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opdfavres & drotáuvoval Tov kepa Nijv. X&pa uév 8) too ktijveos &eipova, kepa Mij 8& Keivy troXXa katapmadaevo, opépova, K. T. M. In B. VI. c. 9i, where he describes the way in which the Eginetan nobles massacred the popular insurgents whom they had overpowered, he says that one of the prisoners escaped, and took sanctuary by clinging to the handles of the door of a temple of Demeter:-of 8*, éretre uv droarāoat oik oiod te dréAkovres éqivovto, droxöyravres airoß was xespas jyov oftw xespes & ke?va èureovkviat #aav total érioraatipoi. Such, at least, is the common reading. In these passages, repaxi ceivn can be translated in no other way than “on that head;" and xeipts ceiva are “those hands.” It is unnecessary to enter into any disquisition to show that such a mode of expression is very improbable. I would observe, however, that exesvos, and not kelvos, is the usual form of the demonstrative pronoun in Herodotus. The transcribers of the Florentine and Sancroft MSS. were aware of this, and have written in the latter passage, Xeopes & exe?val. But this does not mend the sense. I believe that the true readings are, kepa Mj č ceivij, and xespes éé rewal. Kelvös is the Ionic form of kevös, the ordinary meaning of which is “empty:” but I believe that here it is used for “severed,” “separated from the body.” Kepax) rew; is “the severed head;” and xespes retvas, “the severed hands.” I cannot give another example of this use of the word in the physical sense; but there is a metaphorical expression in Soph. Aj. 986, 7, where a lioness, bereaved of her mate, is called revij Aéauva; in illustration of which Lobeck has cited Bion. I. 50, xiipa 3’ & Kv6épeta, kevoi 8' dwā Śiśuat'’Epwres. The extension of the meaning of the word from “wanting that which is commonly contained,” to “wanting that which is commonly attached,” is not violent. How easy the confusion of the form kelvos with the forms ce?vos and ékesvos was, appears from another passage in Herod. II. c. 40, where now all the recent editions have rightly adopted Schweighaeuser's conjecture, and read coixinv učv ketvijv tradav ć &v et\ov; but the Florentine MS. has ceivijv, and the older editions éceivnv. In this passage there can be no question about the emendation, as
the kot)\in has not been mentioned before. H. M.
4. ON THUCYDIDEs vi. 21.
There is a passage in the speech of Nicias in Thucyd. vi. 21, which has given much trouble to the interpreters and commentators. It stands thus in Bekker's edition, (Oxford, reprint, 1821): 'yodoras or,
Having carefully read Mr. Richmond's remarks on my proposed interpretation of this passage, I am bound to say that my opinion remains unshaken. Mr. Richmond considers “the trajection of the datives to the place they occupy after the substantive Kpéovia,” to be a decisive objection. This is a question of grammatical aesthesis, on which I cannot agree with Mr. Richmond. Had I time to read Plato, Demosthenes, and Thucydides for the purpose, I am confident I should find numerous instances of collocation equally free; and if so, poetical arrangement has an a fortiori freedom. Sophocles could not write, Tóv orot ca: Cuoi, Aérow Yap ka? we, dyadov Kpéovta : he therefore throws the words into the order of the text, the admissibility of which I consider free from doubt.” Mr. Richmond asks, “if such be the construction, would not the sense more naturally be, Creon whom you and I THINK good, than, whom you and I THOUGHT good.” I perceive no force in this objection. Tov dyadov does not define time at all : the participle 3vra, which the mind supplies, may refer as much (imperfect) to duration in time past, as (present) to subsistence in time present. Mr. Richmond conceives that my interpretation would demand cduo; instead of kāué. Here again I cannot agree with him. While I grant that Sophocles might have written kāpot, I hold that it was quite open to him to write cdué in the same sense: i. e. “for I name myself also, (as having been accustomed to entertain this opinion,)” instead of “for I say to me also.” Mr. Richmond interprets kāué, “emphatically me.” Without denying the possibility of such an interpretation, (which, by the way, is not inconsistent with my view of the passage,) it seems to me more simple and probable to explain káué from the preceding Aduos, “and to me also ; yes, me also I say.” Mr. Richmond refers Tov dyabov to the opinion of the citizens. This, in itself, is open to no objection. My interpretation I regard as necessary, not to explain Töv doabóv, but to elucidate the pronouns and parenthesis. For I cannot accept as satisfactory Mr. Richmond's paraphrase: “Such is the edict which they say Creon in his good zeal has proclaimed, an edict which must needs affect you and ME above all the citizens ; in saying which I make special mention of myself,
* My opinion on this point is shared by one of the best Greek scholars in England, the Rev. T. S. Evans of Rugby.
