in Cambridge on the 2d of July, and took command of CHAPTER the army the next day. VII. by the Pro gress of Mas sachusetts. July 4. The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, then sitting 1775. at Watertown near Cambridge, received him with great Addressed cordiality, and presented to him an address, proffering vincial Conevery aid in their power to make his command agreeable, and to strengthen his efforts in the common cause. The testimonies of respect and satisfaction, as well from individuals as public bodies, which he had everywhere received, were of the most flattering kind, and demonstrated that the people were not less unanimous in approving the choice of Congress, than the members of that assembly had been in making it. The army greeted him with equal warmth, and hitherto every indication tended to inspire a just confidence in himself, and the best hopes for the future. the state of His first care was to ascertain the numbers, position, Ascertains and arrangements of the troops, to inspect the posts they the army. occupied, and to gain a knowledge of the strength and plans of the enemy. The British general was himself stationed in Boston, with the light-horse and a few other troops; the bulk of his army lay on Bunker's Hill, busy in throwing up intrenchments; and the remainder were on the neck of land between Boston and Roxbury, which had been strongly fortified. The Americans were SO posted as to form a complete line of siege around Boston and Charlestown, extending nearly twelve miles from Mystic River to Dorchester. Intrenchments and redoubts had been begun at different points in this line, and these works were still in progress. The regiments from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and part of those from Connecticut, occupied Winter Hill and Prospect Hill; several of the Massachusetts regiments were at Cambridge, and others from Connecticut and Massachusetts covered the high grounds in Roxbury. Having acquainted himself with this state of affairs, General Washington convened a council of war. It was the opinion of the council, that, according to the best Convenes a council of war. July 9. 1775. CHAPTER information that could be obtained, the enemy's available VII. force in Boston amounted to eleven thousand five hundred men, including the regular troops, Tories, and such sailors as might be spared from the fleet. It was also advised, without a dissenting voice, that the posts now occupied should be held and defended, and that twentytwo thousand men were necessary to give proper security to so long an extent of lines. A place of rendezvous, in case the army should be attacked and routed, was likewise agreed upon. Resolved to hold the army in its present position. Strength of the army. The difficulty was perceived of sustaining posts so widely separated, almost under the guns of the enemy, and exposed at many points to sudden assaults; and the question of removing farther into the country to a stronger position was discussed. But this was thought to be neither politic in itself, nor without hazard in the execution. It would discourage the men, elate the enemy, and have an ill effect upon the minds of the people. This consideration, added to the uncertainty of finding a better place at which to make a stand, and to the great labor and charge already bestowed on the works for defence, was regarded as conclusive against a change. The American army, including the sick and absent, amounted to about seventeen thousand men; but the number present, fit for duty, was only fourteen thousand five hundred. This was so far short of the number wanted, that the council recommended an immediate application to the New England governments to make up the deficiency by new recruits. * * The warlike preparations of the British authorities in Massachusetts, from the time that the Boston Port Bill went into effect, had alarmed the people of that province; and on the 26th of October, 1774, the Provincial Congress resolved on measures of defence. After reciting in a preamble the causes of such a step, among which was the collecting of a formidable body of troops in the metropolis, with the express design of executing acts of the British Parliament subversive of the constitution and liberties of the province, they recommended to the militia to form themselves into companies of minute-men, who should be equipped and prepared to march at the shortest notice. These VII. 1775. of supplies and want of system. It will easily be supposed, that an army, collected as CHAPTER this had been on the spur of the moment from different provinces and under different regulations, would be defective in many essential parts. There were few tents and Deficiency stores, no supply of clothing, no military chest, no general organization. The regiments acted under their respective commanders, who were united only by mutual consent, bound together by no military law, and except those from Massachusetts, yielding obedience to General Ward rather from courtesy and the necessity of the case, than from any recognition of his superior authority. The troops of each province were regulated by their own mil minute-men were to consist of one quarter of the whole militia, to be enlisted under the direction of the field-officers, and divided into companies, consisting of at least fifty men each. The privates were to choose their captains and subalterns, and these officers were to form the companies into battalions, and choose the field-officers to command the same. Hence the minute-men became a body distinct from the rest of the militia, and, by being more devoted to military exercises, they acquired skill in the use of arms. More attention than formerly was likewise