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of mr, a genera) directory of accounts, and a chancery of the household, court and slate. The heads of all these departments bad the rank of secretaries of state and met in council under the royal presidency. In course of time, however, this body became too unwieldy for an effective cabinet, and Maria Theresa established the touncfl of state. During the early years of the reign of Francis, the emperor kept himself in touch with the various departments by means of a cabinet minister; but he had a passion for detail, and afler 1805 he himself undertook <be function of keeping the administration together. At the same time he had no personal contact with ministers, who might communicate with him only in writing, and for months together Dever met for the discussion of business. The council of state was, moreover, itself soon enlarged and subdivided; and in course of time the emperor alone represented any synthesis of the various departments of the administration. The jurisdiction of the heads of departments, moreover, was strictly defined, and all that lay outside this was reserved for the imperial decision. Whatever was covered by established precedent could be settled by the department at once; but matters falling outside such precedent, however insigniSeant, had to be referred to the throne.1 A system so Inelastic, and so deadening to all initiative, could have but one result. Gradually the officials, high and low, subjected to an elaborate system of checks, refused to lake any responsibility whatever; and the minutest administrative questions were handed up, through all the stages of the bureaucratic hierarchy, to be shelved and forgotten in the imperial cabinet. For Frands could not possibly himself deal with all the questions of detail arising in his vast empire, even had he desired to do so. In fact, his attitude towards all troublesome problems was summed up in Ms favourite phrase, " Let us sleep upon it ": questions unanswered would answer themselves.

The result was the gradual atrophy of the whole administrative machine. The Austrian government was not consciously tyrannical, even in Italy; and Francis himself, though determined to be absolute, intended also to be paternal. Nor would the cruelties inflicted on the bolder spirits who dared to preach reform, which made the Austrian government a by-word among toe nations, alone have excited the passionate spirit of revolt vhich carried all before it in 1848. The cause of this is to be •ought rather In the daily friction of a system which had ceased to be efficient and only succeeded in irritating the public opinion it *a* powerless to curb.

Metternich himself was fully conscious of the evil. He recognized that the fault of the government lay m the fact that it did not govern, and he deplored that his own function, in a decadent age, was but "to prop up mouldering institutions." Ht was not constitutionally averse from change; and he was loo dear-sighted not to see that, sooner or later, change was inevitable. But his intcrcsl was in the fascinating game of diplomacy; he was ambitious of playing the leading pan on the great ttage of international politics; and he was too consummate > courtier to risk the loss of the imperial favour by any insistence on unpalatable reforms, which, after all, would perhaps only reveal the necessity for the complete revolution which he feared. The alternative was to use the whole force of the government to keep things as they were. The disintegrating force of the ever-simmering racial rivalries could be kept in check by the «rray ; Hungarian regiments garrisoned Italy, Italian regiments guirded Galicia, Poles occupied Austria, and Austrians Hungary. The peril from the infiltration of " revolutionary " ideas from without was met by the erection round the Austrian dominions ol a Chinese wall of tariffs and censors, which had, however, no mete success than is usual with such expedients.1 The peril from the independent growth of Liberalism within was guarded against by a rigid supervision of the press and the rc-establishtntcl of clerical control over education. . Music alone flourished, 1 Thus, while the number of recruits, though varying from year M year, could be settled by the war department, the question of the claim of a single conscript for exemption, on grounds not rccognuert by precedent, could only be fettled by imperial decree.

1 Forbidden books were the only ones read, and forbidden newjPlptn the only onei believed.

free from government interference; but, curiously enough, the movements, in Bohemia, Croatia and elsewhere, for the revival of the national literatures and languages—which were to issue in the most difficult problem facing the Austrian government at the opening of the zoth century—were encouraged in exalted circles, as tending to divert attention from political to purely scientific interests. Meanwhile the old system of provincial diets and estates was continued or revived (in 1816 in Tirol and Vorarlbcrg, 1817 in Galicia, 1818 in Caraiola, 1828 in the circle of Salzburg), but they were in no sense representative, clergy and nobles alone being eligible, with a few delegates from the towns, and they had practically no functions beyond registering the imperial decrees, relative to recruiting or taxation, and dealing with matters of local police.' Even the ancient right of petition was seldom exercised, and then only to meet with the imperial disfavour. And this stagnation of the administration was accompanied, as might have been expected, by economic stagnation. Agriculture languished, hampered, as in France before the Revolution, by the feudal privileges of a noble caste which no longer gave any equivalent service to the state; ttade was strangled by the system of high tariffs at the frontier and internal octrois; and finally public credit was shaken to its foundations by lavish issues of paper money and the neglect to publish the budget.

