the moral

nature, in

The sense of pleasure and pain, with the desire of plea- Germ of sure and the fear of pain, constitute the germ out of which the whole of our moral and emotional nature is developed. sensation. But though they are emotional, these elements cannot be themselves regarded as moral. There are three things in which morality or moral excellence consists. These are: 1. Preferring the future to the present; or prudence. 2. Preferring the interest of another to one's own; the Unselfishsocial virtues, or unselfishness.

3. Preferring a higher aim to a lower one; as, for instance, preferring the performance of a duty which is certain to be unrewarded, to pleasure; I cannot think of any word that properly distinguishes this class of virtues from the other two, except holiness.

Prudence.

ness.

Holiness.

In morality, as in all life, the higher is developed out of the lower, and presupposes the lower. Prudence, unselfishness, and holiness are all developed out of the preference of pleasure to pain. Out of the sense of pleasure and pain Origin of in the present arises prudence, or care to provide for prudence: pleasure, and against pain, in the future; and the readiness to forego a smaller present pleasure, or to endure a smaller present pain, in order to provide for greater future pleasure, or against greater future pain. Out of the of unselsense of one's own pleasure and pain arises unselfishness, or care for the welfare of others. And out of the pleasures and pains, the desires and fears, of mere sensation, arise of those feelings which belong to a higher order than sensa- holiness. tion-love of beauty, love of truth, and love of virtue.

Concerning the origin of prudence, there is no room for doubt, and not much, so far as I see, even for discussion; it necessarily arises when thought and will have obtained the ascendency over mere sensation and consensual action.

The origin of the unselfish virtues is a subject which has been very much debated. I have stated my reasons for believing that they have their roots in those instincts which prompt all organisms, sentient and insentient alike, to perform such actions as are needful for the preservation of the race.

fishness:

The sense of holiness is a case

But how have we acquired the idea of holiness? how have we learned that some pleasures, quite irrespectively of their intensity, are higher than others, and worthier to be sought that the pleasure of hearing music, for instance, is higher than that of eating and drinking; the pleasures of the affections higher than those of music; and the pleasure yielded by the approbation of a good conscience higher than all the rest? And how have we learned to conceive of aims of duty so high, that not even the highest pleasure, present or future, ought to be weighed against them?

I believe this moral sense, or sense of holiness,1 is incapable of being referred to any principle belonging to of intelli- either matter, life, or sensation, and can only be explained as a case, not of vital but of spiritual intelligence.

gence.

I have only glanced at this most important subject. It would be impossible to do it justice without introducing arguments drawn from another world than that external world which we know of the senses; and to do so would be to enter on a totally new class of subjects. It is not from indifference to them, but rather from the sense of their transcendent importance, that I at present pass them by with this allusion, and restrict myself in this work to the sciences of matter and life.

1 Mr. Mill, in his work on Utilitarianism, maintains, with the whole of the philosophical school which he so ably represents, that the moral sense is what I have called a secondary feeling, and produced by association with the pleasures and pains of sensation. He is, however, obliged to admit— or rather, I ought to say, he places in the front of his theory-that besides differing in quantity (which, I suppose, means intensity multiplied into duration), pleasures differ from each other as higher and lower; a little of a higher pleasure being worth as much as a great deal of a lower one. Of course I agree with this; but I think it destroys the whole of the theory. I think it introduces an ethical element into the subject without saying whence it is derived, and thereby virtually confesses that it is underived.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

BEFORE endeavouring to trace the subject of mental

development in detail, it will be well to recapitulate, so as to bring into one brief view the various statements of the last few chapters concerning the elementary principles of mind.

