Endowments (Scotland) Act, 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 59)-Whether Property irrevocably dedicated to Charitable Uses. A piece of ground was feued out in 1813 to the bailies, treasurer, and councillors of a burgh, and their successors in office, "for the sole and express purpose of building accommodations for charitable institutions." The feuars were taken bound to pay a feu-duty of £2, Os. 8d. so long as the ground and buildings should be used for charitable purposes, but if they used or disposed of the ground or buildings for any other purpose, then they and their successors in office were to pay a feu-duty of £18, 6s. Charity schools were built on the ground feued, the cost being paid out of the burgh funds. These schools were maintained partly out of the burgh funds, and partly by voluntary subscriptions, for a period of fifty-nine years. Subsequent to the passing of the Education Act of 1872 they were let to the school board at a rent sufficient to cover the feu-duty, taxes, and expenses of maintenance. In 1884 the subjects were acquired under the Lands Clauses Act by a railway company. In fixing the amount of the compensation, deduction was made of the capitalised value of the feu-duty of £18, 6s. The amount of the compensation claimed by the Educational Endowments Commissioners having been claimed as an educational endowment within the meaning of the Educational Endowments Act of 1882-held, on a construction of the feu-contract, that as it was within the power of the magistrates to make use or dispose of the subjects for other than charitable purposes on paying the higher rate of feu-duty, the subjects were not vested in them as an irrevocable gift in favour of the public for charitable purposes, and therefore did not fall within the operation of the Educational Endowments Act. The Magistrates of Greenock v. The Educational Endowments Commissioners, p. 335.

—Title to Sue-Process. One of eight beneficiaries interested in the fund in medio in a multiplepoinding brought for the distribution of a trust-estate, stated as an objection to the condescendence of the fund in medio that it did not include a sum of £600 said to be due to the estate by one of the trustees. In answer the trustees explained that they were satisfied they could not prosecute the claim with any hope of success, and produced documents in support of that view, but they offered to give the objector their instance on his finding security for the expenses of the

proceedings. Held that this was all the trustees could not be required to do, and objection repelled. Nicolson and Others (Brown's Trustees) v. Brown, p. 393.

Trust Trusts (Scotland) Act, 1867 (30 and 31 Vict. c. 97), secs. 3 and 4-Trusts (Scotland) Amendment Act, 1884 (47 and 48 Vict. cap. 63), sec. 2-Sale of Trust-Estate-Interests of Liferenter and Fiar. The judicial factor upon a trust-estate presented a petition for authority to sell certain heritable subjects belonging to the trust which were held in liferent and fee. The trust-deed empowered the trustees to sell the heritable subjects either by public roup or private bargain. A price was offered for the subjects which would have increased the income of the liferentrix from £18 to £80. The petition was opposed by the fiar on the ground that his interests would be sacrificed by a sale, as the time was inopportune for selling, and the ground had a prospective feuing value. Held that it was not "expedient for the execution of the trust" to sell the subjects, and petition refused. Molleson v. Hope and Another, p. 506.

-Trustee - Personal Liability - Loan to Trustee-Investment in a Trading Company. A truster directed his testamentary trustees to hold the trust-estate for the alimentary liferent use of his brother and his wife, and the survivor of them, and for the child or children of the marriage in fee. The trustees were empowered "to invest the trust funds in any of the Government securities, or upon heritable security in Scotland, or in such other way or in such other securities as my trustees shall think proper." The trustees, after the truster's death, lent to the brother, who was a trustee, a sum of money to assist him to build a house for the occupation of himself and his family. The loan was secured by bond and disposition in security over the house. The trustees also, at the request of the brother, invested a portion of the trust funds in a trading company with limited liability, and deposited part of the trust funds with a heritable securities company. In an action after the death of the brother, at the instance of his widow, the liferentrix, along with her son, the fiar, against the surviving trustee, and the executor of a deceased trustee, held that the loan to the brother, who was a trustee, was illegal, and that the trustees had no power to invest the trust funds in a trading company, and that therefore the defenders were personally liable for any loss occasioned by the trust funds being invested in these ways, but that the deposit of trust funds with the heritable securities company was within their powers. Ritchie and Another v. Cuthbert, p. 514.

