صور الصفحة
النشر الإلكتروني

was bound to abstain from the exercise of its me to be a sufficient answer that the appointment

a own independent and unquestionable jurisdiction of a judicial factor (whose duties and responsi. over the persons of the trustees and the trust bilities are substantially the same as those of a property, both being in Scotland, on the mere receiver in England) is in effect, so long as it ground that a decree for administration had continues, a judicial administration; that the previously been made against the same trustees factor has given security, and will have to render and as to the same property by an English Court. regular accounts of his intromissions; and that Their competency being undoubted, the question all the parties interested will be at liberty from on this part of the case is, whether what they time to time to apply to the Court of Session, as they have done was right according to that prin- there may be occasion, as to any questions arising ciple of forum conveniens which appears by the upon the factor's accounts, or otherwise relating Scottish authorities generally (see Ferguson v. to the sequestrated estate or to their respective Douglas, Peters v. Martin, M.Master v. Stewart, interests in the funds realised therefrom. So already cited, and also Clements v. Macaulay 4 far as relates to the accounts or other liabilities Macph. 592) to be recognised by the law of Scot- exigible from the trustees in respect of introland.

missions or default prior to the appointment of I think it convenient in the first instance to the judicial factor, the affirmance by your Lordexamine this question as if the Court of Session ships of this part of the interlocutor will not had been able, according to its usual practice, to interfere with the substance of any rights or make, and had actually made, a decree for admin- remedies of the English plaintiff against the istration in Scotland similar to and co-extensive trustees under the decree of the English suit. with that made by the English Court.

The second objection is not in my opinion That priority of suit would not alone be a substantial. It may be true that it is not the sufficient reason in Scotland for leaving the course of the Court of Session to interfere with parties to the English jurisdiction may, I think, the administration of a trust estate extra curiam be collected from the authorities. It is an ele- by trustees without special cause shown. But ment no doubt in the case, but I do not think it in the present case the administration extra ought to prevail if in other respects your Lord- curiam has been interfered with, and to a great ships are unable to say that the Scottish criterion extent superseded, by the English decree. The of greater convenience has not been reasonably Court of Session, therefore, may consistently applied.

with its general rule treat this state of circumThe Scottish jurisdiction has been invoked by stances as an adequate cause for the appointment the pursuers, who constitute the majority in of a judicial factor when asked, as it is, by number and interest (though the original propor- parties having sufficient interest to exercise its tion of interests may have been in some degree jurisdiction so as to retain the general adminisaltered by what has already been done in the tration in what it deems to be the more administration of the trust) of the beneficiaries convenient forum. I may not be so convinced under the testator's will.

that this was clearly ex debito justitiæ as to have The trust is Scottish in form, the testator was thought a different decision erroneous, but I am a domiciled Scotsman. If any questions should not prepared to overrule the judgment of the arise under the terms of the trust Scottish law Court of Session on a point which I regard as must be applied to their solution; the whole trust one of practice more than of principle. estate is de facto in Scotland, and neither the As to the third objection, the intervention of trustees nor the pursuers desire it to be removed the pursuers for certain purposes in certain from that country.

proceedings in the English suit cannot in my The views of the trustees who are appellants opinion be a bar in Scotland to their present here in obedience to the English Court, and who action, or to any proper relief to which in that are suspended from all present action in Scot- action they may be entitled. land by the interlocutors under appeal, may not Lastly, with respect to the position of the perhaps now be very material, but so long as English plaintiff, the objection that he is not they were at liberty to exercise their own judg- made a party to the action in Scotland has been, ment they objected to and resisted the English for all necessary purposes of justice, removed judicial administration. All these circumstances by the undertaking offered by the Solicitorbeing taken into consideration, I am unable to General at your Lordships' bar, that he by his say that there is not such a prima facie case of present or any future next friend who may be convenience in favour of a judicial administra- recognised by the English Court as representing tion in Scotland as to throw upon the appellants him for the purposes of the English suit, shall the burden of proving the contrary.

