IX. 1776. though his army is much dispirited from the late success CHAPTER of his Majesty's arms; yet have I not the smallest prospect of finishing the combat this campaign, nor until the rebels see preparations in the spring, that may preclude all thoughts of further resistance. To this end I would propose eight or ten line-of-battle ships to be with us in February, with a number of supernumerary seamen for manning boats, having fully experienced the want of them in every movement we have made. We must also have recruits from Europe, not finding the Americans disposed to serve with arms, notwithstanding the hopes held out to me upon my arrival in this port." British min This last point was a source of great delusion to the Errors of the British ministers almost to the end of the war. They isters flattered themselves with the belief, that a large part of their army might be recruited among the loyalists in America. Clothes and equipments were abundantly supplied for this purpose, and extravagant bounties were offered. The generals on the spot, being soon undeceived, remonstrated against so fallacious a dependence; but the ministers closed their ears to such counsel, and persevered. Plans were repeatedly formed by the generals, and approved by the cabinet, on the basis of a certain number of troops; but, when the time of execution came, the men sent from Europe fell far short of the number promised, and the commander was instructed to make up the deficiency with American recruits. If the inquiry were pursued, it would be found that the ill success of the British arms, and the defeated expectations of the government, are often to be traced to this cause alone. Hence both Howe and Clinton, the principal commanders in America during the most active period of the war, became dissatisfied, requested their recall long before it was granted, and finally went home to receive the censures of their countrymen and the neglect of the court. and pros The subject, which now engaged the most anxious Situation thoughts of Washington, was the situation and prospects pects of the of the army. We have seen that the establishment form- army. American IX. 1776. CHAPTER ed at Cambridge was to continue for one year, and the time of its dissolution was near at hand. He had often called the attention of Congress to this important subject, and pressed upon them the necessity of some radical alterations in the system hitherto pursued. By the experience of the past year all his first impressions had been confirmed, and all his fears realized, in regard to the mischievous policy of short enlistments, and of relying on militia to act against veteran troops. Disobedience of orders, shameful desertions, running away from the enemy, plundering, and every kind of irregularity in the camp, had been the fatal consequences. Letter to Sept. 24. "To bring men to a proper degree of subordination," said he, "is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year; and, unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner done away, by having such a mixture of troops, as have been called together within these few months. Relaxed and unfit as our rules and regulations of war are for the government of an army, the militia (those properly so called, for of these we have two sorts, the six-months' men, and those sent in as a temporary aid,) do not think themselves subject to them, and therefore take liberties, which the soldier is punished for. This creates jealousy; jealousy begets dissatisfaction; and this by degrees ripens into mutiny, keeping the whole army in a confused and disordered state, rendering the time of those, who wish to see regularity and good order prevail, more unhappy than words can describe. Besides this, such repeated changes take place, that all arrangement is set at nought, and the constant fluctuation of things deranges every plan as fast as it is adopted." At the close of the long and able letter to Congress, from which this extract is taken, his feelings under the trials he suffered, and in contemplating the future, are impressively described. "There is no situation upon earth less enviable, or more IX. change in system rec distressing, than that person's, who is at the head of troops CHAPTER regardless of order and discipline, and unprovided with almost every necessary. In a word, the difficulties, which 1776. have for ever surrounded me since I have been in the A thorough service, and kept my mind constantly upon the stretch; the military the wounds, which my feelings as an officer have re- ommended. ceived by a thousand things, that have happened contrary to my expectations and wishes; the effect of my own conduct, and present appearance of things, so little pleasing to myself, as to render it a matter of no surprise to me if I should stand capitally censured by Congress; added to a consciousness of my inability to govern an army composed of such discordant parts, and under such a variety of intricate and perplexing circumstances; — induce not only a belief, but a thorough conviction in my mind, that it will be impossible, unless there is a thorough change in our military system, for me to conduct matters in such a manner as to give satisfaction to the public, which is all the recompense I aim at, or ever wished for." Moved by his representations and appeals, as