a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony. This consent of mankind in first principles, and this endless variety in their application, which is one among many valuable truths which we may collect from our present extensive acquaintance with the history of man, is itself of vast importance.' he, Dr. Paley has, it is true, presented an imposing array of vices and crimes practised in some age or country, and countenanced by public opinion; but, in doing this, he has most manifestly mistaken the exceptions for the rules which govern human sentiments and conduct. This might be made very clear by a careful analysis of the subject; but it may be still more satisfactory to permit Dr. Paley to destroy his own position, by citing his authority against himself. "The direct object of Christianity," says this valuable writer, "is to supply motives and not rules, sanctions and not precepts. And these," continues 66 were what mankind stood most in need of. The members of civilized society can, in all ordinary cases, judge tolerably well how they ought to act; but, without a future state, or, which is the same thing, without credited evidence of that state, they want a motive to their duty; they want at least strength of motive sufficient to bear up against the force of passion, and the temptation of present advantage." This observation rests entirely on the admission, that men substantially concur in their views of practical morals. Again, he says, still more decisively, "that moralists, from whatever different principles they set out, commonly meet in their conclusions; that is, they enjoin the same conduct, prescribe the same rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cases the same determinations." Here we have the clear and decisive authority of Dr. Paley himself, in favor of the substantial agreement of mankind in the department of practical morals. This general concurrence of sentiment lays a firm and safe foundation on which to build a superstructure. The practical department of moral philosophy contemplates * Discourse on the Law of Nations, pp. 35, 36. + Evidences of Christianity, p. 224. London, 1825. Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 34. 35 two objects; the formation and cultivation of a permanent, strong, and delicate sense of duty; and a knowledge of the chief principles and rules, which determine our duty in the various situations and relations of life. It may be said with the most perfect truth, that there is no quality of the human character so fundamental as the possession of a high and permanent sense of duty. It is composed of the choicest elements of character, the passions under the control of the reason, the will directed by the understanding, a conscience alive to the most delicate moral impressions, and suitable motives steadily and effectually influencing the conduct. It is something more than an upright intention; this is often seen in persons whose sense of duty is comparatively slight; it includes an active, vigilant, persevering desire of practical usefulness. The sense of duty gives a tone to the entire character and conduct of the man. It leads him to act from fixed and well considered principles of action, and not from passion, prejudice, and the impulse of the occasion and of the moment. The supreme object in the mind of every good man is, the upright discharge of the full measure of his duty; and in this discharge consist the highest honor and happiness, which human nature is capable of attaining. Cicero well says, "No part of life, public or private, in the business of the forum or in domestic affairs, in regard to ourselves or as we stand in relation to other men, is without the obligation of duty, and in the discharge of these obligations consists all the honor of life; as, on the other hand, all baseness and dishonor spring from the neglect of them."* Every man, then, has his own sphere of duty, his peculiar field of usefulness, the cultivation or neglect of which will inevitably lead to honor or dishonor, approbation or reproach, general credit or public shame, to the torments of remorse on the one hand, or on the other to the peace of mind which passeth all understanding.t A sense of duty, therefore, includes all the qualities of mind and heart which are accustomed to be esteemed most valuable, + See Mackintosh on the Study and Practice of the Law, pp. 20-26. and which, in their practice, have ever been found most difficult. Its exercise requires physical courage of the highest order, as it sometimes brings us into collision with the passions and interests of the powerful. It requires moral courage of an equally high order, as it may compel us to meet and to brave the frowns, the rebukes, and the scorn of public opinion. It implies a sacrifice of ease, as it calls for patient labor and unremitting activity. Apparent self-interest must frequently be sacrificed to its dictates; for the cases are not few, in which duty seems to call one way and interest another. Magnanimity is necessary to its full exercise, since this many times requires us to pass by the neglect, the provocations, and the overbearing conduct of other men. It requires us to fulfil the law of Christian love, by regarding and treating every man as our neighbour, whose comfort and interest it is in our power to consult, and whose welfare, moral or spiritual, it is in our power to advance. All these qualities, and many more, so trying to human nature, and requiring in their exercise the best qualities of the heart and of the understanding, are combined in the sense of duty, when most perfectly cultivated and matured. - - The sense of duty being thus complex, consisting of the choicest elements of feeling, sentiment, and action, is difficult to be analyzed completely, we must, therefore, be contented with such an imperfect analysis, as, with the aid of the preceding observations, we can make. It embraces, -1. A moral sense, that is, a sense of moral obligation and responsibility. 