have notice of and be at liberty to attend to the The strongest reasons to the contrary which taking of the judicial factor's accounts, and to have been or can be alleged appear to me to be apply and be heard on all matters relative to the these-(1) that the interlocutors are not equiva- sequestered trust estate or the funds arising lent to a decree for general administration, (2) thereupon for any purpose (claims for expenses that they are such as would not have been pro- included) which might be competent to the nounced if the object had not been to displace plaintiff if a party on the record. I propose that the judicial administration in England, (3) that a declaration conformable to that undertaking the pursuers are open to personal exception, should be embodied in the order to be now made having intervened in the English suit, (4) that by your Lordships. the English plaintiff is not a party to the Scottish I think that in this way the plaintiff's interest, action, and that his interests will not be ade- so far as it may be affected by the sequestration quately protected if the sequestration and the and the judicial factor, will be adequately proorder for a judicial factor are allowed to stand. tected. In the English suit it will of course be

To the first of these objections it appears to open to the plaintiff or to the appellants to make

v Orr Ewing's

24, 1885

Wellesley Hope, his present next friend in that suit, or by such other person as may from time to time be admitted by the High Court of Justice in England as the next friend of the said infant plaintiff, is to have notice of and to be at liberty to attend the taking of all accounts of the judicial factor from time to time in this action, and all proceedings thereon, and to make all such applications to the Court of Session on all matters relative to the sequestered trust-estate or the trust funds arising therefrom for any purpose, including claims for expenses, as might be competent to the said infant plaintiff or anyone on his behalf if he were a party on the record, and in other respects, subject to the aforesaid declara. tion, to affirm the interlocutors of the Inner House under appeal, and remit the cause to the Court below.

The interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary having been recalled by the Inner House (which recal will stand) does not require to be dealt with by your Lordships.

I think the costs of the appeal should be paid to the appellants out of the trust-estate.

such application to the Court as they may be advised for the stay of any part of the proceedings under the directions contained in the decree the prosecution of which the sequestration and the appointment of the judicial factor in Scotland (so long as they remain in force) may render impracticable or inexpedient, and it cannot be doubted that on any such application the English Court will do what is right. Nothing in your Lordships' order, or in that part of the interlocutors now under appeal which will be thereby affirmed, can interfere in any way with the power of the English Court to continue the prosecution of such accounts, inquiries, and other proceedings under the English decree as may be for the infant plaintiff's benefit, and not inconsistent with the suspension of the ordinary powers of the trustees in Scotland during the continuance of the sequestration and the judicial factor, and also to give such directions as it may think fit as to any proceedings which it may deem proper to be taken in Scotland on behalf of the infant plaintiff under the respondent's undertaking or otherwise.

With respect to the interdict, as limited by the Inner House, I understand my noble and learned friend Lord Watson to think, that with one slight exception it may be understood in a sense not necessarily involving the principle of those declarations from which your Lordships dissent, and its practical operation is now spent and exhausted. I am ready to defer to my noble and learned friend's opinion, which, however, I do not understand to extend to the prohibition of "accounting (i.e., for the trust-estate or any part of it) to any person or persons other than the judicial factor.” As to this I cannot construe it otherwise than as prohibiting obedience even in England to the decree of the English Court affirmed by this House, and I think it would be dangerous for your Lordships to appear to give your sanction to this by leaving that part of the interdict unaltered, temporary though it

I shall therefore propose to your Lord. ships to vary it in that respect only.

I have only to add that the results thus arrived at appear to me to be entirely consistent with your Lordships' judgment on the former appeal affirming the English decree. At the time when the English decree was made no suit concerning this trust had been commenced in Scotland, and it

then expressly said that “if there had been any proceedings pending in a Scottish Court equally beneficial to the infant plaintiff, in which his rights and interests could have been adequately protected, it would have been competent and probably right for the High Court in England to stay the further prosecution of that suit either before or after decree (9 Appeal Cases, p. 42).

The order which I propose to your Lordships to make is to reverse so much of the principal interlocutor appealed from as finds, declares, and decerns in terms of the declaratory conclu. sions of the summons, and also so much thereof as interdicts, prohibits, and discharges the appellants from accounting for the trust-estate or any part thereof to any person or persons other than the judicial factor, and to declare (the respondents by their counsel consenting thereto) that Malcolm Hart Orr Ewing, the infant plaintiff in the English suit by George


LORD BLACKBURN-My Lords, the Lord Presi. dent in his opinion says, I think quite truly

It is evident that if we pronounce judgment in terms of all or any of these conclusions against the defenders, there will arise immediately a confict of jurisdiction between this Court and the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in England. This is a very serious matter."

