and gives the complexion to all its developments.

The different systems of Philosophy have been divided by Mr. Morell, after the example of Victor Cousin, into five classes, Sensationalism, Idealism, Mysticism, Scepticism, and Eclecti

Inasmuch, then, as Mr. Morell's work per-stitutes the distinctive feature of each Philosophy, forms with considerable though derivative skill, the peculiar functions of the Eclectic School, we deem it entitled to much consideration and regard; and we hailed its appearance with the more satisfaction, as it was calculated to exhibit to English and Scotch Psychologists-(we will cism. Valid objections might be made to this not call them Metaphysicians,)-boundless fields division, as presenting only shadowy and waverof inquiry which they had never trodden, and ing boundaries to separate one form of Philosoingenious, though fallacious systems, of whose phy from another, and as obscuring the significharacter they had hitherto entertained no defi- cant fact that all systems run into and spring out nite idea, and whose pretensions, though higher of each other in such a manner, as to defy the than their own, they have affected through igno- attempt to fix their chamæleon hues; yet, as the rance superciliously to disregard. We cannot, supposed central germs are to ordinary percepindeed, discover in Mr. Morell's writings those tion radically distinct from each other, we will rare graces and elegancies of composition, with for the present accept this distribution, the rather which others have been enraptured-we feel how as it enables us to dispense with a tedious and dangerous it is to doubt where Dr. Chalmers and uninteresting investigation. Of these five SysDr. Thornwell have admired-but his book is tems, it is very evident that Scepticism must be written in a simple, and, for the most part, perspic- without specific philosophical method; for, being uous manner; and, when we consider the obscure by its constitution purely negative in character, labyrinths of thought through which he has had it can only destroy, but never build up: and, to trace his steps, and the difficulty of a clear ex-moreover, constant negation can take place only position of such topics-a difficulty which appeared great even to the perspicacity of Aristotle*—we must commend him highly for these excellencies, which were those most desirable in a criticism of abstruse philosophies. It must not be concealed, however, that there is much vagueness and indecision in his discussion of some disputed points; but this is inevitably incident to all Eclecticism, which is bound in principle to solve no discrepance, without squinting at the same time at the four quarters of the heavens.

With these cursory remarks we close our general notice of Mr. Morell's Critical History of Philosophy, but before putting the volume aside we would subject some of its particular positions to a more special examination.

sub modo asseverationis, and will therefore in each instance be determined by the particular scheme which is the object of refutation. The four other Systems derive their methods from the principles to which they respectively appeal for the evidence of the certainty of human knowledgethe main and fundamental problem of all Metaphysical Philosophy. The four distinct principles, which communicate to each Philosophy its appropriate method, have been designated by Mr. Morell the Positive Principle, the Individual Principle, the Traditional Principle, and the Progressive Principle.*

To the selection and application of these terms we entertain most decided objections. They are calculated to prejudge the merits of the respec"There is one truth," says Mr. Morell, "which tive systems by an appeal ad captandum to the the whole of our inquiries into the speculative heedless ear and the unreflecting mind; and so philosophy of the present age is calculated to far as they have any special connection with the teach-namely, that the great question of phi- Systems to which they are assigned, it is only losophy is that of method." The observation with those systems as professed by some of their is not the less worthy of regard for its immediate most distinguished advocates in the present day. derivation from Saisset and Cousin, with whom There is no intrinsic or permanent propriety in it was by no means original, nor for the frequency their appropriation; the connection is casual and of its repetition. The point of departure and temporary, and cannot be legitimately made the the direction necessarily determine the port at foundation of a philosophical nomenclature. Itis which we shall arrive by the prosecution of our true that M. Comte, the magnus Apollo of modern voyage: and, in a branch of study, where, from Sensationalism has given to his elaborate scheme the nature of the subject, facts are more liable of Philosophy the appellation of Philosophie Pos to be construed in accordance with the pre-ex-itive, and that he has been followed by M. Littré istent lights within, than to modify and shape preconceived notions, the method pursued con* Aristot. Metaph. ii. c. i, p. 996. a. 15.

† Part III. c. ix. §iv. Conclusion, p. 731. cf. p. 46-55. Saisset, cited, p. 125. n. V. Cousin. Hist. Phil. xix. Siècle. Leçon, iii.

and M. Pinel; but the prior employment of the term by Leibnitz in his Théodicée,† which Mr.

