Judge Hobson delivered the opinion of the court of appeals and, in the course of the same, he used the following language:

It will be observed that the plaintiff alleges that his employment was for an indefinite length of time. He had, therefore, the right to quit whenever he saw proper. The defendant had also the right to terminate the employment at pleasure. When it discharged him, therefore, it exercised only a legal right. But it is insisted that the gist of the action is not a breach of the contract, but the conspiracy, which resulted in the damage to appellant. This precise question was determined by this court in Brewster v. Miller, 101 Ky. 368, 41 S. W. 301. In that case the undertakers of Louisville entered into an agreement not to accept employment from a person who was indebted to one of them. Miller refused to serve Brewster because he was indebted to them [him] for previous service. The other defendants refused for the reason that he had not paid Miller. Brewster sued for damages, and it was held that he could not recover. The court said:

"We think Mr. Addison lays down the correct rule in his work on Torts, when he says, in section 850, vol. 2: A criminal proceeding by way of indictment lies for the mere act of conspiring, but a civil action is not maintainable unless the plaintiff has been aggrieved or has sustained actual legal damage by some overt act done in pursuance of the conspiracy.' One has the right to decline to enter into a business undertaking with any one.'

* * *

"It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice. With his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any legal concern." (Cooley, Torts, § 238.) This case followed Bourlier v. McCauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60, 11 L. R. A. 550, 34 Am. St. Rep. 171, where the court said: "Whether a legal wrong has been done or not depends upon the nature and quality of the act, and not upon the motive of the person doing it." Where falsehood or coercion is employed to secure a discharge or prevent an employment, a different rule applies. Judgment affirmed.

DISCHARGE-Baker

v.

CONSPIRACY-BLACKLISTING-PROCURING Sun Life Insurance Company, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 64 Southwestern Reporter, page 967.-Suit was brought in the circuit court of Fayette County to recover damages from the above-named company, charging conspiracy for the purpose of procuring the discharge of the plaintiff, Baker, from his employment by another company. From an adverse judgment the plaintiff appealed.

In affirming the action of the court below Judge Hobson said in part:

A party to a contract can not maintain an action against a person who has maliciously advised and procured the other party to break it, unless the person procuring the breaking of the contract did so by coercion or deception, and thus caused the party to break the contract against his will, or contrary to his purpose.

CONSPIRACY-BOYCOTT BY MEMBERS OF ASSOCIATION-COERCIONDAMAGES-Boutwell et al. v. Marr et al., Supreme Court of Vermont, 42 Atlantic Reporter, page 60%.-In this case James M. Boutwell and others, doing business in Barre as the Boutwell Polishing Company, sought to recover damages from Marr and others, members of the Granite Manufacturers' Association, for injury to the plaintiffs' business. Boutwell had purchased a granite-polishing mill which had been in operation for a number of years, and at the time of purchase was assured by the patrons that they would continue their custom. They did so for some months, the work of the mill averaging more than $1,000 per month until November, when it fell to $200, while not work was offered in December and January following. On the 10th of November the local association had indorsed a resolution of the Granite Manufacturers' Association of New England, with which it was connected, to the effect that "no trade shall be conducted with any individual, firm, or corporation engaging in cutting, quarrying, or polishing granite in the State of Vermont who are not members of this association." Violation of this rule involved a fine of $50. Witnesses testified that they as members of the local association had voted for the adoption of the resolution, understanding that the effect would be to prevent any person in the association from doing business with anyone who declined to join it, and that the plaintiffs had been asked to join, but had declined, and that their refusal was the occasion of the loss of their business. It was also in evidence that defendants had said that the Boutwell company "would find that they couldn't do any polishing business until they joined the association," and that "the effect of the resolution was to destroy their business in one day but if they would join the association, they could get it back in one day."

On suit in the Washington County court both actual and exemplary damages were awarded, and on exceptions by the defendants the case came before the supreme court of the State, where the judgment was affirmed as to the actual and reversed as to the exemplary damages. The following is taken from the remarks of Judge Munson, who delivered the opinion of the court:

There was clearly evidence tending to show that the defendants undertook to compel the plaintiffs to join the association by depriving their mill of work, and that they made use of their organization as a means of concerted action to accomplish their purpose. But there was no evidence tending to show that the defendants made any attempt to compel persons, not members of the association, to withhold their patronage, and they insist that they can not be made liable for simply withholding their own.

