As a result of the injury there is partial vision left in the injured eye estimated by Dr. Andrews as 22-100. The Referee has found that practically this means that the claimant cannot see anything with his right eye until he is within two feet of the object and even by the aid of glasses he has only 22-100 of efficiency with his left eye closed. The medical testimony unites upon the belief that the normal condition of the injured eye will never be restored while the uninjured eye remains normal. A physician furnished the prog nosis that if in the future the present uninjured eye should be lost that the claimant would gain by that loss normal vision by the use of a lens fitted to the injured eye.

Dr. Andrews testified that "if he (meaning the claimant) had his other eye injured in any way, then he could not see. He would be practically blind. Ordinarily he doesn't see anything with his right eye until he is within two feet of the object. With a glass he can only see 22-100 with the left eye closed and when he has both eyes injured, the eye will not get any better and will not get any worse." Further Dr. Andrews testified that in his opinion the claimant had suffered the loss of the use of his right eye. also find the following in Dr. Andrews' testimony:

We

Q. Do I understand you to say that Mr. Hayden has 22-100 vision with a glass?

Q. Is that the very best glass that can possibly be used?

A. Yes sir.

Q. I understand you to find that he would be practically blind if the other eye was lost?

A. He can see my hand about two feet away from him and as far as getting around is concerned he cannot.

Q. He can't use a glass at the present time?

A. No sir.

Q. Suppose his good eye was lost could you fit him with a glass? A. Yes sir for 22-100 but no more.

Q. If his good eye was lost you could give him a glass for his injured eye?

A. Yes sir, but he would have only 22-100 vision.

Q. Then his injured eye he could use if he lost his other eye?
A. He couldn't work and couldn't get around.

Dr. Kleinhans, whose expert knowledge cannot be questioned, in answer to the Referee's question as to the condition of the injured eye as to vision, said: "Without lenses, I should say his vision is about 10-200."

Then the Referee asked:

Q. Do you think that a person having 10-200 of his eye sight is of any assistance to him?

A. Assistance only in that it may give protection on that side. He sees on that side and can recognize objects and the smaller the object the less would be able to use that eye.

Q. To get normal vision in the other eye, he must lose the uninjured eye?

A. Yes, sir, before he could wear correcting lenses.

The Referee had before him the physical demonstration of the claimant and the direct testimony of the attending physician that for all intents and purposes the claimant's eye is destroyed. And he also had the admissions of the experts that in order that this eye should be restored to any valuable degree of its normal condition the claimant would be compelled to lose his good eye; and that then by adjustment of lenses to the present injured one there probably would be a restoration of a certain percentage of vision.

The Workmen's Compensation Act never contemplated such fine distinctions. A careful reading of this testimony is absolutely convincing that this claimant had lost the use of his eye and ought to be compensated in terms of the Act. It is not within the spirit of the law that in the interpretation of this Act we should apply any unnatural meaning to its language in order to defeat its plain provisions. The Referee adopted a common sense conclusion. He is supported in it by the evidence of the claimant and his physician, together with the admissions of the experts. To the claimant who finds himself without the use of an eye it is a very poor answer that vision could be restored to that member should he lose the sight of the other one.

The award of the Referee is affirmed and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Caesarino v. Royer & Herr.

Modification of Agreement.

Duration of injury undetermined modification refused.

Claimant represented by John C. Nissley, Harrisburg.
Defendant represented by E. L. Howard, Philadelphia.

OPINION BY MACKEY-Chairman-January 23, 1917.

Petition for modification of Compensation Agreement No. 58875. We are not able to grant the prayer of this petition and must sustain the finding of the Referee to whom it was sent for a hearing. The Referee heard the evidence and recommended that there be no modification in the agreement which is now on file and upon which the defendant is paying compensation.

It has been thoroughly established that at the present time the claimant is unable to work but how long his status will continue such no one can state, therefore, there is not basis upon which commutation could be granted.

The recommendation of the Referee is affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

*Caesarino v. Royer & Herr.

(3 Dept. Reports, 1967).

Commutation of compensation payments.

If the duration of a claimant's disability is uncertain, there can be no commutation of compensation payments.

Claimant represented by John C. Nissley, Harrisburg.
Defendant represented by E. L. Howard, Philadelphia.

OPINION BY MACKEY-Chairman-June 16, 1917.