-Nobile Officium-Allowance to Children for Maintenance and Education. A truster died leaving a trust-deed in which he directed his trustees by the fifth purpose to apply the free yearly revenue of his estate for the benefit of the young among the lawful descendants of his father, for obtaining for them such a

good and sound education as would enable them to earn a livelihood for themselves, limiting the sum for each to £20 a-year, and making it payable only while in the judgment of the trustees it was necessary. In the sixth and seventh purposes he directed the yearly surplus remaining over to be accumulated for twenty-one years, when it was to be divided among his brother and sisters, and their families. A granddaughter of the truster's father, a widow in poor circumstances, with six children, the two eldest of whom were 16 and 14 respectively, applied to the trustees for help, and they offered to allow her 12s. 6d. a-week for the whole family, and to pay the school fees of the four youngest. The mother and children then presented a petition to the Court craving an annual allowance, and averred that the trustees had administered the revenue so as to divert it from the fifth to the sixth and seventh purposes, in which they were personally interested, and had acted contrary to the truster's directions in refusing to make a reasonable allowance. The Court being satisfied that there was ample revenue at the disposal of the trustees, fixed the rate of allowance for each child at £10 a-year, reserving to either party to apply to the Court at any future time to alter the allowance. Thomson and Others, Petitioners, p. 547. Trust-Personal Liability of Trustee for Imprudent Investment. Trust funds, amounting to £3000, which were left by will primarily for the purpose of making payment of the interest as an alimentary provision, were lent in 1881 by the sole trustee, who acted as law agent in the trust, upon a bond and disposition in security over an estate. The trustee did not, before making the loan, obtain a report from a man of skill in regard to the estate. There were, at the date of the loan, fourteen prior bonds over the estate, amounting in all to £49,525, the interest upon which was about £1845. There was also an existing annuity of £260, and a contingent annuity of £300, the capitalised value of both of which in 1885 was £7700. The trustee had acted as agent for the lenders in five previous loans, between 1865 and 1879, for the total amount of £12,000. In 1881 a statement of particulars in regard to the estate had been prepared with a view to a sale, which was sent to the trustee by his country correspondent, who was factor for the proprietor. The rental as appeared from this statement was £3137. This included £200, the annual value of the mansion-house and shootings, and £650, the rent of a farm, which were in the proprietor's hands. It also included £650, the rent of another farm, the lease of which was to terminate by arrangement at the following Whitsunday. In the case of other farms the rents had been fixed before the agricultural depression commenced. The statement made no deduction for property tax, prospective assessments under the Roads and Bridges Act, or expenses of management and upkeep. The

estate was exposed for sale in 1881, previous to the loan being granted, at the upset price of £100,000, and in 1882 at the upset price of £90,000. Sums of £85,000 in 1881 and £80, 000 in 1882 were mentioned as possible prices by parties desirous of purchasing, but these figures were considered by the proprietor to be too small. The rental of the estate fell so much that in 1884 payment of interest on the bond stopped. Held, in an action at the instance of the beneficiary, that the investment was not a safe one for trust money, and that the trustee was personally liable to replace the sum of £3000. Maclean v. Turnbull, p. 696.