It is clear that everyone has a right to withdraw his own patronage when he pleases, but it is equally clear that he has no right to employ threats or intimidation to divert the patronage of another. If it be true as a general proposition that several may lawfully unite in doing to another's injury, even for the accomplishment of an unlawful pur

pose, whatever each has a right to do individually, it by no means follows that the combination may not be so brought about as to make its united action an unlawful means. It may be true that if the defendants, acting independently of any organization, and moved solely by similarity of interest and views, had united in withdrawing their patronage, the effect upon the plaintiffs' business would have been the same, and yet the defendants have incurred no liability. But, in the case supposed, the united action would result from the free exercise of individual choice. It will be seen upon further inquiry that this can not be said of the action of an organization like that of the defendants. The withdrawal of patronage by concerted action, if legal in itself, becomes illegal when the concert of action is procured by coercion. In this case it could easily be found that a fine of $50 for a violation of the rules was not intended to be applied to rules adopted to secure a performance of the ordinary duties of membership. If in fact designed to hold unwilling members to unity of action in any aggressive movement of unlawful character, the defendants can not complain if the law so treats it.

The fact that the members of the association voluntarily assumed its obligations in the first instance, so far as it is a fact, is not controlling. The law can not be compelled by any initial agreement of an associate member to treat him as one having no choice but that of the majority, nor as a willing participant in whatever action may be taken. The voluntary acceptance of by-laws providing for the imposition of coercive fines does not make them legal and collectible, and the standing threat of their imposition may properly be classed with the ordinary threat of suits upon groundless claims. It is clear that if the association had comprised but a small portion of the manufacturers, and had destroyed the plaintiffs' business by compelling the manufacturers to join them in withholding patronage, its members would have been liable. But it is claimed, in effect, that a business can be destroyed with impunity when the organization has become so extensive that there are no outside patrons to control, or so few that their course is a matter of no moment. Upon this theory, every successful instance of coercion would increase the safety with which another coercion could be attempted, and, when coercion had been pursued until but one contumacious person remained, immunity would be complete. It is clear that the law can not concede to organizations of this character the powers and immunities claimed for their association by these defendants, and retain its own power to protect the individual citizen in the free enjoyment of his capital or labor.

The case stands upon grounds which are inconsistent with the allowance of exemplary damages; for damages of this nature, if ever recoverable against several defendants, are recoverable only where all are shown to have been moved by a wanton desire to injure. Judgment. for actual damages, with interest from date of judgment below.

LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR ENACTED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1896.

[The Second Special Report of the Department contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor in force January 1, 1896. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin from time to time as published.]

CONNECTICUT.

ACTS OF 1901.

CHAPTER 35.-Discharged soldiers, etc., employed in public buildings.

SECTION 1. No honorably discharged soldier, sailor, or marine, having served as such in the Union army or navy during the war of the rebellion, holding a position by appointment or employment as janitor, engineer, or fireman in any public building owned by the State of Connecticut, or by the several counties thereof, shall be removed from such position or employment except for incompetency or misconduct shown, or have his compensation reduced except for cause shown, and after a hearing held upon due notice given to him of such hearing. SEC. 5. This act shall take effect from its passage. Approved April 19, 1901.

CHAPTER 68.-Employment of laborers.

SECTION 1. No contractor, foreman, superintendent, or supervisor of labor shall, while giving or contracting to furnish employment to any person or persons, exact or receive any pay, fee, reward, or voluntary contribution from such person or persons for furnishing such employment.

SEC. 2. Every person who shall violate any provision of the preceding section shall be fined not more than fifty dollars, or imprisoned not more than sixty days, or both.

SEC. 3. Every person and every agent of any firm or corporation who shall keep, maintain, or have the charge of any lodging house, shanty, tent, or other structure used or intended to be used as a boarding house, lodging place, or place of abode for the laborers employed by such person or agent, shall, within seventy-two hours after any such place shall have been occupied for such purpose or purposes, notify the local health officer of the town, city, or borough in which such place is situated, and request him to inspect the same. Such health officer shall, within a reasonable time thereafter, not exceeding five days, inspect such premises, and shall have power to order and direct such alterations or changes in the arrangements and details and provisions for the sanitation of such premises, or to forbid the use of the same altogether, as he shall under the circumstances judge will properly protect the health of the inmates.