well as by their own sense of the necessity of the case, Congress determined to re-organize the army, on a plan conformable in its essential features to the suggestions of the Commander-in-chief. Not that the jealousy of a standing army had subsided, but the declaration of independence had put the war upon a footing different from that, on which it was before supposed to stand; and they, who for a long time cherished a lingering hope of reconciliation, were at length convinced, that the struggle would not soon terminate, and that it must be met by all the means, which the wisdom, patriotism, and resources of the country could supply. As it was a contest of strength, a military force, coherent in its parts and durable in its character, was the first requisite. To the resolute and discerning this had been obvious from the moment the sword was drawn. The events of a year had impressed it on the minds of all. The new army was to consist of eighty-eight battalions, Congress organize the resolves to army anew. IX. 1776. Construction of the new army. CHAPTER apportioned in quotas to the several States according to their ability. The largest quota was fifteen battalions, which number was assigned respectively to Virginia and Massachusetts. The men were to serve during the war, this great point being at last gained. To encourage enlistments, a bounty of twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land was offered to each non-commissioned officer and private; and lands in certain quantities and proportions were likewise promised to the commissioned officers. The business of enlisting the troops to fill up the quotas, and of providing them with arms and clothing, devolved upon the several States to which they belonged. The expense of clothing was to be deducted from the soldiers' pay. Colonels and all lower officers were to be appointed by the States, but commissioned by Congress. The rules for the government and discipline of the army were at the same time revised and greatly amended. Original Thus matured, the plan was sent to the Commanderin-chief, and was soon followed by a committee from Congress, instructed to inquire into the state of the army. From this committee the views of Congress were more fully ascertained; but General Washington perceived defects in the scheme, which he feared would retard, if not defeat, its operation. The pay of the officers had not been increased; and he was persuaded, that officers of character could not be induced to retain their commissions on the old pay. The mode of appointing them was defective, it being left to the State governments, which would act slowly, without adequate knowledge, and often under influences not salutary to the interests of the army. The pay of the privates was also insufficient. Congress partially remedied these defects in conformity to his advice, by raising the officers' pay, giving a suit of clothes annually to each private, and requesting the States to send commissioners to the army, with full powers to arrange with the Commander-in-chief the appointment of all the officers. With the jealousy of State sovereignty, and the fear of a standing army, this was all that could be IX. 1776. obtained from the representatives of the States. And per- CHAPTER haps it was enough, considering their want of power to execute their resolves, and the necessity of being cautious to pass such only as the people would approve and obey. The above plan was modified before it went into effect, by allowing men to enlist for three years; these men not receiving the bounty in land. Hence the army from that time was composed of two kinds of troops, those engaged for the war, and those for three years. At length, also, the States being negligent and tardy in providing for the appointment of officers, Congress authorized General Washington to fill up the vacancies. It kept back men effects of an irregular system of bounties. A circular letter was written by the President of Con- Injurious gress to the States, urging them to complete their quotas without delay. The proper steps were immediately taken; but an evil soon crept into the system, which produced much mischief throughout the war. To hasten enlistments, some of the States offered bounties in addition to those given by Congress; and in many cases the towns, to which quotas were assigned by the State governments, raised the bounties still higher, differing from each other in the amount. Again, when the militia were called out on a sudden emergency, it was usual to offer them extraordinary rewards for a short term of service. This practice was injurious on many accounts. from enlisting by the hope of higher bounties; and, when they were brought together in the field, although the Continental pay was uniform, yet many were receiving more from incidental bounties, and in various proportions, which created murmurings and jealousies between individuals, companies, and regiments. Nor was there the salutary check of interest to operate as a restraint upon the States. The war was a common charge, and, when money or credit could be applied to meet the present exigency, it was a small sacrifice to be bountiful in accumulating a debt, which the continent was pledged to pay. There could be no other remedy than a supreme power in Congress, which did not exist; and the evil was |