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bewildered the German headquarters and conjured up a phantom "Army of the West," just as the promenade in Beauce had fashioned "the Army of the Loire" out of the small force under Reyau. Once more, indeed, as so often in the war, the Germans tried to solve the French problem by German data, and in their devotion to the net idea of "full steam ahead," could not conceive of military activity being spasmodic or unaimed. But this time the Versailles strategists were wrong only in their guess as to the direction of the blow. A blow was certainly impending. By now the deliverance of Paris had become the defined objective of the "new formations" and of the provincial Delegation. Many plans were discussed, both at Paris and at Tours, for a combined effort, but each strategist had to convince the rest of the soundness of his own views, and the interchange of information and plans between Trochu and Gambetta was necessarily precarious. In the end, however, a few clear principles were accepted-Paris must be relieved, not merely revictualled, and the troops must be set in motion with that object at the earliest possible moment. For 200,000 French regulars were closely invested in Metz by Prince Frederick Charles with the I. and II. Armies, if they passed into captivity, the veterans of Vionville and St Privat could be brought over to the Loire, and already there were strange rumours of intrigues between Bazaine, Bismarck and the empress Eugénie. But de Freycinet and d'Aurelle had different views as to the method of recapturing Orleans, which was agreed upon as the first thing to be done, and a compromise had to be made, by which 25,000 men were to advance by Gien and Châteauneuf and the main mass (75,000) from Blois by Beaugency, the hazards of this double movement being minimized by the weakness of the forces under von der Tann (the highest estimate of these that reached Tours was 60,000 and their real number only 26,000). The preliminary movements were to be completed by the 29th of October, when one strong division of the 15th corps was to be set at Gien and the remainder of the 15th and 16th corps between Blois and Vendôme. This was duly carried out, and the Germans were confirmed in their suspicions of a concentration to the west of Paris by the despatch of dummy troop-trains to Le Mans. But bad weather, the news of the disastrous capitulation of Bazaine and the opening of a series of futile peace negotiations delayed the dénouement, the Gien column

was hastily recalled, and the French armies stood fast all along the line in their original grouping, 75,000 men (15th and 16th corps) at Blois-Vendôme, 10,000 men in Sologne and 25,000 at Gien. The Germans round Orleans were some 25,000 strong. Between Montlhéry and Chartres were 21,000 more; but these were paralysed by the fictitious "Western Army" of the French, and von Wittich even thought of obtaining assistance from von der Tann. The activity of the irregulars, and the defiant attitude of the civil population everywhere, presaged a blow to be delivered by the once despised "new formations," but the direction of this blow was misconceived by the German headquarters, by the staff of the III. Army and by von der Tann alike, till the eve of its delivery. The halt of the French army allowed this uneasiness to grow, and, in default of a target, Moltke was unable to assign a definite task to the II. Army, now on its way from Metz. One of its corps, therefore, was sent to the lines before Paris to release the 17th and 22nd infantry divisions from siege duties, and these, with the I. Bavarian corps and the 2nd, 4th and 6th cavalry divisions, were constituted into a special detachment of the III. Army, under Friedrich Franz, grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The duke was ordered to cover the siege of Paris and to break up the "new formations," but he was directed, not towards Orleans or even Tours, but towards Le Mans, concentrating with that object between Châteaudun and Chartres.

D'Aurelle, if cautious and slow, at least employed spare time well. The 16th corps was disciplined to the standard attained by the 15th and Chanzy was placed at the head of it, General Fiéreck, commanding at Le Mans, was ordered to attract the enemy's notice to the west by demonstrations, the defence of localities by irregulars was thoroughly organized, and in the first days of November, on de Freycinet's demand, the general advance was resumed. There was a difference of opinion between d'Aurelle and Chanzy as to the objective, the latter wishing to make the main effort by the left, so as to cut off the Bavarians from Paris, the former, to make it by the right with a view to recapturing Orleans, and, as on the German side at Gravelotte, a compromise was made whereby the army was deployed in equal force all along the line.

The début was singularly encouraging. Part of the German 2nd cavalry division, with its infantry supports, was severely handled

by the French advanced guard near the hamlet of St Laurent des Bois (November 8). The half-heartedness of the Germans, evidenced by the number of prisoners taken unwounded, greatly encouraged the new formations," who cheerfully submitted to a cold bivouac in anticipation of victory Next morning the advance was resumed, d'Aurelle with the 15th corps on the right wing, Chanzy with the 16th on the left and Reyau's cavalry to the front. The march was made straight across country, in battle order, each brigade in line of battalion columns covered by a dense skirmish line. The French generals were determined that no accident should occur to shake the moral of the young troops they commanded.

