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comprising « joint Auttro-Hungirian tariff 31 a basis for the negotiation of new commercial treaties with Germany, Italy and oilier states. This arrangement, which for the sake of brevity will henceforth be referred to as the Szcll- Korber Compact, wu destined to play an important part in the history of the next few years, though it was never fully ratified by either parliament and was ultimately discarded. Its conclusion was prematurely greeted as the end of a period of economic strife between the two halves of the monarchy and as a pledge of a decade of peaceful development. Events were soon to demon* itrite toe baselessness of these hopes.
In the autumn of looj the Austrian and the Hungarian governments, at the instance of the crown and in agreement f.,^ *ith the joint minister for war and the Austrian and ,^£^ Hungarian ministers for national defence, laid before their respective parliaments bills providing for an increase of 11,000 men in the annual contingents of recruits. : ••-• -co men were needed for the joint army, and the remainder (or the Austrian and Hungarian national defence troops (Landwehr and bonvid). The total contribution of Hungary would have been some 6500 and of Austria some 14,500 men. The military authorities made, however, the mistake of detaining in barradu several thousand supernumerary recruits (i.e. Itcnriti liable to military service but in excess of the annual 1O}fno enrollable by law) pending the adoption of the Army bills by the two parliaments. The object of this apparently high-handed step was to avoid the expense and delay of summoning the supernumeraries again to the colours when the bills should have received parliamentary sanction; but it was not unnaturally resented by the Hungarian Chamber, which has ever fnntfllM a lively sense of its prerogatives. The Opposition, consisting chiefly of the independence party led by Francis Kos-suth (eldest son of Louis Kossuth), made capital out of the grievance and decided to obstruct ministerial measures until the supernumeraries should be discharged. The estimates could not be sanctioned, and though Kossuth granted the S/<'11cabinet a vote on account for the first four months of 1003, the Government found itself at the mercy of the Opposition. At the end of 1903 the supernumeraries were discharged—too late to calm the ardour of the Opposition, which proceeded to demand that the Army bills should be entirely withdrawn or that, if adopted, they should be counterbalanced by concessions to Magyar nationalist feeling calculated to promote the use of the Magyar language in the Hungarian part of the army and to render the Hungarian regiments, few of which arc purely Magyar, more and more Magyar in character, b:•' 11, who vainly advised the crown and the military authorities to make timely concessions, was obliged to reject these demands which enjoyed the secret support of Count Albert Apponyi, the Liberal president of the Chamber and of his adherents. The obstruction of the estimates continued. On the tst of May the Szill cabinet found itself without supply and governed (or a time " ac-ltx "; Szell, who had lost the confidence of the crown, resigned and was succeeded (June 36) by Count Khuen-Hedervary, previously ban, or governor, of Croatia. Before taking office KhuenBederviry negotiated with Kossuth and other Opposition traders, who undertook that obstruction should cease if the Army bills were withdrawn. Despite the fact that the Austrian Army bill bad been voted by the Reichsrath (February 19), the crown consented to withdraw the bills and thus compelled the Austrian parliament to repeal, at the dictation of the Hungarian obstructionists, what it regarded as a patriotic measure. Austrian feeling became embittered towards Hungary and the action of the crown was openly criticized.
Meanwhile the Hungarian Opposition broke its engagement. Obstruction was continued by a section of the Independence TA» party; and Kossuth, seeing his authority ignored,
*,f?,r resigned the leadership. The obstructionists now •»"*• •' raised the cry that the German words of command *""" in the joint army must be replaced by Magyar words In the regiments recruited from Hungary—a demand which, •put from its disintegrating influence on the army, the crown
considered to be an encroachment upon the royal military prerogatives as denned by the Hungarian Fundamental Law XII. of 1867. Clause u of the law runs:—" In pursuance of the constitutional military prerogatives of His Majesty, everything relating to the unitary direction, leadership and inner organization of the whole army, and thus also of the Hungarian army as a complementary part of the whole army, is recognized as subject to His Majesty's disposal." The cry for the Magyar words of command on which the subsequent constitutional crisis turned, was tantamount to a demand that the monarch should differentiate the Hungarian from the Austrian part of the joint army, and should render it impossible for any but Magyar officers to command Hungarian regiments, less than half of which have a majority of Magyar recruits. The partisans of the Magyar words of command based their claim upon clause 12 of the Fundamental Law XII. of 1867—which runs:— "Nevertheless the country reserves its right periodically to complete the Hungarian army and the right of granting recruits, Ike fixing of the conditions on which the recruits are granU4, the fixing of the term of service and all the dispositions concerning the stationing and the supplies of the troops according to existing law both as regards legislation and administration." Since Hungary reserved her right to fix the conditions on which recruits should be granted, the partisans of the Magyar words of command argued that the abolition of the German words of command in the Hungarian regiments might be made such a condition, despite the enumeration in the preceding clause 11, of everything appertaining to the unitary leadership and inner organization of the joint Austro-Hungarian army as belonging to the constitutional military prerogatives of the crown. Practically, the dispute was a trial of strength between Magyar nationalist feeling and the crown. Austrian feeling strongly supported the monarch in his determination to defend the unity of the army, and the conflict gradually acquired an intensity that appeared to threaten the very existence of the dual system.