* Part. III. c. ix. §iv, p. 731.

fundunt leges, quas indere naturæ Deo placuit, vel saltem † Aliæ (veritates) vocari possunt Positiva, quoniam ab his dependent. Diss. De Conform. Fid. cum Ratione: pratix. ad Theod. § 2. tom. 1, p. 65.

think it should be awarded to the Mystics, whose isolated reveries, and implicit reliance upon their own individual and inner experience, (be it imagination or not,) and whose utter disregard of the reasons and conviction of others, present a much stronger title to this appellation than can be offered by the Idealists.

Morell had probably read, was utterly alien to an Empirical Psychology, refers every thing to this usage; and it occurs in Deus as a familiar Common Sense: if Fichte developes his whole technical term of Theology,* in a sense wholly scheme out of his single principle, the Ich and incompatible with this conclusive consecration the Nein-Ich; and Hegel, like Gorgias,* by the to the system of materialism, and agreeing bet-process of the individual reason, draws his Abter with the Philosophy of Lamennais. Comte solute Idealism out of nothing, 0=0;—neverthemight, and we think, must have taken the name less this is insufficient to warrant the limitation from Bacon, though Bacon would never have or special application of the Individual Principle assented to the doctrines which have been pub- to Idealism. For certainly the appeal to indilished under that designation. Yet Bacon, Leib-vidual reason and consciousness is not more dinitz, Dens, and Comte, though applying the epi-rect or frequent in the case of these Philosophers thet to diverse schemes, agree in using it with than it was in the writings of Locke and Hume, reference to a common and unvarying idea, and or in the sneers of Voltaire. D'Alembert, and Helin indicating by its use those fundamental doc- vetius. Nay, if any one School is entitled to trines beyond which the human mind cannot in-claim this designation in preference to others, we quire, and for which it is futile to ask for any explanation. With this signification it belongs peculiarly to no particular sect. But if it is to be wrested from its earlier and uniform meaning, in which if appropriated to any single system, it would more nearly accord with Mr. Morell's Traditional Principle than any other, it can be strictly employed merely in contradistinction to It is impossible for us to trace any applicability the Negative Principle, (if we may hazard the ex-whatever of the Traditional Principle to the pression,) involved in Scepticism, and possibly Mystics; but we consider Mr. Morell's remarks in the Critical Philosophy of Kant. Thus ap- upon Mysticism as constituting the feeblest porplied, however, it would have a much more com- tion of his Treatise. It can only result from the prehensive signification than is given to it by Mr. most inexplicable confusion of ideas that Jacob Morell, and one differing widely from it, and it Boehmen, Swedenborg, and Lamennais are would in most instances exclude Philosophers classed with the Sceptics, while St. Simon, belonging to that very school, to which it has (who, we believe, first employed the expression, been exclusively assigned by him, while in a ma- Positive Philosophy, in the same sense as Comte,) jority of cases it would include those belonging is regarded as a Mystic. It is only when we to the opposite Schools. give an unusual and unwarrantable meaning to The term, Individual Principle, is not more the epithet, Traditional, that we can trace any happily chosen. All Metaphysics of the highest connection between the attribute and the thing as of the lowest order, (if we except the budding to which it is attributed by Mr. Morell. If by Philosophy of M. Quetelet, which can scarcely Tradition we understand the claim of Revelaadmit of development into Metaphysics,) must either rest directly upon, or receive its confirmation from the individual consciousness and personal experience of men. It is to the individual consciousness that all arguments must in the last resort be addressed; and it is to that tribunal that every final appeal must be made. If the Scotch School, which forswears Metaphysics, and has only produced what has been well named

tion, or of the direct communication of God to man, then the term may be applicable to the Mystics; but assuredly a happier term might have been invented, for in the ordinary usage of the word, it is much more appropriate to the Eclectics themselves, who profess to seek the materials of their Philosophy in all the systems which have been handed down through the successive ages of the world. It appears to us that Mr. Morell, in forming his catalogue of Sceptics, has confounded and blended together the original and philosophical import of Scepticism with + Nil philosophiam per-æque corrupit, ac illa inquisitio parentum Cupidinis; hoc est, quod philosophi principia its ordinary or derivative meaning, in which it rerum, quemadmodum in natura inveniuntur, non rece- implies infidelity. With similar duplicity he has perunt et amplexi sunt, ut doctrinam quandam positivam, joined together those who assert that the sole et tanquam fide experimentali. Fab. Cupid, Bacon's principle of Philosophy is to be found in the subWorks, Ed. Montagu. vol. xi. p. 99. cf. Comte. Cours de Phil. Pos. tome i. p. vii. It is probably with reference to jective and often artificial passions of the human this remarkable passage that Comte so frequently calls mind, and also those who deny that it is possible

*Theologia tripliciter dividi solet, nempe in positivam, &c. Theolog. Dogm. De Deo. § ii. vol. 1, p. 1.

