some of the Courts of Justice international. The Caisse de la Dette, the result of the Cave Mission, established international control over a large portion of the revenue. By the Goschen Mission, the next in order of time, the State railways were internationalized. Then came the Rivers Wilson Mission, in consequence of which the control was extended to the enormous landed property of the Khedive. Driven to desperation, Ismail made a virtue of necessity and accepted, in September 1878, a Constitutional Ministry, under the presidency of Nubar Pasha, with Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance and De Blignières as Minister of Public Works. Professing to be quite satisfied with this arrangement, he pompously announced that Egypt was no longer in Africa, but a part of Europe; but before seven months had passed he found his Constitutional position intolerable, got rid of his irksome Cabinet by means of a secretly-organized military riot in Cairo, and reverted to his old autocratic methods of government. England and France could hardly sit still under this affront, and decided to administer chastisement by the hand of the Suzerain Power, which was delighted to have an opportunity of asserting its authority. On 26th June 1879 Ismail suddenly received from the Sultan a curt telegram, addressed to him as ex-Khedive of Egypt, informing him that his son Tewfik was appointed his successor. Taken unawares, he made no attempt at resistance, and Tewfik was at once proclaimed Khedive.

of Dual

After a short period of inaction, when it seemed as if the change were for the worse, England and France summoned Re-estabup courage to look the situation lishment boldly in the face, and re-established the Dual Control in the persons of Major Baring and M. Control. de Blignières. For two years the Dual Control governed Egypt, and initiated the work of progress that England was to continue alone. Its essential defect was what might be called insecurity of tenure. Without any efficient means of self-protection and coercion at its disposal, it had to interfere with the power, privileges, and perquisites of a class which had long misgoverned the country. This class, so far as its civilian members were concerned, was not very formidable, because these were not likely to go beyond the bounds of intrigue and passive resistance; but it contained a military element who had more courage, and who had learned their power when Ismail employed them for overturning his Constitutional

Ministry. Among the mutinous soldiers on that Arabi and occasion was a fellah officer calling himself the revolt Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian. He was not a of 1882. man of exceptional intelligence or remarkable

powers of organization, but he was a fluent speaker, and could exercise some influence over the masses by a rude kind of native eloquence. Behind him were a group of men, much abler than himself, who put him forward as the figurehead of a party professing to aim at protecting the Egyptians from the grasping tyranny of their Turkish and European oppressors. The movement began among the Arab officers, who complained of the preference shown to the officers of Turkish origin; it then expanded into an attack on the privileged position and predominant influence of foreigners, many of whom, it must be confessed, were of a by no means respectable type; finally it was directed against all Christians, foreign and native. The Government, being too weak to suppress the agitation and disorder, had to make concessions, and each concession produced fresh demands. Arabi was first promoted, then made Under-Secretary for War, and ultimately a member of the Cabinet. The danger of a serious rising brought the British and French fleets in May 1882 to Alexandria, and after a massacre (11th June) had been perpetrated by the Arab mob in that city, the British Admiral bombarded the

Single

The

handed

British inter

vention.

forts (11th July 1882). The leaders of the National Movement prepared to resist further aggression by force. A conference of Ambassadors was held in Constantinople, and the Sultan was invited to quell the revolt; but he hesitated to employ his troops against Mussulmans who were professing merely to oppose Christian aggression. At last the British Government determined to employ armed force, and invited France to co-operate. French Government declined, and a similar invitation to Italy met with a similar refusal. England therefore, having to act alone, landed troops at Ismailia under Sir Garnet Wolseley, and suppressed the revolt by the battle of Tel-el-Kebir on 13th September 1882. The Khedive, who had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned to Cairo, and a Ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as one of its leading members. On assuming office, the first thing it had to do was to bring to trial the chiefs of the rebellion. Had the Khedive and Riaz been allowed a free hand, Arabi and his colleagues would have found little mercy. Thanks to the intervention of the British Government, their lives were spared. Arabi pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted by the Khedive to banishment; and Riaz resigned in disgust. This solution of the difficulty was brought about by Lord Dufferin, then British Ambassador at Constantinople, who had been sent to Egypt as High Commissioner to adjust affairs and report on the situation. One of his first acts, after preventing the application of capital punishment to the ringleaders of the revolt, was to veto the project of protecting the Khedive and his Government by means of a Prætorian guard recruited from Asia Minor, Epirus, Austria, and Switzerland, and to insist on the principle that Egypt must be governed in a truly liberal spirit. Passing in review all the departments of the administration, he laid down the general lines on which the country was to be restored to order and prosperity, and endowed, if possible, with the elements of self-government for future use.