When Count Khuen-Hedcrviry took office and Kossuth relinquished the leadership of the independence party, the extension of the crisis could not be foreseen. A few extreme nationalists continued to obstruct the estimates, and it appeared as though their energy would soon flag. An attempt to quicken this process by bribery provoked, however, an outburst of feeling against Khuen-Hedcrvary who, though personally innocent, found his position shaken. Shortly afterwards Magyar resentment of an army order issued from the cavalry manoeuvres at Chlopy in Galicia—in which the monarch declared that he would "hold fast to the existing and well-tried organization of the army" and would never "relinquish the rights and privileges guaranteed to its highest war-lord"; and of a provocative utterance of the Austrian premier Korber in the Reichsrath led to the overthrow of the Khucn-Hcdcrvary cabinet (September 30) by an immense majority. The cabinet fell on a motion of censure brought forward by Kossuth, who had profited by the bribery incident to resume the leadership of his party.
An interval of negotiation between the crown and many leading Magyar Liberals followed, until at the end of October 1003 Count Stephen Tisza, son of Koloman Tisza, accepted a mission to form a cabinet after all others had declined, jfaa?" As programme Tisza brought with him a number of concessions from the crown to Magyar nationalist feeling in regard to military matters, particularly in regard to military badges, penal procedure, the transfer of officers of Hungarian origin from Austrian to Hungarian regiments, the establishment of military scholarships for Magyar youths and the introduction of the two years' service system. In regard to the military language, the Tisza programme—which, having been drafted by a committee of nine members, is known as the " programme of the nine "—declared that the responsibility of the cabinet extends to the military prerogatives of the crown, and that "the legal influence of parliament exists in this respect as in respect of every constitutional right." The programme, however, expressly excluded for "weighty political reasons affecting great interests of the nation" the question of the military language; and on Tisz.Vs motion the Liberal party adopted an addendum, sanctioned by the crown: " the party maintains the standpoint that the king has a right to fix the language of service and command in the Hungarian army on the basis of his constitutional prerogatives as recognized in clause 11 of law XII. of 1867."
Notwithstanding the concessions, obstruction was continued by the Clericals and the extreme Independents, partly in the hope of compelling the crown to grant the Magyar words of command and partly out of antipathy towards the person of the young calvinist premier. In March 1904, Tisza, therefore, introduced a drastic " guillotine " motion to amend the standing orders of the House, but withdrew it in return for an undertaking from the Opposition that obstruction would cease. This time the Opposition kept its word. The Recruits bill and the estimates were adopted, the Delegations were enabled to meet at Budapest —where they voted £22,000,000 as extraordinary estimates for the army and navy and especially for the renewal of the field artillery—and the negotiations for new commercial treaties with Germany and Italy were sanctioned, although parliament had never been able to ratify the Sze'll-Kbrber compact with the tariff on the basis of which the negotiations would have to be conducted. But, as the autumn session approached, Tisza foresaw a new campaign of obstruction, and resolved to revert to his drastic reform of the standing orders. The announcement of his determination caused the Opposition to rally against him, and when on the i8th of November the Liberal party adopted a " guillotine " motion by a show of hands in defiance of orthodox procedure, a section of the party seceded. On the > >th of December the Opposition, infuriated by the formation of a special corps of parliamentary constables, invaded and wrecked the Chamber. Tisza appealed to the country and suffered, on the .'iili of January 11105. an overwhelming defeat at the hands of a coalition composed of dissentient Liberals, Clericals, Independents and a few BanfTyites. The Coalition gained an absolute majority and the Independence party became the strongest political group. Nevertheless the various adherents of the dual system retained an actual majority in the Chamber and prevented the Independence party from attempting to realize its programme of reducing the ties between Hungary and Austria to the person of the joint ruler. On the ? -,t li of January, the day before his defeat, Count Tisza had signed on behalf of Hungary the new commercial treaties concluded by the Austro-Hungarian foreign office with Germany and Italy on the basis of the Szell-Kflrbcr tariff. He acted ultra vires, but by his act saved Hungary from a severe economic crisis and retained for her the right to benefit by economic partnership with Austria until the expiry of the new treaties in 1917