Bacon the father of the Positive Philosophy.

Locke. Essay on the Human Understanding. Epistle to the Reader.

to find a valid basis for Philosophy in the human | it, without venturing by any explicit assertion to reason, and has called both of them Mystics. arouse that scrutiny which might summarily reWhen we witness this confusion of ideas and the ject the arrogated claim. Prima facie, the posiarbitrary transference of the term from its legiti-tion of Mr. Morell, if questioned at all, is utterly mate signification, we cannot avoid suspecting untenable; for how can a system, formed out of that the Traditional Principle has been assigned the shreds and patches of other systems, like Joto the Mystics with an ulterior polemical aim; seph's coat of many colours-how can such a sysand very pregnant indications of this might be de- tem, which draws all its materials from the past, tected in the positions assumed by the French be progressive? Neither philosophers, nor ordiEclectics relative to the exciting question of pub-nary men are likely to make much progress, if, lic education in France. when they put their hand to the plough, they do

reverence for the pursuit of Philosophy itself. Are we indebted for anything beyond this to Giovanni Pico di Mirandola, and the other Eclectics at the close of the Middle Ages, who at tempted to reconcile the Peripatetic and Academic Philosophies?—are we indebted for anything more than this to Victor Cousin and his disciples? Certainly not, so far as we are aware. But a conclusive objection to this pretended character of progression is contained in the lead

But we would most particularly take excep- nothing but look backwards. The progress to tion to the claim which is made, and the mode be anticipated from modern Eclecticism may be in which it is made, in favour of the Eclec- estimated from the results due to the Middle tic School. This is done by a very illegiti- Academy, and to the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus, imate petitio principii, which indeed may be Porphyry, and Iamblichus. The ouly service equally observed of the other epithets attributed which it has rendered, and it is one which we are by Mr. Morell to the respective Schools. There more disposed to overrate than undervalue, is is a tacit assumption that the Eclectic School is that it has kept alive, or rather revived, the peculiarly progressive by stating the Progressive knowledge of effete systems and maintained a Principle as its distinguishing characteristic. We have already offered some strong reasons for our belief that Eclecticism belongs pre-eminently to a period of stagnation; but all argument is cashiered by this arrogant appropriation of a name for the purpose of catching the vulgar herd, and securing the adherence of the unreflecting multitude, without even suggesting the necessity of the examination before the sweeping assumption is conceded. Strauss thinks the adoption of his system of biblical and philosophi-ing doctrine of the Eclectics themselves. They cal interpretation, which converts both the Old maintain that each system which has successively and the New Testament Histories into a series of won the credence of the public, whether Sceptimyths, a necessary condition of the continued cism or Positiveism has been the natural result of belief in Christianity and of progress in intelli- the reaction from precedent excesses, and the negence.* Comte likewise claims progress as the cessary preparation for further advancement. characteristic distinction of the Positive Philoso- "Positiveism gives us truth and error; the individphy, and makes this alleged merit its principal ual reason gives us truth and error; tradition gives title to consideration. Whether we admit or us truth and error; but humanity sifts the results of deny the validity of his reasoning, it is by argu-individual thinking, and hands us down a stream ment that he urges his claim; and it must be of truth ever widening as it flows onwards."* confessed that he has made out a very strong and elaborate case in his favour. Comte solicits the public confidence for his system on the ground that it is the only Philosophy which necessarily ly exhibiting, and in that manner strongly refu and potently ministers to the cause of order and progress; and nearly every conclusion throughout his six ponderous tomes is brought to bear upon this supposed characteristic. Mr. Morell, on the other hand, makes the bare assertion that the Eclectic School are the Representatives of the Progressive Principle,‡ and considers their gressive character pre-eminently or characterisclaim established by the naked declaration. Perhaps, we should rather say, that he assumes

*Strauss. Life of Jesus, § 151, vol. iii. p. 440. Eng. Ed. † Comte Cours de Philosophie Positive. tome iv. p. 107. tome vi, p. 516, 735, et passim.

V. Cousin makes the same claim, though in a less objectionable form. Introd. Hist. Phil. Leçons. xii. xiii.

Thus, even the Scepticism of Berkeley and Hume, sweeping as it was, rendered essential aid to the progress of sound Philosophy, by striking

ting the deficiencies and the extravagancies which were involved in the dogmas of Locke. According to the main Eclectic doctrine, every School of Philosophy is progressive as each answers some distinctive purpose in the furtherance of Philosophy; and, therefore, to claim a pro

tically for Eclecticism is virtually to deny one of the fundamental dogmas of the School. In confirmation of this we need only appeal to the writings of Victor Cousin, or to the present work

of Mr. Morell.