SEC. 4. Every person or the agent of any firm or corporation who shall fail to comply with the provisions of this act, or shall refuse to comply with the orders of the health officer in relation thereto, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars. SEC. 5. Every person or agent of any corporation employing laborers, who also is engaged in selling such laborers any goods or merchandise, who shall charge or exact for the articles so sold a greater sum or amount than a reasonable price for such articles in the town or city where said sales are made, shall be fined not more than twenty-five dollars for each sale of each separate article so made as aforesaid. Approved May 17, 1901.

CHAPTER 83.-Inspection, etc., of bakeries.

SECTION 1. All buildings or rooms occupied as biscuit, bread, or cake bakeries shall be drained and plumbed in a manner conducive to the proper healthful and sanitary condition thereof, and constructed with air shafts and windows or ventilating pipes, sufficient to insure ventilation, as the inspector of factories shall direct; and no cellar or basement, not now used as a bakery, shall hereafter be used and occupied as a bakery, and a cellar heretofore occupied as a bakery shall, when once closed, not be reopened for use as a bakery.

SEC. 2. Every such bakery shall be provided with a proper wash room and water-closet or closets, apart from the bake room or rooms where the manufacturing of such food products is conducted; and no water-closet, earth-closet, privy, or ash pit shall be within or communicate directly with a bake shop.

SEC. 3. Every room used for the manufacture of flour or meal food shall be at least eight feet in height; the side walls of such rooms shall be plastered or wainscoted, the ceiling plastered or ceiled with lumber or metal, and, if required by the inspector of factories, shall be whitewashed at least once in three months; the furniture and utensils of such room shall be so arranged as to be easily moved in order that the furniture and floor may at all times be kept in proper healthful sanitary condition. SEC. 4. The manufactured flour or meal food products shall be kept in perfectly dry and airy rooms, so arranged that the floors, shelves, and all other facilities for storing the same can be easily and perfectly cleaned.

SEC. 5. The sleeping places for persons employed in a bakery shall be kept separate from the room or rooms where flour or meal food products are manufactured or stored.

SEC. 6. After an inspection of a bakery has been made by the inspector of factories and it is found to conform to the provisions of this act, said inspector may issue a certificate to the owner or operator of such bakery, that it is conducted in compliance with all the provisions of this act; but where orders are issued by said inspector to improve the condition of a bakery, no such certificate shall be issued until such order and the provisions of this act shall have been complied with.

SEC. 7. The owner, agent, or lessee of any property affected by the provisions of this act, shall, within thirty days after the service of notice upon him of an order issued by the inspector of factories requiring any alterations to be made in or upon such premises, comply therewith, or cease to use or allow the use of such premises as a bake shop; such notice shall be in writing and may be served upon such owner, agent, or lessee, either personally or by mail, and a notice by registered letter, postage prepaid, mailed to the last known address of such owner, agent, or lessee shall be deemed sufficient for the purposes of this act.

SEC. 8. Any person who violates the provisions of this act or refuses to comply with any requirement of the inspector of factories, as provided herein, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be fined not less than twenty nor more than fifty dollars for the first offense; shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten days for the second offense; and shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars and imprisoned not more than thirty days for the third offense.

SEC. 9. No employer shall require, permit, or suffer any person to work in his bake shop who is affected with pulmonary tuberculosis, or with scrofulous diseases, or with any venereal diseases, or with any communicable skin affection, and every employer is hereby required to maintain himself and his employees in a clean and sanitary condition while engaged in the manufacture, handling, or sale of such food products. SEC. 10. Chapter CLXXIV of the public acts of 1897 and chapter 140 of the public acts of 1899 are hereby repealed.

Approved May 29, 1901.

CHAPTER 97.-Factory inspection—Colored glass windows.

SECTION 1. Any firm or corporation using stained, painted, or corrugated glass in factory windows, where the same is injurious to the eyes of the workmen therein, shall remove the same upon the order of the inspector of factories. Approved May 29, 1901.

CHAPTER 100.-Employment bureaus.

SECTION 1. The commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics shall organize and establish in each of the cities of New Haven, Hartford, Bridgeport, Norwich, and Waterbury a free public employment bureau, for the purpose of receiving applications of persons seeking employment and applications of persons seeking to employ