Had the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary not been recalled, this conflict would have been raised in a very painful way, which it would have been difficult to justify, for if the Chancery Division order the trustees to do anything (it may be to render accounts to that Court), the trustees must obey the order or incur all the penalties of a contempt of the Court of Chancery Division. And if that interlocutor had not been recalled they would have incurred all the penal. ties of a breach of interdict of the Conrt of Session if they did obey the order of the Court of Chancery. The course taken by the interlocutor now under appeal relieves the trustees from this painful, and in the present case unnecessary, predicament, as they cannot be held responsible for what is done by the judicial factor. I do not, as at present advised, agree in thinking that the declaratory conclusions of the summons are such as to make it correct to decree in their terms, nor that (on the supposition that the sequestration and appointment of a judicial factor were right) it was either necessary or proper to couch the interdicts in the terms in which they are framed-but these are matters that can be amended.

Two important substantial questions remain(1) Whether the Court of Session had jurisdiction to sequestrate the estate, which lay entirely in Scotland, and appoint a judicial factor? On this I have a distinct opinion that they had such a jurisdiction. And (2) Whether it was a proper exercise of the jurisdiction to exercise it when the only reason for removing the trustees from office or superseding them for a time was, that if not so removed or superseded they would obey the orders of the Chancery Division rather than enter into a personal conflict with that Court? On this I have felt and feel doubt and difficulty.


v Orr Ewing's

24, 1855

There are some matters which it is best to notice before entering upon the merits. I completely agree that unless where some legislation (by the independent Legislature of Scotland before the Union, or by the Legislature of the United Kingdom since) may have made a difference, the judicatures of Scotland and England are as independent of each other as if they were the judicatures of foreign states. I think the Lord President puts the grounds of this rather too low when he says it is the necessary result of the Treaty of Union. The two kingdoms were in all respects independent, foreign, and often hostile kingdoms, and there was a mass of border legislation in both countries founded on the supposition that the normal relation of the inhabi. tants of the two countries was that of hostility. Soon after the accession of James I, to the Crown of England this legislation was all repealed (see 4 James I. c. 1), and it was established that the nominal relations of the inhabitants of the two countries were so far from being hostile that the post nati were not aliens, but there is no pretence that there was any legislation affecting the independence of the judicature of either country. When the Treaty of Union was agreed on it would have been competent for the Legislature of Scotland to enact as part of the bargain that the judicature of Scotland should be subordinate to that of England. I need hardly say that they did not so enact, and as far as I know no one has ever suggested that they did so. In the absence of such an enactment the judicature remained independent as it was before, and though now that England and Scotland have not only a common Sovereign but also a common Legislature, it may not be an inaccurate use of language to call them foreign countries, and though no doubt many enactments have greatly reduced the practical differences between Scotland and England (which is all that I think Sir George Jessel meant to say), I think none of these enactments made the judicature of Scotland dependent on the judicature of England, any more than they have made the judicature of England dependent on that of Scotland.

There was a plea added, putting a construction on the 19th Article of the Treaty of Union, or rather I should say on the Act of Union which incorporates it. It is not made a ground of decision by any Judge, but the Lord Ordinary, Lord Mure, and to some extent Lord Shand, treat it so that it ought to be noticed.

Long before the Union the Superior Courts of England, when a defendant was properly served with process, entertained an action against him wherever the cause of action arose, of course subject to any and every plea to the jurisdiction. The technical rules of English common law pleading required that a venue should be laid to each material allegation, and the very technical way in which this was done is fully explained in note to Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1 Smith's Leading Cases, 689). However, without entering into that, it is certain that when a defendant appeared in the King's Bench, a declaration on a cause of action arising in foreign parts was good, though where for any reason the actual place was material it was necessary to lay a formal venue, and in an action on a deed of covenant, for instance, in case the variance should be fatal on oyer, to say that a bond made at Madras was made at Fort St