The maintenance within the empire of a system so artificial and so unsound, involved in foreign affairs the policy of preventing the success of any movements by which it Meturmight be threatened. The triumph of Liberal principles «fcft'« or of national aspirations in Germany, or elsewhere f°"%l'r in Europe, might easily, as the events of 1848 proved, *'"" shatter the whole rotten structure of the Habsburg monarchy, which survived only owing to the apathy of the populations it oppressed. This, then, is the explanation of the system of " stability " which Metternich succeeded in imposing for thirty years upon Europe. If he persuaded Frederick William III. that the grant of a popular constitution would be fatal to the Prussian monarchy, this was through no love of Prussia; the Carlsbad Decrees and the Vienna Final Act were designed to keep Germany quiet, lest the sleep of Austria should be disturbed; the lofty claims of the Troppau Protocol were but to cover an Austrian aggression directed to purely Austrian ends' and in the Eastern Question, the moral support given to the "legitimate " authority of the sultan over the " rebel " Greeks was dictated solely by the interest of Austria in maintaining the integrity of Turkey. (See Europe: History; Germany: History; Alexander I. of Russia; Metternich, &c.)

Judged by the standard of its own aims Mctternich's diplomacy was, on the whole, completely successful. For fifteen years after the congress of Vienna, in spite of frequent alarms, the peace of Europe was not seriously disturbed; and even in 1830, the revolution at Paris found no echo in the great body of the Austrian dominions. The isolated revolts in Italy were easily suppressed; and the insurrection of Poland, though it provoked the lively sympathy of the Magyars and Czechs, led to no actual movement in the Habsburg states. For a moment, indeed, Mettcrnich had meditated taking advantage of the popular feeling to throw the weight of Austria Into the scale in favour of the Poles, and thus, by re-establishing a Polish kingdom under Austrian influence, to restore the barrier between the two empires which the partition of Poland had destroyed. But cautious counsels prevailed, and by the victory of the Russian arms the status quo was restored (see Poland).

The years that followed were not wanting in signs of the coming storm. On the and of March 1835 Francis I. died, and was succeeded by his son Ferdinand I. The new emperor rvnttwas personally amiable, but so enfeebled by epilepsy ••«* Ias to be incapable of ruling; a veiled regency had to 'Jjf* be constituted to carry on the government, and the vices of the administration were further accentuated by weakness and divided counsels at the centre. Under these circumstances

1 In Hungary the diet was not summoned at all between tSlt and 1825. nor in Transylvania between 1811 and 1834.

popular discontent made rapid headway. The earliest symptoms of political agitation were in Hungary, where the diet began 10 show signs of vigorous life, and the growing Slav separatist movements, especially in the south of the kingdom, were rousing the old spirit of Magyar ascendancy (see Hungary: History). For everywhere the Slav populations were growing restive under the German-Magyar domination. In Bohemia the Czech literary movement had developed into an organized resistance to the established order, which was attacked under the disguise of a criticism of the English administration in Ireland. "Repeal" became the watchword of Bohemian, as of Irish, nationalists (sec Hum.Mm) Among the southern Slavs the "Illyrian" movement, voiced from 1836 onward in the Illyrian National Gaulle of Ljudevit Gaj, was directed in the first instance to a somewhat shadowy Pan-Slav union, which, on the interference of the Austrian government in 1844, wasexchangcd for the more definite object of a revival of " the Triune Kingdom " (Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia) independent of the Hungarian crown (sec Croatia, &c.). In the German provinces also, in spite of Melternich's censors and police, the national movements in Germany had gained an entrance, and, is the revolution of 1848 in Vienna was to show, the most advanced revolutionary views were making headway.