At Orleans, meanwhile, von der Tann, in ever-growing suspense, had, rightly or wrongly, decided to stand his ground. He had been instructed by the headquarters staff not to fall back except under heavy pressure. He had his own reputation, dimmed by the failure of 1866, to retrieve, and national honour and loyalty seemed to him to require, in the words of his own staff officer, that "ere actual conflict had taken place with the 'greatly superior' enemy, no hostile force should enter the city placed under the protection of the Bavarians." But he could not allow himself to be enveloped in Orleans itself, and therefore, calling upon the far-distant III. Army reserves for support, he took up his position with 23,500 men around Coulmiers, leaving 2500 men to hold Orleans. The line of defence was from St Peravy on the Châteaudun road through Coulmiers to La Renardière, and thence along the Mauve stream, and here he was attacked in force on the 9th of November. The French approached from the south-west, and when their right had taken contact, the remainder gradually swung round and attacked the Bavarian centre and right. The result was foregone, given the disparity of force, but the erratic movements of Reyau's Battle of cavalry on the extreme left of d'Aurelle's line exposed Coulmiers Chanzy to a partial repulse and saved the Bavarian right. When at last the French stormed Coulmiers, and von der Tann had begun to retire, it was already nightfall, and the exhausted remnant of the I. Bavarian corps was able to draw off unpursued. The Orleans garrison followed suit, and the French army, gathering in its two outlying columns from Sologne and Gien, reoccupied the city. So ended the first blow of the Republic's armies. Coulmiers would indeed have been a crushing victory had Reyau's cavalry performed its part in the scheme and above all had d'Aurelle, adopting unreservedly either his own plan or Chanzy's, massed his troops here, economized them there, in accordance with the plan, instead of arraying them in equal strength at all points. But d'Aurelle wished above all to avoid what is now called a " regrettable incident" -hence his advance across country en bataille-and to thin out his line at any point might have been disastrous. And incomplete as it was, the victory had a moral significance which can scarcely be overrated. The "new formations had won the first battle, and it was confidently hoped by all patriots that the spell of defeat was broken. But d'Aurelle and the government viewed their success from the standpoint of their own side, and while von der Tann, glad to escape from the trap, fell back quickly to Angerville, d'Aurelle's only fear was an offensive return. Not even when von der Tann's defensive intentions were established did d'Aurelle resume the advance. The columns from Gien and the Sologne peacefully reoccupied Orleans, while the victors of Coulmiers went into cold and muddy bivouacs north of the city, for d'Aurelle feared that their dispersion in comfortable quarters would weaken the newly forged links of discipline. The French general knew that he had only put his hand to the plough, and he thought that before ploughing in earnest he must examine and overhaul his implement. In this opinion he was supported not only by soldiers who, like Chanzy, distrusted the staying power of the men, but even by the government, which knew that the limit of the capital's resistance was still distant, and felt the present vital necessity of protecting Bourges, Châteauroux and Tours from Prince Frederick Charles, who with the II. Army was now approaching from the east. The plan of General Borel, the chief of staff, for a lateral displacement of the whole army towards Chartres and Dreux, which would have left the prince without an animate target and concentrated the largest possible force on the weakest point of Moltke's position, but would have exposed the arsenals of the south, was rejected, and d'Aurelle organized a large fortified camp of instruction to the north of the captured city, to which came, beside the 15th and 16th corps, the new 17th and 18th. To return to the Germans. An army at the halt, screened by active irregulars, is invisible, and the German commanders were again at a loss. It has been mentioned that a day or two before the battle of Coulmiers Moltke had created an Army Detachment under the grand duke of Mecklenburg after for operations south of Paris. His objects in so doing Coulmiers. must now be briefly summarized. On November the 1st he had written to the II. Army to the effect that "the south of France would hardly make great efforts for Paris," and that the three disposable corps of the army were to range over the country as far as Chalon-sur-Saône, Nevers and Bourges. By the 7th his views had so far changed that he sanctioned the formation of the Detachment "with a view to breaking up the Army of the Loire by a march into the west towards Le Mans, the right wing of the II. Army at the same time hurrying on to Fontainebleau to cover the

German

plans

south side of the Paris investment. The king, however, less convinced than Moltke of the position of the Army of the Loire, suspended the westward deployment of the Detachment, with the result that on the 10th the retreating Bavarians were reinforced by two fresh divisions. But the same day all touch with the French was lostperhaps deliberately, in accordance with the maxim that defeated troops should avoid contact with the victor. The curtain descended, and next day a few vague movements of small bodies misled the grand duke into seeking his target towards Chartres and Dreux, directly away from d'Aurelle's real position. Once more the king intervened and brought him back to the Orleans-Paris road (Nov. 13-14), but Moltke hurried forward the IX. corps (II. Army) from Fontainebleau to Étampes so as to release the grand duke from covering duties while satisfying the king's wishes for direct protection towards Orleans.

