randum, and not to have been intended as a completed will. Colvin (Brennan's Executor) v. Turner and Others, p. 632. Succession-Vesting-Conveyance to be on Death of Liferentrix-Clause of Survivorship. A testator conveyed his heritable property to trustees, directing them to pay the annual proceeds thereof to his widow in liferent, and so soon as convenient after her death to convey to his two sons certain portions of the heritable property, equally, share and share alike—

Declaring that if either of my said sons shall predecease my said spouse without lawful issue, then my said trustees shall denude and convey the said several subjects first above described and disponed to my surviving son, but should such predeceasing son leave lawful issue, then such issue shall come in their father's room and stead." Both sons survived the testator. One died without issue in 1864, and the other also without issue in 1873. The widow died in 1877. Held that the object of the survivorship clause was served on the death of the first deceasing son, and that the fee of the heritage vested in the other son at that date. Lindsay v. Lindsay's Trustees, p. 638.

--Trust― Mutual Settlement-Right of Property in Survivor-Destination. A mutual trust-disposition and settlement executed by three sisters contained the provision that on the death of the first deceaser whatever residue remained of her estates after payment of legacies was to be divided and made over equally between the survivors, and on the death of the second deceaser whatever residue remained of her heritable and moveable estate was, after payment of legacies, "to belong to the last survivor." It also reserved a power to alter and revoke, "but so far only as regards our respective estates." Held that the right of the last survivor in the residue of the joint estates was a right of property, and that she was entitled to alter the destination of the whole funds contained in the mutual deed. Young's Trustees v. Hally and Others, p. 643.

"Pro

-Settlement — Conveyance of HeritageWords Importing a Bequest of Heritage-General Word followed by Enumeration perty." A holograph will in these terms—“ I hereby dispone, leave, and allocate all the property, goods, money, gear, stock, shares boats, scrip, &c., which I may be possessed of at the time of my death,"-held habile to carry heritage. Observations (per Lord Young) on Brown and Others v. Bower and Others, January 26, 1770, M. 5440. Special Case-Gilchrist and Others, 784.

-Mutual Settlement- Survivorship—Power of Revocation-Effect of General Settlement on Previous Special Destination. Two sisters executed a mutual trust-disposition and settlement by which they conveyed their whole estate (which was held by them in common on a pro indiviso title) to trustees for certain purposes, and, inter alia, for a liferent of the estate of the predeceaser to the survivor, and then for payment of certain legacies and dis

posal of the residue. The settlement contained a clause to the effect that the testatrices reserved the liferent of their respective estates, with power to either of them at any time during their respective lives to alter or revoke the settlement, each without consent or concurrence of the other. One of the sisters predeceased without having exercised the reserved power of revocation. At the date of her death the joint-estate amounted to £8000. Of this, £5000 was invested on heritable security, the destination in the bond being to the testatrices,

66

or the survivor of them, or to the executors or assignees whomsoever of the survivor." The legacies amounted to £6000. Held that the mutual settlement was revocable by the surviving testatrix only to the extent of her own share of the joint property; that the destination in the bond and disposition in security was not evacuated by the terms of the settlement, and that the sum contained in it therefore belonged to the survivor; and that the contingency that the exercise of that power might not leave sufficient to meet the legacies bequeathed by the settlement did not in the circumstances afford evidence that the general settlement was intended to affect the special destination. Lang's Trustees v. Lang, p. 866. Succession. See Domicile-Revenue- Heritable and Moveable.

Superinduction. See Writ.

Superior and Vassal-Relief-Heir of Investiture -Duly Entered. The destination in a disposition and settlement made by C was "to the heirs-male of my body, whom failing to the heirs-female of my body, whom failing to G, my cousin-german, and the heirs whomsoever of his body, whom failing to my own nearest heirs whomsoever." G succeeded, and made up his title by decree of general service and charter of resignation, which contained the above destination, omitting the words" whom failing to my own nearest heirs whomsoever." On his entry he paid a composition to the superior. In 1881 G died intestate and without issue, and the sisters of C completed a title to the lands by decree of special service as "nearest lawful heirs-portioners of provision in special of G. . . under and by virtue of the foresaid disposition and settlement of C and titles following thereon." A Special Case was presented to decide whether the superior was entitled to a composition or only to relief-duty, in which the superior admitted that the vassals were duly entered. Held that as the vassals were admittedly entered as heirs of investiture no composition was due. Special Case--The Governors of George Heriot's Hospital and Others, p. 29.

