1826] The Protocol of St Petersburg 191

negotiations with the new Emperor. In January, 1826, accordingly, the Duke of Wellington was sent as special envoy to St Petersburg, to congratulate Nicholas I on his accession, and at the same time to come to an understanding as to common action in the affairs of the Ottoman empire. For such a mission the Duke was specially adapted. His great reputation, and his known sympathy with the European system, made him a persona grata at the Russian Court; while the changed situation in the relations of the Powers obviated any danger of his running counter to Canning's policy. " The Duke of Wellington," wrote Canning, " would not have done for any purpose of mine a twelvemonth ago. No more would confidence in Russia. But now—-the ultra system being dissolved, by the carrying of every point which they opposed — the elements of that system have become useable for good purposes. I hope to save Greece through the agency of the Russian name upon the fears of Turkey without a war." The instructions of Wellington were to offer to the Tsar the mediation of Great Britain between Russia and Turkey on the one hand, and between Turkey and the Greeks on the other. At the same time, if a Conference of the Powers were suggested, he was to stave it off " by multiplying conditions."

The Emperor Nicholas was, indeed, as little inclined as Canning to submit the Eastern Question to the continental Allies, by whom he conceived that Alexander had been badly treated; and he was now, as on subsequent and more fateful occasions, anxious to settle the matter by a separate understanding with Great Britain. The mutual sympathy between Nicholas and Wellington, whose qualities were well calculated to draw them together, facilitated the negotiations; and on April 4, 1826, was signed the Protocol of St Petersburg, the first formal step in the establishment of an independent Greece. According to this instrument Great Britain was empowered to offer to the Ottoman Government a settlement of the Greek Question based on the establishment of Greece as a vassal and tributary State. Russia promised her co-operation " in any case"; but by Article III it was stipulated that, should the Porte reject the proffered mediation, the signatory Powers should take the earliest opportunity, either separately or in common, of establishing a reconciliation on the basis of the Protocol.

The changed attitude of the British Government involved in the signature of this instrument was due largely to the well-founded dread of isolated action on the part of Russia. On the other hand, Canning justified an intervention to which he had refused to be a party, so long as it was repudiated by both sides to the quarrel, by the new attitude of the Greeks, who, cowed by Ibrahim's successes, had sought the " good offices" of Great Britain and had even suggested placing themselves under her protection. The terms embodied in the Protocol were substantially those agreed upon at a conference between Stratford Canning and

192 Revolt of the Janissaries. — Treaty of Akkerman [1826

certain of the Greek leaders, held on the island of Perivolakia in January. In spite, however, of the apparent cordiality of the Anglo-Russian entente, causes of friction were not long in showing themselves. The Emperor Nicholas, though prepared to act in concert with Great Britain in the Greek Question, was fully determined to retain in his own hands the settlement of the specific grievances of Russia against the Porte. While Wellington was yet at St Petersburg, and during the negotiations which led up to the April Protocol, Minciaky, the Russian agent at Constantinople, was directed to present an ultimatum to the Ottoman Government demanding the evacuation of the Principalities by the Turkish troops, the release of certain Servian deputies, and the immediate dispatch to the frontier of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of arranging a final settlement. The ultimatum was dispatched on March 17, 1826; and in a circular note of the 16th the Russian Government justified its action to the Powers. The ultimatum, it urged, concerned the affairs of Russia alone. Russia would be grateful if the Powers would press the Porte to make concessions, but asked no more than strict neutrality in case of war. As to Greece, the Emperor would know how to enforce on the Turks respect for the dictates of humanity and European peace.