George in the East Indies, to wit, at London in the Ward of Cheap. Is it contended that if two actions had been brought in the Court of King's Bench, the year after the Union, the one on a bond made at Paris in the kingdom of France, to wit, in London in the Ward of Cheap, and the other on a bond made at Glasgow in the kingdom of Scotland, to wit, in Londou in the Ward of Cheap, the first would have remained a good declaration, but the second would have been void as contrary to the 19th Article of the Treaty of Union? Yet unless we carry the construction of the article so far as to make the entertaining of such an action by.the Court of King's Bench a breach of the Treaty of Union, I do not see how the suit entertained by the Chancery Division in this case could be one. It is extremely improbable that it should have been intended by the Treaty of Union to restrict the jurisdiction of the English Court, and I think the words used cannot bear that construction. There is no authority in either country in favour of such a construction of that Article, and there is such a uniform course of precedents in which the English Courts have since the Union exercised without objection the same jurisdiction in personam over persons within their jurisdiction that they did before the Union, and have exercised in all transitory actions, though in respect of matters happening in Scotland and over which the Scottish Courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the same jurisdiction which they exercised and still exercise over cases originating in all other countries out of England, that I do not think that I need do more at present than say that this construction of the Article of the Treaty is in my opinion utterly untenable.

I now come more to the merits. I think that the state of things was such before the date of the English suit on 25th February that the appellants held the whole property wherever situated as trustees, and no more as executors or administrators than if they had been fresh trustees who had never been executors to whom the original trustees and executors had assigned the property. And though I think that the judicature of Scotland had jurisdiction over the trustees (if properly brought before them) to make them do their duty as trustees, I do not think they had that jurisdiction either on the ground that the testator whose will created the trust was a domiciled Scotsman or on the ground that the trust funds were principally originally collected by a Scottish confirmation, still less that they had exclusive jurisdiction. And here I am afraid I do not take the same view as the Judges below. I cannot but think that the Judges below bave put a mistaken construction on what was said in Preston v. Melville—that “the domicile regulates the right of succession, but the administration must be in the country in wbich possession is taken and held, under lawful authority, of the property of the deceased,"—from not remembering what kind of administration Lord Cottenham was speaking of when he used these words.

There has been a change in the law of England by the 20th and 21st Victoria, cap. 77 (the Probate Act of 1857), as to the Court which is to appoint the personal representative, whether executor or administrator, of deceased persons, and a further change in tbe special case when the deceased is a domiciled Scotsman by 21 and 22 Victoria, cap. 56 (the Probate Act of 1858), but

v Orr Ewing's


the general law remains as it was at the date of Preston v. Melville.

No person can, according either to the law of England or Scotland, by his will deprive his creditors of the right to enforce payment out of the property he leaves behind him of such obligations as survive. The personal representative, whether executor or administrator, might without suit safely pay such obligations, unless he had notice of some obligation of a higher degree. In England at least there is no distinction between English obligations and foreign obligations. The priority in which they are to be paid does not depend on the nationality of the creditor, but on the nature of the debt.

The personal representative is liable so far as he has assets to pay. He might defend himself on the ground that he had already fully administered all such assets, but if he bad misapplied the assets he might be made liable to make good the deficiency out of his own funds. It would obviously be unjust, as long as there were obligations of any sort for wbich the personal representative might be made liable out of his own property on a deficiency of assets, to make him hand over the assets to any persons who in the due course of administration would come after the holders of these obligations, even though they were those to whom the surplus was by the testator's will to come.

The pursuers in Preston v. Melville were such persons; they were the trustees duly appointed by the Court of Session to act in lieu of those named in the testator's will; they were the partners in Coutts' Banking House who had been appointed trustees and named as executors by Sir Robert Preston's will, just as the appellants were appointedandnamed by MrEwing. But the original trustees and executors in that case had, probably very prudently, declined to act.

The law of England, I think, is quite settled that when the personal representative has discharged all that in due course of administration (using the word in its more limited sense) he was bound to discharge, if there is any surplus he ought to deal with it according to wbatever may be the directions in the testator's will. If he, without any sufficient reason refuses to do so, he may be compelled by the Court of Chancery to do so, but he is not required to obtain the sanction of a Court before doing this. It may sometimes be prudent to do so, it would often be vexatious to do so, and it is not necessary that there should be any formal transfer of the property. If Lady Preston, the administratrix, had been satisfied that all Sir Robert's debts were paid, and that the pursuers in that action were the trustees to whom the property by the will was devised in trust, she might have simply assented to their taking it, and that would have vested the property which was in her as administratrix in them as trustees. As to all this, and as to what is sufficient evidence of an assent, see 2 Williams on Executors, part 3, book 3, chapter 4, sec. 3.

