tions of my mind, any more than the actions of my machine-footman would have on the words issuing from my lips. The same inference is to be extended to the relation which the impressions made on my different senses bear to the co-existent perceptions arising in my mind. The impressions and perceptions have no mutual connexion, resembling that of physical causes with their effects; but the one series of events is made to correspond invariably with the other, in consequence of an eternal harmony between them, pre-established by their common Creator.

From this outline of the scheme of Pre-established Harmony, it is manifest, that it took its rise from the very same train of thinking which produced Malebranche's doctrine of Occasional Causes. The authors of both theories saw clearly the impossibility of tracing the mode in which mind acts on body, or body on mind; and hence were led rashly to conclude, that the connexion or union which seems to exist between them is not real, but apparent. The inferences, however, which they drew from this common principle were directly opposite; Malebranche maintaining, that the communication between mind and body was carried on by the immediate and incessant agency of the Deity; while Leibnitz conceived, that the agency of God was employed only in the original contrivance and mutual adjustment of the two machines; -all the subsequent phenomena of each, being the necessary results of its own independent mechanism, and, at the same time, the progressive evolutions of a comprehensive design, harmonizing the laws of the one with those of the other.

Of these two opposite hypotheses, that of Leibnitz is by far the more unphilosophical and untenable. The chief objection to the doctrine of occasional causes is, that it presumes to decide upon a question of which human reason is altogether incompetent to judge;-our ignorance of the mode in which matter acts upon mind, or mind upon matter, furnishing not the shadow of a proof that the one may not act directly and immediately on the other, in some way incomprehensible by our facul

ties.* But the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony, besides being equally liable to this objection, labors under the additional disadvantage of involving a perplexed and totally inconsistent conception of the nature of Mechanism;—an inconsistency, by the way, with which all those philosophers are justly chargeable, who imagine that, by likening the universe to a machine, they get rid of the necessity of admitting the constant agency of powers essentially different from the known qualities of matter. The word Mechanism properly expresses a combination

*The mutual action (or, as it was called in the schools), the mutual influence (influxus) of soul and body, was, till the time of Descartes, the prevailing hypothesis, both among the learned and the vulgar. The reality of this influx, if not positively denied by Descartes, was at least mentioned by him as a subject of doubt; but by Malebranche and Leibnitz it was confidently rejected as absurd and impossible. (See their works passim.) Gravesande, who had a very strong leaning towards the doctrines of Leibnitz, had yet the good sense to perceive the inconclusiveness of his reasoning in this particular instance, and states in opposition to it the following sound and decisive remarks: "Non concipio, quomodo mens in corpus agere possit; non etiam video, quomodo ex motu nervi perceptio sequatur; non tamen inde sequi mihi apparet, omnem influxum esse rejiciendum.

"Substantiæ incognitæ sunt. Jam vidimus naturam mentis nos latere; scimus hanc esse aliquid, quod ideas habet, has confert, &c.; sed ignoramus quid sit subjectum, cui hæ proprietates conveniant.

"Hoc idem de corpore dicimus; est extensum, impenetrabile, &c. sed quid est quod habet hasce proprietates? Nulla nobis via aperta est, quâ ad hanc cognitionem pervenire possimus.

"Inde concludimus, multa nos latere, quæ proprietates mentis et corporis spectant. "Invictâ demonstratione constat, non mentem in corpus, neque hoc in illam agere, ut corpus in corpus agit; sed mihi non videtur inde concludi posse, omnem influxum esse impossibilem.

"Motu suo corpus non agit in aliud corpus, sine resistente; sed an non actio, omnino diversa, et cujus ideam non habemus, in aliam substantiam dari possit, et ita tamen, ut causa effectui respondeat, in re adeò obscurâ, determinare non ausim. Difficile certè est influxum negare, quando exactè perpendimus, quomodo in minimis quæ mens percipit, relatio detur cum agitationibus in corpore, et quomodo hujus motus cum mentis determinationibus conveniant. Attendo ad illa quæ medici, et anatomici, nos de his docent.

"Nihil, ergo, de systemate influxûs determino præter hoc, mihi nondum hujus impossibilitatem satis clarè demonstratam esse videri.”—(Introductio ad Philosophiam.) See Note (X.)

With respect to the manner in which the intercourse between Mind and Matter is carried on, a very rash assertion escaped Mr. Locke in the first edition of his Essay. "The next thing to be considered, is, how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in." (Essay, B. II. ch. viii. § 11.)