Moltke's views of the problem had not fundamentally changed since the day when he ordered the II. Army to spread out over southern France. He now told the grand duke to beat the Army of the Loire or Army of the West near Dreux or Chartres, and, that done, to sweep through a broad belt of country on the line AlençonVerneuil towards Rouen, the outer wing of the II. Army meanwhile, after recapturing Orleans and destroying Bourges, to descend the Loire and Cher valleys towards Tours (14 Nov). On the 15th a fresh batch of information and surmises caused the leader of the Detachment, who had not yet received orders to do so, to leave the Paris-Orleans road to take care of itself and to swing out northwestward at once. The Detachment reached Chartres, Rambouillet and Auneau that night, and headquarters, having meanwhile been mystified by the news of a quite meaningless fight between German cavalry and some mobiles at Dreux, did not venture to reimpose the veto. The adventures of the Detachment need not be traced in detail. It moved first north towards the line Mantes-Dreux, and delivered a blow in the air. Then, hoping to find a target towards Nogent le Rotrou, it swung round so as to face south-west. Everywhere it met with the sharpest resist ments of ance from small parties, nowhere it found a large body the De of all arms to attack. Matters were made worse by staff tachment. blunders in the duke's headquarters, and on the 19th, after a day of indescribable confusion, he had to halt to sort out his divisions. Moltke gave him the rest day he asked for the more readily as he was beginning to suspect that the king was right, that there were considerable forces still at Orleans, and that the Detachment might be wanted there after all.

Move

Advance of the II. Army.

This alteration in his views had been brought about by the reports from the II. Army during its advance from Champagne to the Gâtinais. At the time of the first order indicating Chalon, Nevers and Bourges as its objectives this army had just opened out into line from its circular position round Metz, and it therefore naturally faced south. Moving forward, it reached the line Troyes-Neufchâteau about the time Coulmiers was fought, and was ordered to send in its right (IX. corps) to Fontainebleau. The II. corps had already been taken to strengthen the besiegers, thereby releasing the two Prussian divisions (17th and 22nd) that joined von der Tann on the 10th. The II. Army next changed front, in accordance with Moltke's directions, so as to face S.E. towards Orleans and Gien, and on the 16th the IX. corps and 1st cavalry division were at Méréville and on the Orleans-Paris road, the III. at Sens and the X. at Tonnerre. The III. and X. from this time onward marched, camped and slept in the midst of a population so hostile that von Voigts Rhetz kept his baggage in the midst of the fighting troops, and Prince Frederick Charles himself, with an escort, visited the villages lying off the main roads to gauge for himself the temper of the inhabitants.

From prisoners it was gleaned that the French 18th corps, supposed by the Germans to be forming in the Dijon-Lyons region, had arrived on the Loire, and a deserter said that there were 40,000 men encamped at Chevilly, just north of Orleans. Moltke's faith in his own reading of the situation was at last shaken; whether the Army of the Loire had joined the Army of the West or was still on the Loire, he did not yet know, but it was almost certain that from wherever they came, considerable French forces were around Orleans. He warned the prince to check the southward swing of the X. corps "because it cannot yet be foreseen whether the whole army will not have to be employed towards Châteaudun and Orleans," and turned to the Detachment for further information, cautioning the grand duke at the same time to keep touch with the II. Army. But, ignoring the hint, the grand duke, thinking that he had at last brought the elusive "Army of the West" to bay in the broken ground round Nogent-le-Rotrou, opened out, in accordance with German strategic principles, for a double envelopment of the enemy, He struck another blow in the air. The "Army of the West" had never really existed as an army, and its best-organized units had been sent back to join the new 21st corps at Le Mans ere the Detachment came into action at all, while the older mobiles continued the small war in front of the Germans, and sniped their sentries and trapped their patrols as before. Almost simultaneously with the news of this disappointment, the prince, who had meanwhile used his cavalry vigorously, sent word to Versailles on the 20th that the French 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th corps (in all over 150,000 men) were round Orleans. At this moment the III. corps was close to the

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The Detachment ordered towards

plans.

