promptings is seen in the lives of the pure and the virtuous, has long since ceased to be regarded; stifled as it is, amid the ragings and clamor of passion, and the practice of iniquity. Such are said, in the strong language of Scripture, to have their consciences seared with a hot iron. * They have become insensible to all moral considerations and influences. They have refused to listen to the sure guide given them by their Maker, to guide them amidst the temptations, the seductions, and the perplexities of life. Uninfluenced by moral principles, and regardless of the sacred obligations of duty, they become the sport of chance, of caprice, of humor, of impulse, of prejudice, of passion, and of circumstance. We have, then, no talent intrusted to our care, the due cultivation and improvement of which is so essential as this; no talent, the neglect of which will be so fatal to our usefulness and happiness.

2. We have seen the substantial uniformity and consistency of sentiment, which have prevailed among men, both in ancient and modern times, in regard to the practical department of morals. And we can now understand, why this coincidence of sentiment has not been still more uniform and complete. Like all other faculties of the mind, conscience sometimes fails fully to perform its office. This is equally the case with memory and reason. The one does not bring every thing past to our remembrance; and the other sometimes leads us astray, both in the affairs of life, and in matters of abstract science. As in the case of reason, too, conscience is sometimes perverted. Under the influence of strong prejudice and passion, every object is discolored, the attention is completely absorbed, and all the powers of the mind are disturbed. Under such circumstances, neither the conscience, the memory, nor the imagination, nor any other faculty, can perform the office assigned it. But, when prejudice and passion have subsided, conscience is relieved from its burthen, the power of moral discernment returns, and the man reviews with dismay, remorse, and mortification, the violence and perversion of feeling, to which, in moments of excitement, he had permitted himself to give way.

* 1 Tim. iv. 2.

See above, pp. 6-10.

Again, many actions are complex in their nature; and this is another source of aberration in our moral judgments of men and actions. No one circumstance is of so much importance, in determining the moral character of an action, as the intention of the author. And how frequently is it, that we pronounce on the moral conduct of a man, when we entirely mistake his motives and intentions, or are at least very imperfectly acquainted with them. Moreover, our moral judgments of men and their conduct will be much affected by early associations, by differences of education, and especially by the light and position from which we view them. In all these cases, mistaken moral judgments must be ascribed to want of full and exact knowledge, and not to any defects of conscience. Conscience in moral transactions, as well as reason in other matters, must have fair opportunities for its exercise, or it cannot be expected to lead us in the right way.

3. We may now understand, how a man may follow the dictates of his conscience, and still fall into iniquity, and incur great guilt. We have seen, that the decisions of conscience may be perverted by prejudice and passion, and by the influence of early associations. We have seen, too, that actions are sometimes complex in their nature, that is, they may be in some respects worthy of approbation, and in others of reprehension, and this is another source of wrong moral decisions. Hence, to decide rightly, we must be free from prejudice and passion; we must, as far as possible, divest ourselves of the bias of early associations, and we must patiently analyze the conduct and transactions upon which we presume to pass judg

ment.

Moreover our consciences must be enlightened by knowledge, and we must bring to their aid, full, calm, and honest inquiry. Except in cases where ignorance is invincible, we are required to have a conscience enlightened by knowledge and reflection. St. Paul considered himself highly guilty in persecuting the church of God, although he verily thought at the time of doing this, that he ought to do many things con

*

* 1 Cor. xv. 9; Eph. iii. 8; 1 Tim. i. 13.

that is, he sincerely

trary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth; thought it his duty to oppose the gospel. The reason why he considered himself guilty, in opposing the gospel and persecuting the church, was, that he acted under the influence of unjust prejudices and violent passions, which prevented him from perceiving the evidence, and acknowledging the claim, of Christianity as a revelation from Heaven. Full evidence of the truth of the gospel had been furnished; but he had closed his eyes to its light, and steeled his heart against all impressions in its favor. "In the instance of St. Paul," says Dr. Macknight, we see how much guilt a man, who is not at pains to inform himself, may, through ignorance, contract, without going contrary to his conscience. At this time Paul was doing things, which, after he became an apostle, made him call himself the chief of sinners; he was touching the law blameless, and thought that, in persecuting the Christians, he was doing God service."†

tt

On the moral responsibility accompanying wilful ignorance, and the guilt contracted by refusing or neglecting to enlighten the conscience, Dr. Abercrombie says, "Deep guilt may attach to the moral agent, who has been proof against the influence of moral causes. There is guilt in ignorance, when knowledge was within his reach; there is guilt in heedless inattention, when truths and motives of the highest interest claimed his serious consideration; there is guilt in that corruption of his moral feelings which impedes the action of moral causes, because this has originated, in a great measure, in a course of vicious desires and vicious conduct, by which the mind, familiarized with vice, has gradually lost sight of its malignity. During the whole of this course, also, the man felt that he was a free agent; that he had power to pursue the course which he followed, and that he had power to refrain from it. When a particular desire was first present to his mind, he had the power immediately to act, with a view to its accomplishment, or he had the power to abstain from acting, and to direct his attention more fully to the various considerations and motives, which were calculated to guide his determination. In acting as he did, he not only with