The most important of all the symptoms of the approaching cataclysm was, however, the growing unrest among the peasants. As had been proved in France in 1789, and was again '" b<: sn°wn '" Russia in igo6, the success of any political revolution depended ultimately upon the attitude of the peasant class. In this lies the main significance of the rising in Galicia in 1846. This was in its origin a Polish nationalist movement, hatched in the little independent republic of Cracow. As such it had little importance; though, owing to the incompetence of the Austrian commander, the Poles gained some initial successes. More fateful was the attitude of the Orthodox Ruthenian peasantry, who were divided from their Catholic Polish over-lords by centuries of religious and feudal oppression. The Poles had sought, by lavish promises, to draw them into their ranks; their reply was to rise in support of the Austrian government. In the fight at Gdow (February 26th), where Benedek laid the foundations of the military reputation that was to end so tragically at Koniggrltz, flail and scythe wrought more havoc in the rebel ranks than the Austrian musketry. Since, in spite of this object-lesson, the Polish nobles still continued their offers, the peasants consulted the local Austrian authorities as to what course they should take; and the local authorities, unaccustomed to arriving at any decision without consulting Vienna, practically gave them carte blaticlie to do as they liked. A hideous jacquerie followed for three or four days; during which cartloads of dead were carried into Tarnow, where the peasants received a reward for every " rebel" brought in.

This affair was not only a scandal for which the Austrian government, through its agents, was responsible; but it placed the authorities at Vienna in a serious dilemma. For the Ruthenians, elated by their victory, refused to return to work, and demanded the abolition of all feudal obligations as the reward of their loyalty. To refuse this claim would have meant the indefinite prolongation of the crisis; to concede it would have been to invite the peasantry of the whole empire to put forth similar demands on pain of a general rising. On the <.-.Hi of April 1846 an imperial decree abolished some of the more burdensome feudal obligations; but this concession was greeted with so fierce an outcry, as an authoritative endorsement of the atrocities, that it was again revoked, and Count Franz von Stadion was sent to restore order in Galicia. The result was, that the peasants saw that though their wrongs were admitted, their sole hope of redress lay in a change of government, and added the dead weight of their resentment to the forces making for revolution. It was th* union of the agrarian with the nationalist movements that made the downfall of the Austrian system inevitable.

The material for the conflagration in Austria was thus all

prepared when in February 1848 the fall of Louis Philippe fanned into a blaze the smouldering fires of revolution throughout Europe On the jrd of March, Kossuih, in the diet at Prcssburg, delivered the famous speech which was the declaration o( war of Hungarian Liberalism against the Austrian system. "From the charnel-house of the Vienna cabinet," he exclaimed, " a pestilential air breathes on us, which dulls our nerves and paralyses the flight of our spirit." Hungary liberated was to become the centre of freedom for all the races under the Austrian crown, and the outcome was to be a new " fraternization of the Austrian peoples." In the* enthusiasm of the moment the crucial question of the position to be occupied by the conflicting nationalities in this" fraternal union " was overlooked. Germanism had so far served &s tie basis of the Austrian system, not as * national ideal, but because "it formed a sort of unnational mediating, and common element among the contradictory and clamorous racial tendencies." But with the growth of the idea of German unity, Germanism had established a new ideal, of which the centre lay beyond the boundaries of the Austrian monarchy, and which was bound to be antagonistic to the aspirations of other races. The new doctrine of the fraternization of the Austrian races would inevitably soon come into conflict with the traditional German ascendancy strengthened by the new sentiment of a united Germany. It was on this rock that, both in Austria and io Germany, the revolution suffered shipwreck.

Meanwhile events progressed rapidly. On the nth of March a meeting of " young Czechs " at Prague drew up t petition embodying nationalist and liberal demands; and on the same day the diet of Lower Austria petitioned the crown (o summon a meeting ol the delegates of the diets to set the Austrian finances in order. To this last proposal the government, next day, gave its consent. But in the actual temper of the Viennese the slightest concession was dangerous. The hall of the diet was invaded by a mob of students and workmen, Koisuth's speech was read and its proposals adapted as the popular programme, and the members of the diet were forced to lead a tumultuous procession to the Uofburg, to force the assent of the government to a petition bated on the catch-words of the Revolution. The authorities, taken by surprise, were forced to temporize and agreed to lay the petition before the emperor. Meanwhile round the hall of the diet a riot had broken out; the soldiers intervened and blood was shed. The middle classes now joined the rebels; and the riots had become a revolution. Threatened by the violence of the mob, Metternich, on the evening of the i jlh of March, escaped from the Hofburg and passed into exile in England.