Forest of Orleans, the IX. corps away to the right rear at Angerville, and the X. equally distant to the south-east, as well as separated in three self-contained columns a day's march apart. It seemed as if another Vionville was at hand, but this time Alvensleben and Voigts-Rhetz did not attack an obscure objective coûte que coûte. They stood fast, by the prince's order, to close up for battle and to wait on events in front of the Detachment. The Germans had now discovered their target, and their strategical system, uncomplicated by past nightmares, should have worked smoothly to a decisive result. But there was nearly as much confusion between the various high officers as before. Prince Frederick Charles, in possession of the facts and almost in contact with the enemy, wrote to the grand duke to say that the II. Army was about to attack the enemy, and to suggest that the Detachment, which he knew to be heading for Le Mans, should make a "diversion" in his favour towards Tours, reserving to himself and his own army, as on the 2nd of July 1866 before Königgrätz, the perils and the honours of the battle. The grand duke meanwhile, whose temper was now roused, was making a last attempt to bring the phantom Army of the West to action. Rejecting Blumenthal's somewhat timidly worded advice to go slowly, the grand duke spread out his forces for the last time for an enveloping advance on Le Mans. He had not gone far when, on the 23rd, he received a peremptory order from the king, through the III. Army headquarters, to bring back his forces to Beauce and to be on the middle Loire at latest by the 26th. In vain he pleaded for a day to close up; the king replied that the march must go on, for much depended on it. Moltke, in fact, had seized Orleans. the reins more firmly at the critical moment, and given directions to the army commanders that the II. Army and the Detachment were to make a combined and concerted attack as soon as possible after the 26th. By that date the last brigades of the II. Army would have come up, and the Detachment was to time its own march accordingly. Yet even at this step Blumenthal, the original author of the Western expedition, in transmitting the king's order to the grand duke, assigned not Orleans but Beaugency, some miles down the river, as the objective of the Detachment. D'Aurelle meanwhile had resolutely maintained his policy of inaction, confirmed in that course by the miserable and ill-equipped condition of the troops that came from the east and the French west to double the numbers of the relatively well-disciplined army of Coulmiers. In the grand duke's move to the west, d'Aurelle saw only a trap to lure him into the plains and to offer him up as a victim to the approaching II. Army, the force of which he at first greatly exaggerated. All this time Gambetta and de Freycinet were receiving messages from Paris that spoke of desperate sorties being planned, and assigned December 15th as the last day of resistance. On the 19th of November de Freycinet wrote to d'Aurelle urging him to form a plan of active operations without delay, and even suggesting one (which was, in fact, vicious), but in reply the general merely promised to study the civilian's scheme. A severe letter from Gambetta, which followed this, had no better effect. D'Aurelle had, in fact, become a pessimist, and the Delegation, instead of removing him, merely suggested fresh plans. On the 24th, however, the French at last took the offensive, in the direction of Fontainebleau Forest, to co-operate with the great sortie from Paris which was now definitely arranged. But owing to d'Aurelle's objections, the first orders were modified so far that on attaining the points ordered, Chilleurs (15th corps) Boiscommun-Bellegarde (20th), the troops were to await the order toadvance. Shortly afterwards the 18th corps from Gien was ordered to advance on the line Montargis-Ladon. The rest of d'Aurelle's huge army was scarcely affected by these movements. Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles, to clear up the situation, had pushed out strong reconnaissances of all arms from the front of the II. Army, and these naturally developed strong forces of the defenders. The advanced troops of the X. corps had severe engagements with fractions of the 20th corps at Ladon and Maizières, and those of the III. corps were sharply repulsed at Neuville and drew the fire of several battalions and batteries at Artenay. The French offensive slowly developed on the 25th and 26th, for the Germans were not ready to advance, and in addition greatly puzzled. The erratic movements of the grand duke towards Le Mans before he was recalled to the Loire had seriously disquieted both the Delegation and d'Aurelle, and the 17th corps, under a young and energetic leader, de Sonis, was moved restlessly hither and thither in the country south and west of Châteaudun. A fight at Brou (10 m. W. of Bonneval) provoked the grand duke into another false move. This time the Detachment, then near Droué (12 m. W. of Châteaudun) and Authon (22 m. W. of Bonneval), swung round north-east in defiance of the order to go to Beaugency, and had to be brought back by the drastic method of placing it under the orders of Prince Frederick Charles. General von Stosch of the headquarters staff was at the same time sent to act as Moltke's representative with the duke's headquarters, and Lieut.-Colonel von Waldersee to Prince Frederick Charles's to report thence direct to the king, who was dissatisfied with the diluted information with which the various staff offices furnished him. Still, the upshot was that Prince Frederick Charles was entrusted with affairs on the Loire, and all

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superior control was voluntarily surrendered. The prince had very clear ideas, at the outset, of the task before him. If the French advanced towards Fontainebleau or elsewhere, he expected Prince to be able to repeat Napoleon's strategy of 1814, fighting Frederick containing actions with the IX. and X. corps and delivering blow after blow at different points on d'Aurelle's line Charles lo general of march with the III. If the French, as seemed more command. likely, stood fast, he thought his task more formidable, and therefore, abandoning the idea of a strategic envelopment, he ordered the Detachment inwards with the intention of directly attacking the Orleans position from the north-west. As regards the method of the offensive, there is herein no material advance on the prince's first scheme; the detachment is simply added to the forces making the attack, and the diversion on Tours is abandoned. But the prince was at any rate a leader who enjoyed the responsibilities of director of operations-he even said that he would find the shuttle-play of the III. corps alluded to above" an interesting novelty in his experience of Army command "-while at the same time the unfortunate d'Aurelle was asking the Delegation to give orders direct to his generals.

Beaune

laRolande.

