the adoption of this statute, but it indicates the policy of the law, and the growth or expansion, and perhaps the creation, of legal remedies hardly known to ancient trade mark law. below, in an exhaustive opinion, reviewing all the authorities, among The learned chancellor other things, said (and we can say it no more clearly) that: "The known reputation of a particular kind of skilled labor, employed in the development of a particular product or class of products, determines, to a large degree, the value or price of such products when put on the markets. To stamp or label a commodity as the product of a particular kind or class of skilled labor, determines the demand for, and the price of, such product or commodity. The marketable price of a commodity influences the scale of wages paid for its manufacture. The higher the price, the higher the wages paid. Hence it is indisputable that the employee, whose skilled labor in the production of a particular commodity creates a demand for the same that secures for him higher, remunerative wages, has as definite a property right to the exclusive use of a particular label, sign, symbol, brand, or device, adopted by him to distinguish and characterize said commodity as the product of his skilled labor, as the merchant or owner has to the exclusive use of his adopted trade-mark on his goods."

In Cohn v. People, 149 Ill., 486, 37 N. E., 60, the court upheld the constitutionality of the trades-union act in that State; and as the court, independently of the statute, disposed of one of the contentions of counsel in the case, which is also relied on here, we quote, in part, its argument: "It is next objected that the label, an imitation and counterfeit of which is alleged to have been unlawfully used by plaintiff in error, could not have been rightfully adopted either as a label, trademark, or form of advertisement. It is said that it transgresses the rules of morality and public policy. * heretofore set out, it will be seen that it is a certificate, signed by the By reference to the label, president of the Cigar Makers' International Union of America, certifying that the cigars contained in the box upon which it was placed were made by a first-class workman, a member of the Cigar Makers' International Union of America, an organization opposed to inferior, rat shop, cooly, prison, or filthy tenement house workmanship.' And it concludes: "Therefore we recommend these cigars to all smokers throughout the world.' The purpose, as derived from the label itself, is to send the cigars out to the public with the assurance that they are made by a first-class workman, who belongs to an order opposed to the inferior workmanship designated. It will be observed that the label attacks no other manufacturer of cigars. It says, simply, in effect, 'These cigars are not the product of an inferior, rat-shop, cooly, prison, or filthy tenement-house workmanship.' Can it be said that one may not, without condemning or aspersing the product of other manufacturers, commend the article he has for sale? If he may do so himself, may he not procure the certificate of others as to the quality of the article he puts upon the market?"

Further, we agree with the learned chancellor that there is no competent evidence that the appellees, or any of them, have been engaged in boycotting the appellants, and thus depriving themselves of the right to enforce their legal remedies in a court of equity. Whatever may be said of the letters and circulars looking to this end, and exhibited in the proof, it is not shown by any competent proof that the appellees instigated, or had aught to do with, the attempted boycott. And, moreover, this boycott, which seems to have occurred in 1886, did not in any way grow out of the wrongful use of the label in contro

versy.

On the whole case, therefore, we are of opinion that the law may be justly invoked by organized labor to protect from piracy and intrusion the fruits of its skill and handiwork, and that brain and muscle may be the subject of trade law rules, as well as tangible property. The judgment is affirmed.

SEAMEN'S WAGES-Krueger et al. v. The John and Winthrop, 84 Federal Reporter, page 503.-This was a libel by F. A. Krueger and others against the American bark John and Winthrop to recover seamen's wages, brought in the United States district court for the northern district of California. The defense to the action was that the libelants had shipped for an entire whaling voyage, and while on such voyage attempted to burn and destroy the vessel, and for that offense the captain, after such investigation as he thought sufficent, suspended the libelants from duty, and imprisoned them on board of the vessel. Upon the trial the captain testified that such action was, in his judg ment, necessary for the safety of the vessel. The captain did not, however, of his own knowledge, know that the libelants were in fact guilty of the offense charged against them.

The decision of the district court was rendered December 29, 1897, and allowed the wages claimed. The opinion was delivered by District Judge De Haven, and reads as follows:

The evidence in this case is not such as would warrant the court in finding that the libelants, or either of them, attempted to burn and destroy said bark, John and Winthrop, and thus to break up the voyage for which they shipped as seamen on board of said vessel. The fact, if it be a fact, that the captain, in suspending the libelants from duty and imprisoning them on board the ship, acting in good faith, under the belief that they were guilty of attempting to destroy the vessel, is not of itself sufficient to defeat the claims of the libelants in this action. The good faith of the master in that matter would be important, if the libelants were seeking to recover damages for assault or false imprisonment; but in this action, based on the contract set out in the shipping articles, the libelants are entitled to recover if they are not in fact guilty of the charge of attempting to set fire to the vessel. There will be a decree for the libelants.

