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reference to anything that has gone before. In such a passage as Eur. Bacch. 271, 272, 6pacis & ovvatās kai Aérew otös távilp kakos roMotus overal voov oix éxwv, the negative clause (as has been remarked to me by a friend,) clearly does influence the sense of the whole, indicating the reason why a confident man becomes a bad citizen, quippe qui mente careat. This passage may help us to amend our plea, and suggest that the distinction between ot, and us in such cases is as follows:—oi denies absolutely, though not always independently, as the denial may be put forward as the ground of a proposition; u) gives a denial neither positive nor independent, but checking the sentence as a hypothetical condition; thus aij voov extev would mean “if he has no sense,” merely stating a possibility assumed solely for the sake of supporting the truth of the previous declaration; ot, as this word has even more than ordinary force, it is a matter of fact denial, and something more; the confident not only has not sense, but, by virtue of his confidence, cannot have; wo, on the contrary, does not deny the matter of fact at all; a confident man may or may not have sense; indeed, it rather implies, that in some cases he has sense, by particularizing the case of his not having it as leading to a certain result. It will be safest then to say, as a general rule, that of denies always absolutely, sometimes relatively too; ui), never absolutely, but always relatively. Thus there is no danger of confounding the two, even when both are relative, as the invariable presence of the absolute in ot will sufficiently distinguish it, as in the line above quoted, where since is very different from if. In the passage from the Agamemnon, my version gives what I still hold to be the right rendering-" So let the bow shoot darts at us no more;” but the note is in error in assigning the meaning of since to unkéti rather than to oikéta, and asserting that the use of the latter would necessarily have reduced the line to a mere ornamental addition. I will conclude with a new explanation (as I believe) of a once much disputed passage in Horace, Ars Poetica, v. 128. Difficile est propriè communia dicere: tuque Rectius Iliacum carmen diducis in actus quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.” The commentators have here been greatly perplexed. Horace speaks apparently of the difficulty of treating hackneyed subjects, adding, that, accordingly, it is better to dramatize the Iliad than to attempt something entirely new. The contradiction between the two precepts is at once perceived. Some seek to remedy it by construing tuque as if it were sed two others, a considerable body, beginning, I believe, with Lambin, and ending with Orelli,” give an entirely new sense to communia, not that of hackneyed things, but precisely that of not-hackneyed
* It is not meant that all who take general notion of its intention, e.g. Orelli this view of communia agree in their l does not refer it to subjects, but to ab
things, things as yet untouched, and hence public property. It seems to me that the dilemma will vanish if we regard ignota indictaque neither as opposed to, nor identical with, communia, but as, in a sense, included under it, being, in fact, a method of treatment, not a subject. The whole gist of the passage will then be, It is hard to give freshness and individuality to hackneyed subjects, and you had much better make up your mind to the extreme of literal imitation than run the opposite risk of offending the reader by any startling novelty of handling; better decline the problem altogether than produce a bad solution. This is premised as what is to be done if the worst should come to the worst; then follow some cautions to be observed by those who, in spite of the difficulty, wish to maintain that “Publica materia privati juris erit,” &c., where the language is clearly parallel to proprié communia dicere, a fact which Orelli is compelled to deny. It is possible that others may have given this interpretation, but I do not remember to have seen it anywhere. John CoNINGTON.
Aird's Self-Instructing Latin Grammar. Square, boards. Aristophanis Comoediae Undecim. Textum usibus Scholarum accommodabat H. A. Holden, A.M. 8vo. Oxford. Aristophanes; The Frogs of Translated by C. C. Clifford. 8vo., boards. Arnold, T. K., Eclogge Horatianæ. Pars I. Carmina prope Omnia Continens. New Ed. 12mo., cloth. Arnold's, T. K., Elementary Greek Grammar. 12mo., cloth. London. Arnold's, T. K., Henry's 1st Latin Book. New Edition. Arnold's, T. K., A Greek Grammar; intended as a sufficient Grammar of Reference for Schools and Colleges. 2nd Edition. 8vo., half-bound. London. Caesar: an Epitome of part of the Commentaries; with a Vocabulary and Maps, &c. By Edward Woodford. 18mo. New Edition. Edinburgh. Ciceronis Orationes Selecta, ex recensione Ernesti. By Charles Anthon, LL.D. New Edition. 12mo, cloth. (Priestley's Edition.) Dennis, George, Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria. 2 vols. 8vo., cloth. London. Do Grecian and Roman Mythology. Royal 8vo., cloth. New OTK.
stract qualities, the individualizing of posed to be intruded by proprie di. which, in a human character, is sup- cere.
Donaldson, J. W., A complete Greek Grammar; for the use of
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Aristotelis Ethicorum Nicomacheorum Libri X. In usum Scholar.
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