cent, respectively. In the stonework and earthenware, the textile, and the agricultural, gardening, and live-stock industries in June, and in the textile, the forestry, and the chemical industries in December, over one-half of the unemployed also owed their idleness to temporary disability. The cases where causes other than temporary disability were responsible for nonemployment were found to be most prevalent among employees in the insurance, the hotel and restaurant industries, the State, communal, and church service, and the commercial pursuits in the summer, and among those engaged in the building trades, the agricultural, gardening, and live-stock, and the stonework and earthenware industries in the winter time. The duration of nonemployment at the time of the enumeration was found to be over two weeks in the greater number of ascertained cases both in June and in December. The proportion of those unemployed over two weeks was slightly greater in the summer than in the winter time. The following table shows, by groups of industries, the number of days persons out of employment for causes other than temporary disability had been unemployed at the time the enumerations were taken: NUMBER AND PER CENT OF PERSONS OUT OF EMPLOYMENT FOR CAUSES OTHER THAN TEMPORARY DISABILITY JUNE 14 AND DECEMBER 2, 1895, BY NUMBER OF DAYS UNEMPLOYED. Num- Per Num- Per Num Per Num- Per Num- Per Num- Per JUNE 14. 1 or under 2 to 7.. 8 to 14. 15 to 28 29 to 90.. 91 or over Unknown. Total DECEMBER 2. 1 or under 2 to 7.. 8 to 14. 15 to 28. 29 to 90. 91 or over Unknown Total 231 0.53 2,104 1.17 1.68 1,078 1.10 277 2,007 10, 45 10. 119 10.35 2, 208 3,235 16.84 23,060 23.58 5, 265 1,492 7.77 12, 192 12.47 2, 522 2, 638 13.74 21,116 21.60 7, 295 2, 171 11.30 13.572 13.88 5, 196 7,339 38.22 16,645 17.02 3, 417 19, 204 100.00 97, 782 100.00 26, 180 100.00 30, 907 100.00 4, 931 100. 60 179, 004 100.00 1.06. 401 1.30' 26 8.43 2,906 9.40 4. 68 17.471 9.76 20. 11 7,291 23.59 808 16.39 39,659 22. 16 9.63 3, 179 10. 29 397 8.05 19,782 11.05 27.87 6,865 22. 21 1, 484 30.09 39, 398 22.01 19.85 3, 360 10.87| 957 19.41 25 256 14. 11 13.05 6, 905 22.34 1,028 20.85 35, 334 19.74 3,969 2.44 8, 145 2.97 1, 275 16.804 10.34 40,320 14. 68, 4, 662 45.968 28,29 83,993 30,58 8, 219 36,077 22. 21 45, 296 16.49 5,313 38.813 23.83 61, 239 22. 30 13, 633 6,868 4.23 18, 200 6.63 6, 679 13,973 8.60 17, 432 6.35 2,213 3.04 2, 243 3.28 159 2.59 15,791 2.85 451 7.36 70, 589 12.75 834 13.61 155, 206 28.03 697 11.38 98,180 17.74 21.72 2,210 36. 08,132,810 23.99 8.85 1,252 20.44 39, 051 7.05 11.50 523 8.54 42, 013) 7.59 162, 472 100.00 274, 625 100. 00 41, 994 160. 00 68, 423 100.00 6, 126 100. 00 553, 640 100.00 The duration of nonemployment is greatest in the case of employees in the State, communal, and church service and those engaged in the commercial and transportation industries, both in winter and summer, and least among those engaged in the mining, manufacturing, and 696-No. 11 -8 building industries in the winter, and the agricultural, gardening, live stock, forestry, and fisheries industries in the summer time. As regards the ages of the unemployed, it was found there was an excess of younger over older persons. This is due chiefly to the fact that young persons are more numerous in the employee class. It may also be in part due to the fact that young, inexperienced workers are more liable to dismissal than those of maturer age. In the summer over one-half and in the winter only a little less than one-half of the unemployed were from 14 to 30 years of age. The following table shows the ages of the unemployed by sexes: NUMBER AND PER CENT OF PERSONS OUT OF EMPLOYMENT JUNE 14 AND DECEMBER 2, 1895, BY AGE AND SEX. Of the whole number of unemployed 104,520, or 34.92 per cent, were heads of families at the time of the June enumeration. In December the number of heads of families was proportionately greater, namely, 317,282, or 41.15 per cent of the unemployed. The following table shows the number of heads of families and their dependents for each group of industries: HEADS OF FAMILIES OUT OF EMPLOYMENT AND THEIR DEPENDENTS, JUNE 14 AND DECEMBER 2, 1895, BY GROUPS OF INDUSTRIES. The table shows that the number of dependents was 213,191, or 2.04 for each head, in the summer, and 703,246, or 2.22 per head of family, in the winter time. Of the former, 67,625 were wives, 126,750 were children under 14 years of age, and 18,816 were otherwise dependent. Of the latter, 217,727 were wives, 426,280 were children under 14 years of age, and 59,239 were otherwise dependent. It appears from these figures that, in general, where heads of families were found to be out of employment, the number of dependent children was comparatively small, which seems to indicate that employees with large families exercise greater care in securing and retaining steady employment. There were 16,410 female heads of families out of employment in the summer, and 50,730 in the winter time. DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR. This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, will be continued in successive issues, dealing with the decisions as they occur. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks, and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, immaterial matter, needed simply by way of explanation, is given in the words of the editorial reviser.] DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR WAGES, ETC.-Gulf, C. and Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 17 Supreme Court Reporter, page 255.