Trust-Bad Investment-Liability of Trustee and of Law Agent in Trust-Title to Sue. Trust funds, which were held in terms of an antenuptial marriage-contract, were lent on the security of houses in the course of erection, and were lost through the insufficiency of the security. The marriage-contract empowered the trustees to lend on heritable securities, or personal securities or obligations, and contained a clause which declared that the trustees should not be answerable "for errors, omissions, or neglect of diligence, nor for the insufficiency of securities, insolvency of debtors, or depreciation in the value of purchases." An action was raised by the beneficiaries, who had a contingent right to the fee of the trust-estate, against the trustees and the law agent in the trust, "conjunctly and severally, or severally, or in such other way or manner' as should seem just, to restore the money to the trust. Defences were lodged for one of the trustees and for the law agent. The Court, after a proof, unanimously held that the security was bad, but, by a inajority of seven Judges (diss. Lords Mure, Shand, and Rutherfurd Clark), assoilzied the trustee, and (diss. Lord Young) assoilzied the law agent. The Lord President, Lord Justice-Clerk, and Lord Adam were of opinion that gratuitous trustees are only liable for such diligence, prudence, and knowledge as they actually possess in the management of their own business, and that, judged by this standard, the evidence showed there had been no negligence on the part of the trustee. Lord Young was of opinion that the trustee was not liable, as he had acted on what he considered the best advice, that of the law agent. Lord Mure, Lord Shand, and Lord Rutherfurd Clark were of opinion that gratuitous trustees must show the same reasonable care that a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in the management of his own business, and that the trustee was liable, as the evidence showed that he had failed in this. Opinion per the Lord President that the indemnity clause in the marriage-contract protected the trusteeOpinions contra per Lords Mure, Shand, and Young. The Lord President, Lord JusticeClerk, Lords Shand, Rutherfurd Clark, and Adam, were of opinion that the pursuers had no title to sue the law agent, (1) because he was under no contract of employment with

them, and (2) because they might never become entitled to the trust-estate, and would in that event suffer no damage. Lords Mure and Shand were of opinion that there was no liability, even assuming a title to sue, because a law agent is not responsible for the sufficiency of a security, unless there is a special undertaking to that effect, which was not averred in the present case. Lord Young was of opinion that as all the parties were before the Court the liability of the law agent should be determined in the present action, and, on the evidence, that he was liable, as there had been a failure of duty on his part. Raes v. Meek and Others, p. 737. Trust-Liability of Trustees-Personal Liability of Trustees for Imprudent Investment. Circumstances in which family trustees, with the fullest powers of investment on such securities, heritable or personal, as they should think proper, were made liable for the loss of a sun lent to a member of the family on insufficient security. The trustees of a draper in Glasgow, who died in 1863, held his estate, consisting, inter alia, of £4400 of capital in his business and his business premises, for the purpose of paying his widow an annuity of £400, and of dividing the residue among his children. They had the fullest powers to invest the estate "on such securities," heritable or personal, as they should think proper. The eldest son, who subsequently carried on the business, in 1874 bought the premises for £25,000, and applied to the trustees, after paying £13,000 of the price, for a loan of £12,000 to meet the balance, offering as security the premises themselves, on which he had already borrowed £17,000, and other subjects belonging to him. All these subjects were already burdened. The margin of value of the whole subjects, including the business premises-taking as the gross value in each case the prices paid for them within a year of the loan-was £12,150. He also offered the security of a policy on his life for £2160, the surrender value of which was less than £500, and his share, viz., one-seventh of the sum of £10,000 held by the trustees for security of the widow's annuity. In addition he offered the personal security of his fatherin-law, engaged in business in Glasgow. Both he and the offerer were then in good credit. The offer was accepted, but no communication was made to the other beneficiaries, several of whom were of age. One of them shortly afterwards, on hearing of the loan, protested for himself and the other beneficiaries, but no notice was taken of his letter. In 1884, the debtor and his father-inlaw having both become bankrupt, and the prior bondholders having entered into possession, an action was raised by the beneficiaries against the trustees for repayment of the loss sustained by the estate through the transaction. Held (affirming judgment of Second Division) that the trustees were personally liable, as having invested on unsubstantial and insufficient security, contrary

Valuation Cases-Plants and Tools-" Fixed or Attached to Lands or Heritages." Held that the annual value of plant and tools not physically fixed or attached to lands or heritages should not enter the valuation roll. North British Railway Company v. Assessor of Railways and Canals, p. 4.

