310 Treaty of Oxford. - Parliamentary finance [1642–3

Archdeacons, in short, the whole existing hierarchy, should be abolished; that Church government should be settled on a basis to be determined by Parliament in consultation with the Assembly of Divines, which was now sitting under authority of a Bill passed by both Houses in the previous October; that the navy as well as the army should be under Parliamentary control; and that delinquents, i.e. the King's supporters, should be left to the tender mercies of Parliament. It is needless to describe the hollow negotiations that followed. Neither party was in earnest; and it must be allowed that the terms offered by Parliament were such as could have been accepted only by a beaten foe. The parties did not get so far even as to arrange the details of an armistice; and the war went on meanwhile. The King eventually demanded (April 8) that his magazines, ships, forts, etc., should be restored to him; that expelled Members of Parliament should be allowed to return; and that Parliament should adjourn to some place outside London. These proposals were rejected on April 14; and the "Treaty of Oxford" came to an end. No serious efforts for peace were made again during the next two years.

From the outset of the war, financial difficulties pressed heavily on both parties; but in this respect the advantage was at first with the Royalists. Although the towns and districts controlled by Parliament were far more populous and wealthy than those which adhered to the Crown, the mercantile classes were less willing to contribute to Parliamentary necessities, and were probably less able to find ready money, than the rich nobles and gentry who rallied to the King. The Prince of Orange, though unwilling to send troops, advanced over a million of money. Moreover the ancient feudal attachment of the peasantry to the lords of the soil enabled the latter to raise troops of followers at comparatively slight expense; and to this personal loyalty the enthusiasm of the townsmen for the Parliamentary cause supplied, at first, a very inadequate counterpart. Parliament, at the outset, relied on voluntary contributions. It was naturally reluctant to impose taxation, not so much because it was unconstitutional as because it was sure to be unpopular. But free gifts and loans soon proved totally inadequate to provide for an army which cost a million a year, while the navy required £300,000 besides. The customs-duties were levied by Parliament, but, owing to the falling-off of trade, brought in only £2000 a month. The sequestration of the estates of the Bishops, the cathedral lands, and the property of delinquents, could not fill the gap. Consequently, so early as November, 1642, it was resolved to impose a tax; and an assessment was ordered of all inhabitants of London and Westminster who had not made a voluntary contribution. On December 8 this was extended to the whole country. There was considerable resistance; and wealthy resisters were imprisoned. In February, 1643, the scheme of taxation was developed; and commissioners were appointed to assess property for

1642-3] Queen's return.-Parliamentary Associations 311

weekly contributions throughout the kingdom. Even this, however, was insufficient; and in March Pym proposed to levy an excise. Though this proposal was rejected at the time, the Royalist successes of the following summer proved its necessity; and on July 22 an excise ordinance was issued. On these two elastic sources of revenue, direct and indirect, Parliament mainly subsisted during the war; and its financial system was continued, in principle, after the Restoration.

The progress made in the west and north during the winter shaped Charles' plan for the campaign of 1643. He expected by March to have 40,000 men in the field; and his plan was that he should himself hold Essex in check in the Midlands, while Newcastle and Hopton, pushing south and east respectively, should join hands on the Thames below London, stop the passage of shipping, and starve the City into surrender. The Queen was now at York, having landed at Bridlington a few days before. She had been escorted from Holland by Tromp, and had brought with her a good supply of arms and money. The Commons passed a resolution for her impeachment (May 22), and sent it up to the Lords. There was little hope of other aid from abroad for Charles. The Prince of Orange had done what he could, but Dutch sympathy was mainly with Parliament. As regards France, Charles, without winning the goodwill of the Huguenots, had made an enemy of Richelieu, who (according to Madame de Motteville) "thought it absolutely necessary for the weal of France that that prince should have trouble in his country." The death of Richelieu (December 4, 1642) did not change French policy in this respect. As for Denmark, she was on the point of a war with Sweden, for which she was ill prepared; and Christian IV could do nothing for his nephew.

Apart from the army of Essex, Parliament had relied on county organisation for defence during the first few months of the war. It was found that larger units were desirable; and in December ordinances were passed for an Association of the Midland counties - Leicester, Derby, Nottingham, Rutland, Buckingham, Bedford, and Huntingdon; and another of the Eastern counties - Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, and Hertford. The Midland Association soon broke up; Huntingdon was transferred to the Eastern Association in May, 1643, and Lincoln was added to it in September, so that it finally consisted of seven shires. These shires contained one-fifth of the wealth of the kingdom; the people were a tough stock, deeply Puritan; and the Eastern Association became the mainstay of the Parliamentary cause. The committees by which its affairs were managed included a considerable number of men of rank and position.