Mind is developed out of sensation, as out of a germ. It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the process of development.

tion

But does sensation itself belong to mind? I state this Is sensaquestion, not as one which from my point of view needs mental? any answer, but as one which may naturally arise and embarrass the reader's thoughts; and I reply to it, that the question is a purely verbal one. I have confessed The question my inability to frame a satisfactory definition of mind. is only But, as a matter of fact, mind begins with sensation. verbal. Consciousness belongs to mind; there are feelings of Mind sensation and feelings of consciousness; I have stated my with begius reasons for believing that the seat of both kinds of feelings sensation. is in the sensory ganglia, though produced by the action Feelings of different sets of nerves;1 and feelings of sensation and tion and of consciousness, especially disagreeable ones, often act on of conthe organs of unconscious life in the same way, as for instance in the cases of nausea and of palpitation of the heart, which may be produced either by bodily or by mental feelings.

1 See the Chapter on the Physiology of Mind (Chapter XXIX.). VOL. II.

F

of sensa

sciousness,

or bodily and mental feelings:

I have just used the common expression of "bodily and mental feelings," to signify what I have previously called feelings of sensation and feelings of consciousness. The common expression is perfectly accurate, if we accurately understand what it really means, and do not let ourselves be hampered by preconceived notions about the mutual relation of the body and the mind. Bodily feelings are those which originate in impressions on the body; mental feelings are those which originate within the mind itself.1 To speak in anatomical language: bodily feelings, or feelings of sensation, are those which are due to the action of the nerves that connect the sensory ganglia with the various parts of the body; mental feelings, or feelings of consciousness, are due to the action of the nerves that connect the sensory ganglia with the ganglionic substance of the cerebral hemispheres. But our own consciousness of our mental states unites with reasoning based on no funda- physiological anatomy, in testifying that there is no fundamental difference between the feelings of sensation and those of consciousness.

their

grounds:

mental distinction.

Sensation.

Conscious

ness.

Thought.

Will.

Besides sensation, we have seen that the mental functions are all to be classed under the three following heads:

1. Consciousness; to which belong the feelings of consciousness, also called the mental feelings, or the emotions.3 Consciousness has its root in sensation.

2. Thought; which, as I believe, has its root in the unconscious vital intelligence that belongs to all living beings. And

3. Will; which has its root in involuntary motor action. It may be said that I have here contradicted myself, by saying in one breath that sensation is the germ out of

1 See the chapter on the Laws of Mind, in Mill's Logic, vol. ii.

2 I ought not to put forward an hypothesis, of which part of the details have been, so far as I am aware, first thought out by myself, as if it were a proved theory, though I am myself convinced of its truth. See the chapter on the Physiology of Mind.

3 See Note at end of chapter.

which all mind is developed; and in the next, that consciousness has its separate root in sensation, thought in vital intelligence, and will in motor action. I reply that no such expression can be anything more than a metaphor, and that the truths indicated by the metaphors do not contradict each other, but supplement each other. Had they been indicated by inconsistent metaphors it would not have mattered, but it may be shown, if it is worth showing, that the metaphors are really consistent with each other. We may say that consciousness, thought, and Relation will are all developed out of the single germ of sensation, of thought and will but thought and will send down each its own root into the to the insentient life; thought into unconscious vital intelligence, life. will into the motor function.

I have a few more remarks to make before going on to trace the details of the process by which mind is developed out of the germ of sensation.

insentient

All development, mental as well as bodily, is differentiation; and in describing any process of differentiation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the use of language which will appear to imply that differentiation signifies branching out. Especially is this true when the successive differentiations are stated in a tabular form. In the tabular form to which I intend to reduce the summary of this subject, it will necessarily appear as if the various mental functions branched out of sensation, as the branches of a tree out of its root. But this, though of course only metaphorical, would be a most inaccurate metaphor. The true analogy to the differentiations that constitute mental development does not consist in the separation of the branches of a tree, which are all alike in functions and in organization. The true analogy is in that differentiation Analogy of of unlike parts from each other which takes place in the development of all organisms, and most completely in the develophighest. The differentiated organs and tissues of organisms do not branch out and separate; on the contrary, the more complete is their differentiation, the more complete also is Intertheir integration; that is to say, the more unlike they action of become, the more perfectly their functions are combined, in mind.

mental to

organic

ment.

functions