1884.

The laborious task of putting these general indications into a practical shape fell to Sir Evelyn Baring, who arrived as Consul - General and Diplomatic Sir Evelyn Agent, in succession to Sir Edward Malet, in Baring January 1884. At that moment the situation appointed was singularly like that which had existed on Consul two previous occasions: firstly, when Ismail General, was deposed, and secondly, when the Dual Control had undermined the existing authority without having any power to enforce its own. For the third time in little more than three years the existing authority had been destroyed and a new one had to be created. But there was one essential difference: the power that had now to reorganize the country possessed in the British army of occupation a support sufficient to command respect. Without that support Sir Evelyn Baring could have done little or nothing; with it he did perhaps more than any other single man could have done. His method may be illustrated by an old story long current in Cairo. Mohammed Ali was said to have appointed as Mudir or governor in a turbulent district a young and inexperienced Turk, who asked, "But how am I to govern these people?" 'Listen," replied the Pasha; "buy the biggest and heaviest kurbash you can find; hang it up in the centre of the Mudirieh, well within your reach, and you will very seldom require to use it." The British army of occupation was Sir Evelyn's kurbash; it was well within his reach, as all the world knew, and its simple presence sufficed to prevent disorder and enforce obedience. He had one other advantage over previous English reformers in Egypt: his position towards France was more independent. The Dual Control had been abolished by a Khedivial decree of 18th January 1883,

and replaced by an English financial adviser. France naturally objected; but having refused to co-operate with England in suppressing the revolt, she could not reasonably complain that her offer of co-operation in the work of reorganization was declined.

of evacua

At first the intention of the British Government was simply to restore the power of the Khedive, to keep His Highness for some time in the right path by The policy friendly advice, and to withdraw the British tion. troops as soon as possible. As Lord Granville explained in a Circular to the Powers, the position of England in Egypt imposed on her "the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress." But there was to be no embarking on a general scheme of reforms, which would increase unnecessarily the responsibilities of the protecting Power and necessitate the indefinite prolongation of the military occupation. So far, therefore, as the British Government had a definite policy in Egypt, it was a politique de replâtrage. Even this policy was not strictly adhered to. Mr Gladstone's Cabinet was as unstable as the public opinion it sought to conciliate. It had its hot fits and its cold fits, and it gave orders now to advance and now to retreat. In the long-run circumstances proved too strong for it, and it had to undertake a great deal more than it originally intended. Each little change in the administration engendered a multitude of others, so that the modest attempts at reform were found to be like the letting out of water. A tiny rill gradually became a boisterous stream, and the boisterous stream grew into a great river, which spread to all sections of the administration and ended by inundating the whole country.

question.

Of the numerous questions awaiting solution, the first to claim immediate attention was that of the Sudan. The British Government had begun by excluding it The Sudan from the problem, and by declaring that for events in these outlying territories it must not be held responsible. In that sphere of activity, therefore, the Egyptian Government might do as it thought fit. The principle of limited liability which this attitude assumed was soon found to be utterly untenable. The Sudan was an integral part of the Khedive's dominions and caused, even in ordinary times, a deficit of £200,000 to the Egyptian Treasury. At that moment it was in a state of open rebellion, stirred up by a religious fanatic who proclaimed himself a Mahdi or Messias of Islam. An army of 10,000 men under an English general, Hicks Pasha, had been sent to suppress the revolt, and had been annihilated in a great battle fought on 5th November 1883, near Obeid. The Egyptian Government wished to make a new attempt to recover the lost province, and the idea was certainly very popular among the governing class, but Sir Evelyn Baring vetoed the project on the ground that Egypt had neither soldiers nor money to carry it out. In vain the Khedive and his Prime Minister, Sherif Pasha, threatened to resign, and the latter actually carried out his threat. The British representative remained firm, and it was decided that the Sudan should be, for the moment at least, abandoned to its fate. Nubar, though as strongly opposed to the abandonment policy as Sherif, consented to take his place and accepted somewhat reluctantly the new régime, which he defined as administration of Egypt under the government of Baring." By this time the Mahdi was master of the greater part of the Sudan, but Khartum and some other fortified points still held out. The efforts made to extricate the garrisons, including the mission of General Gordon, the fall of Khartum, and the Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley

