have for shooting Witte was that I was irritated at the condition of my feet and angry at the porter for the way he had used me." And although his violent attack was deliberately directed against the deceased employe, we agree with the conclusion of the Referee that the circumstances of the shooting, considered in the light of the testimony, clearly indicate the assault upon Witte was against him as an employe and not because of reasons personal to him.

It is contended that the wage basis should be $18 per week and not $20 as taken by the Referee. This objection is disposed of by the agreement of the parties written into the testimony, page 10.

The last paragraph of Section 309, which reads: "Where the employe is working under concurrent contracts with two or more employers, his wages from all employers shall be considered as if earned from the employer liable for compensation," taken in connection with the deceased employe's contract with the Borough and receipts therefrom, justify the agreement that $20 was the average weekly wage proper for a basis of conputation of compensation.

The record shows that the expense of the last sickness and burial amounted to about $135, all of which was paid by the defendant. The testimony is not clear under what circumstances this amount was paid. It is contended by the defendant's counsed that the payment was made at the request of the claimant and should therefore be treated as an advance payment on compensation. The Referee has not found that this amount was paid upon request of the claimant nor do we find from the testimony in the record such to be the fact; besides, as we construe the Act the obligation upon the defendant to pay the reasonable expense of the last sickness and burial, where death results within fourteen days, shall not exceed the sum of $100, and any amount paid in excess of this must be treated as a voluntary contribution. To allow credit beyond $100 in this case will compel the claimant to pay an obligation out of the compensation due her which the law does not require her to pay.

Referee affirmed and appeal dismissed.

*Casteel r. Elliott & Fisher.

Evidence-Sufficiency of-Award-When it will be sustained.

If the Board is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence, the award of the Referee will be sustained.

"See page 567, Cases Appealed to Courts.

Appellant represented by Simon H. Sell, Bedford.
Appellee represented by Edw. M. Pennell, Bedford.

OPINION BY MACKEY-Chairman-January 31, 1917.

The Referee has found that Rumzy Casteel, the husband of the claimant, was killed while working for Shannon Elliott; that, at the time of the injury, the said deceased was in the course of his employer's business, and both were under the terms of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915.

After a careful reading of all the testimony, we find no error in either the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or award of the Referee. We find from the evidence that the deceased, Rumzy Casteel, died as the result of an injury received in the course of his employment, and that the said death occurred on September 20, 1916; that he left to survive him the claimant, his lawful widow, and two sons, William Mead Casteel, born February 14, 1907, and Harold Alvin Casteel, born April 10, 1915. We find that his daily wage was $1.25 or an average weekly wage of $6.88. We find that the deceased was an employe of the said Shannon Elliott within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, and that he was not engaged in agriculture and thereby exempt from the provisions of this law by Act No. 343. The award of the Referee is accordingly affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

*Dimple v. Fromm.

(3 Dept. Reports 320.)

Agriculture-When employe is engaged in.

While cranking an automobile preparatory to going to a railroad station for some lime which was to be used in white-washing the buildings in which chickens were kept, an employe on a chicken and poultry farm was fatally injured. Held, that the employe was engaged in an agricultural occupation when injured and the Referee's award of compensation was reversed.

Per Commissioner Leech: "A farmer may cultivate all of his land, or only a part of it. He may engage in general farming or he may specialize. The tendency of the times is to produce specialists in all occupations, and if the farmer chooses to devote his time, talents, energy and capital in any particular direction, whether it be raising crops, raising stock, raising poultry, raising fruit, dairying or any other employment incidental to farming or agriculture in this broad sense, he may do so without taking himself out of his occupation as generally understood.

"For these reasons the Board is of the opinion that the legislature used the term ‘agriculture' in its broad sense and intended to include within its meaning such employments and pursuits as are usually connected with and incidental to the work of farming or agriculture as ordinarily understood.”

*See page 567, Cases Appealed to Courts.

Appellant represented by W. C. McClure, Pittsburgh.
Appellee represented by Wm. F. Knoell, Pittsburgh.

OPINION BY COMMISSIONER LEECH-January 31, 1917.

This appeal raises a most important question of law, to wit: The proper interpretation and application of the word "agriculture," as used in Act No. 343 of June 3, 1915, P. L. 777, entitled

"A Supplement to an Act entitled The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915,' to exempt domestic servants and agricultural workers from the provisions thereof." Which contains but a single section, as follows: .

"Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., That nothing contained in any article or any section of an Act entitled The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915 shall apply to or in any way affect any person who, at the time of the injury, is engaged in domestic service, or agriculture."

Early in the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act the Board, as the request of parties interested and in doubt as to the proper procedure, felt called upon to express its thought upon a number of matters, so that those concerned might have the benefit of the suggestions of the Board. In doing so the Board was governed by a desire to extend the beneficient features of the Compensation Act to as large a number of workmen as possible, in line with the thought so well expressed by Chairman Mackey in Marsh v. Groner, 2 Dept. Reports, page 1108:

"The policy of the law is against the creation of any situation whereby a workman can be engaged in his occupation within the State of Pennsylvania and be deprived thereby of the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act."