2. The having a reasonable, definite, and valuable object of pursuit in life, and the being governed in our conduct by moral and religious rules. No one can have any sense of duty who is conscious of living for no purpose, and of being governed by no moral rule.* 3. In a Christian country, and in a cultivated state of society, it further consists in a supreme regard to the authority of God, and a regard for all other men viewed as brethren of the same great family. 4. A conscientious regulation of our lives and conversations with reference to the rewards and punishments of the life to come as well as of the present life. 5. Industry, activity, Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 30. — Persius, Sat. III. 60 – 62. patience, and perseverance, in the sphere of duty and usefulness, however humble, which, in the order of Providence, has been assigned us. --- No man supremely devoted to habits of self-indulgence, selfgratification, personal ease, and sloth, can be much under the influence of a sense of duty. It is this sense of duty, which is the mainspring of all that is noble and praiseworthy in human character and conduct; and it is this especially, which it is the object of moral philosophy to strengthen and otherwise cultivate. It is this sense of duty, which has led men of the best hopes and talents in every age and nation, without expectation of reward, to devote themselves to the service of their country and the good of mankind. It was this sense of duty, which led Washington and his illustrious compatriots to undertake the arduous and unpromising enterprise of the American revolution, and to sustain the labors, hardships, discouragements, and the thousand other trials, by which they wrought out the political salvation of their country. It was this which led the philanthropic Howard "to visit all Europe, not to survey the sumptuousness of palaces, or the stateliness of temples; not to make accurate measurements of the remains of ancient grandeur, not to form a scale of the curiosity of modern arts, nor to collect medals or collate manuscripts; - but to dive into the depths of dungeons; to plunge into the infection of hospitals, to survey the mansions. of sorrow and pain; to take the gauge and dimensions of misery, depression, and contempt; to remember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, to visit the forsaken, and compare and collate the distresses of all men in all countries."* It was this, which led the apostles of our Saviour, and other early preachers of his gospel and original witnesses of his miracles, voluntarily to subject themselves to unexampled labors, dangers, and sufferings, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of these accounts, and, from the same motives, to submit to new and unusual rules of life and conduct.f It is the same sense of duty, which has led the preachers of Christianity, in every age, to devote themselves to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual interests of mankind, with a zeal, a disinterestedness, and a perseverance, unknown to any other class of men. And it is this, moreover, which is, at this time, leading many Christian missionaries to forsake friends, parents, country, and all earthly prospects, for the sake of planting the standard of the Cross in the remotest corners of the earth. It has before been said, that the sense of duty implies a moral sense, an authoritative standard of human conduct. Now, the decisions of the conscience of each individual are, with respect to him, the authoritative rules of his conduct, and the supreme. and ultimate guide of his life. The conscience is that principle of the mind, whose prerogative it is to prescribe, in morals, to every other, and to pronounce the definitive sentence from which there is no appeal. The fundamental importance of this position, and especially the present state of public sentiment, of literature, and of intellectual philosophy, and the prevailing habits of thinking and reasoning, render some illustration of it useful and ne cessary. To an unsophisticated mind, it may appear surprising, that it should be necessary to delay, for the sake of establishing the existence of conscience in the human breast, or of vindicating its claim to be the great and ultimate guide of the moral sentiments and actions of mankind. And, if some traces of the same error and perversion are found in the writings of the ancient moralists, - still it may be said, with the utmost truth, to have been reserved for very late times, to build up and sanction a system of sophistry in metaphysics and morals, which, by denying the existence, has obscured the decisions of conscience, and has thus been enabled to substitute a false measure of human duty, and a standard of right and wrong in human conduct, which must fluctuate with the ever-varying prejudices, passions, opinions, and interests of mankind. A succession of eminent writers, led on by the celebrated David Hume, have, within the last century, given plausibility and currency to the theory, that the utility of actions is the only criterion of their rectitude, and the supreme standard of their obligation. This theory of morals, as unsound and superficial as it is, which makes virtue a subject of calculation, and, withdrawing the attention from all internal sentiments, |