"the

are described below, in the account given of military operations. The practical result was that the Khedive's authority was limited to the Nile Valley north of Wadi Halfa.

Internal

reorganization.

With the internal difficulties Sir Evelyn Baring had been struggling bravely ever since his appointment, trying to evolve out of the ever-changing policy and contradictory orders of the British Government some sort of coherent line of action, and to raise the administration to a higher standard. For two or three years it seemed doubtful whether he would succeed. All over Egypt there was a feeling of unrest, and the well-meant but not very successful efforts of the British to improve the state of things were making them very unpopular. The introduction of English officials and English influence into all the administrative departments was resented by the native officials, and the action of the irrigation officers in preventing the customary abuses of the distribution of water was resented by the great landowners, who had been, from time immemorial, in the habit of taking as much as they wanted, to the detriment of the fellaheen. Even these latter, who gained most by the reforms, considered that they had good reason to complain, for the defeat of Arabi and the re-establishment of order had enabled the Christian money-lenders to return and insist on the payment of claims, which were supposed to have been extinguished by the rebellion. Worst of all, the Government was drifting rapidly towards insolvency, being quite unable to fulfil its obligations to the bondholders and meet the expenses of administration. All · departments were being starved, and even the salaries of poorly paid officials were in arrear. To free itself from its financial difficulties the Government adopted a heroic remedy which only created fresh troubles. On the advice of Lord Northbrook, who was sent out to Cairo in September 1884 to examine the financial situation, certain revenues which should have been paid into the Caisse for the benefit of the bondholders were paid into the Treasury for the ordinary needs of the administration. Immediately the Powers protested against this infraction of the law of liquidation, and the Caisse applied for a writ to the Mixed Tribunals. In this way the heroic remedy failed, and to the internal difficulties were added international complications.

Fortunately for Egypt, the British Government contrived to solve the international difficulty by timely concessions to the Powers, and succeeded in negotiating the London Convention of March 1885, by which the Egyptian Government was relieved from some of the most onerous stipulations of the Law of Liquidation, and was enabled to raise a loan of £9,000,000 for an annual payment of £135,000. After paying out of the capital the sums required for the indemnities due for the burning of Alexandria and the deficits of the years 1882 and 1883, it still had a million sterling, and boldly invested it in the improvement of irrigation. The investment proved most remunerative, and helped very materially to save the country from bankruptcy and internationalism. The danger of being again subjected to the evils of an international administration was very great, for the London Convention contained a stipulation to the effect that if Egypt could not pay her way at the end of two years, another International Commission would be appointed.

To obviate this catastrophe the British reformers set to work most energetically. Already something in the way of retrenchment and reform had been accomplished. The public accounts had been put in order, and the abuses in the collection of the land tax removed. The constant drain of money and men for the Sudan had been stopped. A beginning had been made for creating a new army to S. III. 89

replace the one that had been disbanded and to allow of a portion of the British garrison being withdrawn. In this work Sir Evelyn Wood had shown much sound judgment as well as great capacity for military organization, and had formed an efficient force out of very unpromising material (see above, under ARMY). His colleague in the Department of Public Works, Sir Colin Scott Moncrieff, had been not less active. By mitigating the hardships of the corvée, and improving the irrigation system, on which the prosperity of the country mainly depends, he had conferred enormous benefits on the fellaheen, and had laid the foundation of permanent budgetary equilibrium for the future. Not less active was Sir Edgar Not less active was Sir Edgar Vincent, the Financial Adviser, who kept a firm hold on the purse-strings and ruthlessly cut down expenditure in all departments except that of irrigation.

officials.