It was now November 27th. The Versailles headquarters were in a state of intense nervous exaltation waiting for the sortie of 70,000 men that was daily expected to be launched at the investing line, and the king's parting words to von Waldersee indicate sufficiently the gravity of the decision that was now entrusted to the most resolute troop-leader in the service: "We are on the eve of a decisive moment. I know well that my troops are better than the French, but that does not deceive me into supposing that we have not a crisis before us. If Prince Frederick Charles is beaten, we must give up the investment of Paris. . . ." The II. Army was waiting events on a dangerously extended front from Toury on the ParisOrleans road (which the prince still thought it his duty to cover) to Beaune-la-Rolande. The Detachment, which never yet had concentrated save to deliver blows in the air, was approaching Châteaudun and Bonneval when von Stosch arrived and gave it the encouragement, the reforms in the staff work and the rest-day it needed. The French, who themselves had suffered from over-extension, had by now condensed on the extreme right. In these general conditions the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande took place an engagement almost as honourable to Voigts-Rhetz and the X. corps as Vionville to Alvensleben and the III. The French attack began early on the morning of the 28th, under command of General Crouzat. It was directed on Beaune-la-Rolande from three sides, and only the want of combination between the various units of the French and the arrival in the afternoon of part of the III. corps saved the X. from annihilation. As it was, the Germans engaged were utterly exhausted, and the X. corps had but three rounds of ammunition per man left. But the magnificent resistance of the men of Vionville prolonged the fight until night had fallen and Crouzat, thinking the battle lost, ordered his troops to evacuate the battlefield. As at Coulmiers, and with even more deplorable results, the French commander saw only the confusion in his own lines, and feared to hazard the issue of the campaign on the mere supposition that the enemy was even more exhausted. There was another resemblance, too, between Coulmiers and Beaune-laRolande, in that the French forces on the outer flank towards Artenay stood idle without attempting to influence the decision. Prince Frederick Charles himself took only a cursory survey of the battlefield, and failed to realize that the whole of the enemy's right wing had been engaged, in spite of what Waldersee, who had been in Beaune, told him of events there. So far, therefore, from considering the battle as a great victory to be followed up by an energetic pursuit, he still feared a move round his left flank from Gien and Montargis towards Fontainebleau. The II. Army orders issued on the night of the battle actually had in view a farther extension eastward. Beaune-la-Rolande was a French defeat without being a German victory, and for the fact that it was a defeat, not a mere check, there was no cause but Crouzat's impressions of the state of the 20th corps, which, composed as it was of the newest levies in his army, was the most susceptible of unreasoning bravery and unreasoning depression.

In view of this, d'Aurelle and de Freycinet decided that the offensive was to be continued not towards Beaune-Nemours, but from the front of the steadier 15th and 16th corps towards Pithiviers, and with that object, on the 29th-a day of inaction for the Germans -the 18th and 20th corps began to close on the centre. There was sharp fighting on the 30th at various points along the north-eastern and eastern fringes of the Forest of Orleans, in which for the most part the French were successful. On the 29th the 11. Army was inactive in spite of almost frantic appeals from Versailles to go forward (the great sortie from Paris had begun), and the Detachment. in accordance with the prince's orders and not with the views held by von Stosch, headed eastward to prolong the right of the 11. Army, halting on the 29th in the arca Orgères-Toury. The prince's message to the grand duke contained the significant phrase. plans to drive the enemy out of Orleans "-he no longer thought of a strategical envelopment of the Army of the Loire in Orleans. Disillusioned during the 30th as to the supposed danger on the side of Montargis, he closed from both wings towards the centre, but still defensively and well clear of the edge of the dangerous forest.

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On this day d'Aurelle and the French generals assembled to receive de Freycinet's orders for the next advance. The 18th and 20th corps were to attack Beaune-la-Rolande, the 15th and 16th Pithiviers, while the 17th, aided by the 21st from Le Mans, was to look after the security of Orleans against a possible southward advance of the Detachment. A wise modification was arranged between d'Aurelle and Chanzy, whereby the first day's operations should be directed to driving away the Detachment with the 17th and 16th corps, preparatory to the move on Pithiviers. On the 1st of December, then, no events of importance took place on the front of the II. Army, the centre of gravity having shifted to Advance of Orgères-Toury and the direction of events to the grand the French duke and Stosch. Fortunately for the Germans the left wing. cavalry general von Schmidt, who had been called upon to return to the II. Army with his division, managed to impress Stosch, in a farewell interview, with the imminence of the danger, and a still more urgent argument was the action of VillépionTerminiers, in which Chanzy with one infantry and one cavalry division attacked part of the I. Bavarian corps and drove it to Orgères with a loss of 1000 men. Von Stosch, therefore, so far from literally obeying the waiting policy indicated in the orders from Prince Frederick Charles, cautiously led the grand duke to prepare for a battle, and the grand duke, seeing the chance of which he had been cheated so often, and secure in his royal rank and in the support of Moltke, Stosch and Blumenthal, took control again. Lastly, von Stosch called back the 22nd division, which had been taken from the Detachment to form the reserve of the II. Army. The result of the decision thus made at the Detachment headquarters was of the highest importance. The French main body moving north-westward in the general direction of Toury encountered first the I. Bavarian corps, then the 17th division, and finally the 22nd division, and the leadership of the German generals, who took every advantage of the disconnected and spasmodic movements of the enemy, secured a complete success (battle of Loigny-Poupry, 2nd Dec.). Meanwhile, and long before victory had declared itself, Prince Frederick Charles, still keeping the III. and X. corps on the side of Boiscommun and Bellegarde, had sent the IX. corps westward to support the Detachment, and halted von Schmidt's returning cavalry division on the Paris road. But from this point there began an interchange of telegrams which almost nullified the strategical effect of the battle. The grand duke and von Stosch, desirous above all of enveloping that is, driving into Orleans-the target that after so many disappointments they had found and struck, wished to expand westwards so as to prevent the escape of the French towards Châteaudun, and with that object asked the II. Army "to attack Artenay and to take over the protection of the great road." Both von Stosch and von Waldersee had reported to the II. Army the importance of the French troops west of the main road, and Prince Frederick Charles, as above mentioned, had already moved the IX. corps and 6th cavalry division towards the Detachment. But when after the battle the grand duke's request to the II. Army arrived at the prince's headquarters, the reply was a curt general order for a direct concentric attack on Orleans by all forces under his command.

