from their principals, should be scrutinized with a close and vigilant suspicion. And, indeed, considering the abuses which may attend any dealings of this sort between principals and agents, a doubt has been expressed, whether it would not have been wiser for the law in all cases to have prohibited them; since there must almost always be a conflict between duty and interest on such occasions."* A special agency is chiefly ministerial, and is constituted for the purpose of having some particular act performed, of effecting some particular purpose, or of accomplishing some special service. Thus, when an attorney is employed to treat for an estate, which is a case of confidential agency, if he finds a defect in the title, he very properly desists, until he can confer with his principal. But if the commander-in-chief of an army detaches a subordinate officer upon a particular service, which service is found more hazardous, or otherwise more difficult, than was supposed; so much so, that the officer is convinced, that his superior, if he were acquainted with the true state of affairs, would recall or modify his orders; still this officer must, if he cannot wait for fresh instructions without prejudice to the service upon which he is detached, pursue at all hazards, those which he brought with him. † This, it must be admitted, is an extreme case, and it is always proper, that even a ministerial (special) agent, should keep in view the nature of the service he is to render, and of the business he is to transact, and that he should in some degree make this his guide. In every great change, especially every sudden change of circumstances, which could not have been anticipated, it is his duty, if possible, to wait for further instructions from his principal. When an agent is made responsible for the issue of any business or enterprise intrusted to him, he ought to be permitted to appoint his assistants and, to choose his own means by w ich to accomplish the object; and, whenever an agent is not allowed to appoint his assistants and to choose his own means, he cannot equitably be made responsible for the result. In one class of instances which come within this relation, the * Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. I. pp. 310, 311. † Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 100. person employed advises and directs his employer, - of which, the lawyer and his client, the physician and his patient, the clergyman and his congregation, are the chief and most familiar cases. This, too, is the nature of the relation subsisting between the Faculties of our universities, colleges, &c., and the Boards of Trustees which employ them, so far as the literary and professional department of those institutions is concerned. These cases, in which the advice of the person employed governs the conduct of the employer, are of all, the most honorable kind of agencies. In them, moreover, a special responsibility always rests on the person employed. In all these cases, the employer calls into requisition and pays for, the peculiar skill and knowledge, and not merely or chiefly the manual labor, of the person employed. And the employments of life rise in rank, in proportion as they require more skill, knowledge, and integrity, for their successful exercise. СНАРТER III. THE OBSERVANCE OF TRUTH. THIS general form of expression is used to designate this part of my subject, because there are many violations of truth, besides direct falsehood. An adherence to truth is deservedly esteemed the chief of the personal virtues, and a disregard of it is universally numbered among the most flagrant offences against manners, morals, and religion. A single deliberate falsehood is a stain on the character which cannot easily be wiped away. "Ye shall not steal," says Moses to the Hebrews, "neither deal falsely, neither lie one to another."* David makes it a characteristic of the wicked, that "they go astray speaking lies as soon as they are born, that they love evil more than good, and lying rather than to speak righteousness."† Again, "Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord, but they that deal truly are his * Leviticus xix. 11. t Psalms lviii. 3; lii. 3. delight." * "Lie not one to another," says St. Paul, "seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds, and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." Again, St. Paul says, "The law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless, for the ungodly, and for sinners, for the unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for liars, for perjured persons, and if there be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine." St. John says, "All liars shall have their part in the lake which burns with fire and brimstone."