down in the streets of Paris. And by this coup d'état he also rose to the imperial throne.

Both were unfaithful to their oaths to observe the existing constitution. But it may be contended that this was owing to the force of circumstances rather than to the ambition and perfidy of the men. That this was the case with Napoleon III. is pretty clear. The assembly, headed by General Changarnier, who was anxious to be dictator, were at open war with the president, and it was simply a question as to which should depose the other. Louis Napoleon was the first to act, and he made good his position by removing his antagonists out of the way; and in so doing he was sustained by the French people, who at once re-elected him president, and subsequently made him emperor. But no such pressing necessity urged on the First Consul. Let him, however, speak for himself:

"It is certain," said Napoleon, "that the Tribunate was absolutely useless; and it cost nearly half a million. I therefore suppressed it. I was well aware that an outcry would be raised against the violation of the law. But I was strong. I possessed the full confidence of the people, and I considered myself a reformer. This, at least, is certain, that I did all for the best."*

In like manner, he found his colleagues, Cambacérès and Le Brun, in his way; so he "reformed" them out of it, dropped the title of consul, and adopted that of emperor, and all because "he was strong," and therefore he assumed to be the absolute judge of right and wrong. But, in truth, his popularity was then so great that he could have done anything with the people.

The following extract from the conversations recorded by Las Casast will fully illustrate Napoleon's ambition and views. Speaking of the United States, he said:

"When I acquired the supreme direction of affairs, it was wished that I might become a Washington. Words cost nothing; and, no doubt, those who were so ready to express the wish did so without any

* Las Casas, vol. 1, p. 185.

Vol. 1, p. 244.

knowledge of times, places, persons, or things. Had I been in America, I would willingly have been a Washington; and I should have had little merit in so being, for I do not see how I could reasonably have acted otherwise. But had Washington been in France, exposed to discord from within and invasion from without, I would have defied him to have been what he was in America, or, if he had attempted it, he would have been but a simpleton, and would only have prolonged the existence of evil. For my own part, I could only have been a crowned Washington. It was only in a congress of kings, in the midst of kings, yielding or subdued, that I could become so. Then, and then only, I could successfully display Washington's moderation, disinterestedness, and wisdom. I could not reasonably do this but by means of the universal dictatorship. To this I aspired."

The reader will duly appreciate the modesty of the foregoing language. Here is a man leading a notoriously dissolute life, and unscrupulously trampling down the rights of the French people, taking it for granted that he could easily be a Washington (i e., a model of purity and patriotism) if it suited his purpose, but that it would not do unless he acquired universal dictatorship! Of such "vaulting ambition as o'erleaps itself" as this of the first Napoleon we may acquit the third, mainly because he had not the ability to conceive it. Judging from the character of the man, his indolence, irresolution, habitual difficulty in making up his mind, and his sensual and luxurious tastes, we should say that he aimed at the imperial throne chiefly because the possession of it would enable him to gratify his propensities on a grand scale; but, as France held a commanding position in Europe, his being at her head would of itself give him a similar position, and thus his ambition would be gratified without calling for any other abilities than those which would enable him to gain the throne and keep possession of it.

Louis Napoleon owed his success, in the first instance, to the prestige of the name of Bonaparte, bequeathed by his illustrious uncle-a name which has, until recently, acted as a magic spell upon Frenchmen; and, in the second, to the zealous services of a set of able adventurers, some of whom had shared his exile. There was Walewski, reputed to be a son of

the first Napoleon by a Polish lady; there were De Morny Maupas, and Fialin (who assumed the name of De Persigny), and Mocquard; there were soldiers like St. Arnaud, Maguan, Forey, and Fleury, who were ready to do anything for employment and promotion; and there were also Corsicans, like Pietri and Abbatucci, who were Bonapartists by affinity, as their fathers had been before them. They were all men of ability, and it was they who planned and acted for Louis Napoleon, he being, in fact, little better than their puppet. It was Fleury who planned, and St. Arnaud who carried out, the coup d'état of the 2d December, 1851; and it has even been asserted that Louis Napoleon at the last moment shrank from attempting it, but that Fleury threatened him with death if he failed to sustain the conspirators. He sat near a fire in an innermost recess of the Tuileries, moody and silent, during the whole of that memorable day and night, listening nerv ously to the volleys of musketry which rang through the neighborhood. In this he certainly did not resemble his uncle, who, on such an emergency, would not only have planned the entire affair, but have personally superintended its execution.