The activity of the British officials naturally produced a certain amount of discontent and resistance on the part of their Egyptian colleagues, and Lord Granville Relations between was obliged to declare very plainly that such resistBritish ance could not be tolerated. Writing (January and native 1884) to Sir Evelyn Baring, he said: "It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges H.M. Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend; and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices." Nubar Pasha, who continued to be Prime Minister, resisted occasionally. What he chiefly objected to was direct interference in the provincial administration and the native tribunals, and he succeeded for a time in preventing such interference. Sir Benson Maxwell and Mr Clifford Lloyd, who had been sent out to reform the Departments of Justice and the Interior, after coming into conflict with each other were both recalled, and the reforming activity was for a time restricted to the Departments of War, Public Works, and Finance. Gradually the tension between natives and foreigners relaxed, and mutual confidence was established. Experience had evolved the working principle which was officially formulated at a much later period: "Our task is not to rule the Egyptians, but as far as possible to teach the Egyptians to rule themselves. European initiative suggests measures to be executed by Egyptian agency, while European supervision controls the manner in which they are executed." If that principle If that principle had been firmly laid down and clearly understood at the beginning, a good deal of needless friction would have been avoided.

International

The international difficulty remained. The British position in Egypt was anomalous, and might easily give rise to international complications. The Sultan might well protest against the military occupaproblems. tion of a portion of his Empire by foreign troops. It was no secret that France was ready to give him diplomatic support, and other Powers might adopt a similar attitude. Besides this, the British Government was anxious to terminate the occupation as soon as possible. With a view to regularizing the situation and accelerating the evacuation, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople in August 1885 on a special mission. On 24th October of that year he concluded a preliminary Convention by which an Ottoman and an English High Commissioner, acting in concert with the Khedive, should reorganize the Egyptian army, tranquillize the Sudan by pacific means, and consider what changes might be necessary in the civil administration. When the two Commissioners were assured of the security of the frontier and the good working and stability of the Egyptian Government, they should present reports to their respective

Governments, and these should consult as to the conclusion of a Convention regulating the withdrawal of the English troops. Mukhtar Pasha and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff were appointed Commissioners, and their joint inquiry lasted till the end of 1886, when the former presented his report and the latter went home to report orally. The remaining stipulations of the preliminary Convention were duly carried out. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff proceeded to Constantinople and signed on 22nd May 1887 the definitive Convention, according to which the occupation should come to an end in three years, but England should have a right to prolong or renew it in the event of internal peace or external security being seriously threatened. The Sultan authorized the signature of this Convention, but under pressure of France and Russia he refused to ratify it. Technically, therefore, the preliminary Convention still remains in force, and in reality the Ottoman Commissioner continues to reside in Cairo.

of reform.

The steadily increasing prosperity of the country during the years 1886 and 1887 removed the danger of national bankruptcy and international interference, and induced Sir Evelyn Baring to widen the area of Progress administrative reforms. In the provinces the local administration and the methods of dispensing justice were still scandalously unsatisfactory, and this was the field to which the British representative next directed his efforts. Here he met with unexpected opposition on the part of the Prime Minister, Nubar Pasha, and a conflict ensued which ended in Nubar's retirement in June 1888. Riaz Pasha took his place, and remained in office till May 1891. During these three years the work of reform and the prosperity of the country made great progress. The new Egyptian army was so far improved that it gained successes over the forces of the Mahdi; the burden of the national debt was lightened by a successful conversion; the corvée was abolished; the land tax was reduced 30 per cent. in the poorest provinces, and in spite of this and other measures for lightening the public burdens, the budgetary surplus constantly increased; the quasi-judicial Special Commissions for Brigandage, which were at once barbarous and inefficient, were abolished; the native tribunals were improved, and Mr (afterwards Sir John) Scott, an Indian judge of great experience and sound judgment, was appointed judicial adviser to the Khedive. This appointment was opposed by Riaz Pasha, and led to his resignation on the plea of ill-health. His successor, Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, continued the work and co-operated cordially with the English officials. The very necessary reform of the native tribunals was then taken seriously in hand. The existing procedure was simplified and accelerated; the working of the Courts was greatly improved by a carefully organized system of inspection and control; the incompetent judges were eliminated and replaced by men of better education and higher moral character; and for the future supply of well-qualified judges, barristers, and law officials, an excellent school of law was established. If the progress made in this direction is maintained, the Native Courts may some day, under proper European control, replace the anomalous Mixed Tribunals, and remove all necessity for the inconvenient consular jurisdictions, which are at present protected by the Capitulations. Meanwhile the reforming activity has been extended to Prisons, Public Health, and Education, and has attained very satisfactory results without ruffling the religious susceptibilities of the people.

