies shall be due and payable on the day of their discharge, and if not then paid, as a penalty for nonpayment, the wages of such employees shall continue at the same rate until paid. Gorey was the conductor of a train in charge of the receivers, and as such had collected certain sums of money which should be paid over to the said receivers, but the amount of money so due was in dispute. Instruction No. 2 for the plaintiff was as follows: "If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a penalty in this case, then in that event he will be entitled to said penalty from the date of his discharge up to the date of the filing of the defendants' answer in this case." The jury awarded the penalty from date of discharge, and on exception to the above instruction the case came to the supreme court, which reversed the judgment and directed a new trial.

Judge Hughes, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

We think there is reversible error in the second instruction set out herein, because there had been no ascertainment of the plaintiff's shortage, and consequently the amount which the railroad company owed him had not been, and could not have been, ascertained at the time of his

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discharge by the receivers; and this seems to have been his fault. The receivers, therefore, were not liable to a penalty for failure to pay his wages until they knew what was due him, or could by the exercise of reasonable diligence have ascertained the same, for failure to pay his wages after which time only the penalty would attach, and not from the time of his discharge. This is a penal act, and should be strictly construed.

STRIKES INJUNCTION-ENTICING APPRENTICES-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-Southern Railway Company v. Machinists' Local Union No. 14 et al., United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Tennessee, 111 Federal Reporter, page 49.-In this case the abovenamed labor union went on strike in obedience to orders from a central organization. The union established and maintained pickets around the shops of the railway company, and its members climbed telephone poles and fences to watch such shops; gathered in numbers at the entrances, and sent abusive and threatening messages to workmen inside. They thrust themselves upon unwilling workmen to argue and persuade, and in some instances personal assaults were made upon such workmen by strikers or their friends.

A statute of Tennessee (Acts 1875, chap. 93) provides "that hereafter it shall not be lawful for any person in this State knowingly to hire, contract with, decoy, or entice away, directly or indirectly, anyone, male or female, who is at the time under contract or employ of another." Counsel for the labor union maintained that this statute applied to farm laborers only, and that it did not apply to the act of the union's committee appointed for the purpose of persuading the railroad company's apprentices to break their contracts and leave its service.

The company petitioned for an injunction against the continuance of the acts above named. In granting the injunction, Judge Hammond used in part the following language:

If the picketing, the climbing of the adjacent telephone poles, the climbing upon the fences, the watching of the shops, the assemblies in the streets and at the entrances and the constant and unceasing surveillance had been confined to obtaining information and to unobjectionable social intercourse, for the purpose of begging and entreating not to work, there could be no injunction. But the thrusting themselves upon unwilling "scabs" to "argue;" "persuading," picketing, climbing poles and fences, as an exhibition of force and threats, accompanied by such assaults as have been mentioned; violent, abusive, and threatening messages sent to "scabs" inside, and the like, as shown in this proof, come clearly within the decisions against such conduct.

The strikers can not have, under the law of equal rights, a liberty of contracting as they please, working when they please, and quitting when they please, which does not belong alike to the "scabs" and their employers. And it is this right the courts of equity enforce by injunction. The Supreme Court of the United States has established that as the law of this case.