Valuation Roll-Sporting Lands Rating (Scotland) Act, 1886 (49 Vict. c. 15)-Deer Forest-Unlet Shootings. On appeal against the determination of a valuation committee, who held that under the Sporting Lands Rating (Scotland) Act, 1886, lands which were unlet and were occupied solely for the purposes of a deer forest should be valued as a deer forest only, and that there should not be a separate entry of the value of the lands for grazing purposes, Lord Fraser was of opinion that the determination was right, and Lord Lee was of opinion that the determination was wrong. The Judges being thus divided in opinion, the determination of the valuation committee stood. Assessor of the County of Argyle v. Stuart, p. 315.

Valuation Roll-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. cap. 91)-Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act, 1845 (8 and 9 Vict. cap. 19), sec. 127-Lands Acquired for Purposes of Railway. In an appeal by a railway company against the determination of a valuation committee, by which lands acquired and ultimately destined for the purposes of their undertaking, though at the time in grass, were entered in the ordinary valuation roll of the county, the company maintained that these lands should not be entered either in the ordinary valuation roll or in the valuation roll made up by the assessor of railways and canals, but ought to be dealt with under section 127 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845. This section provides that if the promoters of an undertaking become possessed of lands charged with certain assessments, they shall, until the works are completed and assessed, be liable to make good the deficiency in these assessments by reason of the lands having been taken or used

for the purposes of the work. Lord Lee was of opinion that the determination of the valuation committee was right, and Lord Fraser was of opinion that the determination was wrong, holding that the lands should have been valued by the assessor of railways and canals as part of the undertaking. The Judges being divided in opinion the determination of the valuation committee stood. Forth Bridge Railway Company v. Assessor of the County of Linlithgow, p. 320. Valuation Cases-Valuation Roll-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. c. 91), sec. 9— Sporting Lands Rating Act, 1886 (49 Vict. c. 15) -Appeal-Competency. The Lands Valuation Act of 1854 provides by section 9 that any person whose name is entered by the assessor in the valuation roll shall be entitled to appeal to the Commissioners with reference to such entry, provided the appellant intimate in writing to the assessor that he is to maintain the appeal, and "specify the amount of valuation which he alleges should be substituted." Held that an intimation to the assessor that the appellant objected to certain unlet shootings being entered in the valuation roll at all was sufficient compliance with the section, and that the appeal was competent. Maitland v. Assessor for the County of Edinburgh, p. 318.

-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. c. 91), sec. 6-Farm-Grazing Let for Part of the Year. Lands which were let for grazing during six months only in the year were valued upon the principle of allowing a deduction of 40 per cent. upon their annual value ten years previously. On appeal Lord Lee was of opinion that the valuation was right, and Lord Fraser was of opinion that the valuation was wrong, holding that the rent received afforded the best means of ascertaining the value of the land. The Judges being thus divided in opinion, the determination of the valuation committee stood. Berwick v. Assessor of the County of Fife, p. 460.

-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. c. 91), sec. 6-Hydropathic Establishment -Basis of Valuation. Held that to fix the annual value of a hydropathic establishment by taking a percentage on the cost of the building was wrong, and the annual value fixed by a comparison with the valuation of other similar establishments. Opinion (per Lord Fraser) that the proper method of fixing the annual value was to ascertain what the annual profits were, and thus what a tenant would be willing to pay, and that the method above mentioned was adopted only in the absence of any evidence in regard to profits. Philp v. Assessor of the Burgh of Rothesay, p. 462.

-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. c. 91), secs. 3 and 21-Bookstall at Railway Station. Held that a bookstall at a railway station which had been included in the valuation of the railway undertaking made by the assessor of railways and canals, did not fall to be entered in the valuation roll of the

burgh. Callander and Oban Railway Company v. Assessor of Burgh of Oban, p. 464. Valuation Cases-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. c. 91)-Payment of Compensation by Tenants of Minerals to Proprietors of Surface. The tenants of certain collieries who were only entitled to work the coal by stoop and room were in use to make payments to the surface proprietors for their permission to work by long wall, by which they got more coal. The surface proprietors were not proprietors of the coal. Their names were entered in the valuation roll in respect of these payments, as being payments of rent. Held that as they were not proprietors of the coal these payments were not for rent, but were merely compensation for their non-interference with the working, and that they were therefore entitled to have their names removed from the roll. Assessor of Fife v. Curror and Others, p. 465.

