XIII. 1781. yield to the request; after which, if they had proceeded CHAPTER to help themselves by force, you could but have submitted; and, being unprovided for defence, this was to be preferred to a feeble opposition, which only serves as a pretext to burn and destroy." The reader need not be reminded of the accordance of these sentiments with the noble disinterestedness, which regulated his conduct through the whole of his public life. An extract from his diary, written on the 1st of May, will exhibit in a striking manner the condition of the army at that time, and the prospects of the campaign. the army. May 1. "To have a clearer understanding of the entries, which Condition of may follow, it would be proper to recite in detail our wants and our prospects; but this alone would be a work of much time and great magnitude. It may suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words. Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here and there in the different States; instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores, they are poorly provided and the workmen all leaving them; instead of having the various articles of field-equipage in readiness to be delivered, the quartermaster-general, as the dernier resort, according to his account, is but now applying to the several States to provide these things for their troops respectively; instead of having a regular system of transportation established upon credit, or funds in the quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it, we have neither the one nor the other, and all that business, or a great part of it, being done by military impress, we are daily and hourly oppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their affections; instead of having the regiments completed to the new establishment, which ought to have been done agreeably to the requisitions of Congress, scarce any State in the Union has at this hour an eighth part of its quota in the field, and little prospect that I can see of ever getting more than half; in a word, instead of having every thing in readiness to take the field, CHAPTER XIII. 1781. Arrival of Count de May 6. Conference we have nothing; and, instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land troops, and money from our generous allies, and these at present are too contingent to build upon." Happily the train of affairs took a more favorable turn than he anticipated. In a short time he received the cheering intelligence, that Count de Barras had arrived in Boston harbor with a French frigate, that other vessels and a reinforcement of troops from France might soon be looked for, and that a fleet under the Count de Grasse would sail from the West Indies to the United States in July or August. Another meeting between the commanders of the allied armies was thus rendered necessary. It took place at Weathersfield, in Connecticut, on the 22d commanders of May. Count de Barras, having succeeded M. Destouches in the command of the French squadron, was detained at Newport by the appearance of a British fleet off the harbor; but the Marquis de Chastellux, a majorgeneral in the army, accompanied Count de Rochambeau. On the part of the Americans were the Commander-inchief, General Knox, and General Duportail. between the American and French at Weathersfield. May 22. Objects of the confer ence. The two principal objects brought under consideration were; first, a southern expedition to act against the enemy in Virginia; secondly, a combined attack on New York. The French commander leaned to the former; but he yielded to the stronger reasons for the latter, which was decidedly preferred by General Washington. A movement to the south must be wholly by land, the French fleet being inferior to that of Admiral Arbuthnot, by which it was blockaded, and of course not in a condition to go to sea. The difficulty and expense of transportation, the season of the year in which the troops would reach Virginia, being the hottest part of summer, and the waste of men always attending a long march, were formidable objections to the first plan. It was believed, also, that the enemy's force in New York had been so XIII. much weakened by detachments, that Sir Henry Clinton CHAPTER would be compelled either to sacrifice that place and its dependencies, or recall part of his troops from the south to defend them. 1781. ter to the governors of States. the eastern May 24. It was therefore agreed, that Count de Rochambeau Circular letshould march as soon as possible from Newport, and form a junction with the American army near Hudson's River. Before leaving Weathersfield, a circular letter was written by General Washington to the governors of the eastern States, acquainting them with the result of the conference, and urging them to fill up their quotas of Continental troops with all possible despatch, and to hold a certain number of militia in readiness to march at a week's notice. If men could not be obtained for three years, or during the war, he recommended that they should be enlisted for the campaign only, deeming the exigency to be of the greatest importance, both in a military point of view and in its political bearings; for the zeal of the Americans, and their willingness to make sacrifices for the common