SEAMEN'S WAGES-COMPLETION OF VOYAGE-Heinrici et al. v. The Laura Madsen et al., 84 Federal Reporter, page 362.-This case was brought in the United States district court for the southern district of California to recover seamen's wages. The libelants at San Francisco, Cal., on March 29, 1897, entered into and duly executed articles of agreement with the master of the schooner Laura Madsen, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the shipping articles, a part of which reads as follows: "The schooner Laura Madsen, of San Francisco, Cal., * now bound from the port of San Francisco, Cal., to

Port Blakeley, thence to San Francisco for final discharge, either direct or via one or more ports on the Pacific coast. Either north or south of the port of discharge. Voyage to be repeated one or more times.” Another material provision of said articles was as follows: "It is especially understood and agreed that the wages of the said crew shall not be due, nor any part thereof, nor shall the crew be entitled to receive any portion of their pay, except at the master's option, until the completion of the entire voyage above described; and that, in case any of the crew leave the vessel before the completion of the voyage as aforesaid, the persons so leaving shall forfeit to the owners of the said vessel all the wages due them."

The vessel entered upon the voyage from San Francisco and proceeded direct to Port Blakeley, in the State of Washington, where she loaded with a cargo of lumber, and thence sailed direct to the port of San Pedro, in the State of California. After discharge of cargo there the master announced to the seamen his purpose of sailing direct to Port Blakeley, and they then and there demanded their wages, but payment was refused. They remained while the vessel took in ballast and assisted in the same, and after that they again demanded their pay. The master refused to pay them, claiming that the voyage had not been ended and that they were not entitled to their wages. The seamen then and there left the vessel without the master's consent, claiming that the voyage was completed and that they were entitled to their wages.

The decision of the court awarding wages to the seamen was rendered November 1, 1897, and from the opinion, delivered by district Judge Wellborn, the following is quoted:

Libelants contend that they had a right to leave the vessel at the time and place they did, for the reason, among others, that the voyage for which they shipped did not include a return from San Pedro to Port Blakeley; and therefore, when the announcement was made to them by the master of the vessel of his intention to return to Port Blakeley, they were justified in leaving said vessel. Respondents insist that libelants, by leaving the vessel at San Pedro, were guilty of desertion, and therefore forfeited their wages.

If it be conceded (which, however, I do not decide) that the shipping articles allowed the vessel to go from Port Blakeley to San Pedro, no fair construction of the articles would permit the return from San Pedro to Port Blakeley. The voyage is expressly described as being from San Francisco to Port Blakeley, thence to San Francisco, etc. Certainly this language does not imply that the vessel could go from Port Blakeley to some other point, as, for instance, San Pedro and return to Port Blakeley. Whatever may be the true construction of the shipping articles as to the ports at which the vessel could touch in going from Port Blakeley to San Francisco, it is clear that the articles did not permit a return to Port Blakeley from any intermediate port before San Francisco had been reached. A decree for libelants will be entered.

SEAMEN'S WAGES-LEAVING VESSEL-ABUSIVE TREATMENT— Richards et al. v. The Topgallant, 84 Federal Reporter, page 356.—This was a libel in rem against the bark Topgallant to recover seamen's wages, heard in the United States district court for the district of Washington, northern division. The following decision of the court was rendered January 3, 1898, by District Judge Hanford:

