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60 & 61

Sched. II.

(11) No Court fee shall be payable by any party in respect of any proceeding under this Act in the county court prior to the award.

(12) Any sum awarded as compensation shall be paid on the receipt of the person to whom it is payable under any agreement or award, and his solicitor or agent shall not be entitled to recover from him, or to claim a lien on, or deduct any amount for costs from, the said sum awarded, except such sum as may be awarded by the arbitrator or county court judge, on an application made by either party to determine the amount of costs to be paid to the said solicitor or agent, such sum to be awarded subject to taxation and to the scale of costs prescribed by rules (a) of Court.

(13) The Secretary of State may appoint legally qualified medical practitioners for the purpose of this Act, and any committee, arbitrator, or judge may, subject to regulations made by the Secretary of State and the Treasury, appoint any such practitioner to report on any matter which seems material to any question arising in the arbitration; and the expense of any such medical practitioner shall, subject to Treasury regulations, be paid out of moneys to be provided by Parliament.

(14) In the application of this Schedule to Scotland

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(a) "Sheriff" shall be substituted for "county
court judge," "sheriff court" for "county
court," "action" for "plaint," "sheriff clerk"
for "registrar of the county court," and "act
of sederunt" for "rules of Court:
(b) Any award or agreement as to compensation
under this Act may be competently recorded for
execution in the books of council and session or
sheriff court books, and shall be enforceable in
like manner as a recorded decree arbitral:

(a) No Rules have yet been issued.

Vict. c. 37,

(c) Any application to the sheriff as arbitrator 60 & 61 shall be heard, tried, and determined summarily Sched. II. in the manner provided by the fifty-second section of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 39 & 40 1876, save only that parties may be represented Vict. c. 70. by any person authorised in writing to appear for them, and subject to the declaration that it shall be competent to either party within the time and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by act of sederunt to require the sheriff to state a case on any question of law determined by him, and his decision thereon in such case may be submitted to either division of the Court of Session, who may hear and determine the same finally, and remit to the sheriff with instruction as to the judgment to be pronounced. (15) Paragraphs four and seven of this Schedule shall not apply to Scotland.

(16) In the application of this Schedule to Ireland the expression "county court judge" shall include the recorder of any city or town.

Amendment of law.

THE EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT, 1880.
43 & 44 VICT. c. 42.

An Act to extend and regulate the Liability of
Employers to make Compensation for Per-
sonal Injuries suffered by Workmen in their
Service.

BE IT

ENACTED by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

:

1. Where after the commencement of this Act personal injury is caused to a workman (1).

8

(1) By reason of any defect (2) in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer; or

As defined by sect 8.*

Subject to sect. 2 (1) and (3).

-defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant. Ways. With regard to " ways," Lord Esher, M. R., has said,

The course which a workman would in ordinary circumstances take in order to go from one part of a shop, where a part of the business is done, to another part where business is done, when the business of the employer requires him to do so, must be regarded as a "way" within the meaning of the statute (a).

(a) Willetts v. Watt & Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 92; 61 L. J., Q. B.

And his lordship also said that "away' need not be habitually used as such, and need not be marked out and defined" (a).

The fact that a substance has been negligently left by somebody in such a position as to obstruct the roadway is not "a defect in the condition of the way." (b). The fact of a plank being loose and tipping up when walked on is evidence of a "defect in the condition of the ways" (c). The fact that a workman, who had to pass close to an aperture to a staircase which was left unprotected, tripped over something and fell down the staircase is evidence of defect in the condition of the ways" (d).

43 & 44

Vict. c. 42, s. 1 (1). Defect in the con

dition of

the ways, works,' machinery, or a plant.

During the building of a house the workmen obtained access to the upper part by ladders placed in a well intended for a staircase. There was another well through the house intended for a lift, down which rubbish had been thrown during the building. Upon the staircase being completed it was closed and the ladders were moved to the lift well. No precautions had been taken to prevent rubbish being thrown down after the ladders were moved. The plaintiff was ascending a ladder when a boy threw a plank down from the third floor and broke his collar bone.

Held, there was no evidence of "a defect in the condition of the ways" (e).

The plaintiff was employed by the defendants as a workman in a large workshop where a part of their business was carried on. In the workshop was a catchpit generally covered with a lid. The lid was removed for a temporary purpose, and the plaintiff in passing from one part of the workshop to another in the course of his business fell into the catchpit and was injured.

66

Held, that the floor of the shop where plaintiff was passing was a way," but held that the removal of the cover from the well did not constitute a "defect in the condition of the way" (a).

The deceased had to pass from a gunboat to the shore by means of two barges moored to the shore and to each other. The ends of the barges were not round but diagonal, and the end of the foremost barge was moored, not "end on," but on the left hand side, so that a man going straight on must fall

(a) Willetts v. Watt & Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 92; 61 L. J., Q. B. 540.

(b) 1882, M'Giffen v. Palmer's Shipbuilding Co., 10 Q. B. D. 5; 52 L. J., Q. B. 25.

(c) 1886, Bromley v. Cavendish Spinning Co., 2 T. L. R. 881. (d) 1886, Wood v. Dorrall & Co., 2 T. L. R. 550.

(e) 1886, Pegram v. Dixon, 2 T. L. R. 801; 55 L. J., Q. B. 446

43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, s. 1 (1).

Works, machinery, and

plant. Machinery out of order.

Machinery and plant

unfit for

the purpose to

which it is applied.

into the river, and he had to turn rather to the left to get on to the diagonal end of the foremost barge, and there were no rails.

The deceased in passing two men bearing long planks, having himself a sack of coals on his shoulders, turned too much to the right and fell into the river, and was drowned. Held, there was evidence on which the jury might find a defect in the plant (g).

works, machinery and plant. Machinery out of order. The fact that a band is constantly slipping off a machine is evidence of a "defect" in its condition (h).

A crane, on the morning of the accident, had been working erratically, occasionally dropping the load back into the barge after raising it a certain height. The work was stopped for half an hour. When it was resumed, one witness said that the crane worked better for a time, but, after a short time, it again dropped the load it was raising and injured the plaintiff. Held, that there was evidence of a "defect in the condition of the machinery" (i).

- machinery and plant unfit for the purpose to which it is applied. The fact that a machine is unfit for the purpose to which it is applied constitutes a "defect in its condition" (k).

Plaintiff, a workman in defendant's employment, was injured by reason of the breaking of a ladder, which was being used to support a scaffold. The ladder was insufficient for the purpose for which it was used, and the scaffold and ladder had been placed and were being used under the directions of one of the defendants. Held, that there was evidence of a "defect in the condition of the plant ” (1).

An employer who uses an arrangement of machinery (not in itself defective), the handling of which, as he knows, is entrusted to such men as stevedores' labourers, is not entitled to have excluded from the consideration of its "reasonable fitness an obvious chance of danger through their want of care (m).

دو

The absence, in the condition of the machinery taken as a whole, of any sufficient safeguard against danger arising from an ordinary and probable occurrence, as a slip in the management of a winch, is a defect" (m).

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(g) 1894, Gill v. Thornycroft, 10 T. L. R. 316.

(h) 1888, Baxter v. Wyman & Sons, 4 T. L. R. 255.

(i) 1887, Bacon v. Dawes & Co., 3 T. L. R. 557.

(k) 1883, Heske v. Samuelson, 12 Q. B. D. 30; 53 L. J., Q. B. 45. (1) 1884, Cripps v. Judge, 13 Q. B. Div. 583; 53 L. J., Q. B. 517. (m) 1893, Stanton v. Scrutton, 5 R. 244; 62 L. J., Q. B. 405.

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