"I am the First, and I the Last, I AM, is my memorial still, And my eternal NAME"* (Exod. iii. 4). "Hence who could weep, when God is near To chase away the rising tear?" C. M. D. Our philosophic fathers, such as Descartes, where are they? And their successors, such as Kant, do they live for ever? It is well for society that it is frequently favoured with a change. I have not seen Professor Ferrier's work. His book will be my next in hand, after I shall have cut it up for perusal. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON. It may not be uninteresting for my kind reader to learn how far the patrons of the university duly appreciated the qualities of our greatest of modern philosophers, on 16th July 1836. The candidates were Sir William, Isaac Taylor, Dr Memes, Col. Stewart, M'Dougall Dunlop, Muston Rae Poole, and George Combe. Dr Neill proposed George Combe. Councillor Johnston (now Bailie Johnston) opposed Sir William on the ground that he was connected with the Edinburgh Review: Councillor Black (now M.P.) said the objection was characterised by bigotry, seeing that Dr Chalmers was also a contributor to that ("obnoxious") journal. "Councillor Deuchar" -I quote from the Mercury-" then spoke at some length in favour of ISAAC TAYLOR, and particularly dwelt on his piety, which he considered an essential qualification for the chair of logic and metaphysics. With regard to George Combe's religious belief, he might say that he could quote a passage from his work on the Constitution of Man,' the tendency of which was to subvert the doctrines of revelation, and which was also at variance with the interests of mankind. With regard to Sir William Hamilton, as far as he saw, Sir William might write well for the few but not for the many. There was another point-religion. They had one testimony in favour of Sir William-that was the Rev. Mr Sinclair, who said Sir William's belief was founded on the doctrines of the Christian religion; but he (Mr D.) had evidence that Sir William could not set those divine truths before the youthful mind so clearly as Mr Isaac Taylor could do." Councillor Duncan McLaren had already said that he had changed his mind, and would vote for Mr Taylor. The votes were, Isaac Taylor, 14; Hamilton, 18. The foregoing lengthy and tedious, but I hope, not unprofitable discussion, will, I trust, serve to cast some light on the propriety of Sir William's election. That he was the greatest of modern philosophers no one can * It is strange that Cruden's Concordance has misquoted this passage. doubt, but was he after all as great a divine? But what, it is said, has Divinity to do with the science of mind? My answer is that which I set out with in my second page—the necessary connection betwixt science and religion has been divorced, and no marvel that philosophy without religion has always ended in scepticism; hence fatalism, which is atheism (Hamilton)! Our conception of the Infinite (with the Bible in our hands) is not the true one (Mansell). Hence the questions remain, What is truth? How can guilty man be justified in the sight of a holy God? I, at least, have found no answer in philosophy. George Combe evaded my question; as little have I found an answer in Hamilton's able and learned lectures. No marvel if I, a humble inquirer after truth, should have after all also partly missed the mark. PROFESSOR FERRIER, I knew not one word of Ferrier's "Institutes" until I read them four days ago. I never even perused a single criticism concerning his peculiar theory of "Nothingness," hence I can judge him unprejudicedly. The Ego, I see at a glance, was with him his all and in all; and yet even of itself he said that it was incogitable. "I, by myself, I," was all that was in his organic eye; and yet it was not even as a part in his mental I, .e. his internal vision. No marvel that he never saw it. Why so? Because, as he said, it was "by itself (as a separate thing) unknowable." The non-Ego was, according to him, precisely in the same-identical condition. He said that both are by themselves unthinkable, because they are unknowable. He knew nothing save the concrete (the Ego and non-Ego in one). That alone was to him the only thing knowable; hence it must also have been to him the only existing thing as well. How then could he analyse it? Two flints strike out fire; hence percussion caps! Ferrier bordered on materialism. Plato, Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, and Kant were, by Ferrier's view, all senseless asses. How could these imbeciles have known anything of Ferrierism? and yet, after all, each had been a pupil of the same "know-nothing school." And what was Ferrier? In his own eyes he was the "prince of all philosophers"! Was not this highest egotism? "I have," said he, "made the greatest of all discoveries. I have revealed what the Absolute really and truly is! It is the general, universal, and unchangeable truth!" But what is truth? It is by itself nothing! The "great unknown" cannot possibly be known even to himself! The concrete alone is knowable, i. e. subject and object in unison, i.e. the universal and the particular as one. Hence the Absolute, even as the Universal, cannot possibly know even the universe by itself! yea, without their conjunction nothing possibly can be known. Hence Ferrier was a pantheist; hence, also, without the universe God could not possibly know himself! Nay more, unless he was only one of the two factors in every cognition, he could not originate one thought, i. e. even think or know the universe by itself. If this "marvellously unknown nothingness" be true, what is truth? And yet that ass Aristotle knew more than Ferrier after all. "The prime mover was himself unmoved," i. e. he was the infinite one, i.e. he could not possibly go out of himself, i. e. extend beyond infinite extent; and yet God, after all, was so isolated and limited, and happy in himself alone, yea, so far removed from creation that he heeded not the actions of men, i. e. he was not a witness, and hence knew not them! I have already criticised Aristotle's half and half equivocal morality, see it in my answer to Combe. Demonstrations? The stripling David, or any child-like simpleton of the same school, can refute all the propositions contained in "Ferrier's Institutes," five hundred and forty-three pages in all, by a few sentences borrowed from God's despised Word. These "Institutes" led Ferrier into rank scepticism, yea, into absolute atheism; yet, "poor man and honest man," (his own words to Reid, 494) he knew it not. Ferrier, when he began, said that he knew not in what he was to end, i. e. he had no compass to guide him. My Bible has been my compass. It is truth. His higher belief (not his logic) saved him in his hour