With this thought in view the Board adopted and published on February 25, 1916, the following rule:

"Those engaged in the business of fruit growing, poultry and stock raising, dairying and horticulture as a business, and not merely as incidental to general farming, come under the Compensation Act of 1915 and are not exempted by Act No. 343 of June 3, 1915, which is a Supplement to the said Act."

(Ruling 11, 2 Dept. Reports 310.)

This rule met with some opposition on the part of those interested generally in agriculture and after several meetings at which the question was thoroughly discussed from every angle the Board, upon

mature deliberation, concluded that the rule adopted, as cited above, had gone too far in limiting and restricting the word "agriculture" and therefore on May 18, 1916, rescinded its former action and withdrew the rule, leaving those interested to act upon their own judgment until such time as the question might be brought before the Board upon a concrete case when it would express its views of the proper interpretation of the term "agriculture" as used in the said Supplemental Act.

The case before us clearly raises this question and we shall address ourselves to the task of answering it.

The Referee found the following important facts:

That at the time of the accident the deceased, Joseph Dimple, husband of the claimant, was employed by the defendant to manage the defendant's chicken and poultry farm, which consisted of about twenty-two acres, and was situate in Cranberry Township, Butler County, Pennsylvania, and that the deceased was employed for the purpose of looking after the chickens of which there were, at the time of the accident, about one thousand on the farm, and that while there was a garden patch on the farm, and some wheat and grain raised thereon, the greater part of the raising of truck and farm products was done by other employes.

He further found that on June 22, 1916, Joseph Dimple, the hus band of the claimant, was cranking an automobile upon the farm premises for the purpose of starting it in order that he might go to a nearby station to meet his wife on her return from Pittsburgh, and also to bring back to the farm some lime purchased by his wife for use in white-washing the buldings in which the chickens were kept. The automobile started unexpectedly and pinned the deceased Joseph Dimple against the building, the spring of the automobile catching him in the throat and tearing it to such an extent that he died a few hours thereafter.

The Referee further found that the claimant was the widow of the deceased Joseph Dimple, and was dependent upon him for support. Upon these facts he arrived at the following conclusion of law:

"That the contract of employment between Joseph Dimple and the defendant, in which the said Joseph Dimple was to manage and operate a poultry or chicken farm for the defendant, and incidental thereto to do some gardening and raising some wheat and other crops, was not such a contract of employment as exempted the said Joseph Dimple from the provisions of Article 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, under the Supplement to said Act approved the 3rd day of June, 1915, exempting such employes as are engaged in domestic service or agriculture for the reason that the principal service to be rendered by the said Joseph

Dimple to his employer was connected with poultry rais-
ing, and the injury sustained by him which caused his
death was sustained while engaged in performing work
in connection with poultry raising under his contract
of employment."

There is no doubt that in his conclusion of law in this case the Referee was, to some extent, influenced by the rule adopted by the Board, which was later withdrawn.

This appeal presents two questions:

First. Whether the raising of poultry upon a farm is agriculture, and,

Second. Assuming that poultry raising is agriculture, whether the task upon which the deceased was engaged at the time of the accident, was so closely related thereto as to be regarded as an agricultural occupation.

The Supplemental Act exempts any person, who at the time of the injury is engaged in domestic service or agriculture.

We take this to mean that the fact that a workman is employed as a farm laborer is not controlling,but that the test to be applied is the character of the work upon which he was engaged at the time of the injury. Thus, if a farm laborer is, when injured, engaged in some work which is clearly not agricultural in its nature, the Supplemental Act would not apply to him, and he would be covered by the Compensation Act, and would be entitled to compensation from his employer.

On the other hand, an employe whose general work is not agricultural, but who is temporarily engaged in agricultural work or in farm labor, and meets with an accident while so engaged, the Supplemental Act would apply to him, and he could not, if injured, claim the benefit of the Compensation Act, nor could his dependents claim compensation thereunder, if death resulted from his injuries.

So it has been held in California that where a farmer temporarily engages in ordinary teaming, such as hauling water from a mine, he takes himself out of the exempted classes and his employe is within the protection of the Compensation Act of that state.

Jenkins v. Pieratt, 1 Ind. Acc. Com. Cal. 114.

So a carpenter, who works in both carpentry and in farm labor, is employed by a farmer as a carpenter to build a cottage, and is injured while so doing, is entitled to compensation.

Blaine v. McKinsey, 1 Ind. Acc. Com. Cal. 641.
Craig v. Hartson, 2 Ind. Acc. Com. Cal. 235.
Cowles v. Alexander, 2 Ind. Acc. Com. Cal. 615.

So also a workman helping to construct a dam for an artificial lake on a farm (Feehan v. Lewis, 2 Ind. Acc. Com. Cal. 434); and a ma