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200

BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN.

The British now employed themselves in endavouring to clear the Delaware of the chevaux-de-frise of timber and iron spikes which had been run across it, below the city, and were guarded by fortifications on the banks and islands of the river, and by floating batteries.

While they were thus employed, Washington, with his army reinforced to 8,000 continental troops and 3,000 militia, lay encamped at Shippack creek, on the Schuylkill, about 20 miles from Philadelphia. Taking advantage of the diversion occasioned by Howe's operations on the river, he determined to attempt a surprise of the British camp at Germantown. With about 2,500 men, he left Shippack creek on the evening of the 3rd October, and at dawn, next morning, attacked the royal army. After a smart conflict, he drove in the advanced guard, and marched on towards the main body. But five companies of the British having thrown themselves into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew, nearly half the American army was occupied for some time in attempting to dislodge them. This circumstance disconcerted the original plan of Washington; and a thick fog which prevailed during the engagement, gave a character of confusion to all the operations of the day, which renders it difficult to understand or describe them. The Americans, however, were foiled in their attempt to surprise the British camp, although the fog covered their retreat, and they were able to retire in tolerable order. The Americans lost 900 men in this engagement, of whom 200 were killed and 400 were taken prisoners. The British acknowledged a loss of 600, killed and wounded.

They now proceeded to attempt the opening of the Delaware to their fleet, which was waiting to proceed to Philadelphia. The upper line of chevaux-de-frise was protected by a work named Fort Mifflin, erected on Mud Island, and by a redoubt called Redbank, on the Jersey side.

Having withdrawn his army from Germantown and encamped in the vicinity of Philadelphia, Howe despatched Count Donop, a German officer, with three battalions of Hessian grenadiers, the regiment of Mirbach, and some light infantry, to reduce Redbank. They reached the fort on the 21st of October, and Count Donop summoned the garrison to surrender, but Colonel Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, who commanded the Americans, answered that he would defend his fort to the last extremity. An

BATTLE OF REDBANK.

201

assault was immediately commenced, and after a desperate conflict, in which Count Donop was mortally wounded, the enemy was compelled to retire, with a severe loss. Count Donop was made prisoner, and soon died of his wounds. The ships which were to co-operate in the attack were some of them grounded; and one was burnt by the Americans.

The British afterwards sent a very heavy sea and land force against the little garrison of 300 men, at Fort Mifflin, which protected the second line of chevaux-de-frise, and after a terrible cannonade, which was smartly returned, they succeeded in beating down the walls of the fort, and dismounting its guns. The garrison then retired, by means of their shipping. Two days afterwards, the post at Redbank, being no longer tenable, was evacuated also. A free passage for the British fleet to Philadelphia was thus secured, although at the cost of great exertion and many lives, on the part of the enemy.

No other important military transactions took place in this quarter, until Washington retired to winter quarters, at Valley Forge, about 26 miles from Philadelphia. The two armies at that time numbered about 14,000 each. Washington, during the early part of the campaign, owing to his want of force, had been obliged to occupy strong positions and be wary in all his movements. He had suffered defeat at Brandywine, and repulse at Germantown, but he had conducted his operations so well, that Howe had gained nothing by the campaign but good winter quarters in Philadelphia.

While the events just related were passing in the middle states, most important transactions were going on in the north, to which we shall now turn our attention.

The British ministry had resolved to prosecute the war vigorously on the northern frontier of the United States, and appointed General Burgoyne, who had served under General Carlton in the preceding campaign, to the command of the royal army in that quarter. General Burgoyne had visited England during the winter, concerted with the ministry a plan of the campaign, and given an estimate of the force necessary for its execution. Besides a fine train of artillery, and a suitable body of artillerymen, an army, consisting of more than 7,000 veteran troops, excellently equipped, and in a high state of discipline, was put under his command. In addition to this regular force, he had a great number of Canadians and savages.

202

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

This force was destined to invade the United States by the way of Lake Champlain and the Hudson, unite with the British army then at New York, and thus cut off all communication between the northern states and those lying south of the Hudson. New England was then to be overrun and reduced to obedience, as a preparation for the complete. subjugation of the southern country.

The first attempts of Burgoyne were as successful as the condition of his army entitled the ministry to expect. The Indians, gained by presents, or stimulated by the hopes of plunder, joined him in considerable numbers. Burgoyne, to quiet his conscience, rendered somewhat uneasy by the employment of such auxiliaries, exhorted them to kill none but such as appeared in arms against them, and to spare the women and children whom the fortune of war might put into their hands. The Indians promised compliance with this injunction, but paid not the slightest regard to it afterwards.

On the 2nd of July the English army encamped on both sides of the narrow channel which connects Lake Champlain and George, with a naval force on the water, near Ticonderoga. To this strong fortress the Americans had retired at the end of the preceding year; and now it was garrisoned with about 6,000 men, under General St. Clair.

