sincere desire to discover the truth, we resign ourselves to the guidance of the light which is with.", aided as it is by that light from heaven which shines upon the path of the humble inquirer. Cultivated on these principles, the science is fitted to engage the most powerful mind; while it will impart strength to the most common understanding. It terminates in no barren speculations, but tends directly to promote peace on earth, and good-will among men. It is calculated both to enlarge the understanding, and to elevate and purify the feelings, and thus to cultivate the moral being for the life which is to come. It spreads forth to the view, becoming smoother and brighter the farther it is pursued; and the rays which illuminate the path converge in the throne of him who is eternal.

SECTION

II.

OF FIRST TRUTHS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL

FEELINGS.

THE knowledge which we receive through our intellectual powers is referable to two classes. These may be distinguished by the names of acquired knowledge, and intuitive or fundamental articles of belief.

It may be well to make to the pupil one or two general statements in respect to the origin of our knowledge, which

What are the two sources of knowledge alluded to? To what minds is the cultivation of the science adapted Practical effect of the study?

will make what follows in this chapter more clear. Human knowledge may then, in the first place, be referred to two great classes.

I. That which we receive by the senses, seeing, hearing, &c. II. That which we receive by the intellectual powers, reasoning, reflection, &c.

The knowledge that grass is green, and that lead is heavy, and vinegar sour, comes under the former of these heads. Our knowledge of the properties of the triangle, and of the nature of the human mind, comes under the latter. This distinction is clearly pointed out and illustrated in the author's Treatise on Intellectual Philosophy. It is only the second of the two heads which is considered in this chapter. Hence it commences, "The knowledge which we receive through our intellectual powers is referable," &c.; so that the two classes spoken of in this chapter is only a subdivision of the second great branch into which the sources of knowledge are divided. The subdivision is, as the pupil will perceive,

1. Knowledge which is acquired.

2. Knowledge which is intuitive.

Our conviction that playing games of hazard, for money, is wrong, is an example of the first class; that is, it is acquired. We obtain it by a long course of observation of the deleterious influences of such a practice, or else by carefully considering the nature and probable tendencies of it.

On the other hand, our belief that maliciously giving pain to one who has never injured us, is wrong, is an example of the second class; that is, it is intuitive. The mind sees the truth at once, without any train of investigation or reasoning.

Which part of these remarks is written by the author, and which by the American editor? First great division of the sources of knowledge? Examples of knowledge acquired by the senses? By the intellectual powers? Which class treated of in this chapter? Subdivision of it? Example of acquired knowledge? Example of intuitive knowledge?

It is impossible to prove it. It is in itself more simple than any thing by which it could be proved.

Now in all sciences, the first step is, to point out and define the intuitive truths, or first principles, as they are sometimes called, i. e., those which the mind receives at once, the moment they are presented, without any train of reasoning or investigation to establish them. These are made the basis on which all the other truths of the science are established. Thus in Geometry, for example, the first principles are always laid down at the outset, without proof. They are called axioms. They are such as these: Things which are equal to the same things are equal to one another, and the whole is greater than a part. The pupil will perceive that the truth of the axioms is perceived by the mind intuitively; that is, at once, without any train of reasoning to establish them. In fact, they, and others like them, are the elements of the reasoning by which all other truths are to be proved.

In the same way in all the other sciences, the first thing is to lay down the first truths, that is, those which are intuitively perceived by the mind, and which are the foundation of all that follow. It is the object of this chapter to point out the nature of them, and to enumerate those which appertain to moral philosophy.

Our acquired knowledge is procured by the active use of our mental powers, in collecting facts, tracing their relations, and observing the deductions which arise out of particular combinations of them. These constitute the operations which I have referred to in another work, under the heads of processes of investi

First step in all sciences? Nature of first truths? Connection with other truths? Examples of them in Geometry? Name given to them in Ge ometry? Object of this chapter? Acquired knowledge, how procured? By what wo processes ?

gation, and processes of reasoning. The full exercise of them requires a certain culture of the mental faculties, and consequently is confined to a comparatively small number of men. We perceive, however, that such culture is not essential to every individual, for many are very deficient in it who yet are considered as persons of sound mind, and capable of discharging their duties in various situations of life in a creditable and useful manner.

But the knowledge which we derive from the other source is of immediate and essential importance to men of every degree; and, without it, no individual could engage, with confidence, in any of the common transactions of life, or make any provision for his protection or comfort, or even for the continuance of his existence. These are the principles also treated of, in a former work, under the name of First Truths. They are not, like our knowledge of the other kind, the result of any process either of investigation or of reasoning; and, for the possession of them, no man either depends upon his own observation, or has recourse to that of other men. They are a part of his mental constitution, arising, with a feeling of absolute certainty, in every sound mind; and, while they admit of no proof by processes of reasoning, sophistical objections brought against them can be combated only by an appeal to the consciousness of every man, and to the absolute conviction which forces itself upon the whole mass of mankind.

If the Creator has thus implanted in the mind of man

Is the exercise of these operations universal? Why not? Importance of knowledge derived from the other source? By what name are those intuitive principles called in the author's former work? What work alluded to? Author's remarks about the nature of these truths.

principles to guide him in his intellectual and physical relations, independently of any acquired knowledge, we might naturally expect to find him endowed, in the same manner, with principles adapted to his more important relations as a moral being. We might naturally expect, that in these high concerns, he would not be left to the knowledge which he might casually acquire, either through his own powers of investigation or reasoning, or through instruction received from other men. Impressions adapted to this important end we accordingly find developed in a remarkable manner, and they are referable to that part of our constitution which holds so important a place in the philosophy of the mind, by which we perceive differences in the moral aspect of actions, and approve or disapprove of them as right or wrong. The convictions derived from this source seem to occupy the same place in the moral system, that first truths, or intuitive articles of belief, do in the intellectual. Like them, also, they admit of no direct proofs by processes of reasoning; and, when sophistical arguments are brought against them, the only true answer consists in an appeal to the conscience of every uncontaminated mind; by which we mean chiefly the consciousness of its own moral impressions, in a mind which has not been degraded in its moral perceptions by a course of personal depravity. This is a consideration of the utmost practical importance; and it will probably appear that many well-intended arguments, respecting the first principles of moral truth, have been inconclusive, in the same manner as were

Should we expect first principles in moral science to be implanted in the mind? Why? Do these first principles admit of proof? Proper reply to arguments against them?