Battle of

Loigny-
Poupry.

This was Moltke's doing. Before Waldersee's telegrams from the front arrived at Versailles, he had sent to the prince a peremptory order "to attack Orleans and thus to bring about the decision. This order was based on Moltke's view that the main body of the French had, after Beaune-la-Rolande, gathered on the west side of the great road, and although the king, in spite of the repulse of the great sortie from Paris, was still uncasy as to the possibility of a French offensive on Fontainebleau, he allowed the chief of his staff to have his way. The order, consequently, went forth. Long before it could be translated into action, the battle of LoignyPoupry had completely changed the situation. Yet it was obeyed, and no attempt was made by the prince either to obtain its cancellation or to override it by the exercise of the beloved "initiative." At the prince's headquarters it was construed as a reflection upon the lethargy of that army after Beaune-la-Rolande, and-although it was the incompleteness of his own reports of that action that had misled Moltke as to the magnitude of the effort that had been expended to win it-the prince, bitterly resentful, fell into that dangerous condition of mind which induces a punctilious execution of orders to the letter, at whatever cost and without regard to circumstances. Hence the order to the Detachment, which allowed the French field army to escape, and substituted for a decisive victory the barren "second capture of Orleans."

The III. corps

The plan for this second capture was simple: 111. corps to fight its way from Pithiviers to Chilleurs-aux-Bois and thence down the Pithiviers-Orleans road through the forest, IX. corps to advance on Artenay and thence down the main road, Detachment to fight its way southward over the plains, in Orleans X. corps in rear of the centre as reserve. Only a small Forest. force was left on the side of Montargis, and the 111. and X. corps, which were many miles away to the south and south-east. had to get into position at once (evening of the 2nd) by night marches if necessary. In short, a single grand line of battle, 40 m. long, supported only by one corps in rear of the centre, was to sweep over all obstacles, woods, fields, orchards and enemy, at a uniform rate

of progress, and on the evening of the second day to converge on Orleans. The advance opened on the morning of the 3rd of December. The French left or main group included the 15th, 16th and 17th corps, the right of the 15th corps being in advance of the forest edge near Santeau. The right group, now under Bourbaki, consisted of the 18th and 20th corps, and faced north-east towards Beaune-la-Rolande and Montargis, the left flank being at Chambon. Fortunately for the III. corps, which numbered barely 13,000 rifles in all, the thinnest part of the opposing cordon was its centre, and the adventurous march of this corps carried it far into the forest to Loury. Only at Chilleurs was any serious resistance met with; elsewhere the French sheered off to their left, leaving the PithiviersOrleans road clear. In the night of the 3rd-4th isolated fractions of the enemy came accidentally in contact with von Alvensleben's outposts, but a sudden night encounter in woods was too much for the half-trained French, and a panic ensued, in which five guns were abandoned. But, as Alvensleben himself said, when he marched into the forest from Chilleurs he "went with open eyes into a den " from which it was more than probable he would never emerge Chilleurs was, in fact, reoccupied behind him by part of the 15th corps. By the fortune of war the III. corps actually did emerge safely, but only thanks to the inactivity of the French right group under Bourbaki,2 and to the almost entire absence of direct opposition, not to Prince Frederick Charles's dispositions.

On the main road, meantime, the IX. corps had captured a series of villages, and at nightfall of the short December day reached the N.W. corner of the Forest. The Detachment, slowly pushing before it part of the army it had defeated at Loigny, and protecting itself on the outer flank by a flank guard (I. Bavarians) against the rest, had closed in towards Chevilly. Prince Frederick Charles, angered by the slow, painful and indecisive day's work, ordered the advance to be continued and the French positions about Chevilly stormed in the dark, but fortunately was dissuaded by von Stosch, who rode over to his headquarters. But the prince never (except perhaps for a brief moment during the battle of Loigny-Poupry) believed that there was any serious obstacle in the way of the Detachment except its own fears, and repeatedly impressed upon Stosch the fact that Orleans was the watchword and the objective for every one.

