deaths occasioned by a dissolute course of life: these things are all seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are. thought no objections against, though they expressly contradict, this universal principle, that the happiness of the present life consists in one or other of them. Whence is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is not the middle way obvious? Can any thing be more manifest, than that the happiness of life consists in these possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree1; that to pursue them beyond this degree, is always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness. Whence then, I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it really the result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness attainable in this world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not act conformably to what is the result of that consideration: i.e. reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love is prevailed over by passion and appetite. So that from what appears, there is no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man, which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow-creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated, than those, which most directly lead us to promote our own private good and happiness.

1 Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ ̓ ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα, καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγη

VOL. II.

E

μένον, μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ TéλELOV Biov; Aristot. Eth. Nic. I. x. 15.

§ 16. We violate our nature as to self, no less than as to others.

The sum of the whole is plainly this. The nature of man considered in his single capacity, and with respect only to the present world, is adapted and leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world. The nature of man considered in his public or social capacity leads him to a right behaviour in society, to that course of life which we call virtue. Men follow or obey their nature in both these capacities and respects to a certain degree, but not entirely their actions do not come up to the whole of what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities or respects: and they often violate their nature in both, i. e. as they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to which their nature leads them; and are injurious, to which their nature is abhorrent: so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which they negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and instruments of their own misery and ruin. Thus they are as often unjust to themselves as to others, and for the most part are equally so to both by the same actions.

SERMON II, III

UPON HUMAN NATURE

For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves.-ROMANS ii. 14.

SERMON II
MON

§ 1. Adaptations of nature indicate the Maker's purpose.

AS

S speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise moral obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than to any other; this is a reason to believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the

And the more

eye was intended for us to see with. complex any constitution is, and the greater variety of parts there are which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the proof that such end was designed.

§ 2. Double caution: (a) not to take the abnormal as the normal; (b) not to dethrone conscience.

However, when the inward frame of man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution

must be used that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or any thing which is the effect of particular customs, though observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and above all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements and affections which principle will of course have some influence, but which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, ought to preside over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of rightly observing the two former cautions; the appearance there is of some small diversity amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, with respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention necessary to survey with any exactness what passes within, have occasioned that it is not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature of man, as of his external form. Neither is this last exactly settled'. Yet we understand one another when we speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we do when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themselves, of showing them what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and would lead them to.

1 Does he refer to the opinions of those who hold that beauty is a floating opinion and rests on no foundation of principle? In our age Butler would have seen the works of Hay, Story, and others, who seek to establish relations between beauty and rules of line and form perhaps not without hope

as to the ultimate result. For his own belief in a substantive idea of beauty, see Serm. xi. 21. The strange power called fashion founds itself upon the negation of all principles of beauty. Fashion seems to be a modern invention: either it did not exist or it was far less traceable among the Greeks.

§ 3. The purpose, e. g., of shame is as plain as the purpose of the eye.

Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and natural conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the proof of things cognizable by them. Since then our inward feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally real; to argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to exception, as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his eyes were given him to see with, as he can doubt of the truth of the science of optics, deduced from ocular experiments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame; a man can as little doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing shameful actions, as he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to guide his steps. And as to these inward feelings themselves; that they are real, that man has in his nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned, than that he has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken; though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter'.

§ 4. We have no propension to evil corresponding with that to social good.

There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several principles in the heart of man,

80.

1 'We can see the wisest and best reasons why this is permitted to be The correction of mistakes in the former case may be more safely left to time and experience, and in fact such correction forms and

strengthens the character; whereas mistakes in the latter would be more immediately attended with danger, or perhaps destruction, to the individual.' Carmichael.