It is a necessary consequence of what we have *Morell. Hist. Phil. Conclusion. p. 734.

remarked upon the principles of Mr. Morell's or organum mainly to its interpretation, gave to classification that we should regard the classifi- his philosophy an empirical tendency, which by cation itself as in many respects highly objec- degrees conferred far too exclusive a value on tionable. But we have no design, at present, of outward observation," &c.* This is by no entering further into this subject, and shall con- means borne out by the fact; though it is supsequently refrain from urging his inconsistency ported by the praise of Bacon's most noisy folat times even with his own principles. We will lowers, and by the constant vituperation of his only add to this general and rapid notice, a few opponents. It is to be regretted that both parobservations upon detached positions of Mr. Mor- ties should have neglected to study Bacon's own ell, which we consider erroneous in themselves, works, or should have read them with so little but which have been the received sophisms of care. An unprejudiced examination of the writhe Idealistic and Eclectic Schools in nearly all tings of Bacon, particularly of the Preface to the ages, and have frequently proved stumbling Instauratio Magna, will prove that Bacon neither blocks even to the votaries of other Schools. At overlooked nor underrated the Ethical departthe same time we shall not neglect such other ments of Science. The circumstances of the errors of Mr. Morell as have diffused their vi- times, and the special object of Bacon's larus throughout his whole Philosophy. bours, to reclaim Natural Science from the vi

by Physical Science and its dependencies. Mr. Morell, it is true, afterwards speaks of Bacon in terms more consonant with the real character of the Baconian Philosophy,† but the general tenor of his remarks coincides with the unfair and partial view of DeMaistre, and can be sustained only by a garbled and defective interpretation of Bacon's works.

We have already called attention to the flip-cious treatment which they had received from pant mode in which Mr. Morell cashiers the me- the Scholastics by their inclusion within the prodiæval Logic and Metaphysics. The views vince of Dialectics, necessarily gave considerawhich we then combated are pressed further ble prominence to the exposition of his views when he remarks that "before any new philoso- relative to the study of nature. But the "Fabuphy could be originated, it was necessary that la Cupidinis" could never have been written by this whole system (Scholasticism) should be one who considered that all valuable or impor combated, and in some measure overthrown."* tant knowledge was contained in or exhausted This is sufficiently vague, but it is "in some measure" true; the victory, however, was pushed too far, and modern philosophy failed to obtain the spolia opima by neglecting to appropriate to itself the arms of the vanquished. Scholasticism rendered its pretensions false and futile, and became positively pernicious by arrogating to Dialectics a domain which did not legitimately beIn all Eclectic criticism a singulong to its jurisdiction. Its defect lay not in an larly false and deceptive procedure is prevalent. erroneous exposition of the laws of human Every scheme, must, according to the fundathought and reasoning, but in the extension of mental doctrines of the Eclectics, have its its claim to empire over the materials of reason- good to be accepted, and its evil to be rejecting and the subject matter of thought. But this ed; hence, they divide the subject of critierror had been as clearly designated as such by cism into two parts by an artificial, and freAristotle as by Bacon, and was recognized, quently imaginary and arbitrary line. In this though not sufficiently guarded against, in the process there is a violent disruption of all the best ages of Scholasticism. By the exclusive natural affinities and coherence which constitute adoption of the Baconian Philosophy, not in the the unity and essence of each system; the naspirit of Bacon, but with a feeling of contempt- tive harmony which assimilates and adunates uous disregard for Scholasticism, we wantonly the whole organism is supplanted by an artifiabandoned the advantages of the strict and sym-cial discord; and the dissevered members repremetrical concatenation of the Scholastic Logic, sent the whole from which they are sundered, the want of which we are beginning to experi- no otherwise than the silly fellow's brick did the ence, and to which we are slowly and obscurely house from which it was taken. returning under the guidance of Mr. Morell.

We have less exception to offer to Mr. Morell's

In the same spirit of exclusive and partial ap-criticism on Locke. His observations on this prehension of the Baconian Philosophy, Mr. subject are exceedingly acute and ingenious, and Morell censures the sage of Verulam by saying in the main both accurate and important. His that "Bacon, by concentrating his chief atten- distinctions are ably and perspicuously elabotion upon nature, and applying his new method

*Morell. Crit. Hist. Phil. p. 61.

Aristot. Metaph. ii, p. 995. Alexander Aphrodisiensis and Asclepius. Schol. ad Aristot, p. 606.