The libelants shipped at San Francisco for a voyage to Puget Sound and return, and they proceeded in the vessel from San Francisco to Port Blakeley, and thence to Seattle, and, while at Seattle, engaged in taking in cargo, there was difficulty between them and the captain. The captain had given orders to the first mate to move the vessel to a different position for convenience in receiving coal, and the mate neglected to have this done until after working hours. After 7 o'clock in the evening the mate asked the men if they would then haul the ship, to which they answered that they would not, and the vessel was not moved that night, and in consequence of this neglect she was delayed in lading. The captain was absent from the ship from the time of giving the order to the mate to the next morning. On being informed by the mate that the men had refused to haul the ship when requested, he reprimanded the crew, and ordered a discontinuance of coffee and a luncheon, which, until that time, during the loading of the vessel, had been served to the men at 9 o'clock in the forenoon, as an extra in addition to the regular breakfast, dinner, and supper. There is a conflict in the testimony as to the conduct and exact words of the captain at this time, and as to threats which the men allege he made of future severity. A day or two after this occurrence, these libelants informed the captain that they wished to leave the ship, and asked him for their wages, which he refused to pay. He informed them, however, that they could leave the vessel if they wished to, but that, if they did leave, he would not pay them their wages. The libelants did leave the vessel. It is my opinion that the libelants were not justified in leaving the vessel before termination of the voyage for which they shipped, by reason of abusive treatment at the hands of the captain; neither was their conduct disobedient or insolent to such a degree as to authorize the captain to discharge them, and claim forfeiture of their wages. The libelants, however, wished to leave the vessel, and so informed the captain; therefore they cannot claim that by telling them to go the captain discharged them unjustly, so as to entitle them to wages for the entire voyage. Upon being told by the captain that they could leave the vessel, they had a right to take him at his word, so that their contract for services in the vessel was, in effect, terminated by mutual consent. The captain seems to have acted upon a mistaken idea that the wages of seamen are forfeited by quitting the service before fulfillment of the entire contract, even when in doing so there is no disobedience. But in law seamen can not be treated as deserters, and their wages forfeited, unless they leave the vessel, and remain absent, without leave of the commander. The rule is that, when the seamen's contract is terminated before conclusion, by mutual assent, the seamen are entitled to wages for the time of their actual service at the rate fixed by their contract. If the captain discharges them before the termination of the voyage, without justifiable cause, they are entitled to wages for the entire voyage, and the amount of their expenses in returning to the port of discharge. Deserters from a vessel are not entitled to any ing.

LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR ENACTED SINCE JANUARY 1, 1896.

[The Second Special Report of the Department contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor in force January 1, 1896. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin from time to time as published.]

NORTH CAROLINA.

ACTS OF 1897.

VOL. I.-PUBLIC LAWS.

CHAPTER 185.-Protection of employees as voters.

SECTION 72. Section seventy-two (72) of said act [chap. 159, acts of 1895] is hereby repealed, and the following substituted therefor: "That any person entitled to vote at any election held under the laws of this State shall, on one of the days set apart for registration for said election, and on the day of such election be entitled to absent himself from service or employment in which he is engaged or employed for a period of time sufficient to enable such person to go and return from the voting place in the precinct wherein such person is entitled to register and vote, while the registration books are open, and while the polls in said precinct are open, if such voter shall notify his employer before the day of such registration or of such election, of such intended absence, and if, thereupon, the time of [such absence] shall be designated by the employer, and such absence shall be during such designated time, or if the employer, upon the days of such notice, makes no designation, and such absence shall be during one of the days for registration or during the day of election, no penalty shall be imposed upon him by his employer by reason of such absence. Ratified the 9th day of March, A. D. 1897.

CHAPTER 219.-Convict labor.

SECTION 5. It shall be the duty of the superintendent of the State's prison

*

(2) To employ all convicts in his custody within the penitentiary or on farms leased or owned by the institution, and to make contracts on remunerative terms with persons or corporations in order to employ and support as many of the ablebodied convicts on public works as the interests of the State and the constitution will permit.

(4) To sell at the highest market prices all articles manufactured and products produced by the convicts not deemed necessary for their use and comfort for the next ensuing year as and when he may deem best; but any article or product held more than two months for better prices shall be sold when the board of directors shall direct.

(11) The superintendent may, with the consent of the governor, erect additional shops within the walls of the prison for employment of convicts confined therein, and may lease and equip farms whenever it may become necessary to keep the ablebodied convicts employed:

Ratified the 3d day of March, A. D. 1897.

CHAPTER 251.—Inspection and regulation of mines.

SECTION 1. Chapter 113 of the laws of 1887 is amended by adding to the duties of the commissioner of labor statistics that of "mine inspector" as herein provided for, which officer is called in this act "inspector."

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the inspector to examine all the mines in the State as often as possible to see that all the provisions and requirements of this act are strictly observed and carried out; he shall particularly examine the works and