—This case was brought up from the supreme court of Texas to the United States Supreme Court on writ of error. On April 5, 1889, the legislature of the State of Texas passed an act containing the following language: 典 * * "Section 1. Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Texas, that after the time this act shall take effect, any person in this State having a valid bona fide claim for personal services rendered or labor done, or for damages, or for overcharges on freight, or claims for stock killed or injured by the train of any railway company, and the amount of such claim does not exceed $50, may present the same, verified by his affidavit, for payment to such corporation, and if, at the expiration of thirty days after such presentation, such claim has not been paid or satisfied, he may immediately institute suit thereon in the proper court; and if he shall finally establish his claim, and obtain judgment for the full amount thereof, * he shall be entitled to recover the amount of such claim and all costs of suit, and in addition thereto all reasonable attorney's fees, provided he has an attorney employed in his case, not to exceed $10, to be assessed and awarded by the court or jury trying the issue." Supp. Sayles' Rev. Civ. St., p. 768, art. 4266 a. * On October 9, 1890, defendant in error (Ellis) commenced this action before a justice of the peace to recover $50 for a colt killed by the railway company. The complaint alleged presentation and nonpayment, as required by the act, and demanded $10 attorney fee. The company answered, admitting everything except the claim for the attorney fee. The case passed, after judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed and an attorney fee of $10, through the district court and the court of civil appeals, to the supreme court of the State, by which, on May 10, 1894, the judgment against the railway company was affirmed. To reverse said judgment the company sued out a writ of error before the United States Supreme Court, which rendered its decision January 18, 1897, and reversed the judg. ment of the State court. The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, and it is given below in part: The single question in this case is the constitutionality of the act allowing attorney fees. The contention is that it operates to deprive the railroad companies of property without due process of law, and denies to them the equal protection of the law, in that it singles themout of all citizens and corporations, and requires them to pay in certain cases attorney fees to the parties successfully suing them, while it gives to them no like or corresponding benefit. Only against railroad companies is such exaction made, aud only in certain cases. The supreme court of the State considered this statute as a whole, and held it valid, and as such it is presented to us for consideration. Considered as such, it is simply a statute imposing a penalty upon railroad corporations for a failure to pay certain debts. No individuals are thus punished, and no other corporations. The act singles out a certain class of debtors, and punishes them when, for like delinquencies, it punishes no others. They are not treated as other debtors, or equally with other debtors. They can not appeal to the courts, as other litigants, under like conditions, and with like protection. If litigation terminates adversely to them, they are muleted in the attorney's fees of the successful plaintiff; if it terminates in their favor, they recover no attorney's fees. It is no sufficient answer to say that they are punished only when adjudged to be in the wrong. They do not enter the courts upon equal terms. They must pay attorney's fees if wrong. They do not recover any if right; while their adversaries recover if right, and pay nothing if wrong. In the suits, therefore, to which they are parties, they are discriminated against, and are not treated as others. They do not stand equal before the law. They do not receive its equal protection. All this is obvious from a mere inspection of the statute. It is true, the amount of the attorney's fee which may be charged is small, but, if the State has the power to thus mulet them in a small amount, it has equal power to do so in a larger sum. The matter of amount does not determine the question of right, and the party who has a legal right may insist upon it, if only a shilling be involved. While good faith and a knowledge of existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, yet to carry that presumption to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation is to make the protecting clauses of the fourteenth amendment a mere rope of sand, in no manner restraining State action. It is well settled that corporations are persons within the provisions. of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The rights and securities guaranteed to persons by that instrument can not be disregarded in respect to those artificial entities called "corporations" any more than they can be in respect to the individuals who are equitable owners of the property belonging to such corporations. A State has no more power to deny to corporations the equal protection of the law than it has to individual citizens. But it is said that it is not within the scope of the fourteenth amendment to withhold from States the power of classification, and that, if the law deals alike with all of a certain class, it is not obnoxious to the charge of a denial of equal protection. While, as a general proposition, this is undeniably |