VOL. XVI-50

rated, though in this respect he is deeply indebted to Cousin. He sees very clearly that Locke's elephant stands upon the back of a tortoise, but

Morell. Crit. Hist. Phil. p. 64.

+ Morell. Crit. Hist. Phil. p. 68–70, p. 115.

he does not perceive that the tortoise, which he theory of innate ideas by Locke, (which we admit discovers, stands upon nothing. He winds up to be not wholly valid or perspicuous,) it is in his criticism upon Locke's refutation of innate some sort rehabilitated by Mr. Morell, and many ideas by observing that "strip them of their ab- of his contemporaries, it may be worth while to stract dress, and you will find that every mind estimate the logical value of that Reductio ad contains in its primitive judgments, nay, possesses, absurdum, which they mainly employ. All that as the very law of its activity, the germ of these cau be proved by this line of argument is, that the very axioms which the more cultivated intellect position maintained by it is consistent with our learns but to develope and to express." But premises, whether those premises or principles on this passage we would remark that, the mind are obtained from consciousness, sense, inducdoes not so much possess these primitive judg- tion, or previous demonstration, and that any ments as the law of its activity, as it solves them other supposition is inconsistent with those prinby the natural operation of the processes of the ciples. Its proof is therefore merely provisional intellect. They are not so much germs at first in default of the human capacity to invent, adlatent and gradually developed, as they are mit, or comprehend direct proof in tali materia. truths resulting from the working of the intellect It does not prove that the position is true, indein obedience to the inherent laws of its solution. pendent of or beyond our particular postulates, The whole subject is skilfully analysed by hypothesis, assumption, or premise. It is thereAristotle. There is no science of particulars; fore merely a relative proof, valid for human but from particulars we rise to the apprehension weakness and fallibility, but no further. And of general truths, and the formation of axioms, or this is the condition in which all our first princithose general principles which furnish the major ples are left, so far as human argument or proof premises in all our reasoning. The most gene- can extend. As then the Reductio ad absurdum ral principles are assumed by successive induc- is a valid argument only with relation to first tions, or are suggested by the unanalysed pro- principles already fixed and accepted, it can have cesses of the mind and the loose indications of a neither force nor applicability in the endeavor to vague experience. This is Aristotelian doctrine. establish those principles-hence we will find In the execution of this process, we are guided that in the reasoning of Mr. Morell and his simiby the laws and organic functions of the human lars on innate principles, the only apparent cointellect, because inevitably subject to them.gency of their arguments is derived from a latent From our premises thus obtained, we reason petitio principii which is inextricably interwoven downwards, and test the accuracy of our deduc-with the whole chain. tion by comparing our conclusions with the results of carefully observed experience; but in the whole of this procedure the mind is limited to relative truth, and neither does nor can ascend to the absolute. The very supposition of its ability to do so is a virtual negation of the subordination of the human intellect to any laws at all-yet this is the very hypothesis which Mr. Morell tacitly assumes both in his observations on Locke and throughout his whole work.

These considerations will enable us readily to perceive why this argument should be so indisputably valid in mathematical reasoning, and of such limited application in metaphysical proof. In mathematics the premises are axioms, postulates, definitions, and both from their own character and the nature of the subject matter, these are absolutely fixed and incapable of doubt or negation. Yet what difficulties would arise even in mathematics from the use of the Reductio ad absurdum if applied to first principles may be seen in the discussions and speculations which have arisen from that crux mathematicorum, the definition or theorem of parallel lines.

The line of argument which is principally adopted by Mr. Morell, in his exposition of Locke's errors relative to innate ideas, is the Reductio ad absurdum. It is similarly employed, to a greater or less extent by all the Eclectics As we have been thus led to take cognizance and Idealists-and it is somewhat singular that of mathematical reasoning, we will venture to they should have been anticipated in this very plunge a little further into the difficult question respect by Aristotle. He attempts to prove the of its peculiar nature and characteristics, and truth of those axioms, which are usually select-we do so the more willingly as it appears to us ed as illustrations of innate principles by this argument. As, notwithstanding the refutation of the

*Morell. Crit. Hist. Phil. xix. Cent. p. 85, and see p. 91-2 where these views are modified.

to have proved a stumbling block to both Jew and Gentile-to Idealists and Sensationalists also. The connection between mathematical and metaphysical reasoning has been deeply feit in all ages, yet it has not wholly escaped notice.

† Aristot. Metaph. ii, 4, p. 999, a. 24 of Mill's Logic and that this analogy is accompanied with most im

Herschel. Disc. Nat. Philos.

Aristot. Metaph. iii, 4.

portant differences. Still the strict coherence of mathematical demoustration has been frequently