The fall of Metternich was the signal for the outburst of the storm, not in Austria only, but throughout central Europe. In Hungary, on the jist of March, the government was forced to consent to a new constitution which virtually erected Hungary into an independent state. On the 8th of April a separate constitution was promised to Bohemia; and if the petition of the Croats for a similar concession was rejected, this was due to the armed mob of Vienna, which was in close alliance with Kossuth and the Magyars. The impotence of the Austrian government in this crisis was due to the necessity of keeping the bulk of the Austrian forces in Italy, where the news of Metternich's fall had also led to a concerted rising against the Habsburg rule (see Italy). Upon the fortunes of war in the peninsula depended the ultimate issue of the revolutions so far as Austria was concerned.

The army and the prestige of the imperial tradition were, In fact, the two sheet-anchors-thai enabled the Habsburg monarchy to weather the storm. For the time the latter was the only one available; but it proved invaluable, especially in Germany, in preventing any settlement, until Radetzky's victory of Novara had set free the army, and thus once more enabled Austria, to back h«r policy by force. The Austrian government, in no position to refuse, had consented to send delegates from iut German provinces to the parliament of united Germany, which met at Frankfort on (he i8th of May 1848. The question it once arm* o( the pUce of th« Austrian monarchy in united Germany. Were only its German provinces to be included? Or was it to be incorporated whole? As to the first, the Austrian government would not listen to the suggestion of a settlement vhich would have split the monarchy in half and subjected it lo a double allegiance. As to the second, German patriots could not stomach the inclusion in Germany of a vast non-German population. The dilemma was from the first so obvious that the parliament would have done well to have recognized at once that the only possible solution was that arrived at, after the withdrawal of the Austrian delegates, by the exclusion of Austria altogether and the offer of the crown of Germany to Frederick WillUm of Pnissia. But the shadow of the Holy Empire, immcmorially associated with the house of Habsburg, still darkened the counsels of German statesmen. The Austrian archduke John had been appointed regent, pending the election of an emperor; and the political leaders could neither break loose from the tradition of Austrian hegemony, nor reconcile themselves with the idea of a mutilated Germany, till it was too late, and Austria was once more in a position to re-establish the system devised by her diplomacy at the congress of Vienna. (See Gekmany: Hillary.)

Ibis fatal procrastination was perhaps not without excuse, in view of the critical situation of the Austrian monarchy during 1848. For months after the fall of Metternich Austria was practically without • central government. Vienna itself, where on the Mth of March the establishment of a National Guard was authorised by the emperor, was ruled by a committee of students and citizens, who arrogated to themselves a voice in imperial affairs, and imposed their will on the distracted ministry. On the ijtb of March the government proposed to summon a centra! committee of local diets; but this was far from satisfying public opinion, and on the is'h of April a constitution was proclaimed, including the whole monarchy with the exception of Hungary and Lombardo-Vcncli.i This was, however, met t>r vigorous protests from Czechs and Poles, while its provisions for a partly nominated senate, and the indirect election of deputies, excited the wrath of radical Vienna. Committees of students and national guards were formed; on the uih of May a Central Committee was established; and on the i ';th a fresh insurrection broke out, as a result of which the government once more yielded, recognizing the Central Committee, admitting the right of the National Guard to take an active part in politics, and promising the convocation of a National Convention on the basis of a single chamber ejected by universal suffrage. On the 17th the emperor left Vienna for Innsbruck " for the benefit of hn health," and thence, on the «th, issued a proclamation in fchii.li be cast himself on the loyalty of his faithful provinces, and, while confirming tbe concessions of March, ignored those of the isth of May. The flight of the emperor had led to a revulsion of feeling in Vienna; but the issue of the proclamation and the attempt of the government to disperse the students by closing the university, led to a fresh outbreak on the 26th. Once more tbe ministry conceded all the demands of the insurgents, and even went so far as to hand over tbe public treasury and the responsibility of keeping order to a newly constituted Committee of Public Safety.

The tide was now, however, on the turn. The Jacobinism ol the Vienna democracy was not really representative of any widespread opinion even in the German parts of Austria, while its loud-voiced Germanism excited the lively opposition of the other races. Each of these had taken advantage of the March troubles to press its claims, and everywhere the government had shown the same yielding spirit. In Bohemia, where the attempt to bold elections for the Frankfort parliament had broken down on the opposition of the Czechs and the conservative German aristocracy, a separate constitution had been proclaimed on the 8th of April; on March the ijrd the election by the diet of Agram of Baron Joseph jellachich as ban of Croatia was confirmed, ai a concession to the agitation among the southern Slavs; on the iitn gf March Count Stadion bad proclaimed a new con

stitution for Galicia. Even where, as in the case of the Serbs and Rumans, the government had given no formal sanction to the national claims, the emperor was regarded as the ultimate guarantee of their success; and deputations from the various provinces poured into Innsbruck protesting their loyalty.