Only once since the retirement of Riaz has the policy of teaching the Egyptians to rule themselves led to friction with the native authorities. In January 1892 the Khedive Tewfik, who had always maintained cordial relations with Sir Evelyn Baring, died suddenly, and was

succeeded by his son, Abbas Hilmi, a young man without political experience, who failed at first to understand the peculiar situation in which a Khedive ruling Accession under British protection is necessarily placed. of Abbas. Aspiring to liberate himself at once from foreign control, he summarily dismissed Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, whom he considered too amenable to English influence, and appointed in his place Fakhri Pasha, who was not a persona grata at the British Agency. Such an incident, which might have constituted a precedent for more important acts of a similar kind, could hardly be overlooked by the British representative. He had always maintained that what Egypt most required, and would require for many years to come, was an order of things which would render practically impossible any return to that personal system of government which had well-nigh ruined the country. The young Khedive was made, therefore, to understand that he must not make such changes in the administration without a previous agreement with the representative of the protecting Power; and a compromise was effected by which Fakhri Pasha retired, and the post of Premier was confided once more to Riaz. With this compromise the friction between the Khedive and Sir Evelyn Baring, who had now become Lord Cromer, did not end. For some time Abbas Hilmi clung to his idea of liberating himself from all control, and secretly encouraged a nationalist and anti-British agitation in the native press; but he gradually came to perceive the folly, as well as the danger to himself, of such a course, and accordingly refrained from giving any occasion for complaint or protest. In like manner the relations between the British officials and their Egyptian colleagues gradually became more cordial, so that it was found possible at last to reform the local administration in the provinces according to the recommendations of Mr J. L. Gorst, who had been appointed adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. Nubar Pasha, it is true, who succeeded Riaz as Prime Minister in April 1894, objected to some of Mr Gorst's recommendations, and in November 1895 resigned. He was succeeded by Mustafa Fehmi, who had always shown a conciliatory spirit, and who had been on that account, as above stated, summarily dismissed by the Khedive in January 1893. After his reinstatement the Anglo-Egyptian condominium worked without serious friction, and there is reason to believe that it will continue so to work in the future as long as England remains true to her mission and shows no signs of hesitation in carrying it out. In the Report by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the finances, administration, and condition of Egypt presented to Parliament in 1901, Lord Cromer concluded by expressing his belief "that His Highness the Khedive's recent visit to England (in 1900), coupled with the very remarkable and touching sympathy displayed by every class of society in this country (Egypt) on the occasion of the death of Queen Victoria, will serve to cement more closely the bonds of friendship and goodwill which, now perhaps more than at any previous period, unite my own countrymen and the Egyptians.

Fashoda.

The success of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, and the consequent economic and financial prosperity of Egypt Proper, rendered it possible to recover from the Mahdists the Sudanese provinces (see below, Military Operations in the Sudan), and to delimit in that part of Africa, in accordance with Anglo-Egyptian interests, the respective spheres of influence of Great Britain and France. The arrangement was not effected without serious danger of a European conflict. Taking advantage of the temporary weakness of Egypt, the French Government formed the project of seizing the Upper Nile Valley and uniting her possessions in West Africa with those at the entrance to

up

the Red Sea. With this object a small force under Major Marchand was sent from the French Congo into the Bahrel-Ghazal, with orders to occupy Fashoda on the Nile; whilst a Franco-Abyssinian Expedition was despatched from the eastward, to join hands with Major Marchand. The small force from the French Congo reached its destination, and a body of Abyssinian troops, accompanied by French officers, appeared for a short time a little higher the river; but the grand political scheme was frustrated by the victorious advance of an Anglo-Egyptian force under General Kitchener and the resolute attitude of the British Government. Major Marchand had to retire from Fashoda, and as a concession to French susceptibilities he was allowed to retreat by the Abyssinian route. By an agreement signed by Lord Salisbury and the French Ambassador on 21st March 1899, and appended as Art. IV. to the Anglo-French Convention of 14th June 1898, which dealt with the British and French spheres of influence in the region of the Niger, France was excluded from the basin of the Nile, and a line marking the respective spheres of influence of the two countries was drawn on the map from the northern frontier of the Congo Free State to the southern frontier of the Turkish province of Tripoli (see AFRICA: History).

