every beast are the effects of dominion in man, and the subjection in brutes." Nay, neither does fear necessarily imply dominion. I may fear what has not dominion over me, and what I am not subject to. And those animals may fear me, over which nevertheless I have not dominion, neither are they subject to me. I fear every viper, yea, every poisonous spider; and they fear me: yet neither has dominion over the other. Fear therefore and dread may be in a high degree: and yet no, dominion at all. But they are "all delivered into our hands." Yes, for meat; as the very next words explain that expression. Whatever therefore it may "import in other scriptures," the meaning of it here is plain and certain.

6. "Would God have exposed the pure and innocent "works of his hands, to such unavoidable perils and mise"ries, as arise from bears, tygers, serpents, precipices, vol"canos, &c."

You answer, "He did expose innocent Adam to a peril and misery greater than all these put together, even to a tempting devil," (p. 191, 192.) I reply, 1. This did not imply any unavoidable misery at all: 2. It implied no more peril than God saw was needful, as a test of his obedience. Therefore this has no parallel case. So this argument also stands unanswered.

7. "It has been said indeed, If Adam fell into sin tho' "he was innocent, then among a million of creatures every one might sin, though he was as innocent as Adam. I "answer, there is a possibility of the event: but the im“probability of it is as a million to one.. I prove it thus. "If a million of creatures were made, in an equal proba“bility to stand or fall; and if all the numbers from one to ❝ one million inclusively were set in a rank: it is plainly ❝ a million to one, that just any single proposed number of "this multitude should fall. Now the total sum is one of "these numbers, that is, the last of them. Consequently "it is a million to one against the supposition, that the "whole number of men should fall. And this argument "will grow still ten thousand times stronger, if we suppose on thousand millions to have lived since the creation."

Your argument stood thus. "If we cannot infer from Adam's transgression, that his nature was originally cor rupt, neither can we infer from the transgressions of all mankind, that their nature is originally corrupt." It is answered, "If a million creatures were made in an equal "probability to stand or fall, it is a million to one they "should not all fall." You reply, "This is no answer to my argument." Surely it is; and a direct answer. That one man sinned, does not prove he had a corrupt nature. Why? because (supposing him free to choose good or evil) it was as probable he should sin, as not, there being no odds on one side or the other. But that all men should sin does prove they have a corrupt nature: because it is not as probable, that all men should sin, as that one man should: the odds against it being as a million or rather ten thousand millions to one. Either therefore we must allow, that mankind are more inclined to evil than to good, or we must maintain a supposition so highly improbable, as comes very near a flat impossibility.

And thus much you yourself cannot but allow: The reasoning may hold good, where all circumstances agree, to make the probability equal with regard to every indivi dual in this supposed million." And how can the probability be other than equal, if every individual be as wise and as good as Adam? But be it equal or not, you say, "The case is not to be estimated by the laws of equal probability, but of infection. For when sin is once entered into a body of men, it goes on, not according to the laws of chance," (is this precisely the same with equal probability?) "but the laws, as I may say, of infection." But how came sin to enter into a body of men? That is the very question. Supposing first a body of sinners, sin "may assume the nature of a contagion." But the difficulty lies against supposing any body of sinners at all. You say indeed, "One sinner produces another, as the serpent drew in Eve! The first sin and sinner being like a 'little leaven which leavens the whole lump.' All this I can understand, supposing our nature is inclined to evil. But if not, why does not one

good man produce another, as naturally as one sinner produces another? And why does not righteousness spread as fast and as wide among mankind as wickedness? Why does not this leaven leaven the whole lump,' as frequently, as readily, and as thoroughly, as the other? These laws of infection (so called) will therefore stand you in no stead. For, (to bring the matter still more to a point,) suppose Adam and Eve newly infected by sin: they had then none to infect, having no child. Afterward they repented and found mercy. Then Cain was born: now surely neither Adam nor Eve would infect him! Having suffered so severely for their own sin; which therefore they must needs guard him against. How then came he to be a sinner? "Oh, by his own choice, as Seth was righteous." Well: afterwards both wicked Cain and good Seth, begat sons and daughters. Now was it not just as probable, one should infect his children with goodness, as the other with wickedness? How came then Cain to transmit vice any more than Seth to transmit virtue? If you say, "Seth did transmit virtue: his posterity was virtuous till they mixed with the vicious offspring of Cain." I answer, I. How does that appear? How do you prove, that all the posterity of Seth were virtuous? But, 2. If they were, why did not this mixture amend the vicious, rather than corrupt the virtuous? If our nature is equally inclined to virtue and vice, vice, is no more contagious than virtue. How then came it totally to prevail over virtue, so that all flesh had corrupted themselves before the Lord?' Contagion and infection are nothing to the purpose; seeing they might propagate good as well as evil.

