103 (Mo.App.) In an action for personal | cation of other powers given trustees by virtue injury in collision with a street car, plaintiff's of the subscription contract.-Quanah, A. & P. error of judgment prompted by fear of imminent Ry. Co. v. Dickey, 179 S. W. 69. injury did not absolve the motorman, under the humanitarian rule, from exercising reasonable care to avoid injury.-Michaels. v. Harvey, 179 S. W. 735. A subscription contract signed by numerous property holders, giving trustees power to contract with a railway to procure permission from the city for the construction of its lines and for relinquishment of damages, when accepted by the railroad, is not a naked power revocable at the subscriber's pleasure.-Id. 103 (Mo.App.) The knowledge of an occupant of a wagon of the approach of defendant's street car held not to bar recovery under the last clear chance doctrine, where the motorman could have avoided injury if he had exercised proper care.-Ingino v. Metropolitan St. Ry. See Novation, €4. Co., 179 S. W. 771. SUBSTITUTION. SUICIDE. 110 (Mo.App.) In action for injuries to person struck by street car, petition held not to charge negligence under the last chance rule, See Insurance, 788. and hence contributory negligence was a complete defense.-Guffey v. Harvey, 179 S. W. 729. SUIT. 114 (Mo.App.) Evidence held to show that See Action. plaintiff either failed to look before turning to drive across street car tracks or took a dangerous and unnecessary chance and drove into a zone of apparent danger.-Guffey v. Harvey, 179 See Pleading, 183. S. W. 729, SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING. SUPPORT. 117 (Mo.App.) In an action for personal injury sustained in a collision between plaintiff's wagon and defendant's street car, evidence held See Parent and Child. to make defendant's negligence under the last clear chance rule a question for the jury.Michaels v. Harvey, 179 S. W. 735. SURETYSHIP. 117 (Mo.App.) In an action against a street See Principal and Surety. car company for injuries to a person riding in a wagon at the invitation of the driver thereof, SURPRISE. by collision with a car, evidence as to the negli- See Continuance, 30; New Trial, 97. gence of defendant under the last clear chance doctrine held for the jury.-Ingino v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 179 S. W. 771. 10 (Tex.Civ.App.) A subscriber to a list for a fund in aid of railway construction will not be permitted to deny a contract authorizing trustees to contract with the railway company, where the subscription list recites that such contract was attached.-Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dickey, 179 S. W. 69. 12 (Tex.Civ.App.) A subscription contract in aid of railway construction, providing for a bond to pay damages to abutting owners if relinquishments were not obtained, held an indemnity contract upon which the subscriber is jointly and severally liable primarily for the amount of his subscription, enforceable although not reduced to judgment.-Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dickey, 179 S. W. 69. 18 (Tex.Civ.App.) Withdrawal by a subscriber to raise a bonus for railway construction of the amount subscribed held not a revo See Death, 5. SURVIVORSHIP. SWINDLING. See Criminal Law, 372; False Pretenses. TAXATION. See Adverse Possession, 86; Constitutional Law, 229, 283, 296; Counties, 190, 196; Embezzlement, 9; Intoxicating Liquors, 46; Municipal Corporations, 406-567; Schools and School Districts, 106. III. LIABILITY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY. (B) Corporations and Corporate Stock and Property. 113 (Ky.) Ky. St. §§ 4226, 4230a, imposing a tax on premiums collected by life companies and authorizing the collection of the tax after such a company has voluntarily ceased to do business in the state, are not unconstitutional. -Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S. W. 591. 169 (Ky.) Where foreign corporations acquired lots of insignificant value not related to their corporate business, defendant, a resident shareholder, could not escape taxation on stock owned by her, under Ky. St. § 4085.-Slater v. Commonwealth, 179 S. W. 201. (D) Exemptions. 241 (Ky.) A home for destitute old women held exempt from taxes as an institution of purely public charity, under Const. § 170.Commonwealth v. Parr's Ex'r, 179 S. W. 1048. That the trustee and executor withheld a fund bequeathed for the purpose of erecting a charitable institution from the board of managers thereof, pending contest of will, held not to remove it from the protection of Const. § 170, exempting public charities from taxation.