The administration of the Sudan was organized on the basis of an agreement between the British and Egyptian Governments signed on 19th January 1899. The According to that agreement the British and AngloEgyptian flags are Egyptian flags are used together, and the Egyptian supreme military and civil command is vested

Sudan.

in a Governor-General, who is appointed by the Khedive on the recommendation of the British Government, and who cannot be removed without the British Government's consent. So far the arrangement has worked well. The Governor-General, Sir Reginald Wingate, in his report dated Khartum, 30th January 1901, after giving an account of the progress made, says: "I cannot close this report without recording my appreciation of the manner in which officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and officials— British, Egyptian, and Sudanese, without distinctionhave laboured during the past year to push on the work of regenerating the country. Nor can I pass over without mention the loyal and valuable assistance I have received from many of the local Ulemas, Sheikhs, and Notables, who have displayed a most genuine desire to see their country once more advancing in the paths of progress and material and moral improvement." (D. M. W.)

On

BRITISH MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 1882-1885. In February 1879 a slight outbreak of discharged officers and soldiers occurred at Cairo, which led to the despatch of British and French ships to Alexandria. On 26th June of that year Ismail Pasha was removed from Egypt, and Tewfik assumed the Khediviate, becoming practically the protégé of the two Western Powers. 1st February 1881 a more serious disturbance arose at Cairo from the attempt to try three colonels, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al, who had been arrested as the ringleaders of the military party. The prisoners were released by force, and proceeded to dictate terms to the Khedive. Again British and French warships were despatched to Alexandria, and were quickly withdrawn, their presence having produced no apparent impression. It soon became clear that the Khedive was powerless, and that the military party, headed by Arabi, threatened to dominate the country. The "dual note," communicated to the Khedive on 6th January 1881, contained an intimation that Great Britain and France were prepared to afford material support if necessary; but the fall of Gambetta's Ministry produced a reaction, and both Governments

proceeded to minimize the meaning of their language. The Khedive was practically compelled to form a government in which Arabi was Minister of War and Mahmoud Sami Premier, and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The situation now became critically serious: for the third time ships were sent to Alexandria, and on 25th May 1882 the ConsulsGeneral of the two Powers made a strong representation to Mahmoud Sami which produced the resignation of the Egyptian Ministry, and a demand, to which the Khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement of Arabi. The attitude of the troops in Alexandria now became threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they were "absolutely defenceless." This warning was amply justified by the massacres of 11th June, during which more than one hundred persons, including an officer and two seamen, were killed in the streets of Alexandria, almost under the guns of the ships ment of in harbour. It was becoming clear that definite action would have to be taken, and on the 15th the Channel Squadron was ordered to Malta. By the end of June twenty-six warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees were embarked. The order received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour on 3rd July was as follows:

Bombard

Alexan

dria.

Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform Military Commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to population, shipping, and foreign men-of-war.

On the 9th the Admiral received a report that working parties had been seen in Fort Silsileh "parbuckling two smooth-bore guns-apparently 32-pounders-towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour." Fort Silsileh was an old work at the extreme east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns do not bear on the harbour. On the 10th an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha, the Military Commandant, intimating that the bombardment would commence at sunrise on the following morning unless "the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria" were previously surrendered "for the purpose of disarming." The fleet prepared for action, and the bearer of the reply, signed by the President of the Council, and offering to dismount three guns in the batteries named, only succeeded in finding the flagship late at night. This proposal was rejected, and at 7 a.m. on 11th July the Alexandra opened fire and the action became general. The attacking force was disposed in three groups: (1) the Alexandra, Sultan, and Superb, outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earth works under weigh; (2) the Monarch, Invincible, and Penelope, inside the harbour, to engage the Meks batteries; and (3) the Inflexible and Temeraire, to take up assigned stations outside the reef and to co-operate with the inshore squadron. The gunboats Beacon, Bittern, Condor, Cygnet, and Decoy were to keep out of fire at first and seek opportunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was silenced by about 12.45 p.m., and a party from the Invincible landed and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under way was not effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about 10.30 a.m., and succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12.30 p.m., and Fort Adda, by the explosion of the main magazine, at 1.35 p.m. The Inflexible weighed soon after 8 a.m. and engaged Ras-el-Tin, afterwards attacking Forts Pharos and Adda. The Condor, followed by the Beacon, Bittern, and Decoy, engaged Fort Marabout soon