#

Acts xxvi. 9.

t Comm. on 1 Tim. i. 13.

held his attention from those truths, which were thus calculated to operate upon him as a moral being; but he did still more direct violence to an impulse within, which warned him, that he was wandering from the path of rectitude. The state of moral feeling which gradually results from this habitual violation of the indications of conscience, and this habitual neglect of the serious consideration of moral causes, every individual must feel to be attended with moral guilt. The effect of it is, not only to prevent the operation of moral causes on his future volitions, but even to vitiate and distort the judgment itself, respecting the great principles of moral rectitude. Without attempting any explanation of this remarkable condition of the mental functions, its actual existence must be received as a fact in the constitution of human nature, which cannot be called in question; and it offers one of the most remarkable phenomena that can be presented to him, who turns his attention to the moral economy of man." * Another writer well says, "Apart from human judgments, there is an intrinsic moral difference in actions; and hence results the previous obligation of informing the mind, by a diligent attention to the dictates of reason and religion, and of delaying to act until we have sufficient light; but, in entire consistence with this, we affirm, that where there is no hesitation, the criterion of immediate duty is the suggestion of conscience, whatever guilt may have been previously incurred by the neglect of serious and impartial inquiry."†

THE CONSCIENCE, THEREFORE, OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL IS TO HIM THE SUPREME AND ULTIMATE RULE OF DUTY; BUT, TO INSURE SAFE DECISIONS, THE MIND MUST BE KEPT FREE FROM PREJUDICE AND PASSION, AND, ABOVE ALL, THE CONSCIENCE MUST BE GUIDED, REGULATED, AND ENLIGHTENED. In truth all the powers of the mind require cultivation for their due exercise. The reason is necessary to confine the imagination within sober limits; the memory furnishes the reason with the materials of which it is to make use; and both the reason and the conscience impose restraints on the appetites, the passions, and the will. All the other faculties have, in like manner,

*

Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, p. 169.

Rev. Robert Hall's Works, Vol. I. p. 342. New York. 1832.

important relations with the conscience, by the exercise and aid of which, it may be so regulated and enlightened, and otherwise cultivated, as to be qualified to perform its high office of deciding on the moral feelings, sentiments, and conduct. I proceed to review the chief sources by the aid of which the conscience may be regulated and enlightened.

I. The Scriptures fully recognise civil government as binding on the conscience; and, therefore, the enactments of the government under which we live, or, in other terms, the law of the land, is one of the rules by which the consciences of individuals are to be regulated.

The law of a country is the combined reason, sentiment, and wisdom of the citizens of such country, so far as relates to the subjects embraced by the law, and therefore, aside from its binding character as law, is entitled to the respect of the citizens. It is chiefly occupied in devising the means of protecting the persons, liberties, reputation, and estates of the citizens; in settling the rules of evidence, and the forms of proceedings; in prescribing rules and ordinances in the numerous cases, in which natural equity only ordains that there shall be a rule, but does not prescribe what the rule shall be; in adjusting private rights in their endless and perplexing diversity, and in guarding against fraud in all its devious ways. The practical administration of the law consists, for the most part, in ascertaining the facts, which enter into controversies, and on which their rightful decision depends; in inquiring into the extent of injury inflicted, and the corresponding amount of damages which ought to be rendered; in settling the construction of statutes; in applying the law to various facts and unforeseen contingences, which daily happen in the affairs of men ; and in looking beyond the present case, to see, on the one hand, how the decision of to-day agrees with preceding decisions, and, on the other hand, how it will

* Rom. xiii. 1-7; 1 Peter, ii. 13-16.

Thuanus (De Thou) says, "The life, and soul, and judgment, and understanding of the country, centre in the laws. A state without law, like a body deprived of its animating principle, is defunct and lifeless in its blood and members. Magistrates and judges are but ministers and interpreters of the laws, and in fine, we are all servants of the laws, that we may be free." - Præfatio Thuani ad Henricum IV.