-Id. 241 (Ky.) Under Const. § 170, hospital incorporated as charitable corporation, held an "institution of purely public charity," whose invested fund, used solely for hospital expenses, was exempt from taxation.-Mason County v. Hayswood Hospital of Maysville, 179 S. W. 1050. 242 (Ky.) An office building owned by a church conference, the rentals of which are devoted exclusively to the partial support of a college maintained by the church, held exempt from taxation under Const. § 170.-Commonwealth v. Board of Education of Methodist Episcopal Church, 179 S. W. 596. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES. See Commerce, 8. I. ESTABLISHMENT, CONSTRUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE. 7 (Ky.) A municipal ordinance granting a franchise to a telephone company held invalid under Const. § 164, and Ky. St. § 3636, because not passed in the prescribed manner.-Eastern Kentucky Home Telephone Co. v. Hatcher, 179 S. W. 7. That a college maintained by a church gives preference to students who are candidates for the ministry does not deprive it of its exemp-20 (Ky.) Manner in which plaintiff was intion from taxation under Const. § 170.-Id. V. LEVY AND ASSESSMENT. (C) Mode of Assessment in General. 3624 (Ky.) Proceeding under Ky. St. c. 108, art. 17, for assessment of omitted property, is special, and the judge of the county court acts in a ministerial capacity.-Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S. W. 1080. Under Ky. St. § 4260, a party in proceeding to assess omitted property may object to a jury, and the court must then try the case without a jury. Id. (D) Mode of Assessment of Corporate Stock, Property, or Receipts. 387 (Ky.) Plaintiff foreign assessment insurance company held liable to tax of $2 on every $100 of premium receipts under Ky. St. § 4226, embracing all foreign life insurance companies other than fraternal assessment companies. Clay v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 1024. XI. TAX TITLES. (C) Actions to Confirm or Try Title. 805 (Ark.) Where purchaser of wild lands under tax deed paid taxes thereon for 14 years after tax sale, the former owner's action to quiet title is barred by the seven-year statute of limitations.-McGill v. Adams, 179 S. W. 489. While plaintiffs, seeking to quiet title to unimproved land, are not barred by the statute of limitations, being under coverture, their action for equitable relief is barred by their laches in failing to pay taxes for 45 years, 14 of which followed defendant's purchase from the state. -Id. XIII. LEGACY, INHERITANCE, AND TRANSFER TAXES. 860 (Ark.) The Inheritance Tax Act is not a tax on property but on the privilege of succession, and, being a special tax, must be construed strictly against the government.-McDaniel v. Byrkett, 179 S. W. 491. 861 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 4281a, subsec. 1, which went into effect in 1906, imposing a succession tax, held not to have a retroactive effect so as to apply to a conveyance made in 1895 whereby land was granted reserving a life estate which did not end until after 1906.-Commonwealth v. McCauley's Ex'r, 179 S. W. 411. 866 (Ark.) The widow's dower does not come to her as the heir of her husband or by virtue of the intestate laws, and hence is not taxable under the Inheritance Tax Law.-McDaniel v. Byrkett, 179 S. W. 491. 889 (Ark.) Provisions of the Inheritance Tax Act for payment of taxes by widow of deceased thereunder apply only to such property as she acquires in a manner to make it taxable, and not to her dower.-McDaniel v. Byrkett, 179 S. W. 491. 895 (Ark.) Under Acts 1909, Act 303, p. 906, § 3, the exemption from inheritance tax of $5,000 is to be deducted after distribution of the property, and the tax imposed upon the remainder.-McDaniel v. Herrn, 179 S. W. 337. jured held to raise presumption of negligence of defendant telephone company in construction of the line under doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. -Beall v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., 179 S. W. 251. Evidence in an action for personal injuries against a telephone company held not to constitute variance with complaint.-Id. Limitation on method of fastening its wire by owner of land held not to excuse telephone company for injury caused by defective fastening of wire.-Id. II. REGULATION AND OPERATION. 48 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a telegraph agent converted money paid by the cousin of one accused of crime in order to stop proceedings, held. that creditors who instituted the proceedings had no right of action against the telegraph company; title not having passed, and the agreement being illegal.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Smith, 179 S. W. 548. 