PART III. OF THE MORAL PRINCIPLE, OR THERE has been much dispute respecting the nature and even the existence of the Moral Principle, as a distinct element of our mental constitution; but this controversy may probably be considered as allied to other speculations of a metaphysical nature, in regard to which a kind of evidence was sought of which the subjects are not susceptible. Without arguing respecting the propriety of speaking of a separate power or principle, we simply contend for the fact, that there is a mental exercise, by which we feel certain actions to be right and certain others wrong. It is an element or a movement of our moral nature which admits of no analysis, and no explanation; and is referable to no other principle than a simple recognition of the fact, Subject of this lesson? What dispute in respect to the moral principle does the author allude to? Does he intend to enter into this dispute? He insists only upon a certain fact; what is it? Can this fact be analyzed or explained? When which forces itself upon the conviction of every man who looks into the processes of his own mind. Of the existence and the nature of this most important principle, therefore, the evidence is entirely within. We appeal to the consciousness of every man, that he perceives a power which, in particular cases, warns him of the conduct which he ought to pursue, and administers a solemn admonition when he has departed from it. For, while his judgment conveys to him an impression, both of the tendencies and certain of the qualities of actions, he has, besides this, a feeling by which he views the actions with approbation or disapprobation, in reference purely to their moral aspect, and without any regard to their consequences. we refer to the sacred writings, we find the principle of conscience represented as a power of such importance, that, without any acquired knowledge, or any actual precepts, it is sufficient to establish, in every man, such an impression of his duty as leaves him without excuse in the neglect of it:- For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." We even find a power assigned to the decisions of conscience, differing in extent only, but not in kind, from the judgment of the Almighty:-"If our heart condemn Where do we find the evidence of it? Difference between the judgment and the moral sense, in respect to their decisions on human actions? ScripAural view of conscience? Quotation. Where is this passage found? us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things." The province of conscience then appears to be, to convey to man a certain conviction of what is morally right and wrong, in regard to conduct in individual cases, and to the general exercise of the desires or affections. This it does independently of any acquired knowledge, and without reference to any other standard of duty. It does so, by a rule of right which it carries within itself; and by applying this to the primary moral feelings, that is, the desires and affections, so as to indicate among them a just and healthy balance towards each other. The desires direct us to certain gratifications which we feel to be worthy of acquirement; and the affections lead us to a certain course of conduct which we feel to be agreeable to ourselves, or useful to others. But, to act under the influence of conscience is to perform actions, simply because we feel them to be right, and to abstain from others, simply because we feel them to be wrong,without regard to any other impression; or to the consequence of the actions either to ourselves or others. He, who on this principle performs an action, though it may be highly disagreeable to him, or abstains from another though it may be highly desirable, is a conscientious man. Such a man, under the influence of habit, comes to act more and more easily under the suggestions of conscience, and to be more and more set free from every feeling and propensity that is opposed The true province of conscience? Do its decisions depend upon acquired knowledge? How does it obtain its rule of right? Difference between the desires, the affections, and the conscience, in their influence on human conduct? Influence of habit. to it. Conscience seems therefore to hold a place among the moral powers, analogous to that which reason holds among the intellectual; and, when we view it in this relation, there appears a beautiful harmony pervading the whole economy of the mind. By certain intellectual operations, man acquires the knowledge of a series of facts; he remembers them, he separates and classifies them, and forms them into new combinations. But, with the most active exercise of all these operations, his mind might present an accumulation of facts, without order, harmony, or utility; without any principle of combination, or combined only in those fantastic and extravagant forms which appear in the conceptions of the maniac. It is reason that reduces the whole into order and harmony, by comparing, distinguishing, and tracing their true analogies and relations, and then by deducing truths as conclusions from the whole. It is in this manner particularly, that a man acquires a knowledge of the uniform actions of bodies on each other, and, confiding in the uniformity of these actions, learns to direct his means to the ends which he has in view. He knows also his own relations to other sentient beings, and adapts his conduct to them, according to the cireumstances in which he is placed, the persons with whom he is connected, and the objects which he wishes to accomplish. He learns to accommodate his measures to new circumstances as they arise, and thus is guided and directed through his physical relations. Analogy between conscience and reason? Condition of intellectual acquisitions, without reason? Province of reason;-its powers. Example given ? When reason is suspended, all this harmony is destroyed. The visions of the mind are acted upon as facts; things are combined into fantastic forms, entirely apart from their true relations; conduct is widely at variance with what circumstances require; ends are attempted by means which have no relation to them; and the ends themselves are equally at variance with those which are suitable to the circumstances of the individual. Such is the maniac, whom accordingly we shut up, to prevent him from being dangerous to the public; for he has been known to mistake so remarkably the relations of things, and the conduct adapted to his circumstances, as to murder his most valuable friend, or his own helpless infant. In all this process, there is a striking analogy to certain conditions of the moral feelings, and to the control which is exercised over them by the principle of conscience. By self-love, a man is led to seek his own gratification or advantage; and the desires direct him to certain objects by which these propensities may be gratified. But the affections carry forth his views to other men with whom he is connected by various relations, and to the offices of justice, veracity, and benevolence, which arise out of them. Conscience is the regulating power, which acting upon the desires and affections, as reason does upon a series of facts, preserves among them harmony and order. It does so by repressing the propensity of selfishness, and reminding the man of the true relation between regard to his own Effect resulting when reason is suspended? Extremes to which this dis order extends in the case of the maniac? What analogy does the writer draw from this? Condition of the moral powers without conscience? Pro vince and influence of the conscience? |