of men to him by an unjust war. The justice of every action consisteth in the merits of the cause, the warrant of the jurisdiction, and the form of the prosecution. As for the inward intention, I leave it to the court of heaven. Of these things severally, as they may have relation to the present subject of a war against infidels; and namely, against the most potent and most dangerous enemy of the faith, the Turk. I hold, and I doubt not but I shall make it plain, as far as a sum or brief can make a cause plain, that a war against the Turk is lawful, both by the laws of nature and nations, and by the law divine, which is the perfection of the other two. As for the laws positive and civil of the Romans, or others whatsoever, they are two small engines to move the weight of this question. And therefore, in my judgment, many of the late schoolmen, though excellent men, take not the right way in disputing this question; except they had the gift of Navius, that they could, "cotem novacula scindere," hew stones with pen-knives. First, for the law of nature. The philosopher Aristotle is no ill interpreter thereof He hath set many men on work with a witty speech of "natura dominus," and "natura servus;" affirming expressly and positively, that from the very nativity some things are born to rule, and some things to obey which oracle hath been taken in divers senses. Some have taken it for a speech of ostentation, to intitle the Grecians to an empire over the barbarians; which indeed was better maintained by his scholar Alexander. Some have taken it for a

speculative platform, that reason and nature would that the best should govern; but not in any wise to create a right. But for my part, I take it neither for a brag, nor for a wish; but for a truth as he limiteth it. For he saith, that if there can be found such an inequality between man and man, as there is between man and beast, or between soul and body, it investeth a right of government: which seemeth rather an impossible case than an untrue sentence. But I hold both the judgment true, and the case possible; and such as hath had, and hath a being, both in particular men and nations. But ere we go farther, let us confine ambiguities and mistakings, that they trouble us not. First, to say that the more capable, or the better deserver, hath such right to govern, as he may compulsorily bring under the less worthy, is idle. Men will never agree upon it, who is the more worthy. For it is not only in order of nature, for him to govern that is the more intelligent, as Aristotle would have it; but there is no less required for government, courage to protect; and above all, honesty and probity of will to abstain from injury. So fitness to govern is a perplexed business. Some men, some nations, excel in the one ability, some in the other. Therefore the position which I intend, is not in the comparative, that the wiser, or the stouter, or the juster nation should govern; but in the privative, that where there is an heap of people, though we term it a kingdom or state, that is altogether unable or indign to govern; there it is a just cause of war for another

nation, that is civil or policed, to subdue them: and this, though it were to be done by a Cyrus or a Cæsar, that were no Christian. The second mistaking to be banished is, that I understand not this of a personal tyranny, as was the state of Rome under a Caligula, or a Nero, or a Commodus: shall the nation suffer for that wherein they suffer? But when the constitution of the state, and the fundamental customs and laws of the same, if laws they may be called, are against the laws of nature and nations, then, I say, a war upon them is lawful. I shall divide the question into three parts. First, whether there be, or may be any nation or society of men, against whom it is lawful to make a war, without a precedent injury or provocation? Secondly, what are those breaches of the law of nature and nations, which do forfeit and divest all right and title in a nation to govern? And thirdly, whether those breaches of the law of nature and nations be found in any nation at this day? and namely, in the empire of the Ottomans? For the first, I hold it clear that such nations, or states, or society of people, there may be and are. There cannot be a better ground laid to declare this, than to look into the original donation of government. Observe it well, especially the inducement, or preface. Saith God: "Let us make man after our own image, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air and the beasts of the land, &c." Hereupon De Victoria, and with him some others, infer excellently, and extract a most true and divine aphorism, "Non fundatur dominiumnisi in imagine Dei". Here we have

the charter of foundation: it is now the more easy to judge of the forfeiture or reseizure. Deface the image, and you divest the right. But what is this image, and how is it defaced? The poor men of Lyons, and some fanatical spirits, will tell you, that the image of God is purity; and the defacement, sin. But this subverteth all government neither did Adam's sin, or the curse upon it, deprive him of his rule, but left the creatures to a rebellion or reluctation. And therefore if you note it attentively, when this charter was renewed unto Noah and his sons, it is not by the words, "You shall have dominion; but Your fear shall be upon all the beasts of the land, and the birds of the air, and all that moveth" not regranting the sovereignty, which stood firm; but protecting it against the reluctation. The sound interpreters therefore expounded this image of God, of natural reason; which if it be totally or mostly defaced, the right of government doth cease; and if you mark all the interpretes well, still they doubt of the case, and not of the law. But this is properly to be spoken to in handling the second point, when we shall define of the defacements. To go on : The prophet Hosea, in the person of God, saith of the Jews; "They have reigned, but not by me; they have set a seigniory over themselves, but I knew nothing of it". Which place proveth plainly, that there are governments which God doth not avow. For though they be ordained by his secret providence, yet they are not acknowledged by his revealed will. Neither can this be meant of evil governors or

tyrants for they are often avowed and established, as lawful potentates; but of some perverseness and defection in the very nation itself; which appeareth most manifestly in that the prophet speaketh of the seigniory "in abstracto", and not of the person of the Lord. And although some heretics of those we speak of have abused this text, yet the sun is not soiled in passage. And again, if any man infer upon the words of the prophet following, which declare this rejection, and, to use the words of the text, rescission of their estate to have been for their idolatry, that by this reason the governments of all idolatrous nations should be also dissolved, which is manifestly untrue, in my judgment it followeth not. For the idolatry of the Jews then, and the idolatry of the Heathen then and now, are sins of a far differing nature, in regard of the special covenant, and the clear manifestations wherein God did contract and exhibit himself to that nation. This nullity of policy, and right of estate in some nations, is yet more significantly expressed by Moses in his canticle; in the person of God to the Jews: "Ye have incensed me with gods that are no gods, and I will incense you with a people that are no people :" Such as were, no doubt, the people of Canaan, after seisin was given of the land of promise to the Israelites. For from that time their right to the land was dissolved, though they remained in many places unconquered. By this we may see, that there are nations in name, that are no nations in right, but multitudes only, and swarms of people. For like as there are par