54 (Ark.) Where the contract between a telegraph company and the sender of a message limits liability to $50, the sender suing for negligent failure to deliver can recover nothing over $50.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brooks, 179 S. W. 649. 68 (Ark.) Mental anguish alone will not support a recovery for negligence in failing to deliver an interstate message.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Culpepper, 179 S. W. 494. TENANCY IN COMMON. II. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF COTENANTS. 29 (Tex.) Tenant in common having property improved held not entitled to contribution, where he had not paid the cost of improving the property, and limitations had run against it. -Stephenson v. Luttrell, 179 S. W. 260. 38 (Tex.) Tenant in common suing for contribution held, under his petition, not entitled to recover defendant's share of the cost of improving a street adjacent to the property.Stephenson v. Luttrell, 179 S. W. 260. III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF COTENANTS AS TO THIRD PERSONS. 49 (Ky.) A lease by one or more of several tenants in common is not valid as to those not joining therein, but merely makes the lessee a tenant in common with the owners.-Geary v. Taylor, 179 S. W. 426. For breach of lease by agent of tenants in common, G., the only tenant in common who authorized the lease, held liable only for his proportionate share of the difference between the agreed rent and the rental value.-Id. THEATERS AND SHOWS. See Licenses, 39. THEFT. See Embezzlement; Larceny. 39 (Tex.Civ.App.) Admission of testimony of witness in trespass to try title that, to the best of his recollection, the vendor's lien notes on which title depended had been transferred by the former owners of the property before it held not error, in view of the lapse of time and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, other circumstances.-Etheridge v. Campbell, 179 S. W. 1144. 41 (Tex. Civ.App.) Evidence in an action of trespass to try title, wherein the question of title depended on whether the former owners of the property had transferred, prior to making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, vendor's lien notes retained by them held to show that the notes had been transferred.-Etheridge v. Campbell, 179 S. W. 1144. TRIAL. See Continuance; Costs; Jury; New Trial; For trial of particular actions or proceedings, For review of rulings at trial, see Appeal and See Master and Servant, 107, 112, 190, 210. I. NOTICE OF TRIAL AND PRELIMI TORTS. See Damages, 69; False Imprisonment; Fraud; Husband and Wife, 209; Insurance, 93; Judgment, 597; Libel and Slander, 7-123; Limitation of Actions, Own 55; Malicious Prosecution; Municipal Corporations, 747-822; Negligence; Nuisance; Trover and Conversion; Venue, 8. 4 (Tenn.) A malicious act is one injurious to another, intentional and without legal justification, but an act, otherwise lawful if it is reasonably of benefit to the doer, is not within the rule, because there was malice in the doing. -Hutton v. Watters, 179 S. W. 134. 10 (Tenn.) Whether a cause of action for wrongful destruction of a business is shown must be determined in each case on its own facts, as no rule can be stated to govern its determination.-Hutton v. Watters, 179 S. W. 134. 26 (Tenn.) Petition in an action for wrongful destruction of a business held to present a cause of action, and demurrer thereto should have been overruled.-Hutton v. Watters, 179 S. W. 134. TOWAGE. See Appeal and Error, 837. TOWNS. See Municipal Corporations. See Appeal and Error, TRANSCRIPTS. 553. TRANSFER OF CAUSES. See Appeal and Error, 11. TREES. See Logs and Logging. 358, 424; Courts, III. COURSE AND CONDUCT OF 25 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under rule 31 for district and county courts (142 S. W. xx), including the provision of Rev. St. art. 1953, held, on the pleadings in an action on a note, that the granting to defendants of the right to open and close was error.-First State Bank of Amarillo v. Cooper, 179 S. W. 295. 25 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 1953, and rule 31 for district and county courts (142 S. W. xx), court held to have erred in permitting_defendant to open and close the argument.-J. W. Carter Music Co. v. Bailey, 179 S. W. 547. IV. RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE. (C) Objections, Motions to Strike Out, and Exceptions. 76 (Ky.) Objection to bank cashier testifytoo late when made after his testimony was coming from memorandum concerning deposit held pleted.-Shelby v. Grabble, 179 S. W. 1. 