To say that the government deliberately adopted the Machiavellian policy of mastering the revolution by setting race against race would be to pay too high a compliment to its capacity. The policy was forced upon it; and was only pursued consciously when it became obvious. Count Stadion began it in Galicia, where, before bombarding insurgent Cracow into submission (April 26), be had won over the Ruthcnian peasants by the abolition of feudal dues and by forwarding a petition to the emperor for the official recognition of their language alongside Polish. But the great object lesson was furnished by the events in Prague, where the quarrel between Czechs and Germans, radicals and conservatives, issued on the i?th of June in a rising of the Czech students and populace. The suppression of this rising, and with it of the revolution in Bohemia, on the i6lh of June, by Prince Windischgratz, was not only the first victory ol the army, but was the signal for the outbreak of a universal race war, in which the idea of constitutional liberty was sacrificed to the bitter spirit of national rivalry. The parliament at Frankfort hailed Windischgratz as a national hero, and offered to send troops to his aid; the German revolutionists in Vienna welcomed every success of Radetzky's arms in Italy as a victory for Germanism. The natural result was to drive the Slav nationalities to the side of the imperial government,'since, whether at Vienna or at Budapest, the radicals were their worst enemies.

The 16th of June had been fatal to the idea of an Independent Bohemia, fatal also to Pan-Slav dreams. To the Czechs the most immediate peribnow seemed that from the German parliament, and in the interests of their nationality they were willing to join the Austrian government in the struggle against German liberalism. The Bohemian diet, summoned for the igth, never met. Writs were issued in Bohemia for the election to the Austrian Rcichsrath; and when, on the loth of July, this assembled, the Slav deputies were found to be in a majority. This fact, which was to lead to violent trouble later, was at first subordinate lo other issues, of which the most important was the question of the emancipation of the peasants. After long debates the law abolishing feudal services—the sole permanent outcome of the revolution—was carried on the 3151 of August, and on the 7th of September received the imperial consent. The peasants thus received all that they desired, and their vast weight was henceforth thrown into the scale of the government against the revolution.

Meanwhile the alliance between the Slav nationalities and the conservative elements within the empire had found a powerful representative in Jellachich, the ban of Croatia, At first, indeed, his activity had been looked at askance at Innsbruck, as but another force making for dis* "Wlr^ integration. He had apparently identified himself"' with the " Illyrian " party, had broken off all communications with the Hungarian government, and, in spite of an imperial edict issued in response to the urgency of Batthyani, had summoned a diet to Agram, which on the oth of June decreed the separation of tbe "Triune Kingdom" from Hungary. The imperial government, which still hoped for Magyar aid against the Viennese revolutionists, repudiated the action of the ban, accused him of disobedience and treason, and deprived him of his military rank. But his true motives were soon apparent, his object was to play off the nationalism of the "Illyrians" against the radicalism of Magyars and Germans, and thus to preserve his province for the monarchy; and the Hungarian radicals played into his hands. The fale of the Habsburg empire depended upon the issue of the campaign in Italy, which would have been lost by the withdrawal of the Magyar and Croatian regiments; and the Hungarian government chose this critical moment to tamper with the relations of the army to the monarchy. In May a National Guard bad been established; and the soldiers of the line were invited to join this, with the promise of higher pay; on the ist of June the garrison of Pest took the oath to the Constitution. On the loth Jellachich issued a proclamation to the Croatian regiments in Italy, bidding them remain and fight for the emperor and the common Fatherland. His loyalty to the tradition of the imperial army was thus announced, and the alliance was cemented between the army and the southern Slavs.

Jellachich, who had gone to Innsbruck to lay the Slav view before the emperor, was allowed to return to Agram, though not as yet formally reinstated. Here the diet passed a resolution denouncing the dual system and demanding the restoration of the union of the empire. Thus was proclaimed the identity of the Slav and the conservative points of view; the radical "Itlyrian " assembly had done its work, and on the oth of July Jellachich, while declaring it "permanent," prorogued it indefinitely "with a paternal greeting," on the ground that the safety of the Fatherland depended now " more upon physical than upon moral force." The diet thus prorogued never met (gain. Absolute master of the forces of the banat, Jellachich now waited until the intractable politicians of Pest should give him the occasion and the excuse for setting the imperial army in motion against them.