after 8 a.m. till 11 a.m., when the gunboats were recalled. After the works were silenced, the ships moved in closer, with a view to dismount the Egyptian guns. The bombardment ceased at 5 p.m.; but a few rounds were fired by the Inflexible and Temeraire on the morning of the 12th at the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines.

The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria is interesting as a gauge of the effect to be expected from the fire of ships under specially favourable conditions. The Egyptians at different times during the day brought into action about 33 R.M.L. guns (7-inch to 10-inch), 3 R.B.L. guns (40 prs.), and 120 S. B. guns (6.5-inch and 10-inch), with a few mortars. These guns were disposed over a coast-line of about 10 sea miles, and were in many cases indifferently mounted. The Egyptian gunners had been little trained, and many of them had never once practised with rifled ordnance. Of seventy-five hits on the hulls of the ships only five can with certainty be ascribed to projectiles from rifled guns, and thirty were unquestionably due to the old smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The total loss inflicted was 6 killed and 27 wounded. The British ships engaged fired 1741 heavy projectiles (7-inch to 16-inch) and 1457 light (7-prs. to 64-prs.), together with 33,493 machine-gun and rifle bullets. The result was comparatively small. About 8 rifled guns and 19 smoothbores were dismounted or disabled and 4 and 1 temporarily put out of action respectively. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted, after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the ships. As many as twenty-eight rifled guns and 140 smoothbores would have opened fire on the following day. The Egyptians made quite as good a stand as could be expected, but were driven from their guns, which they were unable to use with adequate effect; and the bombardment of Alexandria confirms previous experience, that the fire of ships cannot really compete with that of well-mounted and well-handled guns on shore.

In the afternoon of the 12th, fires, which were the work of incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alexandria; and the town was left to murder and pillage till the following day, when a party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 p.m.

Military intervention being now imperatively demanded, a vote of credit for £2,300,000 was passed in the British House of Commons on 27th July. Five days later the French Government failed to secure a similar vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question alone. An expeditionary force detailed from home stations and from Malta was organized in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps troops, and a siege British train, numbering in all about 25,000 men. expedition An Indian contingent numbering about 7000 under Sir combatants, complete in all arms and with its Garnet Wolseley. own transport, was prepared for despatch to Suez. General Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with Lieut.-General Sir J. Adye as Chief of the Staff. The plan of operations contemplated the seizure of Ismailia as the base for an advance on Cairo, Alexandria and its suburbs to be held defensively, and the Egyptian forces in the neighbourhood to be occupied by demonstrations. The expeditionary force having rendezvoused at Alexandria, means were taken by Rear-Admiral Hoskins and Sir W. Hewett for the seizure of the Suez Canal. Under orders from the former, Captain Fairfax, R.N., occupied Port Said on the night of 19th August, and Commander Edwards, R.N., proceeded down the Canal, taking possession of the gares and dredgers, while Captain Fitzroy, R.N., occupied Ismailia after slight opposition. Before nightfall on 20th August the Canal was wholly in British hands. Meanwhile, leaving Sir E. Hamley in command at Alexandria, Sir G. Wolseley with the bulk of the expeditionary force arrived at Port Said on 20th August, a naval demonstration having been made at Abukir with a view to deceive the enemy as to the object of the great movement in progress. The advance from Ismailia now began. On the 21st Major-General Graham moved from Ismailia with about 800 men and a small naval force, occupying Nefiche, the junction with the Suez line, at 1.30 a.m. without opposition. On the