76 (Tex.) In tenant in common's action for contribution, objection to testimony concerning improvement of adjacent street not alleged in the petition held interposed in time, and not waived.-Stephenson v. Luttrell, 179 S. W. 260. 85 (Tex.Civ.App.) There was no error in 1068; Vendor and overruling an objection to the whole of testimony, part of which was admissible.-First State Bank of Amarillo v. Cooper, 179 S. W. 295. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE. See Appeal and Error, II. PROCEEDINGS. 27 (Tex.Civ.App.) A judgment in trespass to try title to defendant's homestead held void, where defendant's wife was not a party, though she had subsequently died childless.-Harper v. 85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Assignments complaining of objections going to the entire answers of a witness will be overruled, where a part of the answers was admissible.-Bolt v. State Savings V. ARGUMENTS AND CONDUCT OF 191 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action on note, instruction held not objectionable, as assuming that court thought that part of defendants were sureties. First State Bank of Amarillo v. Cooper, 179 S. W. 295. 112 (Ky.) Where a personal injury case consumed one day with the examination of 16 witnesses, and 8 instructions, held error to limit argument to 20 minutes on each side.-Moses 192 (Mo.App.) Where defendant, in an action for breach of marriage promise, admitted his unwarranted refusal, it was not error for instructions to assume those facts.-Chapman V. Brown, 179 S. W. 774. v. Proctor Coal Co., 179 S. W. 1043. 125 (Ky.) Reference by counsel in action for personal injuries to defendant's "hoarded thousands and millions," the accidents in its mine, and the fact that it was a corporation held to require a reversal.-Carter Coal Co. v. Hill, 179 S. W. 2. VI. TAKING CASE OR QUESTION (A) Questions of Law or of Fact in Gen- 139 (Ark.) In action against railroad company for overcharge in freight, held error to direct a verdict against the company, where there was some evidence of the correctness_of the amount charged.-Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Bull, 179 S. W. 172. 194 (Mo.App.) In an action against a city for personal injuries to plaintiff truck driver through a defect in a street, instruction held improper as invading the jury's province to weigh the evidence.-Morrill v. Kansas City, 179 S. W. 759. 194 (Tex. Civ.App.) In action on a note, a requested instruction held properly refused, being on the weight of the evidence.-First State Bank of Amarillo v. Cooper, 179 S. W. 295. 199 (Mo.App.) In suit on a note, instruction submitting to jury whether plaintiff's liability was based on valuable consideration, a claimed agreement to release defendant from question of law, held erroneous.-Lumpkin v. Strange, 179 S. W. 742. 139 (Ark.) Where there is any evidence tending to establish an issue in favor of a party it is error to take the case from the jury and direct a verdict against such party.-Bar-208 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the court erronerentine v. Henry Wrape Co., 179 S. W. 328. (B) Necessity and Subject-Matter. ously denied a motion to strike incompetent evidence, the refusal of a charge to disregard such evidence was error.-Occident Fire Ins. Co. v. Linn, 179 S. W. 523. (C) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency. 232 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a cause was submitted on special issues, a charge correctly embodying the law but calling for a general verdict should not be given.-International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Reek, 179 S. W. 699. There was no error in informing the jury which party had requested that the cause be submitted on special issues.-Id. (D) Applicability to Pleadings and Evi dence. 139 (Tex.) Unless all reasonable minds would agree that the evidence is insufficient to establish a cause of action, the court is not warranted in taking the case from the jury.-250 (Tex.Civ.App.) An instruction presentInternational & G. N. R. Co. v. Walters, 179 S. W. 854. 139 (Tex. Civ.App.) The weight of testimony is for the jury.-Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Vogel, 179 S. W. 268. 140 (Tex.Civ.App.) The credibility of witnesses is for the jury.-Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Vogel, 179 S. W. 268. 140 (Tex.Civ.App.) A case wholly dependent upon the uncorroborated testimony of a party interested in the litigation, though not contradicted, is for the jury.-First Nat. Bank of Plainview v. McWhorter, 179 S. W. 1147. 143 (Ark.) Where there is a material conflict in the evidence, a peremptory instruction is error.-Holman v. Nutt, 179 S. W. 811. 