The impression made upon the British Government by this action was naturally not altogether favourable. It was felt that Wellington had to a certain extent allowed himself to be hoodwinked; and that, under cover of friendly negotiations with a view to joint intervention, Russia had taken the first step towards that isolated action which it was the aim of British policy to forestall. The premature publication of the Protocol of April 4, which it had been intended to keep secret, increased the risk of war. Sultan Mahmud, not unnaturally, resented the intrusion of fresh demands before he had time to consider those already presented, and saw in them one more proof that Russia desired to drive him to extremities. His immediate answer was to hurry on the military reforms which he hoped would put him in a position to bid defiance to the Tsar's threats. The measures he took to achieve his ends, however, recoiled upon himself. The Janissaries, whose traditional privileges were threatened by the Sultan's plans, rose in revolt on June 15; and, though Mahmud, with the aid of his Anatolian troops, was able to crush the insurrection and to exterminate the turbulent Praetorians who had so long tyrannised over his predecessors, the immediate result was so seriously to weaken his available forces that he was compelled to come to terms with Russia. On October 7 was signed at Akkerman a treaty conceding all the demands of Russia with regard to the Principalities, the navigation of the Straits, and the cession of certain Circassian fortresses. Full diplomatic relations between St Petersburg and Constantinople were now resumed, and the dreaded war was again postponed.

Meanwhile the Protocol had not resulted in any effective action.

1826] Inaction of the Powers 193

Canning resented the haste with which its terms had been communicated to the other Powers, as tending to revive " the principle of an unasked authoritative interference of the Alliance," with which this, "a corporate movement in a particular case," had nothing to do. The Emperor Nicholas, on the other hand, noted the apparent reluctance of Great Britain to take action, and began to suspect that her motives had been solely to prevent any isolated action of Russia. Canning, indeed, wished to hold the Protocol in reserve, and to use it only in the event of the Porte rejecting the separate mediation of England. The stubborn spirit of Sultan Mahmud soon made it clear that no mediation unsupported by a threat of force would have any chance of success. In view of the continued Turkish successes against the insurgents, it was indeed hardly reasonable to expect any other attitude; and Russia continued to urge the necessity for enforcing the terms of the Protocol. In June Prince Lieven was instructed to point out the notorious plan of Ibrahim for exterminating the Greeks of the Morea, and to ask whether the British Government had represented to the Porte the intention of Russia and England to unite in preventing this. The attitude of the British Ministers in face of this direct appeal seemed to justify the suspicions of Russia. Wellington, denying that the intention to depopulate the Morea had been proved, declared that the object of the Protocol had been purely pacific, and that Great Britain had never departed from her firm objection to the coercion of Turkey.

A long correspondence between the several chanceries followed. Metternich, who had stigmatised the Protocol as a "feeble and ridiculous production," and regarded Canning's whole policy in the Eastern Question as fatal to the peace of Europe, based as this was upon the sanctity of treaties, was obdurate; and Prussia faithfully supported his views. Charles X, on the other hand, in his capacity of " Most Christian King," was favourable to an armed intervention, which savoured of a crusade. By the end of August Canning, still to a certain degree actuated by dread of isolated action on the part of Russia, ventured a step forward. On September 4 he addressed a note to the Russian Government suggesting that Great Britain should point out to the Sultan that " the sentiments of humanity and the interests of commerce " made it necessary for the two Powers to insist on his accepting their mediation on the basis of the Protocol and suggesting, in the event of his refusal, to withdraw the British and Russian representatives from Constantinople, to establish diplomatic agents in Greece, and, possibly, to recognise the independence of the Morea and the islands. To this note the Tsar replied by a general acquiescence, but suggested that, before threatening a breach of diplomatic relations, the two Powers should demand the establishment of an armistice, so as to prevent the extermination of the Christian population. The particular claims of Russia had been satisfied by the Treaty of Akkerman ; and the Russian Government was anxious not to renew the

C. M. H. X. 13

194 Conference of London. The Porte rejects mediation [1826-7

crisis, if this could be avoided without sacrificing the cause of the Greeks. Only in the event of the armistice being refused were the Powers to take any coercive measures ; and, as to their nature, on September 29 Lieven was instructed to point out to Canning that the plan, suggested by himself, of isolating Ibrahim in the Morea by intercepting succours from Egypt would be the easiest way of convincing the Porte without a declaration of war. This could be done by a union of the fleets of the Powers willing to share in the pacification of Greece.

Common action was delayed by the hope of still bringing into line, on the basis of the Protocol, all the Powers interested in the Eastern Question. But the Conference, opened in London in the spring of 1827, only emphasised their irreconcilable differences. Metternich protested as energetically as ever against any coercion of Turkey, and repudiated " mediation " at the request of " rebels " ; Prussia, as usual, followed obediently in his wake; and the two Powers which alone seemed to remain faithful to the principles of Troppau withdrew from the Conference.