A deadlock, lasting from January 1905 until April 1906, ensued between the crown and Hungary and, to a great extent, between Hungary and Austria. The Coalition, though ot'yos. possessing the majority in the Chamber, resolved not to take office unless the crown should grant its demands, including the Magyar words of command and customs separation from Austria. The crown declined to concede these points, cither of which would have wrecked the dual system as interpreted since 1867. The Tisza cabinet could not be relieved of its functions till June 1903, when it was succeeded by a nonparliamentary administration under the premiership of General Baron Fcjervary, formerly minister for national defence. Seeing that the Coalition would not take office on acceptable terms, FejervSry obtained the consent of the crown to a scheme, drafted by Krist6ffy, minister of the interior, that the dispute between the crown and the Coalition should be subjected to the test of universal suffrage and that to this end the franchise in Hungary be radically reformed. The scheme alarmed the Coalition, which saw that universal .suffrage might destroy not only the hegemony of the Magyar nobility and gentry in whose hands political power was concentrated, but might, by admitting the nun-Magyars to political equality with the Magyars, undermine the supremacy of the Magyar race itself. Yet the Coalition did not yield at once. Not until the Chamber had been dissolved
by military force (February 19,1006) and an open breach of tht constitution seemed within sight did they come to terms wuh the crown and form an administration. The miserable state of public finances and the depression of*trade doubtless helped to induce them to perform a duty which they ought to have performed from the first; but their chief motive was the desire to escape the menace of universal suffrage or, at least, to make sure that it would be introduced in such a form as to safeguard Magyar supremacy over the other Hungarian races.
The pact concluded (April 8, 1906) between the Coalition and the crown is known to have contained the following conditions •— All military questions to be suspended until after the ^^ introduction of universal suffrage; the estimates I90t and the normal contingent of recruits to be voted for 190$ and 1906; the extraordinary military credits, sanctioned by the delegations in 1904, to be voted by the Hungarian Chamber; ratification of the commercial treaties concluded by IV.. i. election of the Hungarian Delegation and of the Quota-Deputation; Introduction of a suffrage reform at least as far reaching as the Krist&ffy scheme. These " capitulations" obliged the Coalition government to carry on a dualist policy, although the majority of its adherents became, by the general election of May 1906, members of the Kossuth or Independence party, and, as such, pledged to the economic and political separation of Hungary from Austria save as regards the person of the ruler. Attempts were, however, made to emphasize the Independence of Hungary. During the deadlock (June 2, 1905) Kossuth had obtained the adoption of a motion to authorize the. compilation of an autonomous Hungarian tariff, and on the »8th of May 1906, the Coalition cabinet was authorized by the crown to present the Szfll-Kfirbcr tariff to T he Chamber in the form of a Hungarian autonomous tariff distinct from but identical with the Austrian tariff. This concession of form having been made to the Magyars without the knowledge of the Austrian government, Prince Konrad Hohcnlohe, the Austrian premier, Tcsigned office; and his successor, Baron Beck, eventually (July 6) withdrew from the table of the Reichsrath the whole Szell-Kfirber compact, declaring that the only remaining economic ties between the two countries were freedom of trade, the commercial treaties with foreign countries, the joint state bank and the management of excise. If the Hungarian government wished to regulate its relationship to Austria in a more definite form, added the Austrian premier, it must conclude a new agreement before the end of the year 1907, when the reciprocity arrangement of 1899 would lapse. The Hungarian government replied that any new arrangement with Austria must be concluded in the form of a commercial treaty as between two foreign states and not in the form of a " customs and trade alliance."