The occasion was not to be long postponed. Every day the

rift between the dominant radical element in the Hungarian

parliament and imperial court was widened. Kossuth

"ogsry. an^ ^-s f0j]owcrs were evidently aiming at the complete separation of Hungary from Austria; they were in sympathy, if not in alliance, with the German radicals in Vienna and Frankfort; they were less than half-hearted in their support of the imperial arms in Italy. The imperial government, pressed by the Magyar nationalists to renounce Jellachich and all his works, equivocated and procrastinated, while within its councils the idea of a centralized state, to replace the loose federalism of the old empire, slowly took shape under the pressure of the military party. It was encouraged by the news from Italy, where, on the >sth of July, Radctzky had won the battle of Custozza, and on the 6th of August the Austrian standard once more floated over the towers of Milan. At Custozza Magyar hussars, Croats from the Military Frontier, and Tirolcse sharpshooters had fought side by side. The possibility was obvious of combating the radical and nationalist revolution by means of the army, with its spirit of comradeship in arms and its imperialist tradition.

So early as the beginning of July, Austrian officers, with the permission of the minister of war, had joined the Serb insurgents who, under Stratemirovif, were defying the Magyar power in the banat. By the end of August the breach between the Austrian and Hungarian governments was open and. complete; on the 4th of September Jellachich was reinstated mall his honours, and on the 11 th he crossed the Drave to the invasion of Hungary. The die was thus cast; and, though efforts continued to be made to arrange matters, the time for moderate counsels was passed. The conservative leaders of the Hungarian nationalists, Eotvos and Deak, retired from public life; and, though Batthy&ni consented to remain in office, the slender hope that this gave of peace was ruined by the flight of the palatine (September 34) and the murder of Count Lamberg, the newly appointed commissioner and commander-in-chicf in Hungary, by the mob at Pest (September 37). The appeal was now to arms; and the fortunes of the Habsburg monarchy were bound up with the fate of the war in Hungary (see Hungary: Hillary).

Meanwhile, renewed trouble had broken out in Vienna, where the radical populace was in conflict alike with the government and with the Slav majority of the Reichsrath. Toe German democrats appealed lor aid to the Hungarian government; but the Magyar passion for constitutional legality led to delay, and before the Hungarian advance could be made effective, it was too late. On the 7th of October the emperor Ferdinand had fled from Schonbrunn to Olmutz, a Slav district, whence he issued a proclamation inviting whoever loved "Austria and freedom" to rally round the throne. On the nth WincUschgriLz proclaimed

his intention of marching (gainst rebellious Vienna, and on the i6th an imperial rescript appointed him & field-marshal and Commander-in-chief of all the Austrian armies except that of Italy. Meanwhile, of the Reichsrath, the members of the Right and the Slav majority had left Vienna and announced a meeting of the diet at Brtlnn for the loth of October; all that remained in the capital was a rump of German radicals, impotent in the hands of the proletariat and the students. The defence of the city was hastily organized under Bern; an ex-officer of Napoleon; but in the absence of kelp from Hungary it was futile. On the iSth of October Windischgrau began his attack; on the 1st of November he was master of the city.

The fall of revolutionary Vienna practically involved that of the revolution in Frankfort and in Pest. From Italy the congratulations of Radetzky's victorious army came to Windischgralz, from Russia the even more significant commendations of the emperor Nicholas. The moral of the victory was painted for all the world by the military execution of Robert Blum, whose person, as a deputy of the German parliament, should have been sacrosanct. The time had, indeed, not yet come to attempt any conspicuous breach with the constltu tional principle; but the new ministry was such as the imperial sentiment would approve, inimical to the German ideals of Frankfort, devoted to the traditions of the Habsburg monarchy. At its head was Prince Felix Schwarzenberg ($.».), the "army-diplomat," a statesman at once strong and unscrupulous. On the J?th of November a proclamation announced that the continuation of Austria as a united stale was necessary both for Germany and for Europe. On the 3nd of December the emperor Ferdinand, bound by too many personal obligations to the revolutionary parties to serve as a useful instrument for the new „,>«,„„„ policy, abdicated, and his nephew Francis Joseph oifnaft* ascended the throne. The proclamation of the new Mm**" emperor was a gagcof defiance thrown down to Magyars and German unionists alike: " Firmly determined to preserve undimmcd the lustre of our crown," it ran, " but prepared to share our rights with the representatives of our peoples, we tcust that with God's aid and in common with our peoples we shall succeed in uniting all the countries and races of the monarchy in one great body politic."