§ Again, "There shall in no wise enter into it (the holy Jerusalem) any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie." And again, And again, "Without are dogs, (all persons not good men, all defiled by sin,) and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie." || In these passages, falsehood is ranked with perjury, murder, sorcery, idolatry, parricide, and whatsoever worketh abomination. We may not perhaps be warranted in concluding, that all these sins are of an equally dark dye; but assuredly we may conclude, that falsehood is any thing but a light sin, when it is ranked, on Divine authority, with the abominations of perjury and parricide, without any mark of discrimination between them. And, when we advert to the consequences of general and indiscriminate falsehood, we must be convinced, that right reason coincides with and sustains Divine revelation in its estimate of the importance of truth, and of the abomination of falsehood; and that mankind are not in the wrong in estimating a regard for truth as the first of the personal virtues. The seal of universal reprobation is rightfully fixed on wilful and deliberate lying. Mutual confidence is the main spring of all that renders life valuable; and a regard for truth is the corner-stone, nay, it is the entire foundation, of all the confidence which exists, whether in the social intercourse, or in the business transactions, of mankind. So accustomed are we to receive and reciprocate confidence, that we cannot, without some reflection, be sensible of its abso1 Tim. i. 9, 10. * Prov. xii. 22. + Col. iii. 9, 10. lute necessity to the welfare of mankind. Occasions for reposing it occur every hour, at home and by the wayside, by day and by night, in solitude and in company. --- Let us suppose, for a moment, the great moral obligation of a mutual regard for truth to be dissolved, no man reposing confidence in another, or entitled to it himself; - who does not see, that universal suspicion and distrust, insecurity, anxiety, and alarm, must be the consequence? Direct and deliberate falsehood, therefore, is so personally disgraceful, so pointedly condemned by Scripture, and tends in its consequences to such overwhelming, such universal ruin of every thing valuable and estimable in life, that it is condemned universally, no voice is ever raised in its justification. But, as has been said before, truth is accustomed to be violated in many ways, besides direct falsehood. It is violated whenever there is an intention or a willingness to deceive. Without attempting a complete enumeration of these ways, I shall touch, as I may, upon those which are most worthy of the notice of an elementary writer on morals. 1. Truth is violated when facts, reasonings, circumstances, or any thing else, by whatever name called, are suppressed or omitted, with the knowledge or belief, that any person will be led into error or mistake by such suppression or omission. I do not say, that the omission or suppression of facts, circumstances, or whatever else is seen to be necessary to lead the reader or hearer into the truth, is equally criminal with the direct assertion of what is known to be false; it may not be so, there are degrees in all offences, but it is unquestionable, that the one as well as the other is a great violation of truth. And the comparative frequency with which truth is violated in this way, makes it a matter of importance, that this part of the subject should be well understood. Various sources of illustration might be used to set this point in a clear light. Truth is violated by the historian, when he omits facts and circumstances, the absence of which prevents his narrative from making such an impression of events, characters, and transactions, as would be communicated by stating the truth in the full measure of its integrity, and without disguise. The truth of history requires, that nothing he suppressed or omitted, which can mate rially affect the general impression made by the narrative.* History is the greatest of earthly tribunals; but all its dignity and glory vanish, when truth no longer sits supreme on the seat of justice. Again, truth is violated by the biographer, when he suppresses or omits incidents and traits of character, which are necessary to the full understanding and estimate of the person whose character he has undertaken to portray. swer. Does not the lawyer, also, violate truth in the same way, when he suppresses or omits facts, authorities, and circumstances, knowingly, and for the purpose of leading the court and jury astray? I will permit the late Sir James Mackintosh to an"He who is influenced by the spirit of integrity," says he, "will never himself misrepresent, or be knowingly the cause of others misrepresenting the truth in a court of justice; no prospect of advantage to himself or his client will tempt him to the commission of so gross an error. I will mention two modes (by way of caution) in which it may be committed; 1. by giving a false color to facts, in his own statement of them to the jury; 2. by turning the answers of witnesses to purposes eccentric from their original design. Both these are very bold attacks upon the understanding and common sense of men. Integrity is averse from a conduct like this; it teaches its pupil to consider, that in a court of justice the grand aim is truth; and that a subversion of truth cannot be achieved, but at the expense of honor; an expense which no man of a right mind will willingly incur."† 2. Truth is violated, by speaking or writing with a view to produce a particular effect, but without much regard to the truth of what is spoken or written, provided it is calculated to accomplish the desired end. Controversial writers of every description are frequently guilty of violating truth in this way. Stimulated by the anticipated shouts of victory, or mortification of defeat, truth, in too many cases, soon ceases to be their main object, if it was so at first; moral and equitable restraints are gradually cast aside; and at length, blinded by prejudice, and heated by passion, nothing serves their purpose which does not Cicero, De Oratore, Lib. II. c. 15. + Study and Practice of the Law, pp. 245, 246. |