Austria ultimately consented to negotiate on this basis. In October 1907 an agreement was attained, thanks chiefly to the sobering of Hungarian opinion by a severe economic crisis, which brought out with unusual clearness the i^UToi fact that separation from Austria would involve a ifor. period of distress if not of commercial ruin for Hungary. Austria also came to see that separation from Hungary would seriously enhance the cost of living in Cisleithania and would deprive Austrian manufacturers of their best market. The main features of the new "customs and commercial treaty" were: (i) Each state to possess a separate but identical custom) tariff. (2) Hungary to facilitate the establishment of direct railway communication between Vienna and Dnlmatia, the communication to be established by the end of 1911, each state building the sections of line that passed through its own territory. (3) Austria to facilitate railway communication between Hungary and Prussia. (4) Hungary to reform her produce and Stock Exchange laws so as to prevent speculation in agrarian produce. (5) A court of arbitration to be established for the settlement of differences between the two states, Hungary selecting four Austrian and Austria four Hungarian judges, the presidency of the court being decided by lot, and each government being represented before the court by its own delegates. (6) Impedimenta to free trade in sugar to be practically abolished. (7) Hungary to be entitled to redeem her share of the old Austrian debt (originally bearing interest at j and now at 4-9%) at the rate of 4-31; % within the next ten yean; if not redeemed within ten yean the rale of capitalization to decrease annually by <pi% until it reaches4'»%. This arrangement represents a potential economy o( some £>.ooo,ooo capital, for Hungary as compared with the original Austrian demand that the Hungarian contribution to the service of the old Austrian debt be capitalized at 4-1%. (8) The securities of the two governments to rank as investments for savings banks, insurance companies and similar institutions in both countries, but not as trust fund investment*. (9) Commercial treaties with foreign countries to be negotiated, not, as hitherto, by the joint minister for foreign affairs alone, but also by a nominee of each government. (10) The quota of Austrian and Hungarian contribution to joint expenditure to be 63-6 and 36-4 respectively—an increase of i % in the Hungarian quota, equal to some £200,000 a year.
The economic dispute between Hungary and Austria was thus settled for ten years after negotiations lasting more than twelve yean. One important question, however, that of the future of the joint Stale Bank, was left over for subsequent decision. During the negotiations for the customs and commercial treaty, the Austrian government attempted to- conclude for a longer period than ten years, but was unable to overcome Hungarian resistance. Therefore, at the end of 1017, the commercial treaties with Germany, Italy and other countries, and the AustroHungarian customs and commercial treaty, would all lapse. Ten yean of economic unity remained during which the Dual Monarchy might grow together or grow asunder, increasing iccordingly in strength or in weakness. (H. W. S.) •
During this period of internal crisis the international position of the Dual Monarchy was threatened by two external dangers. The unrest in Macedonia threatened to reopen the Eastern Question in an acute form; with Italy the irredentist attitude of the ZanardeUi cabinet led in 1002-1003 to such strained relations that war seemed imminent. The southern Tirol, the chief passes into Italy, strategic points on' the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, wen strongly fortified, while in the interior the Tan em, Karawanken and Wochcin railways were constructed, partly in order to facilitate the movement of troops towards the Italian border. The tension was relaxed with the fall of the Zanardelli government, and comparatively cordial relations •era gradually re-established.
In the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula a temporary agreement with Russia was reached in 1003 by the so-called "February __^ Programme," supplemented in the following October JJJJ* by the "Murzsteg Programme" (see Macedonia; TirUBY;E(n)OFE: Bulay). The terms of theMurzsteg programme were observed by Count Goluchowski, in spite of the ruin of Russian prestige in the war with Japan, so long as he remained in office. In October 1006, however, he retired, and it was soon clear that his successor, Baron von Aerenthal,' was determined to take advantage of the changed European situation to Ukc up once more the traditional policy of the Habsburg monarchy in the Balkan Peninsula. He gradually departed from the Murzsteg basis, and in January 1908 deliberately undermined the Austro-Russian agreement by obtaining from the sultan a concession for a railway from the Botnian frontier through the sanjak of Novibazar to the Turkish terminus at Mitrovitza. This was done in the teeth of the expressed wish of Russia; it roused the helpless resentment of Senna, whose economic dependence upon the Dual Monarchy was emphasized by the outcome of the war of tariffs into which (he had plunged in 1006, and who saw in this scheme another link in the chain forged for hex by the Habsburg empire; it
1 -\l,.i-, Count I <•• .1 von Aerenthal, was born on the a?th of September 1854 at GroM-Ska) in Bohemia, studied at Bonn and Prague, wasattache at Paris (1877) am) afterwards at St Petersburg, twvoy extraordinary at Bucharest (1895) and ambassador at St Ptlrnburp (1696). He was created a count on the emperor's 79th birthday in 1909.