In the above case the Board has extended every opportunity to the claimant to establish a status whereby we could find some way of relieving his situation. There is no question but that the claimant was seriously and perhaps permanently injured while engaged in the employ of the defendant. He is under compensation at this time. We have had him examined by disinterested experts and while the seriousness of his present condition is not denied, nevertheless, no physician nor surgeon can say how long this condition will continue. It may continue for the full 500 weeks, which would be the number of weeks of compensation for permanent disability, or the symptoms may clear up in a week, month or a year.

The claimant's condition of total disability at the present time might be reduced to partial disability within a short time by an unexpected recuperation, therefore, the Board has no date upon which it can grant commutation.

In order that our statisticians or actuarial experts may be able to compute present values from continuing payments there must be a definite and fixed term during which such payments are to run, otherwise, there can be no mathematical calculation. In the case of a lost member the Act specifically schedules the number of weeks during which the claimant shall be compensated so that when we have that class of cases before us present value can be computed with certainty, but in the case at bar we could not adopt one week nor five hundred as a basis of commutation,

*See page 567, Cases Appealed to Courts,

We find as a fact in this case that it would be for the best interests of the claimant to have his compensation commuted to present value and to have it paid to him in a lump sum. The man has apparently been rendered helpless. He is in a strange country, removed from his friends and his compensation is not sufficient to maintain him. Under the undisputed testimony, were we able to award his compensation in a lump sum in present value he could return to his native land where he would be surrounded by his own kin and where he could secure more comfort at less cost.

But under the foregoing facts there can be no commutation in this

case.

Boezina v. Forge Coal Mining Co.

(3 Dept. Reports, 181).

Injured by accident-Evidence sufficient to sustain award for hernia.

While working in a mine an employe slipped with one foot going backward and the other going forward. Immediately afterward he became violently ill with eramps or sickness in the abdominal region. A physician found that he had suffered a hernia. Held, that the Referee's findings of fact warranted by the testimony and sufficient to sustain an award for hernia.

Appellant represented by McCann & McCann, Ebensburg.
Appellee represented by James Feeley, Dunlo.

OPINION BY COMMISSIONER LEECH-January 23, 1917.

There is but a single question of fact raised by this appeal to wit: Did the claimant suffer an injury by reason of an accident occuring in the course of his employment by the defendant company?

This case is on all-fours with Smith v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 2 Dept. Reports, 1119 in which the Board held that:

"An injury by accident', is an injury resulting from a mishap or untoward event which is not expected or designed. Although the injury received is due to the performance of an operation which is in the ordinary course of the employe's work, it is an 'injury by accident', and is compensable.

"Where a strain causes a protusion of the bowels the injury is compensable, even though the protusion occurs at a point weakened by congenital malformation or preexisting hernia."

The Referee found that while the claimant was employed in the defendant's mine working at taking up bottom in a low place he slipped with one foot going backwards and the other foot going

forward, immediately afterward was seized with severe cramps or sickness in the abdominal regions, shortly afterwards he went to a physician who made an examination and pronounced it hernia and directed the claimant to a hospital where he underwent an operation. These findings of fact are all based upon sufficient competent testimony and will not be disturbed.

The award is therefore affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

*Franzek v. Forty Fort Coal Co.

(3 Dept. Reports, 256).

Hearing de novo---
-When it will be granted.

After a hearing de novo the Board filed its opinion, whereupon the claimant presented a petition, supported by exparte affidavits, alleging after discovered evidence, and requesting that a rule be granted upon the defendant to show cause why a second hearing de novo should not be granted. The rule was granted, argued, and a second hearing de noro granted as prayed for.

Claimant represented by R. J. Dever, Wilkes-Barre.
Defendant represented by John R. Wilson, Scranton.

OPINION BY MACKEY-Chairman-Jnauary 25, 1917. And now January 12, 1917, a hearing de novo is hereby awarded, the time and place of the same to be hereafter fixed by the Board. Since filing the opinion in this case a petition was presented by claimant's counsel to stay the running of the time for appeal, alleging after discovered evidence and praying for an opportunity to prepare the same for presentation to this Board.

Ex-parte evidence was presented to the Board in the form of physicians' reports and affidavits, a copy of which was furnished to the defendant.

This Board then entered a rule upon the defendant to show cause why under these additional facts and information a hearing de novo should not be granted. Time was fixed for argument. Both sides appeared and were heard by the Board.

The Board is satisfied that a hearing de novo will at least give both sides an opportunity to present evidence that will more clearly define the facts and will lead to a more satisfactory situation than at the present time, for the whole case now seems involved in doubt.

*See page 567, Cases Appealed to Courts.