tive regard to that other person: and, in the case we have assumed, this influence stands in the place of a certain quantity of intrinsic and direct affection towards what is good; and, so standing, becomes liable to all the rules under which we show that while both belief and practice are essentially founded upon the affections, yet the latter is, under that very theory, likely to rest below the former. It is unnecessary to consider in detail the other cases in which the same principle of confidence or substitution may appear under different forms. We have taken that where the attraction to good is in the form of example. If it be in the shape of direct precept from those who have influence over us, this makes no change in the conditions. It still remains more apt and able to modify our belief than our conduct.

31. Nor does it matter whether the attractive regard or influence be based upon the strength, or talent, or human virtue of the regarded party; except as these are in a progressive scale of dignity and worth. But in none of them do we love the man for his goodness; and yet in all of them, he being by supposition both good and also loved, we are attracted towards his goodness by being attracted towards him; and towards goodness in general, by being attracted towards his goodness. And it should also be remarked, that all these extrinsic elements of inducement or suasion, which take the forms of precept or example, and which take effect through our love, or admiration, or trust, or respect, or fear of persons, operate much

more effectively upon our theories than upon our practice: they are usually first entertained in the region of the understanding, and they are apt to remain in the form of mere speculation.

32. Now in the recognition of these intermediate attractive powers, it is quite clear that the understanding may have a share. For instance, it is by an intellectual faculty, at all events, that we form the conception of power, or that of talent; and either of these may be the particular feature, or the joint features, which are the groundwork of the influence exercised over us by the man possessing them. And thus the understanding, by leading us to follow and copy the good man for the sake of these secondary considerations, collaterally brings our affections into contact with his goodness, and gives to it, as it were, the opportunity of acting upon their susceptibilities. Upon the other hand, if the visible human affections of a man who teaches us to cultivate the divine and spiritual affection be the basis of the charm, then it is obviously through our affections that we appreciate him.

33. This power of confidence, then, has a ground in the several departments of the mind; and the question, in which of the two it operates with the greater force, depends upon a larger one—that, namely, whether in general, or in the given case, or in both, the affections supply the subject matter and the movements of the individual character in a greater or less degree than the other faculties of his nature, his passions, his particular propensions, his lower desires. It is enough

here to have shown that the work is a joint one; that confidence is operative on practice by substitution; and operative alike through the single action of mind, and through the double action of mind and heart: we might perhaps add, that third case, in which the heart prompts instinctive action without the perceptible intervention of the understanding in its instrumental capacity. Consequently other influences, besides those that are derivable from the direct and proper action of the affections, may, by association or substitution, come to have a part in the formation of our own dispositions respecting good and evil, and as these elements may act with different degrees of force on our belief and our practice respectively, we are therefore to expect on this ground that the state of the affections considered singly may not be an accurate and invariable index either of our convictions or of our conduct.

34. Another material part of this subject is that which connects itself with what are termed passive habits. The operations of these habits are those wherein the mind is excited by the presentation of the appropriate object, but does not carry out the movement into the corresponding action. For instance, when we see a duty, are reminded of it by something presented to the sight, and yet omit to do it; or when we see an object of pity, are moved by it, and yet, having the ability, do not administer relief; or when we see an object of desire, and, desiring it, are unable to arrive at it. This last case is mentioned for the purpose of showing that it is not really, though it is

F

formally, in point, and though it falls within the denomination of passive habits; for the mental act of volition undoubtedly takes place, though the external consequences are barred by obstructions that we are unable to remove; but in the previous cases, which are properly in point, that act of volition is as undoubtedly withheld, and practice is not contemplated at all. From this trifling with our nature and with its Maker, arises, as Bishop Butler has wisely shown, a deadening influence, by reaction upon the emotions themselves, and a diminution of their real liveliness Now here we find one of the special dangers to which the action of the understanding exposes us. The emotion, considered singly, will carry us forward to action in its own line, with a force proportioned to its own; but it is the intervention of other faculties, absorbing and exhausting it on the which defeats its purpose.

and power.

way,

35. When, for instance, it is aroused, but aroused by a spectacle in which are combined with the cause of our emotion, accessories addressing themselves more powerfully to the fancy or the imagination than the cause of emotion addresses itself to the heart-then, because one faculty at a time is apt to take the lead and govern the action of the man, the imagination or the fancy, being more powerfully stimulated, subordinates to itself that which is properly termed the feeling, and directs and attaches it to its own ends, which are not, directly at least, in the region of practice, but which consist in the erection of fabrics

having in the first instance, individually at least, subjective existence alone; and which are thereby distinguished from the understanding, which, in proportion as its action is legitimate, follows strictly, and ascertains the objective existences around us: homo, naturæ minister et interpres.*

36. Thus a religious creed presented to the mind for its acceptance may be excluded from the heart if it so be that the imagination, unduly predominating over the mind of the man, interposes, and anticipating the torpid action of the affections, meets that creed, views it artistically, as it is termed, in the manner, that is to say, in which a workman would view a block of marble which he is about to reduce to shape; estimates it with reference not to its appointed ends, but to the law of beauty and its correspondence therewith, or discrepancy therefrom.

37. But the imagination is not the only interceptor of affections divinely destined to the purposes of action. The understanding may be excited simultaneously, and when set to work in reasoning upon the relations of any given phenomena, or upon reducing them into a system, it may thus, with speculative truth for its end, be so delighted with its own energies as to lead us into forgetfulness of action. Thus it absorbs in intellectual exercise the strength that ought to have been spent in practical exertion; and while it seems to be doing the work of the affections it diverts them from their own end, em*Novum Organon, aph. i.