It might have happened, though in this case it did not, that the testator had at the time of his death personal estate in many countries-in, for instance, some one or more of the United States, or in some one or more of the British Coloniesin each of those, in order to get possession of the estate, a personal representative would have had to be appointed. It probably would not have been convenient to make any of the executors

themselves such a representative in a distant country, and it certainly would not have been necessary. And it might have happened, though it did not, that his debts would have been so great that his personal estate would not have been sufficient to pay 20s. in the £. Many difficult questions might in such a case, specially if the estate was insolvent, have arisen. I do not enter on these questions, for none of these things did happen, and the time when they could bave happened was over as soon as the personal representatives were satisfied that all debts and obligations were discharged and that the administration, in the sense in which Lord Cottenham used the word, was completed, and remitted the foreign funds, if there were any, to the trustees. The trustees would have held them under the same obligation to dispose of them according to the trust, in whatever way those funds came to their hands, if they were received by them rightfully. The domicile of the testator might be all-important in ascertaining what the trusts were but not otherwise.

I cannot therefore think that it makes any difference whether the funds came to the hands of the trustees by means of administrators, whether themselves or others appointed under the Probate Act of 1857 or under the Probate Act of 1858, or (had the fact been so) by means of administrators who collected and remitted tbe funds from New York or Calcutta or Melbourne. I cannot therefore agree with the Lord President and Lord Shand that the Probate Act 1858 makes any difference in this case, or that it is at all neces. sary to examine its provisions.

The testator in this case was a Scotsman, the great bulk of his estate was in Scotland, though £25, 235 was in England, a sum not by any means despicable, and much more than sufficient to discharge every liability of the testator's. He named four of his relatives, all Scotsmen like himself, two of whom resided in England and two in Scotland, and one of his partners, and Mr M'Grigor, a writer in Glasgow, and “such other person or persons as may hereafter be nominated by me or assumed into the trust hereby created, and the acceptor and acceptors, survivors and survivor, of them, the major part of them accepting and surviving and resident in Great Britain from time to time being a quorum," as trustees for the ends and purposes after mentioned. The six named trustees, who are the appellants, he named as his executors.

He further “empowered my trustees to appoint any one or more of their own number to be factor or factors under them, or to be law-agent or law. agents for the trust, and to allow such factor or factors, and such law-agent or law-agents, their professional charges, and to do everything which in their discretion they may conceive to be for the benefit of my estate.” When the trastees had got possession of the trust-property they proceeded to work the trust in Scotland; nor do I suppose anyone can doubt that the testator expected them to act in that way, and I suppose the testator made Mr M'Grigor one of his trustees in order that he might be the factor and law-agent. At all events, the trustees did so work the trust, and no one says it was wrong to do so. But I fail to find anything in the trust-deed to require them to do so. There is no provision in the trust that I find which must be executed in Scotland. The only qualification on the trustees is that the

v Orr Ewing's Trs

. ]
s.] The Scottish Law Reporter.- Vol. XX11.

July 24, 1885. quorum shall consist of the majority resident in tor administered, and the trusts of his will carried Britain.

into execution, by and under the direction of the If the majority of the trustees at any time Court of Chancery. I do not now repeat anycame to reside in England, and bona fide thought thing as to the English law; that has been deit best for the interest of the estate that the whole cided finally by the English Courts and in this funds should be vested in English securities and House in the case of Ewing v. Orr Ewing, L. R., 9 managed in England, there is nothing expressed App. Ca. 34.