because, whether you join with me or not, I mean to incur the penalty of burying our brother.” This explanation, like Wex's, with which it agrees in the main, I cannot accept: (1) because I do not believe that words, such as totabrá opaq, Kpéovtd out Käuoi kexmpvXéval can mean, “Such is the edict which they say Creon has proclaimed, an edict which must needs affect you and me :” or any thing else but, “Such is the edict which they say Creon has proclaimed to you and me ;” (2) because the hint suggested to be lurking in the parenthesis is too obscure and enigmatical for even the daughter of an OEdipus; (3) because such an emphasis and such a hint seems to destroy the beauty and propriety of Antigone's character. How much more suitable to suppose her saying, “this is the proclamation of the man whom you, dear sister, from the impulse of your gentle, affectionate, and too confiding nature, used to call ‘the good, whom even I—let me frankly own it—though of sterner temper, have often called so.” I will merely add that, although more accustomed to be sceptical than dogmatical in the interpretation of difficult passages in classical literature, I entertain no doubt in the present instance. This affords no reason for the mere adoption of my present opinion : but it serves to explain why I continue to place it before the eyes of scholars, trusting that it will be generally sanctioned for its own value. BENJ. H. KENNEDY.
1. GREEK VERBs, Irregular and Defective, their Forms, Meaning, and Quantity: Embracing all the Tenses used by the Greek Writers, with References to the passages in which they are found. By the Rev. William Veitch. Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black. 1848.
CLAssical scholars are much indebted to Mr Veitch for this most elaborate and meritorious work. It contains all that the title conveys or implies, and more. There is truly little left to be done by future labourers in the same field.
All will admit that it is indispensable to correct scholarship, to be acquainted, not only with the general principles on which the Greek verbs are constructed, but with the anomalies in which that language, so luxuriantly rich in forms, abounds. The analogies of the language, when these are correctly ascertained, may lead, and have often led, to the correct reading, and the right understanding of a disputed passage.
Of course there can be no attainments to any extent made, when the scholar wanders in a maze of perplexity, apt to be led astray, in search of the truth, by a resemblance in form, while there exists a difference in the reality. But there may be a question as to what goes beyond this. When we have ascertained that the Greeks used a form which, in ordinary cases, is connected with another, it may be plausibly said that the existence of the former presupposes that of the latter, although we do not find it actually in the writings now extant. To use the words of Salmasius (Commentar. de Hellenistica, p. 107,) on a kindred subject, Vir millesima pars restat eorum, qui aliquid Graece commentati sunt. Si omnes extarent, nulla vow tam novipos in nova et vetere pagina reperiretur, quin xpija is ejus er aliquo auctore qui periit confirmari posset. Granting the truth of this in such vocables as rarely occur, from the rare occurrences of the notions which they express, there are numerous words so necessary to the very use of speech, that if we do not find them in certain forms in the writings which survive, we may safely conclude that such forms were purposely shunned. If we cast a glance at the uses to which we put our knowledge of the forms of verbs, we shall find that there are mainly three—to understand the original writers themselves, or to express our thoughts in that language, or to ascertain from analogy, in disputed cases, what the Greeks actually wrote. For all of these cases, a certain knowledge of the forms of the verbs, and for the two latter an accurate familiarity with them, is indispensable. The last, indeed, is that on which the two former are based. Before we can interpret what an author wrote, we must know what he actually did write. Where good MSS. agree, we have, of course, no right to pursue the question farther. This is all the evidence which we can have on the subject; and we must conclude, that whatever our notions may be of what an author should have written, he preferred to use such and such words. But where there is a discrepancy of MSS., or an uncertainty as to the reading anyhow arising, he is the only safe authority, who, with an accurate acquaintance of what forms authors of the same dialect and age were in the habit of employing, sagaciously suggests the very form which probability, thus derived, leads him to conjecture. This, certainly, is the noblest use to which this knowledge can be turned. But in the other cases, also, non absurdum est. More especially, in an extensive perusal of Greek authors, it is impossible to avoid perplexity and error without this knowledge. The forms and the senses varied in different times and in different parts of the country. How puzzled would a student of our own language be, if he took up certain American works, and did not know that the vocables were used in a sense, and often in a form, different from ours! Should changes and revolutions disgorge new authorities, the lost records of past ages, and the