Let us go one step farther. Eight persons only were saved from the general deluge. We have reason to believe, that four, at least, of these were persons truly virtuous. How then came vice to have a majority again, among the new inhabitants of the earth? Had the nature of man been inclined to neither, virtue must certainly have had as many votaries as vice. Nay, suppose man a reasonable creature, and supposing virtue to be agreeable to the highest

reason, according to all the rules of probability, the majority of mankind must in every age have been on the side of virtue.

8. "Some have reckoned up a large catalogue of the "instances of divine goodness, and would make this as " evident a proof that mankind stands in the favour of God, "as all the other instances are, of a universal degeneracy "of man, and the anger of God against them. But it is

easy to reply, The goodness of God may incline him to "bestow a thousand bounties upon criminals, But his "justice and goodness will not suffer him to inflict misery ❝in such a universal manner, where there has been no sin "to deserve it either in parents or children."

You answer, "There is more than enough sin among mankind, to deserve all the sufferings God inflicts upon them. And the Scriptures represent those sufferings as disciplinary, for correction and reformation." What, all the sufferings of all mankind? This can in no wise be allowed. Where do the Scriptures say, that all sufferings, those of infants in particular, are purely disciplinary, and intended only "for correction and reformation?" Neither can this be reconciled to matter of fact. How did the sufferings of Grecian or Roman infants, tend to their correction or reformation? Neither do they tend to the correction and reformation of their parents or of any other persons under heaven. And even as to adults: if universal suffering is a proof of universal sin; and universal sin could not take place, unless men were naturally prone to evil. Then the present sufferings of mankind are a clear and strong evidence that their nature is prone to evil.

9. "Notwithstanding all God's provision for the good of "man, still the Scripture represents men, while they are "in their fallen state, as destitute of God's favour, and "without hope."

You answer, "How can men be destitute of God's favour, when he has vouchsafed them a Redeemer?" (p. 207.) By destitute of God's favour, we mean, children of wrath, objects of God's displeasure. And because they were so,

the Redeemer was given, to reconcile them to God by his own blood. But notwithstanding this, while we and they were in our fallen state, we were all objects of God's displeasure.

"But how can they be without hope, when he hath given them the hope of eternal life" All men who are not born again, born of God, are without hope at this day. God indeed hath given, but they have not accepted › the hope of eternal life.' Hence the bulk of mankind are still as void of this hope as are the beasts that perish. And so (the Scripture declares) are all men by nature, whatever difference grace may make. By nature all are children of wrath, without hope, without God in the world.' »

10. "Doth that man write the sincere sense of his own "mind and conscience, who charges the expression, Adam “was on trial for us all, with this inference, "That we are

none of us in a state of trial now, but Adam alone was "upon trial for us all?" We have owned and granted, "that men are now in a state of trial: but this is upon the "foot of a new covenant."

You answer, "What can be more evident than that according to this scheme Adam alone was to be upon trial for us all, and that none of Adam's posterity are upon personal trial ?" (p. 209.) Do you not see the ambiguity in the word alone? Or do you see and dissemble it? Dr. Watts supposes, that Adam alone, that is, This single person was on trial for all men. Does it follow from hence, that Adam alone, that is, no other person, was ever in a state of trial? Again if no person but Adam was upon trial for all men, will it follow, "No person but Adam was upon trial at all 9" It is really hard to think, that you here" speak the sincere sense of your own mind and conscience.'

You go on, "He supposes all mankind are still under the original covenant with Adam, according to which he alone was upon trial for us all, and none of his posterity are upon personal trial." He does not suppose any man to be so under that covenant, as to supersede his being upon personal trial. Yourself add, "I knew he owned, we