But the Lord President shows, in the deed to prevent their doing so. I cannot, what I had before only suspected, that such an notwithstanding what is said by the Lord Presi. "administration suit" is not known to the law of dent, think that there could have been any ground Scotland. It may be doubted, if all that is now for an interdict to prevent them from doing so. known had beer foreseen, whether the ChiefThey never proposed to do so, but continued to Clerk's certificate would have been reversed by work the trust in Glasgow.

the order of 21st March 1881. I thought that What they have done appears by the joint- whilst that order was unreversed the decisions in minute of admissions:- “Burnet for the pursuers, the Court of Chancery bound me to say that it and Smith for the defenders, concurred in stat- was ex debito justitice, and not a question of dising-That the whole estate of the deceased John cretion, to grant such an administration. I wished Orr Ewing which was situated in England at the it had been otherwise, and I wish it more now date of his death, amounting to £25, 235, 125. 6d., that the admissions show how very little of the had been realised, and remitted to Scotland- estate (indeed I think at the time when the writ £22,535 or thereby having been remitted prior was issued no part of the estate) really was in Eng. to the issuing of the writ in the administration land, and consequently how strong a case there suit on 25th February 1880, and the balance, would have been for refusing such a grant in this being £2700 or thereby, shortly thereafter." case if it bad been a matter of discretion. They further stated that “the defendants, in The declaratory conclusions of the summons terms of an order of the Court of Chancery, go much further than is required in order to dated 4th May 1883, pronounced in the adminis- support the sequestration. It is one proposition tration suit at the instance of Malcolm Hart Orr to say that owing to the interference of the Ewing, of which order a copy is hereto annexed, Court of Chancery, and the refusal of the trustees remitted to England, and on 20th June 1883 paid to enter into a personal conflict with that Court, into the said Court of Chancery, the sum of the trust has become unworkable in the hands of £25,384, 28. 11d, on account of capital, and a the present trustees unless they substitute for further sum of £8039, 23. 11d. on account of in- their discretion that of the Court of Chancery, come on behalf of the said Malcolm Hart Orr and that so to do is injurious to the interests Ewing, in respect of his interest in the estate of of the pursuers, and therefore that the Court the deceased John Orr Ewing, conform to the two of Session may and should change the trustees, official receipts by the Paymaster-General, of and it is quite another thing to deny that the truswhich copies are also hereto annexed.”

tees can under any circumstances act in England, No one has ever alleged that the trustees up to or that an English Court has any jurisdiction at 25th February 1883 had in any way acted, or evea all, even to give relief. given rise to a suspicion that they meant to act, The declaratory conclusions of the summons contrary to their duty as trustees.

are as follows:-" That it ought and should be having a proper interest had asserted that they found and declared, by decree of the Lords of our had done or left undone something, and properly Council and Session, that by virtue of said trustbrought the trustees before the Court of Session, disposition and settlement and relative codicils, that Court would certainly have had jurisdiction and of said testament-testamentar, the defenders to entertain the action and give or refuse re- are bound as trustees and executors foresaid to lief.

uplift, receive, administer, and dispose of the In Brown v. Stirling - Maxwell's Trustees, whole estate and effects of the said deceased July 17, 1883, 10 R. 1235, where the ques- John Orr Ewing, and to give effect to and carry tion was whether Brown was within a class out the purposes of his said trust-disposition and of servants to whom Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell settlement and relative codicils in Scotland, and had left legacies, the pursuer sued in Scotland, according to the law of Scotland, and under the aud got relief, and no one could doubt the juris- authority and subject to the jurisdiction of the diction of the Court of Session. Had Brown Scottish Courts alone : And further, it ought issued a writ in England, and the trustees ap- and should be found and declared by decree peared to the writ, no one would have doubted foresaid that the defenders, as trustees and the jurisdiction of the English Court to entertain creditors foresaid, are not entitled to place the the same question. All that I have before this said said estate and effects under the control of the as to administering the assets as personal repre- Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice sentative, and working the trust as trustees, is in England, or to administer the same under the only important as leading to this, that in the directions of the High Court of Justice in latter case at least the Courts of Scotland and England or any of the divisions thereof, or of England have concurrent jurisdiction, the juris- any other foreign court or tribunal furth of diction of the English Court not depending, as Scotland and having no jurisdiction in Scotland, the Lord Ordinary geems to think, on the exist- or to place the said estate and effects beyond the ence of funds in England, but on the trustees control of the Scottish Courts : And further, it being brought in person within the jurisdiction. ought and should be found and declared, by

The writ in this case was not issued for the decree foresaid, that the defenders, as trustees purpose of obtaining relief for anything of this and executors foresaid, are bound to render just sort, but on behalf of an infant by his next friend, count and reckoning for their intromissions with in order to have the personal estate of the testa- said estate and effects, whenever the same shall

If anyone

[ocr errors]
« السابقةمتابعة »