X. 1777. road on the right near the Schuylkill, and gain their left CHAPTER and rear. The divisions of Greene and Stephen, flanked by McDougall's brigade, were to make a circuit on the American left, and attack the British right wing, while the Maryland and Jersey militia, under Smallwood and Forman, were to move down by a road still farther to the left, and fall upon their right flank and rear. The plan was extremely well concerted, and the surprise was complete. The attack commenced between daybreak and sunrise. At first the action was very warm in the centre, and afterwards on the American left, and every thing seemed to promise success; but the Americans were ultimately obliged to retreat, and leave the enemy in possession of the ground. Washington speaks of this event as follows, in a letter to his brother. "After the enemy had crossed the Schuylkill, we took the first favorable opportunity of attacking them. This was attempted by a night's march of fourteen miles to surprise them, which we effectually did, so far as to reach their guards before they had notice of our coming; and, if it had not been for a thick fog, which rendered it so dark at times that we were not able to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of thirty yards, we should, I believe, have made a decisive and glorious day of it. But Providence designed it otherwise; for, after we had driven the enemy a mile or two, after they were in the utmost confusion, and flying before us in most places, after we were upon the point, as it appeared to everybody, of grasping a complete victory, our own troops took fright and fled with precipitation and disorder. How to account for this, I know not; unless, as I before observed, the fog represented their own friends to them for a reinforcement of the enemy, as we attacked in different quarters at the same time, and were about closing the wings of our army when this happened. One thing, indeed, contributed not a little to our misfortune, and that was a want of ammunition on the right wing, which began the engagement, and in the course of two hours and forty Washing ton's ac count of the battle. X. 1777. CHAPTER minutes, which time it lasted, had, many of them, expended the forty rounds, that they took into the field. After the engagement we removed to a place about twenty miles from the enemy, to collect our forces together, to take care of our wounded, get furnished with necessaries again, and be in a better posture, either for offensive or defensive operations. We are now advancing towards the enemy again, being at this time within twelve miles of them. Loss in the action. Affair at Effects of the battle. "Our loss in the late action was, in killed, wounded, and missing, about one thousand men, but, of the missing, many, I dare say, took advantage of the times, and deserted. General Nash of North Carolina was wounded, and died two or three days after. Many valuable officers of ours were also wounded, and some killed. In a word, it was a bloody day. Would to Heaven I could add, that it had been a more fortunate one for us." General Howe reported his loss to be seventy-one killed, four hundred and fifty wounded, and fourteen missing. The American loss, as stated by Dr. Gordon on the authority of the Board of War, was one hundred and fifty killed, five hundred and twenty-one wounded, and about four hundred prisoners. In the midst of the action, six companies of the fortieth British regiment, commanded by Colonel Mulgrave, took possession of Chew's House, a strong stone building, which they barricaded and defended with so much obstinacy, as to retard for some time the advance of the second line of the Americans, intended to support the centre; and, during this delay, Sullivan's division, which had been closely engaged in front, having mostly expended its ammunition, began to retreat, and, falling back upon the second line, threw it into disorder. This circumstance, added to the dense fog, is supposed to have contributed much to the unfortunate issue of the day. But the battle of Germantown was not without its good effects. It revived the hopes of the country by proving, that, notwithstanding the recent successes of the enemy, X. 1777. neither the spirit, resolution, and valor of the troops, nor CHAPTER the energy and confidence of the Commander, had suffered any diminution. They were as prompt and eager to meet their adversaries in battle, as at the beginning of the campaign. Considered in its political relations, the event was not less important. When the American Commissioners in Paris had their first interview with Count de Vergennes to converse on a treaty of alliance, after complimenting them on the favorable prospects in America, and the conduct of the American troops, he added, "that nothing struck him so much as General Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's army; that to bring an army, raised within a year, to this, promised every thing." It has been commonly supposed, that Burgoyne's defeat was the turning point with the French government in joining the United States against England, and probably it was; but the above fact, recorded by one of the Commissioners at the time, shows that the operations of Washington's army had their due weight in the scale. in the Delaware. The British fleet having entered