-Lands Valuation Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict. c. 91), sec. 42--Quarry not Worked during Year of Assessment. Held that a quarry let for eight years from Martinmas 1885, but which had ceased to be worked at Martinmas 1886, and of which the lease had been brought to an end at Whitsunday 1887, did not fall to be entered in the valuation roll for 1887-88, although the full rents and lordships received had not appeared on the valuation roll. Lord Elphinstone v. Assessor of County of Lanark, p. 466.

Valuation by Man of Skill. See Arbitration.
Valuation in cumulo. See Teinds.
Value of Unlet Shootings. See Revenue.
Verdict of "Guilty of Misappropriation." See
Justiciary Cases.

Vesting of Provisions to Children. See Marriage-
Contract.

Wage, Precarious, of Colliery Labourer. See Arrestments.

Warrandice Heir and Executor Catholic Security. By a trust-disposition and settlement, executed in 1853, the granter conveyed his whole estate, heritable and moveable, to trustees, for the purpose, inter alia, failing heirs of his body, of conveying his estate of M, and his other lands in the county of L, to his brother, and the heirs of his body, under the fetters of an entail. By the same deed he directed his trustees, failing his own issue, to make over the whole residue of his estate to the person who should succeed to M. By a codicil, dated in 1876, he disponed to his wife, in the event of her surviving him, the lands of B and A (which were among the lands originally directed to be entailed), and bequeathed to her the whole residue of his estate. By a previous deed he had appointed his wife his sole executrix. The disposition of B and A contained a clause of warrandice in ordinary form under the Titles to Land Consolidation Act, 1868 (31 and 32 Vict. cap. 101), which imports absolute warrandice. În 1882 the truster granted a bond and disposition in security for £250,000 over the estates of M, B, and A. On the truster's death his

widow maintained that no part of the debt of £250,000 was payable out of B and A, or out of residue, but that the whole debt was entirely chargeable against M. Held (affirming the judgment of the Second Division) that the truster had in imposing the obligation of warrandice used words limited in their significance to personal obligation, and that his widow, as personal representative and executrix, must herself discharge the obligation of warrandice. Dowager Duchess of Montrose and Others v. Stirling Stuart, p. 454.

Warrant, Illegal. See Reparation.

Warrant, Oppressive Use of. See Reparation. Waste and Uncultivated Ground. See Property. Waterworks. See Property.

Way-leave for Water Supply. See Property. Widow's Obligation to Maintain and Educate Children. See Succession.

Widow's Repudiation of Settlement. See Suc

cession.

Wife's Separate Estate. See Husband and Wife. Wife's Signature to Husband's Settlement. See Husband and Wife.

Will. See Writ-Succession. Writ Authentication · Will-Signature on Erasure-Onus of Proof. The signature upon a will, written on a printed form, and ex facie probative, was ascertained after the testator's death to have been written on an erasure. This fact was not mentioned in the testing clause. The will was found in the repositories of the deceased, where he had kept it for nine years, and it was proved that he intended it to be effectual. In a competition for the executorship of the deceased, the will was challenged on the ground that the existing signature on the will had not been adhibited in the presence of the witnesses. It was not disputed that the testator had on one occasion duly subscribed the deed before the witnesses. Held that the deed being ex facie duly attested and probative, the onus lay upon the person challenging it, and that this had not been discharged. Duncan's Executors v. Duncan, p. 369.

Wrong Manoeuvre by Ship. See Shipping Law. Wrongous Dismissal. See Master and Servant. Wrongous Use of Diligence. See Reparation.