In the course of Locke's controversial discussions with the Bishop of Worcester, he afterwards became fully sensible of this important oversight; and he had the candor to acknowledge his error in the following terms: "'Tis true, I have said, that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else. And so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operations. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power in this point by my narrow conceptions. And, therefore,

in the next edition of my book, I will take care to have that passage rectified." It is a circumstance that can only be accounted for by the variety of Mr. Locke's other pursuits, that in all the later editions of the Essay which have fallen in my way, the proposition in question has been allowed to remain as it originally stood.

of natural powers to produce a certain effect. When such a combination is successful, a machine, once set a going, will sometimes continue to perform its office for a considerable time, without requiring the interposition of the artist And hence we are led to conclude, that the case may perhaps be similar with respect to the universe, when once put into motion by the Deity. This idea Leibnitz carried so far as to exclude the supposition of any subsequent agency in the first contriver and mover, excepting in the case of a miracle. But the falseness of the analogy appears from this, that the moving force in every machine is some natural power, such as gravity or elasticity; and, consequently, the very idea of mechanism assumes the existence of those active powers, of which it is the professed object of a mechanical theory of the universe to give an explanation. Whether, therefore, with Malebranche, we resolve every effect into the immediate agency of God, or suppose, with the great majority of Newtonians, that he employs the instrumentality of second causes to accomplish his purposes, we are equally forced to admit with Bacon, the necessity not only of a first contriver and mover, but of his constant and efficient concurrence (either immediately or mediately) in carrying his design into execution :-" Opus," says Bacon, "quod operatur Deus a primordio usque ad finem."

In what I have now said I have confined myself to the idea of Mechanism as it applies to the material universe; for, as to this word, when applied by Leibnitz to the mind, which he calls a Spiritual Automaton, I confess myself quite unable to annex a meaning to it: I shall not, therefore, offer any remarks on this part of his system."

*

To these visionary speculations of Leibnitz, a strong and instructive contrast is exhibited in the philosophy of

" où

Absurd as the hypothesis of a Pre-established Harmony may now appear, not many years have elapsed since it was the prevailing, or rather universal creed, among the philosophers of Germany. "Il fut un temps," says the celebrated Euler, le systême de l'harmonie pré-établie étoit tellement en vogue dans toute l'Allemagne, que ceux qui en doutoient, passoient pour des ignorans, ou des esprits bornés." (Lettres de M. Euler à une Princesse d'Allemagne, 83e Lettre.) It would be amusing to reckon up the succession of metaphysical creeds which have been since swallowed with the same implicit faith by this learned and speculative, and (in all those branches of knowledge where imagination has no influence ov the judgment) profound and inventive nation.

Locke; a philosophy, the main object of which is less to enlarge our knowledge, than to make us sensible of our ignorance; or (as the author himself expresses it)" to prevail with the busy mind of man to be cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities." "My right hand writes," says Locke, in another part of his Essay, "whilst my left hand is still. What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, my right hand rests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact which cannot be denied. Explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand Creation. ..... ... In the mean time, it is an overvaluing ourselves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities; and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite Mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain." * (Vol. II. pp. 249, 250.)

This contrast between the philosophical characters of Locke and of Leibnitz is the more deserving of notice, as something of the same sort has ever since continued to mark and to discriminate the metaphysical researches of the English and of the German schools. Various exceptions to this remark may, no doubt, be mentioned; but

* That this is a fair representation of the scope of Locke's philosophy, according to the author's own view of it, is demonstrated by the two mottos prefixed to the Essay on Human Understanding. The one is a passage of the book of Ecclesiastes, which, from the place it occupies in the front of his work, may be presumed to express what he himself regarded as the most important moral to be drawn from his speculations. "As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child; even so, thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things." The other motto (from Cicero) strongly expresses a sentiment which every competent judge must feel on comparing the above quotations from Locke, with the monads and the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere?' See Note (Y.)

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these exceptions will be found of trifling moment, when compared with the indisputable extent of its general application.

The theory of pre-established harmony led, by a natural and obvious transition, to the scheme of Optimism. As it represented all events, both in the physical and moral worlds, as the necessary effects of a mechanism originally contrived and set a-going by the Deity, it reduced its author to the alternative of either calling in question the Divine power, wisdom, and goodness, or of asserting that the universe which he had called into being was the best of all possible systems. This last opinion, accordingly, was eagerly embraced by Leibnitz; and forms the subject of a work entitled Theodicea, in which are combined together, in an extraordinary degree, the acuteness of the logician, the imagination of the poet, and the impenetrable, yet sublime darkness, of the metaphysical theologian.*

The modification of Optimism, however, adopted by Leibnitz, was, in some essential respects, peculiar to himself. It differed from that of Plato, and of some other sages of antiquity, in considering the human mind in the light of a spiritual machine, and, of consequence, in positively denying the freedom of human actions. According to Plato, every thing is right, so far as it is the work of God;-the creation of beings endowed with free will, and consequently liable to moral delinquency ;—and the government of the world by general laws, from which occasional evils must result,-furnishing no objection to the perfection of the universe, to which a satisfactory reply may not be found in the partial and narrow views of it, to which our faculties are at present confined. But he held at the same time, that, although the permission of moral evil does not detract from the goodness of God, it is nevertheless imputable to man as a fault, and renders him justly obnoxious to punishment. This system (under a

* "La Théodicée seule," says Fontenelle, "suffiroit pour représenter M. Leibnitz. Une lecture immense, des anecdotes curieuses sur les livres ou les personnes, beaucoup d'équité et même de faveur pour tous les auteurs cités, fût-ce en les combattant; des vues sublimes et lumineuses, des raisonnemens au fond desquels on sent toujours l'esprit géométrique, un style où la force domine, et où ce pendant sont admis les agrémens d'une imagination heureuse."-Eloge de Leibnitz."