The question of the conversion of the Protocol into a formal treaty, suggested so early as January by France, was now seriously taken up. Russia was prepared to adopt this course, on condition that the ultimate appeal was to be to force. " We are invited," wrote Count Nesselrode, " to sanction a principle. We invite the recognition of its consequences." " It is part of their civil and religious system that Orientals never act save in obedience to absolute necessity," Prince Lieven had written on January 21,1827, at the same time pointing out that the Porte was perfectly able to distinguish between a mere " demonstration " and a serious business. This was a proposition the truth of which a rich experience has since brought home to all the Powers. But Canning was by no means willing to break with the traditional British policy, and still objected to making the rejection of mediation by the Porte a casus belli; and, on April 4, the Protocol was presented to the Sultan by the British and Russian ambassadors. The result was what the Russian Government had expected. The Porte indignantly rejected the proffered mediation as an impertinent interference in the affairs of Turkey and as irreconcilable with the precepts of the Koran. Canning now realised that the only way to hold Russia to the spirit of the Protocol, and to prevent her from declaring war on her own account, was to forestall her by agreeing to apply coercive measures. This resolution accentuated the crisis in the Cabinet produced by the illness of Lord Liverpool and the succession of Canning to the premiership. In April, Wellington, who was.opposed to the conversion of the Protocol into a treaty, had refused a place in the new Government, and he was now in open opposition to the policy of Russia, and to any coercion of Turkey. This attitude was to produce its effect later; for the present the Tory Cabinet was embarked on a course opposed to the Tory tradition.

1827] Treaty of London 195

On July 6, 1827, the Protocol of St Petersburg was converted into the Treaty of London; Austria and Prussia refused to sign; and the final settlement of the Greek Question was thus left to Great Britain, Russia, and France. By the ostensible articles of the new treaty the three signatory Powers engaged to procure the autonomy of Greece, under the suzeraintyofthe Sultan, without breaking off friendly relations with the Porte. By additional secret articles, however, suggested by Canning, it was agreed that, in the event of the Ottoman Government refusing the mediation of the Powers, commercial relations by means of Consuls should be established with the Greeks ; that an armistice should be proposed to both sides ; and that this should be enforced by all the means that might " suggest themselves to the prudence " of the High Contracting Parties. In general it was held that a " pacific " blockade of Ibrahim in the Morea, as already proposed, would be the readiest way of bringing him to terms; and instructions to this effect were sent to the admirals of the allied Powers in Levantine waters, to whom necessarily a wide discretion was left.

On August 16 the ambassadors of the three Powers presented a joint note to the Porte, demanding the immediate arrangement of an armistice with the Greeks, and threatening, in case of refusal, to take in common the measures necessary to enforce it. The Porte, as usual, met a dangerous situation by an attempt to procrastinate; and Metternich, encouraged by the death of Canning on August 8, still hoped to retrieve the situation. He was encouraged also by the language of the Emperor Nicholas, who, while consenting to sign the Treaty of London, had expressed his deep regret at having to do so without two of his brother sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, for which he still proclaimed his heart-felt attachment, and protested his abhorrence of the Greeks as "subjects in open revolt against their legitimate sovereign." In Metternich's view the impending catastrophe might yet be averted, if the Porte would consent to accept the good offices of Austria, and explain to the intervening Powers that it was the method, and not the substance, of their proposals that it resented. The Austrian note embodying these proposals was presented at Constantinople on October 20. It was too late. That very afternoon the dilatory threads of diplomacy had been rudely torn, and the fate of Greece decided, in the Bay of Navarino.

The events leading up to the battle of Navarino demand a somewhat more detailed treatment than the other episodes of the war, since they produced a more immediate, profound, and lasting effect upon the general diplomatic situation. The terms of the Treaty of London had been communicated to the British and French admirals at Smyrna on August 11, 1827. They were empowered to propose an armistice to both combatants and to make it effective, by peaceful means if possible, by force if necessary. Admiral Codrington sailed at once for Nauplia,