order tremble for the institutions and salvation of his country.

We are aware, that some will meet us at this point with a stout denial of the evil influences, by telling us that the opposite sides are in equilibrio,-that the forces neutralize each other, that talent, address, ingenuity, every thing which can conduce to success are in the hands of either party; so that, in the end, nothing can be lost by their employment, Now, let us ask, in calm deliberation, is not this converting the forum, where justice and virtue ought to sit enthroned, into an arena for angry contest, art, subterfuge and chicanery? Is it not to leave the victory, and, of consequence, the administration of law itself, in the hands of him who has had the address to bring to his aid the greater amount of sophistry and craft, and can wield his deceptions with the greater impudence and the more barefaced and unblushing effrontery? Is it to this, then, that we have reduced the boasted perfection of our judicial forum? O dii immortales! ubinam gentium sumus? in qua urbe vivimus? quam rempublicam habemus? What! say the defenders of this indiscriminate advocacy, is it not in the face of our free and happy institutions that a man should be prohibited from pleading his own case, and saying any thing in his defence that best pleases? And has he not a right to say, by another, what he might say himself? Can there be any thing of moral perversion in the lawyer who becomes the mere conduit pipe through which the court receives what his client has to allege? Is not the lawyer a mere part of the machinery of justice, without power to decline the functions of that part, viz. the making known to the court what it would not be expedient for it to hear from the client, even if that client had the capacity, which is not to be supposed? Would there not, in too many cases, be a palpable defect of justice, if the plain and manifest right of the cause must appear, before counsel will undertake, for is it not often the case, that in the course of the hearing,-even after the trial is at end,-nay, after execution is awarded, something turns up which gives an entirely new phasis to the question, and chases away all the clouds, doubts and darkness which overshadowed the minds of those who had prejudged it? Did not the pure and pious Hale see fit to change the course which had characterized his earlier efforts at the bar,

on discovering how often his first prejudices were dissipated by a nearer view of the case?* If lawyers, distinguished for integrity and spirit, were accustomed to make this discrimination, would it not throw an extensive amount of business into the hands of the dissolute, of which the profession shall never be in want? At the worst, is not truth and justice sifted out in the course of the various and conflicting allegations and pleadings, whatever may be intended by the parties, and could they be so well sifted out under any other system of practice? All of these, and a hundred other questions may be propounded, wherein plausibility disguises sophistry and wins its way to the hearts of incautious or interested reasoners. The answers could easily be made in detail, and the reader, if his understanding be trained up to right principles, will make them for us. All attempt to mystify so evident a matter must prove abortive. A plain, honest mind could never hesitate a moment its decision in favor of that minority who hold that in no case and under no circumstances whatsoever, can it be the duty of the lawyer to advocate other than right and justice. Such an advocacy has on its side all the sanctions of morality and religion; it is a pure, a noble and an elevated one; it upholds the character of the profession; attaches it to the State; enlists, in defence of society, its warmest sympathies; calls into exercise all the highest faculties of its professors; assimilates them to the great Hale,-the beloved Hamilton,†— the pure Grimke.‡

But that we may not appear unsupported in our opinions, we shall introduce into this place some of the arguments that have been alleged by the advocates of either side. We are indebted for many of them to Mr. O'Brien, and if much space be occupied by their introduction, let the reader remember that they belong to great authorities, and have the most direct bearing upon the subject before us. We make no other apology.

Alas that the incorruptible Sir Matthew should be introduced in support of a practice which his whole life condemns.

+ On being asked by a young lawyer the best road to eminence at the bar, Hamilton replied "be ever found upon the right side."

The name of Grimke must ever be venerated, associated as it is with all the highest qualities of human nature. We know his faults and forget them.

The name of one, deservedly high in the Christian Church, though frequently the advocate of error, presents itself first:

I. Dr. Paley. There are falsehoods which are not lies, as a prisoner pleading not guilty, a servant denying his master, and an advovate asserting the justice or his belief of the justice of his client's

cause.

II. Dr. Johnson. Sir you do not know it (the cause) to be bad till the judge determines it. An argument which does not convince yourself, may convince the judge to whom you urge it, and if it does convince him, why then, sir, you are wrong and he is right. Every body knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your client.

III. Mr. Montague. None but the ignorant and unreflecting can think Bacon censurable for anything that he did as counsel for the crown, as no advocate can justifiably use any discretion as to the party for whom he appears.

IV. Bishop Warburton. I apprehend it to be the natural right of every member of society, whether accusing or accused, to speak freely for himself. And if this cannot be done in person, to have a proxy provided or allowed by the State to do for him, what he cannot or may not do for himself. I apprehend that every advocate is such

a proxy.

V. Basil Montague. He (the barrister) exerts his power to strengthen his own case and weaken his opponent's, because he knows that taking all things into consideration, justice is best promoted by collision of intellect, and that the whole truth will be eviscerated by the opposite counsel, or that the intelligence which presides will not permit truth to be misrepresented by any partial examination.

VI. Lord Erskine. From the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say that he will or will not stand between the crown and a subject, arraigned in the court where he daily sits to practice, from that moment the liberties of England are at an end. If the advocate refuses to defend from what he may think of the charge or of the defence, he assumes the character of the judge; nay, he assumes it before the hour of judgment; and, in proportion to his rank or reputation, puts the heavy influence of perhaps a mistaken opinion into the scale against the accused, in whose favor the benevolent principles of English law makes all presumtions, and which commands the very judge to be his client.