cause, would be estimated by the manner in which they should now second the efforts of their allies, and contribute to give effect to their proffered services. A body of militia was likewise to be called to Newport, for the defence of the French fleet in the harbor after the departure of the troops. The two commanders returned to their respective armies, and prepared to put their plan in execution. the people It may here be observed, that, after the treaty of alli- Apathy of ance, the people of the United States, feeling secure of their independence by the powerful aid of France, became more and more remiss in complying with the requisitions of Congress. The eastern and middle States in particular, after the French troops had arrived in the country, and the theatre of war had been transferred by the enemy to the south, relapsed into a state of comparative inactivity and indifference; the more observable on account of the contrast it presented with the ardor, energy, and promptitude which had previously character XIII. CHAPTER ized them. To shake off this lethargy, or at least to counteract its influence and stimulate them to furnish the supplies absolutely necessary for the army, Washington resorted to every expedient, which he thought would operate on their public spirit and immediate interests. 1781. Washington's designs respecting the campaign. Large extent of Washington's command. Hence he had determined, nearly a year before this time, to give out and cause it to be believed, that New York was the point of attack at which he aimed with all the force and means that could be collected. Speaking on this subject at a later date, he said, "It never was in contemplation to attack New York, unless the garrison should first have been so far disgarnished to carry on the southern operations, as to render our success in the siege of that place as infallible as any future military event can ever be made. For, I repeat it, and dwell upon it again and again, some splendid advantage (whether upon a larger or smaller scale was almost immaterial) was so essentially necessary to revive the expiring hopes and languid exertions of the country, at the crisis in question, that I never would have consented to embark in any enterprise, wherein, from the most rational plan and accurate calculations, the favorable issue should not have appeared as clear to my view as a ray of light. The failure of an attempt against the posts of the enemy could, in no other possible situation during the war, have been so fatal to our cause." The main object was to strengthen the army and obtain supplies. The mode of applying them might be regulated according to circum stances. The attention of the Commander-in-chief was but partially taken up with the affairs under his own eye. He held a constant correspondence with General Greene and Lafayette, who kept him informed of the operations at the south, and asked his advice and direction on points of difficulty and importance. The western posts beyond the Alleganies were also under his command, and required much of his care. Incursions of the enemy from Canada kept the northern frontier in a state of alarm, and a considerable portion of the New York troops was called away for the protection of that quarter. CHAPTER XIII. 1781. Morris. The wants of the army, especially in the article of bread, were at this time relieved by the generous and Robert spirited exertions of Robert Morris, recently appointed Superintendent of Finance by Congress. He procured from contractors two thousand barrels of flour, promising hard money, and pledging his own credit for its payment. The act was voluntary, and the relief seasonable. It was one of the many valuable services, which that distinguished patriot rendered to his country. General Washington drew the several parts of his army out of their quarters, and took his first position near Peekskill, but soon advanced towards New York, and encamped on the 4th of July near Dobbs's Ferry, and about twelve miles from Kingsbridge. On the 6th he was joined by Count de Rochambeau with the French army, which had marched in four divisions from Providence by way of Hartford. The Americans encamped in two lines, with their right resting on the Hudson. The French occupied the left, in a single line extending to the river Brunx. Preparations were made for an attack on the north part of New York Island a short time before the junction of the two armies. General Lincoln descended the Hudson with a detachment of eight hundred men in boats for this purpose, landed above Haerlem River, and took possession of the high ground near Kingsbridge. At the same time the Duke de Lauzun was to advance from East Chester with his legion, and fall upon Delancey's corps of refugees at Morrisania. Unforeseen causes prevented the attack, and Lauzun did not arrive in season to effect his part of the enterprise. After some skirmishing the enemy's outposts were withdrawn to the other side of Haerlem River. General Washington came forward with the main army as far as Valentine's Hill, four miles from Kingsbridge, to support General Lincoln in case it should be necessary. The troops lay upon their arms Junction of can and the Ameri French ar mies. July 6. Preparations for an attack on New York. July 21. |