While the Rcichsrath, transferred to Kremsier, was discussing "fundamental rights" and the difficult question of how to reconcile the theoretical unity with the actual dualism of the empire, the knot was being cut by the sword on the plains of Hungary. The Hungarian retreat after the bloody battle of Kapolna (February 36-37,1849) was followed by the dissolution of the Kremsier assembly, and a proclamation in which the emperor announced his intention of granting a constitution to the whole monarchy "one and indivisible." On the 4tb of March the constitution was published; but it proved all but as distasteful to Czechs and Croats as to the Magyars, and the speedy successes of the Hungarian arms made it. for the while, a dead letter. It needed the intervention of the emperor Nicholas, in the loftiest spirit of the Holy Alliance, before even an experimental unity of the Habsburg dominions could be established (see Hungary: History).

The capitulation of Vilagos, which ended the Hungarian insurrection, gave Schwarzcnbetg a free hand for completing the work of restoring the ilotut quo anlt and the influence of Austria in Germany. The account of the process by which this was accomplished belongs to the history of Germany ({».). Here it will suffice to say that the terms of the Convention of Olmiltz (November jg, 1850) seemed at the time a complete triumph for Austria over Prussia. As a matter of fact, however, the convention was, in the words of Count Beust," not a Prussian humiliation, but an Austrian weakness." It was in the power of Austria to crush Prussia and to put an end to the dual influence in the Confederation which experience had proved to be unwork* able; she preferred to re-establish a discredited system, and lo leave to Prussia time and opportunity to gather strength for the inevitable conflict.

In r-ji Austria had apparently triumphed over all its difficulties. The revolutionary movements had been suppressed, the attempt of Prussia to assume the leadership in Germany defeated, the old Federal Diet of 1815 had been restored. Vienna again became the centre of a despotic government the objects of which were to Germanize the Magyars and Slavs, to check all agitation for a constitution, and to suppress all attempts to secure a free press. For some ten yean the Austrian dominion groaned under one of the worst possible forms of autocratic government. The failure of the Habsburg emperor to perpetuate this despotic regime was due (i) to the Crimean War, (2) to the establishment of Italian unity, and (3) to the successful assertion by Prussia of its claim to the leadership in Germany. The disputes which resulted in Uk Crimean War revealed the fact that " gratitude " plays but a small part in international affairs. In the minds of Austrian statesmen the question of the free navigation of the Danube, which would have been imperilled by a Russian occupation of the Principalities, outweighed their sense of obligation to Russia, oo which the emperor Nicholas had rashly relied. That Austria i' first took no active part in the war was due, not to any sentimental weakness, but to the refusal of Prussia to go along with fctr aad to the fear of a Sardinian attack on her Italian provinces. But, on the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Principalities, these were occupied by Austrian troops, and on the and of December 1854. a treaty of alliance was signed at Vienna, between Great Britain, Austria and France, by which Austria undertook to occupy Moldavia and Walachia during the continuance of the war and " to defend the frontier of the said principalities against any return of the Russian forces." By Article III., in the event of war between Russia and Austria the alliance both offensive and defensive was to be made effective (Herulel, No. 152). With the progressive disasters of the Russian arms, however, Austria grew bolder, and it was the ultimatum delivered by her to the emperor Alexander II. in December 1855, that forced Russia to come to terms (Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856).

Though, however, Austria by her diplomatic attitude had secured, without striking a blow, the settlement in her sense of the Eastern Question, she emerged from the contest without lilies and without friends. The " Holy Alliance " of the three autocratic northern powers, rcccmcnted at MiinchcngrStz in 1833, which had gained for Austria the decisive intervention of the tsar in 1849, had been hopelessly shattered by her attitude during the Crimean War. Russia, justly offended, drew closer her ties with Prussia, where Bismarck was already hatching the plans which were to mature in 1866; and, if the attitude of Napoleon in the Polish question prevented any revival of the alliance of Tilsit, the goodwill of Russia was assured for France in tLe coming struggle with Austria in Italy. Already tie isolation of Austria had been conspicuous in the congress of Paris, where Cavour, the Sardinian plenipotentiary, laid bare t«'orc assembled Europe the scandal of her rule in Italy. It ns emphasized during the campaign of 1859, when Sardinia, ia alliance with France, laid the foundations of united Italy. The threat of Prussian intervention, which determined the provisions of the armistice of Villafranca, was due, not to love of Austria, but to fear of the undue aggrandizement of France. The campaign of 1850, and the diplomatic events that led up to it, are dealt with elsewhere (sec Italy, Italian Wars, N*pouos III., Cavouk). The results to Austria were two-fold. Externally, she lost all her Italian possessions except Venice; internally, her failure led to the necessity of conciliating public opinion by constitutional concessions.