offended several of the great powers, whb seemed to see in this railway concession the .price of the abandonment by AustriaHungary of her interest in Macedonian reforms. That Baron von Aerenthal was able to pursue a policy apparently so rash, was due to the fact that he could reckon on the support of Germany. The intimate relations between the two powers had been' revealed during the dispute between France and Germany about Morocco; in the critical division of the 3rd of March 1006 at the Algeciras Conference Austria-Hungary, alone of all the powers, had sided with Germany, and it was a proposal of the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary that formed the basis of the ultimate settlement between Germany and France (see Morocco: It: t •••;>. The cordial relations thus emphasized encouraged Baron Aerenthal, in the autumn of 1008, to pursue a still bolder policy. The revolution in Turkey had entirely changed the face of the Eastern Question; the problem of Macedonian reform was swallowed up in that of the reform of the Ottoman empire generally,' there was even a danger, that a rejuvenated Turkey might in time lay claim to the provinces occupied by Austria-Hungary under the treaty of Berlin; in any case, the position of these provinces, governed autocratically from Vienna, between a constitutional Turkey and a constitutional Austria-Hungary, would have been highly anomalous. In the circumstances Baron Aerenthal determined on a bold policy. Without consulting the co-signatory powers of the treaty of Berlin, and in deliberate violation of its provisions, the king-emperor issued, on the i ;Ui of October, a decree annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg Monarchy, and at the same time announcing the withdrawal of the AustroHungarian troops from the sanjak of Novibazar.. (See Europe: History.)
Meanwhile the relations betwc'en the two halves of the Dual Monarchy had again become critical. The agreement of 1907 had been but a truce in the battle between two irreconcilable principles: between Magyar nationalism, rf»/!i[DJ' determined to maintain its ascendancy in an indc- tf^tats. pendent Hungary, and Habsburg imperialism, equally determined to preserve the economic and military unity of the Dual Monarchy. In this conflict the tactical advantage lay with the monarchy; for the Magyars were in a minority in Hungary, their ascendancy was based on a narrow and artificial franchise, and it was open to the king-emperor to hold in terrcrtm over them an appeal to the disfranchised majority. It was the introduction of a Universal Suffrage Bill by Mr Joseph Krist6ffy, minister of the interior in the "unconstitutional" cabinet of Baron Fejerviry, which brought the Opposition leaders in theHungarian parliament to terms and made possible the agreement of roo?. But the Wekerle ministry which succeeded that of Fejerviry on the 9th of April 1006 contained elements which made any lasting compromise impossible. The burning question of'the " Magyar word-of command " remained unsettled, save in so far as the fixed determination of the king-emperor had settled it; the equally important question of the renewal of the charter of the Austro-Hungarian State .Bank had also formed no part of the agreement of 1907. On the other hand, the Wekerle ministry was pledged to a measure of franchise reform, a pledge which they showed no eagerness to redeem, though the granting of universal suffrage in the Austrian half of the Monarchy had made such a change inevitable. In March 1908 Mr Hallo laid before the Hungarian parliament a formal proposal that the charter of the Anstro-Hungarian Bank, which was to expire at the end of 1910, should not be renewed; and that, in the event of failure to negotiate a convention between the banks of Austria and Hungary, a separate Hungarian Bank should be established. This question, obscured during the winter by the Balkan crisis, once more became acute in the spring of i goo. In the Coalition cabinet itself opinion was sharply divided, but in, the end the views of the Independence party prevailed, and Dr Wekerle laid the proposal for a separate Hungarian Bank before the king-emperor and the Austrian government. Its reception was significant. The emperor Francis Joseph pointed out that the question of a separate Bank for Hungary did not figure in the act of 1867, and could not be introduced into it, especially since the capital article of the ministerial programme, i.e. electoral reform, was not realised, nor near bring realised. This was- tantamount to an appeal from the Magyar fcopuius to the Hungarian plebs, the disfranchised non-Magyar majority; an appeal all the more significant from the fact that it ignored the suffrage bill brought in on behalf of the Hungarian government by Count Julius Andrissy fa November 1908, a bill which, under the guise of granting the principle of universal suffrage, was ingeniously framed so as to safeguard and even to extend Magyar ascendancy (sec Hungary: History), In consequence of this rebuff Dr Wckerle tendered his resignation on the 27th of April. Months passed without it being possible to form a new cabinet, and a fresh period of crisis and agitation was begun. (W. A. P.)
