their more prominent properties, he can have no information respecting their distinctive character or uses. This observation is quite as true of art as of nature. Here, though the artisan exert his utmost skill to make one object exactly like another, we shall find, upon a close inspection, that he never wholly succeeds in his attempt. Some slight variety, in shape, form, colour, or weight, will be discovered, sufficient to distinguish the copy from the original. It may, indeed, be more difficult to distinguish between objects purposely constructed alike; still, however, the truth will remain, that a close examination will not fail to detect a peculiarity in substance, construction, dimension, or some other quality, sufficient to mark a difference between the two objects.

Of Nature's intention in making this wonderful variety in her works, it is not necessary here to speak, nor indeed is the present work suited for such a discussion. One reflection, however, which the consideration of this variety will naturally suggest to our minds, bears more directly upon the subject before us. It is this: that the very habit of indifference to an exact knowledge of distinguishing qualities, even in apparently trivial or insignificant objects, is the main cause of all that vague idea and indefinite conception, which is so common even among those who pass with the world for wellinformed and well-instructed men. The extent to which this habit often prevails during our years of

education, and the extraordinary influence it has upon us throughout life, are scarcely to be credited. It is this almost inveterate indifference, acquired in early life, which causes us to rest satisfied with general rather than particular knowledge, originates so many indistinct conceptions, produces a positive and violent aversion from thinking, and thus exercises a most pernicious influence upon the intellectual character of the man.

If an infinite variety in the appearance of external things be admitted, it will follow that there must be, in like manner, a great variety in the meaning of those words which are their conventional signs. We must not, however, expect to find the same extent of variety in words as in things, because the system of generalization applied to language does not admit of the same extension. Thus, though the word table will represent, generally, a flat substance supported by legs, it will not stand for the many varieties of this piece of furniture which might be presented to the eye. In this respect, single words. are imperfect; for, though some have undoubtedly a more specific meaning than others, they cannot express all the varieties of every species of things; all they can do is to supply us with general signs, which must be rendered specific by the addition of those qualifying terms which serve to modify their signification, and give them a more definite meaning.

But words, though they do not express individual

things, actions, or qualities, are found to approximate so closely in meaning, that it is no easy matter, in many cases, to distinguish them from each other. The leading idea contained in several belonging to the same class of meaning is so prominent, that the mind, in endeavouring to discover their differences, becomes dazzled by the more intensive property of the words, and neglects to examine the attendant shades by which the one may be distinguished from the other. It is not asserting too much to declare, that scarcely any give themselves trouble to search for those nice distinctions of meaning by which words are characterized; nay, we are certain there are few candid persons not ready to admit that they have hitherto contented themselves with feeling the difference between the signification of two words of a similar meaning, without having directed the least attention to the cause of that difference, or to any philosophical principle by which a distinction may be established between them.

It is of no weight to argue, that there is no necessity for the study of verbal distinctions, because many writers have composed with accuracy and elegance, who have never bestowed any attention on the philosophy of synonymy. Some are naturally endowed with a more delicate faculty of distinction than others; and such persons, from an almost intuitive sense of the exact meaning and application of words, are seldom likely to use them incorrectly; but it would be utterly absurd to infer from this

fact, that some general rules to guide the student in his choice and distinction of words, and in a proper use of them, would not be acceptable to those who are desirous of improving their style in elegance and precision. For, the habit of taking things for granted is not only highly unsatisfactory to an inquiring mind engaged in honestly searching for truth, but it is also replete with danger, and cannot but continually lead us into error. He who always places dependence on appearances, and never appeals to his own powers of reasoning or investigation, is sure to be constantly involved in difficulties; and though he may possibly be sometimes right, he never can explain why he is so, or guard against the recurrence of perplexities.

Accuracy of expression will naturally lead to accuracy of thought; for the practice of carefully examining the shades of difference between words is not only useful in regard to writing, but also exercises a most salutary influence upon the thinking power. Now, there are grounds to fear that language is, by many, considered as something existing of itself, and independent, rather than connected with its proper origin, or to be referred to a higher principle. In studying language we should never lose sight of the fact, that it is the visible and audible expression of the mind, and that, therefore, all the phenomena of language are to be referred, for their source, to the intellectual powers. It is, then, only by investigating the modes in which Nature

works in the human mind, and by patiently observing her operations, that we can expect to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the philosophy of expression. In these researches, the study of metaphysics is our only way to arrive at any satisfactory result; for from no other source can we acquire any solid information on this subject, nor upon any other principles can we safely proceed in our investigations. Though many scholars have displayed wonderful ingenuity and sagacity in philological research, which cannot fail to command the admiration of all who make this subject their study; no one has yet set forth a system of language referable to the human mind, and applicable to human expression; no one has yet tested the significations of words, their differences, their various classes of differences, and the causes of those differences, in such a manner as to reduce them to a system; or has laid down principles to serve as a basis upon which to ground a general and comprehensive classification of our language.

Though the author of the present work is far from pretending to supply this desideratum, he thinks it may be not wholly useless to mention some opinions he has long entertained on the subject, and to explain some principles to assist in forming a plan by which the unpractised writer may be enabled to avoid the looseness of expression so common with the majority of writers, and to compose in a clear and intelligible style.