VII. Benjamin D'Israeli. I confess I have imbibed an opinion that it is the duty a council owes his client to adjust him by all possible means, just or unjust, and even to commit a crime for his assistance or extrication.

VIII. Lord Brougham. An advocate, by the sacred duty of his connection with his client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client, and no other. To save that client by all expedient means,-to protect that client at all hazards and cost to others, and, among others, to himself, is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction which he may bring upon others; nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, he must go on, reckless of the consequences, if his fate should unhappily be to involve his country in confusion for his client,

These, then, are the authorities upon which the affirmative of the question rely, and strongly insist, with much of that confidence which results from the association of great names; but it must be remembered "that great names can only give splendor to error, without being able to transform it into truth." However, the negative, in demanding to be heard, brings with it an array of names, not wanting in any of the elements of true greatness, as will directly be seen,-divines, moralists, casuists, lawyers, legislators. Audi alteram partem.

I. Bishop Sanderson. Let it be a ruled case to thee in all thy pleadings, not to speak in any cause to wrest judgment.

II. Hooker. If they which employ their labour and travel about the public administration of justice, follow it only as a trade, not being persuaded in heart that justice is God's own verdict, and themselves his agents in this business, formalities of justice do but serve to smother right; and that which was necessarily ordained for the common good, is made the cause of common misery.

III. Baxter. It is a dear-bought fee which is got by such a wilful, aggravated sin as the deliberate pleading for iniquity or opposing of the truth.

IV. Fuller. He (the advocate) joys not to be retained in such a suit, where all the right in question is but a drop, blown up with malice to be a bubble.

V. Thomas Aquinas. Now, the advocate clearly counsels and assists him whose cause he undertakes, and if he knowingly undertakes an unjust cause, is without doubt guilty of heinous sin, and is bound to make restitution to the party who, by his assistance, has been unjustly injured.

VI. Grotius. Qui sancta sumis arma civilis togæ cui se reorum capita, fortunæ, decus intenda credunt, nomini præsta fidem juris sacerdos: ipse die causam tibi litemque durus arbiter præjudica voto clientum jura metiri time, nec quod colorem patitur, id justum puta. Peccet necesse est sæpe, qui nunquam negat.

VII. St. Germains. He may give no counsel against the law of God or the law of reason; that a man should do as he would be done by, is grounded upon both these laws.

VIII. Sir Matthew Hale. It is as great dishonor as a man is capable of, that for a little money he is to be hired to say or do otherwise than as he thinks.

IX. Sir John Davies. Good lawyers have not with us that liberty which good physicians have, for a good physician may lawfully undertake the cure of a foul and desperate disease, but a good lawyer cannot honestly undertake the defence of a foul and desperate cause. X. Domat. All the duties of advocates may be reduced to two maxims: one, never to defend a cause that is unjust,-and the other, not to defend just causes but by the ways of justice and truth.

XI. Lord Langdale. The zeal and the arguments of every counsel, knowing what is due to himself and his honorable profession, are qualified by considerations affecting the general interests of justice,

But why go on multiplying the authorities, which are sufficiently numerous, when we might well conclude that none at all are necessary. Is not the rule we advocate sustained by the immutable principles of right, as well as the civil institutions of many countries? The Roman advocate was sworn never to defend a cause known to be unjust. A similar oath was administered to the Scotch; and, in Holland, the advocate is so sworn even at the present day. The earlier English statutes were to the same point.

The catalogue of eminent lawyers affords frequent illus tration of the fact, that no position in society, however low and humble, can throw a barrier in the way of those who aspire to be great. Some of the brightest characters that have ever adorned the profession, set out in life under circumstances the most discouraging, and worked their way upwards, at last, to the highest elevations, by the most untiring assiduities and labour. In the law, there is no mushroom growth: the lawyer "is made," whatever be said of the poet, and the elaboration is one of highest effort. In his earlier prospects, every thing is frequently dark and cheerless, and the most inglorious obscurity seems, for a long time, to threaten the talent and learning which need only an occa→ sion for brilliant display. Frequently has it been the result of mere accident, that the lawyer is brought into notice, and then the clouds begin gradually to be dissipated. Perhaps, it may be, the very difficulties with which, at first, he has had to contend, and the conflicts in his own bosom occasioned by them, have called into exercise and developed the loftiest energies of soul, and fitted, when the time should come, for the noblest achievements in the profession. Adversity, after all, is the school in which to educate men for greatness it sharpens all their powers, it developes all their resources,-it makes them great, in their very struggles to exist. Who that is at all acquainted with biography, needs yet to be informed of this? "Pray, my Lord, what do you think my son had better do to succeed in the law?" "Let him spend all his money, marry a rich wife, spend all her's, and when he has not got a shilling in the world, let him attack the law." Such was Lord Kenyon's advice. Erskine used to say, that "when he was about giving up in despair at the bar, he felt his little children in imagination tugging at the skirts of his gown." And our own Patrick Henry doubtless discovered the potency of a combination of