II. Austria Proper since i.°'.«.
As already explained, the name Austria is used for convenience to designate those portions of the possessions of the house of Habsburg, which were not included by the settlement of 1867 among the lands of the Hungarian crown. The separation of Hungary made it necessary to determine the method by which these territories' were henceforth to be governed It was the misfortune of the country that there was.no clear legal basis on which new institutions could be erected. Each of the territories was a separate political unit with a separate history, and some of them had a historic claim to a large amount of selfgovernment; in many the old feudal estates had survived till 1848. Since that year the empire had been the subject of numerous experiments in government; by the last, which began in 1860, Landlagc or'diets have been instituted in each of the territories on a nearly uniform system and with nearly identical powers, and by the constitution published in February 1861 (the February Constitution, as it is called), which is still n, the ultimate basis for the government, there was
instituted a Rcichsratk or parliament for the whole empire; it consisted of a 'House of Lords (Herrenoa' kaus), in which sat the archbishops and prince bishops, members of the imperial family, and other members appointed for b'fe, besides some hereditary members, and a Chamber of Deputies. The members of the latter for each territory were not chosen by direct election, but by the diets. The diets themselves were elected for six years; they went chosen generally (there were slight local differences) in the following way: (a) a certain number of bishops and rectors of universities sat in virtue of their office; (l>) the rest of the members were chosen by four electoral bodies or turiac,—(i) the owners of estates which before 1848 had enjoyed certain feudal privileges, the so-called great proprietors; (2) the chambers of commerce, (3) the towns; (4) the rural districts. In the two latter classes all had the suffrage who paid at least ten gulden in direct taxes. The districts were so arranged as to give the towns a yery large representation in proportion to their populations. In Bohemia, e.g., the diet consisted of 241 members: of these five were ex oficit members; the feudal proprietors had seventy; the towns and chambers of commerce together had eighty-seven; the rural districts seventy-nine. The electors in the rural districts were 236,000, in the towns 03,000. This arrangement seems to have been deliberately made by Schmcrling, so as to
1 It i> impossible to avoid using the word " Austria " to designate these territories, though jt is probably incorrect. Officially the word *' Austria" is not found, and though the sovereign is emperor of Austria, an Austrian, empire appears not to exist; the territories arc spolccn of in official documents as "-the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrath." Toe Hungarians and the German party in Austria have expressed their desire that the word Austria should be used, but it has not been gratified. On the other hand, expressions such as "Austrian citizens," "Austrian law" arc found. The reason of this peculiar Use is probably twofold. On the one hand, a reluctance to confess that Hungary is no longer in any sense- a part of Austria; on the other hand, the refusal of the Czechs to recognize that their country is part of Austria. Sometimes the word Erblander. which properly is applied only to the older ancestral dominions of the bouK-of Habsburg, is used for want at a better word.
give greater power to the German inhabitants of the towns; the votes of the proprietors would, moreover, nearly always give the final decision to the court and the government, for the influence exercised by the government over the nobility would generally be strong enough to secure a majority in favour of the government policy'
This constitution had failed; territories so different in size, history and circumstances were not contented with similar institutions, and a form of self-government which satisfied Lower Austria and Salzburg did not satisfy Galicia and Bohemia. The Czechs of Bohemia, like the Magyars, had refused to recognize the common parliament on the ground that it violated the historic rights of the Bohemian as of the Hungarian crown, and in 1865 the constitution of jS6i had been superseded, while the territorial diets remained. In 1867 it was necessary once more to summon, in some form or another, a common parliament for the whole of Austria, by which the settlement with Hungary could be ratified.
This necessity brought to a decisive issue the struggle between the parties of the Centralists and Federalists. The tatter claimed that the new constitution must be made by Cmm* agreement with the territories; the former maintained ten m*4 that the constitution of 1861 was still valid, and "•<•«"*• demanded that in accordance with it the Reichsrath '*"' should be summoned and a "constitutional" government restored.. The difference between the two parties was to a gnat extent, though not entirely, one of nee. The kernel of the empire was the purely German district, Including Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tirol (except the south) and Vorarlberg, all Styria except the southern districts, and a large part of Carinthia. There was strong local feeling, especially in Tirol, but it was local feeling similar to that which formerly existed in the provinces of France; among all classes and parties there was great loyalty both to the ruling house and to the idea of the Austrian state; but while the Liberal party, which was dominant in Lower Austria' and Styria, desired to develop the central institutions, there was a strong Conservative and Clerical party which supported local institutions as a protection against the Liberal influence of a centralized parliament and bureaucracy, and the bishops and clergy were willing to gain support in the struggle by alliance with the Federalists.