the Delaware, every Operations exertion was made to remove the obstructions in the river, and drive the Americans from their fortified posts. By the activity of the small naval armament under Commodore Hazelwood, and the brave defence of Red Bank and Fort Mifflin, these efforts were resisted for more than six weeks, when a vastly superior force, both by land and water, compelled an evacuation of those places, and opened a passage for the enemy's shipping to Philadelphia. sent to New General Washington returned to his former station after the bat- Detachment tle of Germantown, and in a few days encamped in a Jersey under strong position at Whitemarsh, fourteen miles from Phila- Greene. delphia. General Greene was ordered with a detachment November. into New Jersey to operate against Cornwallis, who had passed over with a large body of troops to aid in reducing Fort Mercer at Red Bank. The Marquis de Lafayette was a volunteer under Greene, and distinguished himself in a skirmish with the enemy at Gloucester Point, CHAPTER although his wound was not yet entirely healed. No X. event of importance occurred. The British recrossed the 1777. river to Philadelphia, and Greene joined the main army at Whitemarsh. A reinforcement likewise arrived from the north, consisting of Morgan's rifle corps and part of the New Hampshire and Massachusetts troops; the surrender of Burgoyne, and the relinquishment by the British of their temporary acquisitions in the Highlands, rendering their services no longer necessary in that quarter. Skirmish at Whitemarsh. Sir William Howe, having received an accession to his strength by several regiments from New York, thought a December 5. good opportunity presented itself for trying his fortune in another battle, if he could find the Americans in such a condition as to attack them to advantage. He marched out of the city with twelve thousand men, in the evening of the 4th of December, and the next morning took post at Chesnut Hill, about three miles from the right of the American encampment. Washington sent out light troops to skirmish, but resolved to wait for the general attack on the ground he had chosen. This was an adventure, which General Howe was not inclined to hazard. After manœuvring three days in the front and on the flanks of the American lines, seeking for an advantage which his opponent was careful not to give, he retreated suddenly to Philadelphia, having lost in the different rencounters twenty men killed, sixty-three wounded, and thirty-three missing. Preparations for winter The season being far advanced, and the troops worn quarters. down by the hard service of the campaign, it was thought necessary to make immediate preparations for winter quarters. Many of the soldiers were suffering extremely for the want of clothes and shoes; and even the supplies of provision and forage were obtained with difficulty. So great was the disaffection of the inhabitants, particularly after the British entered Philadelphia, that the larger portion of them refused to sell their produce to the American contractors, some perhaps through fear of the enemy, others from a sincere attachment to the royal cause; and X. 1777. even the well affected were unwilling to part with their CHAPTER property upon so feeble a security as the certificates given on the authority of Congress. With his usual delicacy and caution, Washington was reluctant to exercise the powers with which he was intrusted to obtain supplies from the people by forcible means. The soundest policy forbade this practice, as long as it could possibly be avoided. It alienated friends, and added a new motive for disaffection. ton's deli cacy in the military exercise of power. Dec. 15. "I confess," said he, in writing to the President of WashingCongress, "I have felt myself greatly embarrassed with respect to a vigorous exercise of military power. An illplaced humanity, perhaps, and a reluctance to give distress, may have restrained me too far; but these were not all. I have been well aware of the prevalent jealousy of military power, and that this has been considered as an evil much to be apprehended, even by the best and most sensible among us. Under this idea, I have been cautious, and wished to avoid as much as possible any act that might increase it. However, Congress may be assured, that no exertions of mine, as far as circumstances will admit, shall be wanting to provide our own troops with supplies on the one hand, and to prevent the enemy from getting them on the other. At the same time they must be apprized, that many obstacles have arisen to render the former more precarious and difficult than they usually were, from the change in the commissary's department, at a very critical and interesting period. I should be happy, if the civil authority in the several States, through the recommendations of Congress, or their own mere will, seeing the necessity of supporting the army, would always adopt the most spirited measures, suited to the end. The people at large are governed much by custom. To acts of legislation or civil authority they have ever been taught to yield a willing obedience, without reasoning about their propriety; on those of military power, whether immediate or derived originally from another source, they have ever looked with a jealous or suspicious eye." |