LONDON:

R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS,

BREAD STREET HILL.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER XXVII.

INTELLIGENCE.

Formative, motor, and mental functions, all guided by intelligence-Instinctive

intelligence of the bee the same in kind with formative intelligence—Instinct
is not more wonderful than formative intelligence-Purpose in the formation
and action of the iris–Gradation from unconscious to conscious and rational
motor actions in the eye, and in the digestive organs-Actions determined by
sensation-All motor actions are intelligent, whether conscious or not—Intel-
ligence, unconscious and conscious, formative and mental, is fundamentally
the same—This view includes instinct-We cannot point out the beginning of
sensation, or of consciousness—Most thought, perhaps all, is partly unconscious

- Identity of formative, instinctive, and mental intelligence-A special act of

creation is not necessary for every new adaptation-Moral difficulties lessened

by this view—Parasitic worms—Unnatural or immoral instincts-All matter

is endowed with forces, and vitalized matter is endowed with intelligence-

Intelligence tends to guide all vital actions in the direction that is best for the

health of the organism-Disease is no exception-Vital actions ininister not

only to the individual, but to the race-Reproductive and maternal functions-

Social affections—Development of unconscious action into conscious—Love of

life.

NOTE : Instinct :- Instincts of social insects cannot be inherited-Darwin's ex-

:

Analogous impressions from different senses-Consciousness is indivisible-
Biological ground of this in nervous centralization Sensation is divisible :
consciousness not-Consciousness not hereditary-Instance : how birds acquire
a dread of man

Pp. 12–17

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.

Differentiation into organs of vegetative and of animal life-Contractility the

fundamental character of the latter-Nervous system developed out of mus-
cular--Its primary function is to transmit stimuli to the muscles-Nervous
system never simple—Ganglia-Reflex action-Nervous function differentiated
from muscular function-Sensation does not exist at first-It begins probably
with special sense—Sentient and insentient nerves histologically alike-Parallel
development of organs and of functions --Corpora striata : their relation to the
sensory ganglia-Consensual action : its similarity to merely reflex action-
Sensation at first is only the guide to action-Insects have only this, with some
possible exceptions-Sensory ganglia developed out of spinal cord, and cerebrum
out of sensory ganglia—The cerebrum is the organ of consciousness—Largest
in the highest animals—Cerebrum not in direct connexion with the organs of
external life-Its structure—The functions of its parts can be ascertained only by
analogy-Phrenological theory disproved by facts-One nervous current pro-
ducing another—Consciousness is thus produced-Nerves and nerve-currents
of consciousness—Is consciousness produced in the sensory ganglia or the
cerebrum ?-Consciousness of thought is distinct from thought-Unconscious
thought-Recollection without apparent cause—Nerves of thought—The sen-
sory ganglia are the seat of consciousness—Consciousness of thought : how
produced—Seat of consciousness—Memory-Its rudimentary form is a con-
sciousness of sensation outlasting the sensation-Recollection due to the repro-
duction of a current of consciousness—Consensual action produced by remem-
bered consciousness—Voluntary action—The same action may be at one time
consensual, at another voluntary, according to the nature of the stimulus-
Thought acts on the motor ganglia through the nerves of will—Position of
the nerves of will—Voluntary actions may become consensual—Instance of a
musician—This may become hereditary in animals, as in birds, and in dogs-
This explanation will not apply to all consensual actions—Instance of the bee

- Voluntary action has been developed out of consensual, and consensual out
of insentient-Summary-Enumeration of mental actions-Mutual relation of
the nervous organs of mind-Sensation—Consensual action-Consciousness of
sensation—Thought_Consciousness produced by thought-Will-Reverie-
Sleep-Dreaming--Somnambulism—Grounds of theory stated—Functions of
sensory and motor nerves and ganglia are known—Those of the cerebral nerves
may be inferred by analogy-Cerebral nerves of consciousness, of thought, and of
will—Three primary mental functions probably corresponding thereto-Nerves
of consciousness distinct from those of thought and will-Nerves of consciousness:
how identified-Thought is in itself unconscious-Nerves of thought-Nerves
of will—Ideo-motor and voluntary actions: how distinguished—The theory

incomplete.