In pursuance of the idée fixe, the prince issued orders for the 4th to the following effect: III. corps to advance on Orleans and to "bring artillery into action against the city," at the same time carefully guarding his left flank; IX. and 6th cavalry division to go forward along the general line of the main road; Detachment to make an enveloping attack on Gidy in concert with the attack of the IX. corps. In the forest Alvensleben, knowing that he could__not capture Orleans single-handed, guarded his left with a whole division and with the other advanced on the city, stormed the village of Vaumainbert, which was stubbornly defended by a small French force, and close upon nightfall perfunctorily threw a few shells into Orleans. The flank-guard division had meanwhile been gravely imperilled by the advance of Crouzat's 20th corps, but once again the 111. corps was miraculously saved, for Bourbaki, receiving word from d'Aurelle that the left group could not hold its position in advance of the Loire, and that the line of retreat of the right group was by Gien, ordered the fight to be broken off.

Second Battle of Orleans.

In the centre the IX. corps, after fighting hard all day, progressed no farther than Cercottes. The prince and the grand duke had a short interview, but, being personal enemies, their intercourse was confined to the prince's issuing his orders without inquiring closely into the positions of the Detachment and its opponents. Thus while the main body of the French left group, under the determined Chanzy, slipped away to the left, to continue the struggle for three months longer, the Detachment was compelled to conform to the movements of the IX. corps. But it was handled resolutely, and in the afternoon its right swung in to Ormes. The 2nd cavalry division, finding a target and open ground, charged the demoralized defenders with great effect, a panic began and spread, and by nightfall, when the prince, who was with the IX. corps, had actually given up hope of capturing Orleans that day and had issued orders to suspend the fight, his rival and subordinate was marching into Orleans with bands playing and colours flying. There was no pursuit, and the severed wings of the French army thenceforward carried on the campaign as two separate armies under Chanzy and Bourbaki respectively. See F. Hoenig, Volkskrieg an der Loire, and L. A. Hale, The People's War, besides general and special histories and memoirs referred to in FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. (C. F. A.)

ORLEY, BERNARD VAN (1491-1542), Flemish painter, the son and pupil of the painter Valentyn van Orley, was born at

'The same night Moltke received copies of the prince's orders and also news of the victory of Loigny-Poupry, but for some reason that is still unknown he let events take their course.

With all his faults, Bourbaki was hardly responsible for this failure. Gambetta had for some days been giving orders to the 18th and 20th corps direct, but precisely at the moment he handed back the control of the group to d'Aurelle, this being arranged over the wires while the III. corps was advancing.

Brussels and completed his art education in Rome in the school | of Raphael. He returned to Brussels, where he held an appointment as court painter to Margaret of Austria until 1527, in which year he lost this position and left the city. He only returned to it upon being reinstated by Mary of Hungary in 1532, and died there in 1542. Whilst in his earlier work he continued the tradition of the Van Eycks and their followers, he inaugurated a new era in Flemish art by introducing into his native country the Italian manner of the later Renaissance, the style of which he had acquired during his sojourn in Rome. His art marks the passing from the Gothic to the Renaissance period; he is the chief figure in the period of decline which preceded the advent of Rubens. Meticulously careful execution, brilliant colouring, and an almost Umbrian sense of design are the chief characteristics of his work.

Van Orley, together with Michael Cocxie, superintended the execution of van Aelst's tapestries for the Vatican, after Raphael's designs, and is himself responsible for some remarkable tapestry designs, such as the panels at Hampton Court. His also are the designs for some of the stained glass windows in the cathedral of Ste Gudule, in Brussels, at the muscum of which city are a number of his principal works, notably the triptych representing "The Patience of Job" (1521). Among his finest paintings are a "Trinity at Lübeck cathedral, a "Pietà" at Brussels, a Madonna at Munich and another at Liverpool.

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The National Gallery owns a " Magdalen, reading," another version of the same subject being at the Dublin National Gallery. Lord Northbrook possesses a portrait of Charles V. by the master. ORLOV, the name of a noble Russian family that produced several distinguished statesmen, diplomatists and soldiers. GREGORY (Grigorii) GRIGORIEVICH ORLOV, COUNT (1734

1783), Russian statesman, was the son of Gregory Orlov, governor of Great Novgorod. He was educated in the corps of cadets at St Petersburg, began his military career in the Seven Years' War, and was wounded at Zorndorf. While serving in the capital as an artillery officer he caught the fancy of Catherine II., and was the leader of the conspiracy which resulted in the dethronement and death of Peter III. (1762). After the event, Catherine raised him to the rank of count and made him adjutantgeneral, director-general of engineers and general-in-chief. At one time the empress thought of marrying her favourite, but the plan was frustrated by Nikita Panin. Orlov's influence became paramount after the discovery of the Khitrovo plot to murder the whole Orlqy family. Gregory Orlov was no statesman, but he had a quick wit, a fairly accurate appreciation of current events, and was a useful and sympathetic counsellor during the earlier portion of Catherine's reign. He entered with enthusiasm, both from patriotic and from economical motives, into the question of the improvement of the condition of the serfs and their partial emancipation. He was also their most prominent advocate in the great commission of 1767, though he aimed primarily at pleasing the empress, who affected great liberality in her earlier years. He was one of the earliest propagandists of the Slavophil idea of the emancipation of the Christians from the Turkish yoke. In 1771 he was sent as first Russian plenipotentiary to the peace-congress of Focshani; but he failed in his mission, owing partly to the obstinacy of the Turks, and partly (according to Panin) to his own outrageous insolence. On returning without permission to St Petersburg, he found himself superseded in the empress's favour by Vasil'chikov. When Potemkin, in 1771, superseded Vasil'chikov,