143 (Ky.) It is the province of the jury to determine the facts, where the evidence is conflicting.-Hodge Tobacco Co. v. Whaley, 179 S. W. 840. (D) Direction of Verdict. 168 (Ky.) An affirmative defense may not be asserted by a motion for a directed verdict. Pete Sheeran, Bro. & Co. v. Tucker, 179 S. W. 426. VII. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY. (A) Province of Court and Jury in General. 191 (Mo.App.) In an action on a fire insurance policy, instructions as to waiver of the iron-safe clause held not erroneous as assuming facts in dispute.-Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 766. ing an issue unauthorized by any pleading or evidence is properly refused.-Ablon v. Wheeler & Motter Mercantile Co., 179 S. W. 527. 250 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where error is assigned for refusal to instruct upon an issue not raised by the pleadings or evidence, it will be overruled.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Winkler, 179 S. W. 691. 250 (Tex.Civ.App.) A charge on the duty of a railroad company to give the crossing signals prescribed by Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 6564, is not appropriate in an action for the killing of cattle, unless they were killed on a crossing.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Decatur Cotton Seed Oil Co., 179 S. W. 1104. 251 (Mo.App.) In an action on a note, where the amended answer admitted there was a partial consideration, giving of an instruction submitting the hypothesis that there was no consideration was error.-Lumpkin Strange, 179 S. W. 742. v. 25! (Tex. Civ.App.) The question of estoppel not being raised by the pleadings, an instruction thereon is properly refused.-Bankers' Trust Co. of Amarillo v. Cooper, Merrill & Lumpkin, 179 S. W. 541. 251 (Tex. Civ.App.) In broker's action for commissions, objection to instruction on ground that the pleadings raised no issue as to failure to consummate deal being due to defendants' fault held unfounded.-Levy v. Dunken Realty Co., 179 S. W. 679. 251 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for balance of a bill for lumber, furnished to build a house, held that, upon the pleadings, instructions as 260 (Mo.App.) It is not error for the court to refuse a request covered and stated by other instructions given for the party.-Morrill v. Kansas City, 179 S. W. 759. instructions to defendant's waiver or estoppel in respect to the size of the house actually built should not have been given.-Scruggs v. E. L. Woodley Lumber Co., 179 S. W. 897. 251 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action by former 260 (Tex.Civ.App.) Requested partner for share of commissions on deal completed after dissolution on an issue as to whether deal was pending at time of dissolution definition of "pending" held sustained by the peti-260 (Tex.Civ.App.) It is not error to refuse tion.-Daniel v. Lane, 179 S. W. 906. a requested instruction substantially covered by the charge of the court.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Winkler, 179 S. W. 691. covered by others given need not be given.Bankers' Trust Co. of Amarillo v. Cooper, Merrill & Lumpkin, 179 S. W. 541. 251 (Tex.Civ.App.) A requested charge that there was no evidence showing the train was being run at excessive speed is properly refused 260 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries in an action for killing cattle, where excessive from being run over by train at a depot, held, speed was not made a basis of recovery.-Ft. that it was not error to refuse an instruction on Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Decatur Cotton Seed discovered peril where it was substantially covOil Co., 179 S. W. 1104. ered by one given.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Aston, 179 S. W. 1128. 263 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a party requests two special instructions on the same issue, and the court selects and gives one, the party cannot complain of the refusal of the other.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Aston, 179 S. W. 1128. 252 (Ky.) Instructions which there was no proof to sustain should not have been given. Elsey v. People's Bank of Bardwell, 179 S. W. 392. 252 (Tex. Civ.App.) In an action on a note, where there was no evidence to support the issue as to whether plaintiff had failed to account for collateral, it should not have been submitted.-First State Bank of Amarillo v. Cooper, 179 S. W. 295. (F) Objections and Exceptions. 273 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. St. 1911, art. 1971, as amended by Act 33d Leg. c. 59, an objection to a paragraph of the charge, not made and presented to the court before the charge was read to the jury, was waived.