of need. He only had thought that he had logically, i. e. philosophically, slain the greatest of Goliahs-materialism. But in achieving this glorious feat, he saw not that he had by the same "stroke" slain spiritualism, idealism, conceptualism, and all other isms, his own included as well. In a word, his philosophy reduced every highly respectable Ego, and every respective object, as well to what he called a "surd," i. e. "nonsense," i. e. it is not the absolute of him whom he called "poor Reid," alias common sense! But as it may be said that I have only been dealing with Ferrier's generals," I must now condescend to notice his "particulars; " why so? It is the way that nature teaches after all. "Alas! poor Yoric! He had an excellent fancy," so said the writer of Ferrier's obituary of him; yea more, it was said that he had demonstrated rightly or wrongly what no one could easily refute; so also said Reid of Berkeley, with this one addition, "which no one in his senses could believe." Why so? Because it was altogether" contradictory." Alpha est, Alpha non est. The Ego is, and yet the Ego is not (Ferrier)! But to proceed. THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR. 1. The Ego in every perception, conception, cognition, is the general, universal, unchangeable factor, hence its identity without personality, and its nothingness as well (Ferrier)! 2. The "particular" is the other factor. It is the changeable contingent, i. e. it cannot by itself stand alone (Ferrier) ! 3. A perception, conception, cognition of a thing or thought is the concrete, i. e. the two (general and particular) inseparably unified, but not known as existent each by itself alone (Ferrier)! I refute Ferrier thus: The Ego is a unity, an entity called self." I, by myself, I" illustrates this general truth. Hence the Ego's personal identity, as revealed in consciousness. I perceive, I judge, next concept, cognosce; the result is my conception of things, so called cognitions. But things as "particulars" are totally separate and distinct from self; and although all things change, yet the perceptions of them are not contingent, changeable, as Ferrier said; they are in themselves independent truths, i. e. they vary not, as I have already proved. If they were changeable, they with the Ego never could unite. Like always draws to like, hence all truths necessarily unite. Contraries are antagonistic; they see each other and repel each other; they never can possibly agree. Hence "war to the knife," as in America (if possible, live peaceably with all men ; if not possible, separate-St Paul). The highest truth is the Absolute the ALL and WHOLE-ALL and ALL-ALL in ALL, and hence it has within it an infinitude of parts. The Ego as a fact or truth is a part of the Absolute infinite whole; hence in itself it is only as a thing finite, a part of the created finite whole, i. e. the universe. The Ego differs from matter in its nature. Matter changes, and is divisible; the Ego is not. I have said that perceptions are not particulars, in Ferrier's sense, i. e. they are not contingent, they are independent, i. e. they change not. A photograph is a fixed likeness; the person or thing may change through time, but the photograph ever remains the same so long as it is a photograph. Hence all truths are blood relations, having family likenesses, all are descendants from one and the same blood. We cannot mistake a vivid perception caused by a material impression or impulse. Hence external injuries are felt as realities, or if slight we scarcely feel them; hence we overlook them. Even words are blows, and the Ego (not the ear) feels them as such. A wound in the flesh heals itself by its "first intention," vis medicatrix. A mental injury is instantly cured if it was by non intention in the agent. No one can easily bear an intentional insult. Revenge is just and honourable; not to revenge is to be as mean as a slave (he dared not)-Aristotle. "Not so," said Jesus, of love absolute. "Avenge not," said Paul. Thus far as to the factor called by Ferrier the "particular in thought." And how egregious was his error, i. e. he confounded real and permanent perceptions with conceptions, which are ever changing as we advance in life. Knowledge acquired is à posteriori empirical, i. e. by experience. Hence a rampaging tory becomes a rational conservative. Even Peel gave up prejudice-misconception-when he became the advocate of free trade. "Matter is not the cause of conceptions," said Ferrier. "They are,' said he, "supplied by the Ego out of itself." How so? seeing he had said that the Ego was by itself incogitable-an absolute "surd"! Hence, in one sense he said they are innate! as much so as perceptions are innate! Is a tree innate, i. e. as a perception? It has its source in the senses, and its origin in the mind! said Hamilton. Was this not one of Ferrier's perfect "surds"? The fact is, that from Plato to Descartes, and from him to Ferrier, all philosophers have erred. They had confounded perceptions with conceptions, and their misconceptions of what I have revealed as the simplest of all primitive truths have been the destruction of metaphysics! Perceptions are as certain as the things perceived are certain (Reid). Over them, without distinction, the Ego has no control (Combe). The external object may change, and it does change, omnia mutantur, but its photographic impression and the perception of it changes not. But what of motion? We see it not. The eye imperceptibly follows the crow while. flying. The eye turns on its axis, and becomes sensible of the crow's motion by the fact that all things else are fixed; yea more, when we are flying at railway speed we think that the crow has no apparent motion in its flight. It cannot beat the telegraph. We even think that the distant trees are all in motion, and move more quickly than those that are near at hand. Yea more, instead of proceeding, I have at times thought I was retrograding when the engine was at its full speed. "Behold! we could not know anything," unless our perceptions were formed in less than a second, and as instantly fixed. Hence we can recall them, by the law of association, even by the mark of an immoveable type. Thus the ceremonial law was in its every jot, tittle, and iota, fixed, i. e. it was unalterable by man until it was absolutely fulfilled by Christ. How else could he have appealed to it as his exemplar? The types were so fixed for the sake of the antitype. Hence a simple mark transferred to the brain may stand for the subject of a whole chapter! The Ego sees it, and perceives it, next knows and judges of it, yea, determines it as well, i. e. it "forms its own conception of it," and may be its misconception of it after all, and yet our D d |