Very different was it in the other territories where the majority of the population was not German—and where there was • lively recollection of the lime when they were not Austrian. With Palacky, they said, "We existed'" before Austria; we shall continue to exist after it is gone." Especially was this the case in Bohemia. In this great country, the richesl part of the Austrian dominions, where over three-fifths of the population were Czech, racial feeling was supported by the appeal to historic law. A great party, led by Palacky and Ricger, demanded the restoration of the Bohemian monarchy in its fullest extent, including Moravia and Silesia, and insisted that the emperor should be crowned as king of Bohemia at Prague as his predecessors had been, and that Bohemia should have a position In the monarchy similar to that obtained by Hungary. Not only did the party include all the Czechs, but they were supported by many of the great nobles who were of German descent, including Count Leo Thun, his brother-in-law Count Heinrich Clam-Martinitz, and Prince Fricdrich von Schwarzenberg, cardinal archbishop of Prague, whb hoped in a self-governing kingdom of Bohemia to preserve that power which was threatened by the German Liberals. The feudal nobles had great power arising from their wealth, the great traditions of their families, and the connexion with the court, and by the electoral law they had a large number of representatives in the diet. On the other hand the Germans of Bohemia, fearful of falling, under the control of the Czechs, were the most ardent advocates of centralization. The Czechs were supported also by their fellow-countrymen in Moravia, and some of the nobles, headed by Count Belcredi, brother of the minister; but in Bruno there was a strong German party. In Silesia the Germans had a considerable majority, and as there was a large Polish element which did not support the Cttchs, the diet refused to recognize the claims of the Bohemians.
The Poles of Galicia stood apart from the other Slav races. The German-speaking population was very small, consisting chiefly of government officials, railway servants and Jews; bat there was a large minority (some 43%) of Ruthcnes. The Poles wished to gain as much autonomy as they could for their own province, but they had no interest in opposing the centralization of other parts; they were satisfied if Austria would surrender the Ruthenes to them. They were little influenced by the pan-Slav agitation; it was desirable for them that Austria, which gave them freedom and power, should continue strong and united. Their real interests were outside the monarchy, and they did not cease to look forward to a restoration of the Polish kingdom. The great danger was that they might entangle Austria in a war with Russia.
The southern Slavs had neither the unity, nor the organization, nor the historical traditions of the Czechs and Poles; but the Slovenes, who formed a large majority of the population in Canuola, and a considerable minority in the adjoining territory of Carinthia and the south of Styria, demanded that their language should be Used for purposes of government and education. Their political idea! wasan" lilyrian "kingdom, including Croatia and all the southern Slavs in the coast district, and a not very successful movement had been started to establish a wcalled lllyrian language, which should be accepted by both Croats and Slovenes. There was, however, another element in the southern districts, viz. the Serbs, who, though of the same race and language as the Croats, were separated from them by religion Belonging to the Orthodox Church they were attracted by Russia. They were in constant communication with Servia and Montenegro; And their ultimate hope, the creation of a great Servian kingdom, was less easy to reconcile with loyalty to Austria. Of late years attempts have been made to turn the Slovenian national movement into this direction, and to attract the Slovenes also towards the Orthodox non-Austrian Slavs.
In the extreme south of Dalmatia is a small district which had not formed part of the older duchy of Dalmatia, and had not been Tg-fll joined to the Austrian empire tilt 1814, in former years timmtt*. P*rt °f '* formed the republic of Ragusa, and the rest belonged to Albania. The inhabitants of this part, who chiefly belonged to the Greek Church, still kept up a close connexion with Albania and with Montenegro, and Austrian authority waa maintained with difficulty. Disturbances had already broken out once before: and in 1869 another outbreak took place. This district had hitherto been exempted from military service; by the law of 1869. which introduced universal military service, those who had hitherto been exempted were rvuuircd ta nerve, not in the regular irmy but in the militia. The inhabitants of the district round the BorchediCattaro (the Bocchwi. as t hey arc commonly called) refused t'j obey this order, and when a military force was sent it failed to overcome their resistance; and by an agreement made at Kne'zlac m December 1869. Rodics, who had taken command, granted the iruurgrnts all they asked and a complete amnesty. After the conquest of Bosnia another attempt was made to enforce military scnric*: once more a rebellion broke out, and spread to the ranlifuous districts of Herzegovina. This time, however, the government, whine position in the Balkan* had been much strengthened by the occupation of the new provinces, did not fear to act with decanon. A considerable force was sent undcrGeneral Baron Stephan vun Jovanovich (1828-1885): they were supported from sea by the tLivv. and eventually the rebellion was crushed. An amnesty was proclaimed, but the greater number of the insurgents sought refuge m Munteaegro rather than submit to military service.