The approaches of the British were rapid and decisive. Soon after their appearance before the American works, they took possession of Sugar-hill; an eminence which overlooked the fortifications, and enabled them to place their batteries to great advantage, but which the Americans had supposed it was impossible to ascend. On the 5th, every step had been taken to render the investment complete.

St. Clair, however, conscious of his inability to defend the place, and anxious at the same time to avoid the necessity of surrendering his troops prisoners of war, abandoned the works, when he was nearly surrounded, and retreated over Mount Independence to Castleton, and thence to Skeensborough, in the vicinity of Lake George. Previous to his departure, he had ordered the baggage and military stores to be sent by water to the same place; but the vessels which were employed for that purpose, were attacked by the English ships, and either destroyed or rendered unfit for. service; and in consequence of this disaster, the Americans set fire to their boats and fortifications at Skeensborough, and retreated towards Fort Ann. On land, the royalists

ADVANCE OF BURGOYNE.

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were not less successful. Colonel Francis, and a body of provincial troops, were defeated with great slaughter by General Reidesel; and by the skilful manoeuvring of Burgoyne, St. Clair was prevented from reaching Fort Ann. An engagement then took place in the woods, in which the Americans were defeated, and compelled to retire to Fort Edward, on the Hudson, where St. Clair joined General Schuyler on the 12th of July.

The loss of Ticonderoga was one for which the United States were not prepared. Neither the strength of the invading army, nor the weakness of the garrison, appears to have been understood. It was universally believed that the whole force of Canada did not exceed 6,000 men; and therefore no adequate measures were taken to enable St. Clair to maintain his position. Washington complained of this indistinct information and its fatal consequences in a letter addressed to General Schuyler, the commander of the northern army, and at the same time expressed a hope that the confidence, which Burgoyne derived from success, would hurry him into measures, which in their consequences might be favourable to the Americans. In this expectation he was not disappointed.

The army of General Schuyler did not exceed 4,400 men. With that force he could not face the British army; and in order to gain time, he sent detachments of his men, who broke down the bridges; cut down trees so as to fall across the roads, and intermingled their branches, and threw every possible obstacle in the way of Burgoyne's advance. He also solicited reinforcements of regular troops; called on the militia of New England to join the regular army, and used all his personal influence in the surrounding country, to inspire the people with military ardour and patriotic enthusiasm. The militia of New England were not willing to serve under General Schuyler; and General Lincoln was appointed to raise and command them. Arnold was directed to join the northern army; Colonel Morgan and his riflemen were also attached to it; and tents, artillery, and other munitions of war, were diligently provided.

Meantime Burgoyne, who had been obliged to halt at Skeensborough, to rest his troops and bring forward his artillery, baggage, and military stores, was commencing his march towards the Hudson, greatly elated with his past His progress was so effectually retarded by the

success.

204

BATTLE OF BENNINGTON.

obstructions which General Schuyler's men had thrown in his way, that he was frequently occupied a whole day in advancing with the army a single mile. It was not till the 30th of July that he reached Fort Edward, which General Schuyler had quitted a short time before, retreating to Saratoga. Burgoyne might have much more easily reached Fort Edward by the way of Lake George; but he had been led up the South river in pursuit of the retreating Americans; and he persevered in that difficult route, lest he should discourage his troops by a retrograde movement.

At Fort Edward, Burgoyne found it necessary to pause in his career. He was greatly in want of provisions and draught horses; and his carriages had been broken and needed repairs. It was not till the 15th of August that he succeeded in transporting a quantity of supplies from Fort George.

In order to obtain a further supply, he had detached Colonel Baum, a German officer with 500 men, partly cavalry, two pieces of artillery and 100 Indians, to surprise Bennington, in Vermont, and seize a large deposit of carriages, corn, flour, and other necessaries, which had been collected by the Americans in that place.

General Starke, with the New Hampshire militia, 400 strong, happened to be in that vicinity, on his way to join General Schuyler. He heard first of the approach of the Indians, and soon afterwards of the regular force. He collected his brigade, sent expresses to the neighbouring militia to join him, and also to Colonel Warner's regiment at Manchester. On the morning of the 14th of August, he marched against the enemy, at the head of 700 men; and sent Colonel Gregg, with a party of 200, to skirmish in their front, and retard their progress. He drew up his men in order of battle; but, on coming in sight of him, Baum halted on advantageous ground; sent an express to Burgoyne informing him of his situation; and fortified himself as well as circumstances would permit.

After some skirmishing, on the morning of the 16th, Starke commenced a furious attack on the royal forces. Baum made a brave defence. The battle lasted two hours, during which he was assailed on every side by an incessant discharge of musketry. He was mortally wounded; his troops were overpowered; a few of them escaped into the woods and fled, pursued by the Americans; the rest were killed or

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