The proclamation on the ;6th of February 1861 of the new constitution for the whole monarchy, elaborated by Anton von SchroerUng, though far from satisfying the national aspirations of the races within the empire, at least gave Austria a temporary popularity in Germany; the liberalism of the Habsburg monarchy *u favourably contrasted with the "reactionary" policy of Prussia, where Bismarck was defying the majority of the diet in hii determination to build up the military power of Prussia. Toe meeting of the princes summoned to Frankfort by the m t*

emperor Francis Joseph, in 186.5, revealed the ascendancy of Austria among the smaller slates of the Confederation; but it revealed also the impossibility of any consolidation of the Confederation without the co-operation of Prussia, which stood outside. Bismarck had long since decided that the matter could only be settled by the exclusion of Austria altogether, and that the means to this end were not discussion, but " Blood and Iron." The issue was forced by the developments of the tangled Schleswig-Holstein Question (4.0.), which led to the definitive breach between the two great German powers, to the campaign of 1866, and the collapse of Austria on the field of Koniggratz (July 3. See Seven Weeks' Wak). (VV. A. P.; A. Hl.)

The war of 1866 began a new era in the history of the Austrian empire. By the treaty of Prague (August 23,1866) the emperor surrendered the position in Germany which his ancestors had held for so many centuries; Austria and Tirol, Bohemia and Salzburg, ceased to be German, and eight million Germans were cut off from all political union with their fellow-countrymen. At the same time the surrender of Venetia completed the work of 1859, and the last remnant of the old-established Habsburg domination in Italy ceased. The war was immediately followed by a reorganization of the government. The Magyar nation, Lstnbiith' as well as the Czechs, had refused to recognize the "">»<»' validity of the constitution of 1861 which had estab- <*««»•' lished a common parliament for the whole empire; °"""nl"r; they demanded that the independence of the kingdom of Hungary should be restored. Even before the war the necessity of coming to terms with the Hungarians had been recognized. In June 1865 the emperor Francis Joseph visited Pest and replaced the chancellors of Transylvania and Hungary, Counts Francis Zichy and Naddsdy, supporters of the February constitution, by Count Majlalh, a leader of the old conservative magnates. This was at once followed by the resignation of Schmcrling, who was succeeded by Count Richard Belcredi. On the 20th of September the Reichsrath was prorogued, which was equivalent to the suspension of the constitution; and in December the emperor opened the Hungarian diet in person, with a speech from the throne that recognized the validity of the laws of 1848. Before any definite arrangement as to their re-introduction could be made, however, the war broke out; and aflcr the defeats on the field of battle the Hungarian diet was able to make its own terms. They recognized no union between their country and the other parts of the monarchy except that which was based on the Pragmatic Sanction.1 All recent innovations, all attempts made during the last hundred years to absorb Hungary in a greater Austria, were revoked. An agreement was made by which the emperor was to be crowned at Pest and take the ancient oath to the Golden Bull; Hungary (including Transylvania and Croatia) was to have its own parliament and its own ministry; Magyar was to be the official language; the emperor was to rule as king; there was to be complete separation of the finances; not even a common nationality was recognized between the Hungarians and the other subjects of the emperor; a Hungarian was to be a foreigner in Vienna, an Austrian a foreigner in Budapest. A large party wished indeed that nothing should be left but a purely personal union similar to that between England and Hanover. Defik and the majority agreed, however, that there should be certain institutions common to Hungary and the rest of the monarchy; these were—(i) foreign affairs, including the diplomatic and consular service; (2) the army and navy; (3) the control of the expenses required for these branches of the public service.

Recognizing in a declaratory act the legal existence of these common institutions, they also determined the method by which they should be administered. In doing so they carried out with great exactitude the principle of dualism, establishing in form a complete parity between Hungary on one side and the other territories of the king on the other. They made it a condition

1 For the separate political histories of Austria and Hungary tee the section on If. Austria Proper, below, and Hungary; the present section deals with the hiitory of the whole monarchy

as such.

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