-Disposition-Clause of Relief from Public Burden occurring in Disposition in favour of the Crown-Transmissibility in favour of Successor of Crown. A Crown vassal executed in 1767 a disposition of certain lands in favour of the Crown, with procuratory of resignation ad remanentiam. The disposition contained a clause "in favour of His Majesty and his royal heirs and successors," of relief from cer

tain specified burdens, and every other parish or public burden which might be demanded from them, for and in respect of the lands disponed. In an action raised by a successor of à disponee from the Crown against the representative of the original disponer, for implement of the obligation, the House (aff. judgment of Second Division) assoilzied the defender on the ground that the obligation was one strictly and inalienably in favour of the Crown and the royal successors of the Crown in the lands, and therefore not transmissible to the effect of entitling the pursuer to enforce it against the defender. Orr Ewing v. Earl of Cawdor, p. 105.

Superior and Vassal-Casualty-Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874 (37 and 38 Vict. cap. 94), sec. 4. The Conveyancing Act of 1874 has not enlarged the superior's rights so as to entitle him to a casualty as on an entry which he would not have been entitled to before the statute. Mounsey v. Palmer, p. 118.

Casualty Intermediate Vassal-Effect of Payment of Casualty by Duly Entered Vassal. H, the last entered vassal in certain lands, died in 1871. At that time the lands were held in property by M, who remained in possession of them till 1875, when he sold them to P. In 1883 the superior demanded from P a casualty in respect of the death of the last duly entered vassal in 1871, and P paid the casualty, taking a receipt "in full of the casualty payable for the subjects on the death of the last entered vassal in 1871, viz., H." Thereafter, M. having died, the superior demanded another casualty from P in respect of the death of M, and P's infeftment. Held that the Act of 1874 had not increased the right of the superior to demand casualties, and that as the casualty now sued for would not have been exigible under the law existing prior to the Act, the defender was entitled to absolvitor. Mounsey v. Palmer, p. 118.

-Entry-Untaxed Entry-Casualty-Year of which Rent to be Taken in Estimating Casualty--Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874 (37 and 38 Vict. cap. 94), sec. 4. Held that the year the rent of which is to be taken as the amount of the casualty due in respect of an implied entry under the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874, is the year of the implied entry, and not the year in which the casualty may be demanded. At the date at which the casualty due in respect of an entry fell to be estimated, the lands were under a lease and the tenant had sublet them at an increased rental. Held that the rent payable under the lease, and not that under the sublease, was to be taken as the measure of the casualty. Campbell v. Stuarts, p. 292.

-Arrears of Feu-Duty-Poinding of the Ground-Title to Poind the Ground after Parting with Superiority. Held (diss. Lord Shand) that a person who had been formerly superior of certain lands but had parted with the superiority, was not entitled by means of poinding the ground to recover feu-duties which had fallen into arrear while he held

the superiority. The Scottish Heritages Company (Limiten) v. Miller and Others, p. 361. Superior and Vassal-Irritancy--Railway-Private Right to Stop Trains. The proprietor of land through which a railway was formed feued to the railway company at a nominal feu-duty land on which the company undertook to erect and maintain " a station for passengers and goods travelling by the.... railway, at which all passenger trains shall regularly stop." An irritant clause provided that in the event of the company discontinuing the use of the station as a regular goods and passenger station, the grant should be null, and the ground and all buildings thereon should revert to the granter. The company erected the station, which was called C, and for a time all passenger trains stopped at it, but there were established after the date of the contract certain trains subsidised in the public service by the Home Office and Post Office, in which ordinary passengers might travel, and which were regularly advertised as conveying passengers in the company's time tables. These trains were not regularly stopped at C. In an action by the proprietor to have it found that the company were bound to stop at C, to take up and set down passengers, all trains not hired by individuals for their exclusive use, and in particular the trains above described-held (rev. judgment of Second Division) that these trains came within the obligation, and that the company were bound to stop them. There were also established certain Saturday excursion trains not stopping at C. The tickets for these trains were all return tickets only available to return the same day. Question, Whether these trains were passenger trains in the sense of the obligation? Sir Robert Burnett, Bart. v. The Great North of Scotland Railway Company, p. 456.

Sub-Vassal-Irritancy ob non solutum canonem-Conventional Irritancy-Act 1597, c. 250. Held by a majority of the Whole Court (diss. Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Deas, Lord Young, Lord Craighill, Lord Lee, and Lord Fraser) that when a feu-right is irritated ob non solutum canonem, whether by virtue of an irritant clause in the feu-right, or of the Act 1597, c. 250, the right of a sub-vassal holding of the defaulting vassal falls under the forfeiture. Sandeman v. Scottish Property Investment Co., Feb. 16, 1883. 20 S.L.R. 400, and 10 R. 614, overruled. Cassels and Others v. Lamb and the Scottish Heritable Security Company (Limited) and Liquidator, p. 477.

Sub-Vassal-Irritancy ob non solutum canonem-Act 1597, c. 250. Held (rev. judgment of Second Division) that when a feu right is irritated ob non solutum canonem (whether by virtue of an irritant clause in the feu right or under the Act 1597, c. 250) the right of a sub-vassal to whom the defaulting vassal has granted a sub-feu falls under the irritancy. Sandeman v. The Scottish Property Investment Company Building Society and Liquidators, and Others, p. 850.

