the feelings and intentions of the agent, we approve of his conduct as right; if not, we consider it as wrong. If, in the individual to whom the action refers, we sympathize with a feeling of gratitude, we regard the agent as worthy of praise; if with a feeling of resentment, the contrary. We thus observe our feelings respecting the conduct of others, in cases in which we are not personally concerned, then apply these rules to ourselves, and thus judge of our own conduct. This very obvious statement, however, of what every man feels, does not supply the place of a fundamental rule of right and wrong; and indeed Dr. Smith does not appear to contend that it does so. It applies only to the application of a principle, not to the origin of it. Our sympathy can never be supposed to constitute an action right or wrong; but it enables us to apply to individual cases a principle of right and wrong derived from another source; and to clear our judgment in doing so from the blinding influence of those selfish feelings by which we are so apt to be misled when we apply it directly to ourselves. In estimating our own conduct, we then apply to it those conclusions which we have made with regard to the conduct of others; or we imagine others applying the same process in regard to us, and consider how our conduct would appear to an impartial observer.

This, however, is a most important principle in regard to our moral decisions,-namely, the process by

Explain this theory. Remarks of the author on this theory? Can our sympathy ever constitute an action right or wrong? What is its trae province? Important process of mind arising from these principles?

which we view an action, or a course of conduct, in another, and then apply the decision to ourselves When the power of moral judgment is obscured or deadened in regard to our own conduct, by self-love or deranged moral habits, all the correctness of judgment is often preserved respecting the actions of others. It is thus that men are led on by interest or passion into courses of action, which, if viewed calmly and dispassionately, they would not deliberately defend even in themselves, and which, when viewed in others, they promptly condemn. This principle is beautifully illustrated in the sacred writings, when the prophet went to the king of Israel, and laid before him the hypothetical case of a rich man, who had committed an act of gross and unfeeling injustice against a poor neighbor. The monarch was instantly roused to indignation, and pronounced a sentence of severe but righteous vengeance against the oppressor, when the prophet turned upon him with the solemn denunciation, "Thou art the man." His moral feeling in regard to his own. conduct was dead; but his power of correct moral decision when applied to another was undiminished.

In regard to the whole of this subject, an important distinction is to be made between the fundamental principle from which actions derive their character of right and wrong, and the application of reason in judging of their tendencies. Before concluding this part of the subject, therefore, we have to add a very few

Which remains longest unimpaired, a correct moral judgment in respect to our own conduct, or in respect to that of others? Interesting appeal to this principle in the Scriptures? Who were the parties in this case? Fun damental distinction to be made in considering this whole subject?

observations on the influence exerted on our moral decisions by reason; always however in subserviency to the great principle of conscience. The office of reason appears to be, in the first place, to judge of the expediency, propriety, and consequences of actions, which do not involve any feeling of moral duty. In regard to the affections, again, a process of reason is often necessary, not only respecting the best mode of exercising them, but also, in many cases, in deciding whether we shall exercise them at all. Thus, we may feel compassion in a particular instance, but perceive the individual to be so unworthy, that what we could do would be of no benefit to him. In such a case we may feel it to be a matter not only of prudence, but of duty, to resist the affection, and to reserve the aid we have to bestow for persons more deserving.

In cases in which an impression of moral duty is concerned, an exercise of reason is still, in many instances, necessary, for enabling us to adapt our means to the end which we desire to accomplish. We may feel an anxious wish to promote the interest or relieve the distress of another, or to perform some high and important duty, but call reason to our aid respecting the most effectual and the most judicious means of doing so. Conscience, in such cases, produces the intention, reason suggests the means; and it is familiar to every one that these do not always harmonize. Thus a man may be sound in his intentions, who errs in judgment respecting the means for carrying them

Has the reason any important influence in our moral decisions? What is primarily its office? Its office in regard to the affections? Example. Anoher point in respect to which exercise of reason is necessary? Example illustrating this?

into effect. In such cases, we attach our feeling of moral approbation to the intention only; we say the man meant well, but erred in judgment: and to this error we affix no feeling of moral disapprobation, unless, perhaps, in some cases, we may blame him for acting precipitately on his own judgment, instead of taking the advice of those qualified to direct him. We expect such a man to acquire wisdom from experience, by observing the deficiency of his judgment in reference to his intentions; and, in future instances, to learn to take advice. There are other circumstances in which an exercise of reason is frequently brought into action in regard to moral decisions:―ás in some cases in which one duty appears to interfere with another; likewise in judging whether, in particular instances, any rule of duty is concerned, or whether we are at liberty to take up the case simply as one of expediency or utility. In making their decisions in doubtful cases, of this description, we observe great differences in the habits of judging in different individuals. One shows the most minute and scrupulous anxiety to discover whether the case involves any principle of duty, and a similar anxiety in acting suitably when he has discovered it. This is what we call a strictly conscientious man. Another, who shows no want of a proper sense of duty when the line is clearly drawn, has less anxiety in such cases as these, and may sacrifice minute or doubtful points to some other feeling, as self-interest, or even friendship, where

Distinction between the intentions and the means of effecting them? Which of these is alone the object of moral disapprobation? Other circum stances in which an exercise of the reason is necessary? Different habits of judging?

the former individual might have discovered a principle of duty..

Reason is also concerned in judging of a description of cases, in which a modification of moral feeling arises. from the complexity of actions, or, in other words, from the circumstances in which the individual is placed. This may be illustrated by the difference of moral sentiment which we attach to the act of taking away the life of another, when this is done by an individual under the impulse of revenge, by the same individual in self-defence, or by a judge in the discharge of his public duty.

There is still another office frequently assigned to reason in moral decisions,-as when we speak of a man acting upon reason as opposed to passion. This however is, correctly speaking, only a different use of the term; and it means that he acts upon a calm consideration of the motives by which he ought to be influenced, instead of being hurried away by a desire or an affection which has been allowed to usurp undue influence.

The important distinction, therefore, which these observations have been intended to illustrate, may be briefly recapitulated in the following manner. Our impression of the aspect of actions, as right or wrong, is conveyed by a principle in the human mind entirely distinct from a simple exercise of reason; and the standard of moral rectitude derived from this source is, in

Exercise of reason in respect to complex actions? Does the character of an act depend upon the circumstances attending it? Illustrations. Another office frequently assigned to reason? Recapitulation of the great distinc sion brought forward in this discussion?