bestowed on the training and drilling of the militia. But it was not till April 22d, 1775, three days after the affair of Lexington and Concord, that any movement was made towards embodying a regular army. On that day the Massachusetts Congress resolved unanimously, that it was necessary for the defence of the colony, that an army of thirty thousand men should be immediately raised and established. It was at the same time resolved, that thirteen thousand six hundred should be raised in Massachusetts, and a committee was appointed to devise a plan for the establishment of the army. The remainder of the thirty thousand it was expected would be furnished by the other New England provinces, and for this object letters were addressed to Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. In the mean time, the news of the Lexington battle had gone abroad, and the militia from various parts in Massachusetts and New Hampshire began to assemble around Boston. Within three days, several companies from New Hampshire had arrived at Medford and taken their station in that place. The Massachusetts militia convened at Cambridge. The plan of the new army was soon arranged, General Ward was placed at its head, and recruiting orders were sent out. The other three colonies agreed to furnish their proportion of troops, who were raised and sent forward with as much expedition as possible. VII. CHAPTER itia laws. These were various and discordant; and hence no general system could prevail. Discipline was lax; disorders frequent. 1775. Want of ammunition. Appoint ment of offi isfactory. But the most alarming want was that of ammunition, respecting which the officers themselves seem to have been deceived, till General Washington discovered, to his great astonishment, that there was not powder enough in the whole camp for nine cartridges to a man. Out of these materials, and in the midst of these emcers not sat- barrassments, it was General Washington's first task to form, commission, and systematize an army. Another circumstance caused great perplexity from the beginning. The appointment of general officers by Congress had given much dissatisfaction. The pretensions to rank, on the score of former services, had not been well adjusted. The subordinate officers and private soldiers mingled their sympathies and complaints, and threatened to leave the army unless these grievances should be redressed. Symptoms of discontent appeared in every quarter, and threatened to destroy the little that remained of method and discipline. The ferment was gradually allayed by the prudence of Washington, who referred the matter to Congress, and proceeded steadily to mature his plans. Arrange ment of the army. Officers commission ed anew. He arranged the army into six brigades, of six regiments each, in such a manner, that the troops from the same colony should be brought together, as far as practicable, and act under a commander from that colony. Of the whole he made three grand divisions, each consisting of two brigades or twelve regiments. The division forming the left wing was stationed at Winter Hill, and commanded by Major-General Lee; the centre division was at Cambridge, under Major-General Putnam; and the right wing at Roxbury, under Major-General Ward. The headquarters of the Commander-in-chief were with the centre at Cambridge. Thus was planted the original germ of the Continental army, to foster the growth and strength of which required the utmost care and address. All the officers were com VII. 1775. missioned anew by Congress, although no changes of rank CHAPTER were attempted, and no appointments made, except of the major and brigadier generals. By degrees the system worked itself into a tolerable method; but, after all, it was full of imperfections, which no art or skill could remedy. The soldiers had been enlisted by their respective governments for a definite time and object, and they looked upon this contract as one which they were bound to fulfil, but not such as could put them under any other power. Each individual regarded himself as a party concerned, and claimed his rights as a citizen. accede re the new ar Hence, when the rules and regulations of the Conti- The soldiers nental army, which had been prescribed by Congress, luctantly to were presented to them, many would not accede, because rangement. they did not enlist on such terms, and they were apprehensive some new obligations might devolve on them by giving their assent. Having left their homes to fight for liberty, they chose to assert it first in their own behalf. However repugnant this temper was to the existence of an army, the commander yielded to his good sense, and resorted to no other force than that of argument and facts, judiciously set forth from time to time in the general orders; tenacious of his authority no farther than the public good exacted, and forbearing to oppose prejudices, which could not be softened by persuasion nor subdued by severity. He left it optional with the men to subscribe the articles or not, making it a necessary condition only with the new recruits, who enlisted into the Continental ranks. jealous of power. In addition to the management and direction of the Congress armies in the field, which is all that is usually expected military from a commander-in-chief, a most responsible service of a different kind was thrown upon General Washington. Congress, as the civil head of the confederacy, was as yet feeble in its powers, imperfectly organized, distrustful of its control over the public will, and wholly unversed in military concerns. Nor did unanimity reign among its members. On the great point of resistance, till wrongs should be redressed, there was but one voice. As to the |