TEc Italians of Trieste and Istria were the only people of the empire who really desired separation from Austria; annexation to Italy was the aim of the //i/tanimmf, as they were called. The feeling was less strong in Tirol, where, except in the city of Trent, they srem chiefly to have wished for separate local institutions, Hi that they should no longer be governed from Innsbruck. The Italian-speaking population on the coast of Dalmatia only a&krd that the government should uphold them against the pressure of the Slav race* in the interior, and for this reason were ready to support the German constitutionalists.
The party gf centralization was then the Liberal German
party, supported by a few* Italians and the Ruthcnes, and as years went by it was to become the National German party. They hoped by a common parliament to create the ocrtn»a feeling of a common Austrian nationality, by German Comttto*schools to spread the use of the German language. *£ffy Every grant of self-government to the territories ***" must diminish the influence of the Germans, and bring about a restriction in the use of the German language; moreover, in countries such as Bohemia, full self-government would almost certainly mean that the Germans would become the subject race. This was a result which they could not accept. It was intolerable to them that jus! at the time when the national power of the non-Austrian Germans was so greatly increased, and the Germans were becoming the first race in Europe, they themselves should resign the position as ruins which they had won during the last three hundred years. They maintained, moreover, that the ascendancy of the Germans was the only means of preserving the unity of the monarchy; German was the only language in which the different races could communicate with one another; ft must be the language of the army, the civil service and the parliament. They laid much stress on the historic task of Austria in bringing German culture to the half-civilized races of the east. They demanded, therefore, that all higher schools and universities should remain German, and that so far as possible the elementary schools should be Germanized. They looked on the German schoolmaster as the apostle of German culture, and they looked forward to the time when the feeling of a common Austrian nationality should obscure the national feeling of the Slavs, and the Slavonic idioms should survive merely as the local dialects of the peasantry, the territories becoming merely the province* of a united and centralized state. The total German population was not quite a third of the whole. The maintenance of their rule was, therefore, only possible by the exercise of great political ability, the more so, since, as we have seen, they were not united among themselves, the clergy and Feudal party being opposed to the Liberals, Their watchword was the constitution of 1861. which had been drawn up by their leaders; they demanded that it should be restored, and wilh it parliamentary government. They called themselves, therefore, the Constitutional party. But the Introduction of parliamentary government really added greatly to the difficulty of the task before them. In the old days German ascendancy had been secured by the common army, the civil service and the court. As soon, however, as power was transferred to a parliament, the Germans must inevitably be in a minority, unless the method of election was deliberately arranged so as to give them a majority. Parliamentary discussion, moreover, was sure to bring out those racial differences which it was desirable should be forgotten, and the elections carried into every part of the empire a political agitation which was very harmful when each party represented a different race.
The very first events showed one of those extraordinary changes of policy so characteristic of modern Austrian history. The decision of the government on the constitutional question was really determined by immediate practical necessity. The Hungarians required that the settlement should be ratified by a parliament, therefore a parliament must be procured which would do this. It must be a parliament in which the Germans had a majority, for the system of dualism was directly opposed to the ambitions of Ihe Slavs and the Federalists. Belcredi, who had come into power in 1865 as a Federalist, and had suspended the constitution of 1861 on the 2nd of January '1867, ordered new elections for the diets,' which were then to elect deputies to an extraordinary Reichsrath which should consider the A usglficH, or compact with Hungary. The wording of the decree implied that the February constitution did not exist as of law; the Germans and Liberals, strenuously objecting to a "feudalfederal '* constitution which would give the Slavs a prepondeti ance in the empire, maintained that thcFebruaryconstitution was still in force, and that changes could only be introducedbya regular Reichsrath summoned in accordance with it, protested against the decree, and, in some cases, threatened not to-take part in the elections. As the Federalists