-McLaughlin v. Terrell Bros., 179 S. W. 932. 252 (Tex. Civ.App.) An instruction, unauthorized by any evidence in the case, is properly refused.-Bankers' Trust Co. of Amarillo v. Cooper, Merrill & Lumpkin, 179 S. W. 541. 253 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for killing cattle, an instruction held improper as tending to exclude the defense that the cattle were killed on a public road, where the tracks were not re-296 (Ky.) In a servant's action for injury quired to be fenced.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Decatur Cotton Seed Oil Co., 179 S. W. 1104. (E) Requests or Prayers. 255 (Ky.) While an instruction, in a servant's action for injury, limiting the competency of life tables to showing expectancy of life, should be given on request, a failure to so instruct was not error, where no request was made. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Calhoun, 179 S. W. 590. 255 (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try title, held, that party desiring issue submitted, or desiring its theory of the case presented, should have requested proper charges.-Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Somerville, 179 S. W. 671. (G) Construction and Operation. while operating a machine, instruction on contributory negligence, read with the other instructions, held not misleading.-Phillips v. Corbin & Fannin, 179 S. W. 586. 296 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action on a fire insurance policy, an instruction ignoring the defense of settlement held erroneous, notwithstanding other instructions.-Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Richards, 179 S. W. 926. 296 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an instruction, purporting to generally define the rights of the parties, omits defenses, the fact that other instructions present those defenses will not cure the error.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Decatur Cotton Seed Oil Co., 179 S. W. 1104. IX. VERDICT. (A) General Verdict. 255 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for partnership accounting, wherein defendant denied the existence of the partnership and set up 329 (Tex.Civ.App.) In broker's action for special partnerships in respect to which he asked an accounting, held, that failure to instruct that the burden was on defendant to establish matters in respect to which he asked affirmative relief was not error, in the absence of a request. -Hall v. Ray, 179 S. W. 1135. 256 (Mo.App.) In action for wrongful death of plaintiff's minor daughter under Rev. St. 1909, § 5425, general charge that jury might find for plaintiff not less than $2,000 and not more than $10,000 held not erroneous in absence of request for more definite instruction.-Albert v. St. Louis Electric Terminal Ry. Co., 179 S. W. 955. 260 (Ark.) The court properly refused requested instructions if the matters contained therein were embraced in other instructions given.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brooks, 179 S. W. 649. commissions, verdict for plaintiffs held to dispose of defendants' cross-action, and judgment was properly rendered against defendants on their cross-action.-Levy v. Dunken Realty Co., 179 S. W. 679. 331 (Tex. Civ.App.) In action for conversion, verdict for plaintiff, construed in light of charge, held to remove objections of uncertainty and that it did not dispose of cross-action setting up indebtedness to defendant.-San Antonio, U. & G. Ry. Co. v. Yarbrough, 179 S. W. 523. 339 (Tex. Civ.App.) Action of court in directing that jury return to jury room and correct their verdict so as to include an item which they had overlooked and which the undisputed evidence showed defendant to be entitled to held not error.-Hall v. Ray, 179 S. W. 1135. 343 (Mo.App.) A verdict resolves all con260 (Ky.) Where instructions in a cause flicts in the evidence in favor of the successful fully and fairly present to the jury every ma-party.-Chapman v. Brown, 179 S. W. 774. terial issue of fact necessary to a correct de-343 (Tex.Civ.App.) Verdict for plaintiff held cision of the case, no error is presented by the to decide against defendant issue, submitted to court's refusal to give requested instructions. the jury, on which the testimony was conflict-Carrick v. Garth, 179 S. W. 609. ing.-Levy v. Dunken Realty Co., 179 S. W. 260 (Mo.App.) Where the the essential ele- 679. ments of a requested instruction were fully embodied in the party's given instructions, the (B) Special Interrogatories and Findings. refusal of the request was proper.-Hopfinger v. 349 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the court would |