ly to the will of the Deity, and holds that there is nothing wrong which might not have been right, if he had so ordained it.

By the immutability of moral distinctions, as opposed to these theories, we mean, that there are certain actions which are immutably right, and which we are bound in duty to perform, and certain actions which are immutably wrong, apart from any other consideration whatever; and that an absolute conviction of this is fixed upon us in the moral principle or conscience, independently of knowledge derived from any other source respecting the will or laws of the Almighty. This important distinction has been sometimes not unaptly expressed by saying of such actions, not that they are right because the Deity has commanded them, but that he has commanded them because they are right. By this system, therefore, which refers our moral impressions to the supreme authority of conscience, a principle is disclosed, which, independently even of revelation, not only establishes an absolute conviction of the laws of moral rectitude, but leads us to the impression of moral responsibility and a moral Governor; and, as immediately flowing from this, a state of future retribution. We have already shown this to accord with the declarations of the sacred wri tings, and it is evidently the only system on which we can account for that uniformity of moral sentiment which is absolutely required for the harmonies of

What implied in the immutability of moral distinctions as maintained by the author? Mode in which this immutability has been sometimes expressed? Results of this system? Phenomenon which can be accounted for only on this view?

*

society. For it is, in fact, on a conviction of this feeling in ourselves, and of the existence of a similar and universal principle in others, that is founded all the mutual confidence which keeps mankind together. It is this reciprocity of moral feeling that proves a constant check upon the conduct of men in the daily transactions of life; but, to answer this purpose, there is evidently required an impression of its uniformity, or a conviction that the actions which we disapprove in others, will be condemned in us by the unanimous decision of other men. It is equally clear that we have no such impression of a uniformity of sentiment on any other subject, except on those referable to the class of first truths; and this immediately indicates a marked distinction between our moral impressions, and any of those conclusions at which we arrive by a process of the understanding. It is clear, also, that this uniformity can arise from no system, which either refers us directly to the will of God, or is liable to be affected by the differences which may exist in the judgment, the moral taste, the personal feelings, or the interests of different individuals. It must be, in itself, fixed and immutable, conveying an absolute conviction which admits of no doubt and no difference of opinion. Such is the great principle of conscience. However its warnings may be neglected, and its influence obscured by passion and moral degradation, it still asserts its claim to govern the whole man. "Had it strength," says Butler, "as it had right; had it power, as it had

Evidence that the standard of right and wrong is universal? Have we any such impression of such a uniformity of sentiment among men on any other subjects?-in respect to what class of truths? Inference from this?

manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world."

In opposition to this belief of a uniformity of moral feeling, much importance has been attached to the practices of certain ancient and some barbarous nations, as the encouragement of theft in Sparta, and the exposure of the aged among certain tribes in India. Such instances prove no diversity of moral feeling; but a difference of practice, arising from certain specialties, real or supposed, by which, in the particular cases, the influence of the primary moral feeling is, for the time, set aside. It is of no importance to the argument, whether the disturbing principle thus operating be the result of an absurd local policy or a barbarous superstition. It is enough that we see a principle, which, in point of fact, does thus operate, suspending, in the particular instances, the primary moral impression. It was not that, in Sparta, there was any absence of the usual moral feeling in regard to theft in the abstract, but. that the cultivation of habits of activity and enterprise, which arose from the practice, was considered as a national object of the highest importance, in a small and warlike state, surrounded by powerful enemies. It is precisely in the same manner that, in individual conduct, a man may be misled by passion or by interest to do things which his sober judgment condemns. In doing so, there is no want of

Butler's remark upon the power of conscience? What argument has been adduced against this view? Do these instances really prove a diversity of moral feeling? Explanation of them? Was it really theft itself which was approved by the Spartans? What was the real object of their approbation and encouragement? Similar examples in common life?

the ordinary moral feeling which influences other men; but he has brought himself to violate this feeling, for certain purposes which he finds to be highly desirable; and then, probably, seeks to defend his conduct to the satisfaction of his own mind, and of the minds of others. He has a distinct perception of what is right, while he does what is wrong. There are numerous facts which illustrate the same principle, and show the recognition of correct moral feelings, even in those who habitually and daringly violate them;-as the laws of honor and honesty which robbers observe towards each other, and the remarkable fidelity of smugglers towards their associates. In some of the tribes in the South seas, also, most remarkable for their dishonesty, it was found, that while they encouraged each other in pillaging strangers, theft was most severely punished among themselves. Need I farther refer, on this subject, to the line of argument adopted in the great question of slavery. It is directed to the palliating circumstances in the actual state of slavery, not to a broad defence of slavery itself. Its object is to show, that slavery, under all its present circumstances, may be reconciled with the principles of humanity and justice: no attempt is ever made to prove, that it is consistent with these principles to tear a human being from his country and his kindred, and make him a slave.*

On this subject we are sometimes triumphantly

* See this subject eloquently argued in Dr. Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise.

Explanation of them. Example from the habits of thieves and smugglers? South sea savages? Argument drawn from the mode in which slavery is defended?

asked, Where is the conscience of the inquisitor? as if the moral condition of such an individual incontestably proved, that there can be no such power as we consider conscience to be. But I think it cannot be doubted, that. as in the more common cases which have been mentioned, the conscience of the inquisitor comes gradually to be accommodated to the circumstances in which he has voluntarily placed himself. This remarkable moral process has been repeatedly referred to. It may originate in various causes. It may arise from passion, or an ill-regulated state of the desires or affections of the mind; it may arise from motives of interest, leading a man by small and gradual steps into actions which his sober judgment condemns; or false opinions, however received, may be allowed to fasten on the mind, until, from want of candid examination, they come to be invested with the authority of truth. In the moral process which follows, each single step is slight, and its influence almost imperceptible; but this influence is perpetuated, and gains strength in each succeeding step, until the result is a total derangement of the moral harmony of the mind.

It remains only that we briefly notice the system of Dr. Adam Smith, commonly called the theory of Sympathy. According to this ingenious writer, it is required for our moral sentiments respecting an action, that we enter into the feelings both of the agent, and of him to whom the action relates. If we sympathize with

Case of supposed difficulty? Author's explanation of the moral state of the inquisitor? Various ways in which this process of moral deterioration may originate? Manner in which such a process goes on? One remaining theory to be noticed; whose? How designated?