Orlov became of no account at court and went abroad for some

years. He returned to Russia a few months previously to his death, which took place at Moscow in 1780. For some time

before his death he was out of his mind. Late in life he married his niece, Madame Zinoveva, but left no children. See A. P. Barsukov, Narratives from Russian History in the 18th Century (Rus.) (St Petersburg, 1885).

ALEXIS GRIGORIEVICH Orlov, COUNT (1737-1808), brother of the above, was by far the ablest member of the Orlov countly family, and was also remarkable for his athletic strength and dexterity. In the revolution of 1762 he played an even more

important part than his brother Gregory. It was he who conveyed Peter III. to the château of Ropsha and murdered him there with his own hands. In 1770 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the fleet sent against the Turks, whose far superior navy he annihilated at Cheshme (July 5th 1770), a victory which led to the conquest of the Greek archipelago. For this exploit he received, in 1774, the honorific epithet Chesmensky, and the privilege of quartering the imperial arms in his shield. The same year he went into retirement and settled at Moscow. He devoted himself to horse-breeding, and produced the finest race of horses then known by crossing Arab and Frisian, and Arab and English studs. In the war with Napoleon during 1806-07 Orlov commanded the militia of the fifth district, which was placed on a war footing almost entirely at his own expense. He left an estate worth five millions of

roubles and 30,000 serfs.

See article," The Associates of Catherine II.," No. 2, in Russkaya Starina (Rus.) (St Petersburg, 1873).

THEODORE (Fedor) GRIGORIEVICH ORLOV, COUNT (1741-1796), Russian general, first distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War. He participated with his elder brothers, Gregory and Alexis, in the coup d'état of 1762, after which he was appointed chief procurator of the senate. During the first Turkish War of Catherine II. he served under Admiral Spiridov, and was one of the first to break through the Turkish line of battle at Cheshme. Subsequently, at Hydra, he put to flight eighteen Turkish vessels. These exploits were, by the order of Catherine, commemorated by a triumphal column, crowned with naval trophies, erected at Tsarskoe Selo. In 1775 he retired from the public service. Orlov was never married, but had five natural children, whom Catherine ennobled and legitimatized.

ALEXIS FEDOROVICH ORLOV, PRINCE (1787-1862), Russian statesman, the son of a natural son of Count Theodore Grigorievich Orlov, took part in all the Napoleonic wars from 1805 to the capture of Paris. For his services as commander of the cavalry regiment of the Life Guards on the occasion of the rebellion of 1825 he was created a count, and in the Turkish War of 1828-29 rose to the rank of lieutenant-general. It is from this time that the brilliant diplomatic carcer of Orlov begins. He was the Russian plenipotentiary at the peace of Adrianople, and in 1833 was appointed Russian ambassador at Constantinople, holding at the same time the post of commanderin-chief of the Black Sea fleet. He was, indeed, one of the most trusty agents of Nicholas I., whom in 1837 he accompanied on his foreign tour. In 1854 he was sent to Vienna to bring Austria over to the side of Russia, but without success. In 1856 he was one of the plenipotentiaries who concluded the peace of Paris. The same year he was raised to the dignity of prince, and was appointed president of the imperial council of state and of the council of ministers. In 1857, during the absence of the emperor, he presided over the commission formed to consider the question of the emancipation of the serfs, to which he was altogether hostile.

His only son, PRINCE NIKOLAI ALEKSYEEVICH ORLOV (18271885), was a distinguished Russian diplomatist and author. He first adopted a military career, and was seriously wounded in the Crimean War. Subsequently he entered the diplomatic service, and represented Russia successively at Brussels (18601870), Paris (1870-1882) and Berlin (1882-1885). As a publicist he stood in the forefront of reform. His articles on corporal

punishment, which appeared in Russkaya Starina in 1881, brought

about its abolition. He also advocated tolerance towards the

dissenters. His historical work, Sketch of Three Weeks' Campaign in 1806 (St Petersburg, 1856) is still of value.

(R. N. B.)

ORM, or ORMIN, the author of an English book, called by himself Ormulum ("because Orm made it "), consisting of metrical homilies on the gospels read at mass. The unique MS., now in the Bodleian Library, is certainly Orm's autograph, and contains abundant corrections by his own hand. On palacographical grounds it is referred to about A.D. 1200, and this date is supported by the linguistic evidence. The dialect is midland, with some northern features. It is marked in an

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