NOTE: Nervous Currents :-Consciousness is always a secondary phenomenon-

The secondary current is not a continuation of the first-Compared to electric

telegraph currents—Nerve-fibres are more than merely conductors. Pp. 18—41

CHAPTER XXX.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT,

Physiology is useless as a guide in any but elementary psychology, though all

mind depends on nervous action-Proofs of this-Feeling is wider than con-

sciousness—Feelings of sensation and feelings of consciousness—Gradations of

consciousness—Emotions-Feeling is inexplicable—Thought is explicable-It

begins with the sense of the relation of sensations to each other-Attention to

one particular sensation, or to one particular relation between sensations-

Instance in geometrical study-We have no real consciousness of relations,

only of related things—But we have knowledge of relations—Unconscious

thought thus explained—Thought ceases to be conscious when it is of relations

only, to the exclusion of the feelings between which the relations are- - What is

taken for consciousness of thought is often really consciousness of mental effort.

Pp. 42—47

CHAPTER XXXI.

MENTAL HABIT.

All actions tend to become habitual— Motor habits—Voluntary actions becoming

habitual and consensual-Mental habit, or association of ideas-Impressions on

consciousness are either sensory or ideal—Law of association stated—Instance

of a man's face and his voice-Groups of sensations-Association by contiguity

and by resemblance, both cases of the same principle-Explanation of associa-

tion by resemblance : it is a case of association by contiguity—The power

of cognising resemblance and difference is an ultimate fact-All association

depends on habit-Forgetting, a case of loss of habits by disuse—Reappearance

of memories supposed to be lost-Association enters into all inental acts-

Memory--Acquisition of knowledge—Accurate knowledge-Error--Reverie-

Invention-Reasoning—The mind cannot create, but can only combine—Are all

mental facts referable to the law of mental habit alone ?-Parallel question in

biology-I believe in intelligence, in addition to the laws of habit—The ques-

tion stated : Is intelligence an ultimate fact ?-Why I have treated of associa-

tion so briefly

Pp. 48–55

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE GROUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.

Definition-Moral means emotional-Moral is contrasted with intellectual--The

root of the moral nature is in the sense of pleasure and pain—Pleasure and

pain are inexplicable in themselves, but it may be possible to tell how they

arise—Organic intelligence guides all organisms to do what is for their welfare

-Sentient organisms are guided to their welfare by sensation-Exceptions-

Reason for thinking the law must be general-Desire and fear-Love of life

Sexual, domestic, and social affections : their roots in the organic life—Great

changes are injurious, slight ones beneficial : great changes are painful, slight

ones agreeable--Application of this principle to beauty-Roots of emotions in

the organic life—Emotions generated by association Association of feelings-

Love of money not a primary feeling : may have become hereditary—Emotions

have their seat in the nerves of consciousness—Germ of the moral nature in

sensation-Prudence-Unselfishness-Holiness-Origin of prudence : of unsel-

fishness : of holiness—The sense of holiness is a case of intelligence.

Pp. 56–-64

Is sensation mental ?— The question is only verbal— Mind begins with sensation,

Feelings of sensation and of consciousness, or bodily and mental feelings : their
anatomical grounds : no fundamental distinction—Sensation-Consciousness-
Thought-Will-Relation of thought and will to the insentient life—Analogy
of mental to organic development-Inter-action of functions in mind—Deve-
lopment of thought, feeling, and will–Consensual and voluntary actions-
Intermediate class-Sensation and consciousness both inexplicable-Develop-
ment of memory, from consciousness outlasting sensation-Necessity of this to
thought-Hearing words and sentences—Memory is developed by the law of
association - Reverie-Recollection, or voluntary memory—Children have
memory with little power of recollection-Only what has been attended to can
be recollected—Imagination-Continuance of impressions-Memory—Recollec-
tion-Imagination-Development of reasoning out of cognition of relations-
Elementary relations--Likeness—Succession-Space-relation-Causation-Re-
lations presupposed in association--Perception—Perception may have its seat
in the sensory ganglia—Man's superiority in reasoning—Power of directing
thought at will—Language-Abstraction-Whately's view on language-Use of
words in thought, due to the power of directing thought at will : whence also
the power of abstraction—Instance in arithmetic-Voluntary action is always
later developed than involuntary—Simple inference and abstract reasoning
- Moral nature developed out of the sense of pleasure and pain-Care for