*

Napoleon I. brooked no divided authority. His associate consuls had only nominal power. His ministers and marshals were mere tools in his hands. His genins inspired them, and when he fell they fell with him. But Napoleon III. suffered himself to be swayed by those around him. At the beginning of his reign he was so implicated in the schemes of Walewski, De Morny, and De Persiguy, that he could not shake them off, nor did he dare to offend them. He was in their power, and his policy, both foreign and domestic, was dictated by them. But they died off, one after the other, and he then fell under the influence of the empress and of a set of worthless speculators. Profuse expenditure, boundless extravagance, and general licentiousness became the order of the day, and the empire rapidly decayed. The true character of Napoleon III. began to reveal itself, and the man who, in the hands of

* Kinglake, Crimean War, vol. 1, chap. xiv.

Walewski and his associates, had filled Europe with wonder and terror as a veritable "nephew of his uncle," was found to be but an ordinary mortal after all. Certain it is that when they died his power began to decline. He had nothing to rely upon but the army; and at the opening of 1870, he found his popularity gone, himself lampooned, caricatured, insulted, and despised, his health failing, his household embittered and the nation on the verge of insurrection. Under these circumstances, nothing but a successful war could have saved him. He tried his hand at it and failed. We are by no means sure he was sorry for his failure. Feeling his growing incompetence to contend with the foes rising up everywhere against him, his bodily health broken, and success against the Prussians hopeless, his surrender at once relieved him of all difficulty and danger, and he obtained repose in his humiliation.

He died in exile, like his uncle; but the comparison may stop there. The third Napoleon was welcomed in England, where he was always popular. A victim to the brutality of the British ministry, the first Napoleon passed the remainder of his days on a barren island, giving vent to a series of utterances, displaying for the most part the profoundest wisdom, based on a thorough knowledge of men and books, which utterances will be of value while the world lasts. We have yet to learn that Napoleon III. varied his occupations at Wilhelmshöhe and Chiselhurst with any such philosophizing, or uttered a word that is worth remembering. Ilis "Life of Cæsar" throws no new light on history.* His "Idées Napoleoniennes" were borrowed from his uncle. Much of the merit of the Code Napoléon is due to the first Napoleon; it

*Louis Napoléon n'avait absolument rien compris à ce merveilleux génie de César, et à l'action profonde qu'il exerça sur les destinées du monde. Cette grande figure, du plus celebre insurgé de l'histoire, n'inspira rien au chroniquer impérial. Il crut qu'ecrire l'histoire de Cesar consistait à suivre plus ou moins exactement le pas du géant sur le carte du mond, et à rectifier l'emplacement d'un camp au le nom d'une bourgade, enterrée sous les débris des siécles. Quant à une pensée politique, à une appréciation pyschologique ou historique, il en trouva une seule, laquelle est une hallucination inepte." -Le Dernier des Napoléon, p. 53.

emanated from him and was greatly improved by his wise sug gestions. If his bulletins had only been true statements of facts some of them would have served for models of historical writing. Unfortunately, those already published tarnish his reputation for veracity, and show him to have been little better than an extortioner and a plunderer. De mortuis nil nisi VERUM is our motto in regard to kings and emperors; we discard the bonum because there could be no history worth reading were such a rule to be observed.

Both uncle and nephew sought to strengthen their position by marriage with a foreign princess. Napoleon I. obtained Maria Louisa by the bayonet, the Austrian emperor having a prudent dread of him, and wishing to make a friend. Napoleon III. could not induce any European princess to listen to him. Thereupon, like the fox in the fable, he explained to the French nation that the choice of the people, the head of a democratic empire, ought to disdain princesses, and that he had selected for his wife a Spanish lady, Eugenia de Montijo. We should be inclined to award Napoleon III. the palm over his uncle in the matter of marriage, were it not for the fact that it was not until after he had found he could not have a princess that he resolved to take a wife from motives of affection. At all events he did not divorce a wife who loved him to marry a woman who did not, and that from mere motives of policy. This was one of the first Napoleon's greatest crimes as well as blunders, and he soon regretted having married her.* The results of the two marriages were what might have been predicted. When misfortune overtook Napoleon I., Maria Louisa forsook him, and never expressed a wish to share his exile with him. When a similar calamity befell Napoleon III., Eugenie clung to him and consoled his dying hours. It is a remarkable coincidence that the sole issue of each marriage was a son.