Survivor. See Succession.
Suspension and Interdict. See Process-Sale.

Tacit Relocation. See Teinds.
Tantum et tale. See Bankruptcy.
Taxation. See Agent and Client.
Teacher. See Master and Servant.
Teinds-Tack of Teinds-Inhibition-Tacit Re-
location. In 1791 the titular granted a tack
of teinds of the lands of B., which included
the lands of P. and D., for 19 years. On the
expiry of the tack in 1810 the tacksman con-
tinued to possess the teinds on tacit relocation
till 1839. In that year an inhibition was used
by the titular, which was admittedly invalid.
Nothing followed upon this inhibition until
1860, when on a demand from the titular,
the tacksman made payment of the surplus
teinds of P. from 1841 to 1861. No surplus
teind was paid for the lands of D. after the
date of the tack. In 1884 the titular raised
an action against the tacksman for payment
of (1) £30, 4s., the amount of the surplus teinds
of P. from 1861 to 1881; and (2) £227, 19s.,
the amount of the surplus teinds of D. from
1844 to 1881, on the ground that the defender
by making payment in 1860 of the teinds of
P. had recognised the inhibition as valid, and
as putting an end to tacit relocation. The
defender answered that the payment had been
made in ignorance of the invalidity of the in-
hibition. Held that the payment in 1868 was
inconsistant with the continuance of tacit
relocation as regarded the teinds of P., and
decree granted for £30, 4s., the admitted
amount of the surplus teind, but (diss. Lord
Shand, rev. Lord M'Laren) that nothing had
been done to put an end to the possession of
the teinds of D. upon tacit relocation, and
that the defender should be assoilzied from
the demand for arrears of teinds from these
lands.

Question-Whether the rule established in the case of Burt v. Home, 5 R. 445 (Calton case), with regard to a locality, that unvalued teinds are to be estimated at onefifth of the rental, is applicable to the case of a titular suing for arrears. Lord Advocate v. Duke of Athole, p. 573.

-Res judicata. In a process of augmentation, &c., raised by the minister of the united parishes of Ardchattan and Muckairn in 1816, the lands of Dalness, situated in the parish, were entered at £300 in the proven rental. None of the heritors stated any objection to the rental, and the heritors were held confessed thereon. Thereafter the Lords having advised the scheme of the rental and prepared state, modified a stipend to the minister. This stipend was the whole amount of the teind as it appeared in a sub-valuation of the parish in 1629. Dalness was not included nominatim in this sub-valuation, and did not appear in the prepared state. A scheme of locality, which was a copy of the prepared state, was thereafter lodged in process, and approved final in 1817. In an action raised in 1884 by the minister of the parish to have it declared that the lands of Dalness were not valued, and

Teinds--Valuation--Presumption. Circumstances in which held that the terms of a report of sub-commissioners of teinds in 1629, decree of approbation thereof in 1777, and the proceedings in certain processes of augmentation in 1799 and 1816, raised a presumption that the whole lands in the parish had been valued in 1620, but that this presumption had been rebutted by proof that certain lands were not included in the valuation. Maclauchlan v. Stuart, 721.

-Sub-Valuation - Approbation — Dereliction. In an action brought by a heritor in the Teind Court in 1884 for approbation of a report of the sub-commissioners in 1630 valuing the teinds of certain lands, the minister lodged defences, in which he stated that though the victual teind was calculated according to standard measure, yet stipend had for more than a hundred years been paid according to the county measure, which exceeded the former. He also stated that a small payment had been paid to the minister of an adjoining parish out of the lands valued. He pleaded that the pursuer and his predecessors had derelinquished the sub-valuation sought to be approved. Held that there was no evidence of an intention on the part of the heritor to abandon the sub-valuation, and defences therefore repelled. Smollett v. Simson, p. 768.

Valuation-Rescissory Act 1662, cap. 1— Act 1662, c. 9-Act 1663, c. 28. A valuation of teinds by the High Commission in 1647 held not to be struck at by the Rescissory Act 1662, c. 1, depriving of all force acts, gifts, tacks, or deeds passed after 1637 to the prejudice of the rights of the several bishoprics. Lord Advocate v. Lady Willoughby de Eresby, p. 891.

Testament. See Succession-Writ.
Theft

Embezzlement

Relevancy. A prisoner was charged with theft or breach of trust and embezzlement, in so far as he, having been sequestrated in bankruptcy, and having thereafter got into his custody and control, as general manager of a joint-stock banking company promoted by himself, and of which there were no directors duly appointed to control or supervise him, "all the moneys of the said company, being the capital of the said company in so far as paid up, and the moneys lodged with the said company by depositors or persons having current accounts or operative deposit-receipts with the said company," amounting to a specified sum, and it having been his duty and according to his trust to apply the moneys only in the ordinary course of banking business, and for the best interest and security of the depositors, and in