Among these was Oliver Cromwell. He had commanded a troop in Essex' regiment of horse, one of the two regiments which helped to break the Royalist foot at Edgehill, though it is doubtful whether he was himself present at the battle. He had told his cousin Hampden at

312

Cromwell's Ironsides.-The King at Oxford [1643

that time that the Parliamentary troops would always be beaten as long as they consisted of "old, decayed serving-men, tapsters, and such kind of fellows." In January he went back to Cambridge, and converted his troop into a regiment, finding plenty of yeomen eager to serve under him. He accepted none but those "who had the fear of God before them, and made some conscience of what they did." His regiment consisted of five troops in March, and rose to fourteen by the end of the year. The name of Ironsides, given by Rupert to Cromwell himself after Marston Moor, attached itself to the regiment; but the men were not cuirassiers, as the name suggests. They wore lighter armour, and were classed as harquebussiers, though their weapons were sword and pistols. Discipline was strict among them; and it was said of them two years afterwards, "there was none of them known to do the least wrong by plunder, or any abuse to any country people where they came."

Their discipline showed itself also on the battlefield. In Clarendon's words, "though the King's troops prevailed in the charge, and routed those they charged, they never rallied themselves again in order, nor could be brought to make a second charge the same day . . . whereas Cromwell's troops, if they prevailed, or though they were beaten and routed, presently rallied again, and stood in good order till they received new orders." He points out that this was not the case with other Parliamentary horse. While Cromwell followed Rupert's example in always attacking, instead of waiting to be attacked, he relied more on the superiority of his men in hand-to-hand fighting with sword and pistol than on the shock of a charge at speed, and he was satisfied with "a good round trot."

By occupying Oxford as his headquarters, with outlying garrisons, the King had driven a wedge into the heart of the Parliamentary territory; and during the winter he tried to widen this wedge, and lessen the intervals separating him from Hopton and Newcastle. But he lost more ground than he gained. The Royalists of Cheshire and Lancashire were defeated by Sir William Brereton at Nantwich (January 28); Lichfield was taken (March 4); and Sir William Waller, by "nimble and successful marches," surprised the troops blockading Gloucester, took Hereford (April 25), and then rejoined Essex.

In the middle of April Essex again took the field at the head of an army of nearly 20,000 men. Hampden and others urged him to "strike at the root" by marching on Oxford; but he thought it necessary first to recover Reading. The garrison of 4000 men were of much more importance than the place, but by the terms of surrender they were allowed to rejoin the King. This practice had much to do with the prolongation of the war. It was June before Essex found himself able to move on to Oxford; and by that time Charles had received the arms and ammunition brought over by the Queen, of which he was sorely in need. The Queen herself followed a month afterwards, with an escort

1643] Roundway Down; Bristol; Ardwalton Moor 313

of 5000 men from Newcastle's army. Essex made no serious attempt to intercept her. While he moved ineffectually between Oxford and Aylesbury, his army was wasting away from sickness and desertion; and by the end of July he had less than 6000 men fit for duty. Rupert made raids to cut off his convoys; and it was on the return from one of these raids that the skirmish at Chalgrove took place, which inflicted on the Parliamentary cause the irreparable loss of Hampden (June 18).

Meanwhile things were going well with the Royalists in the west. Hopton had been unable to take Plymouth; but at Stratton, near Bude (May 16), he had stormed a camp held by 5000 infantry with guns, and had taken 1700 prisoners, his own force being only 2400. Waller, who had won the name of William the Conqueror in Gloucestershire, was sent to hold him in check, but found himself overmatched. Hopton pushed across Devon into Somerset, and was joined at Chard by Hertford and Prince Maurice. The Cornish army, as it was still called, now numbered 6000 men; it occupied Taunton and marched on Bath. Waller, a most expert "shifter and chooser of ground," baffled the Royalists there, and followed them to Devizes, where he invested Hopton's foot; but Maurice brought some fresh cavalry from Oxford, and Waller's army was destroyed at Roundway Down (July 13). He had been extolled as the coming man by those who were dissatisfied with Essex, and he attributed his disaster to Essex' jealousy. Rupert joined the victors a few days afterwards, and led them to Bristol, which was stormed after three days' siege (July 26). The west was now entirely in the hands of the Royalists, with the exception of a few towns on the coast. But the habit of living on the country, to which their necessities had driven them, persisted when there was no need for it, and made their presence unwelcome even to their sympathisers. Bitter complaints were made to the King of the plundering of Dorset homesteads by Maurice's troopers; and Maurice himself was blamed by Hertford for showing no consideration except to his men.

In the north, Newcastle had an army of 10,000 men, notwithstanding the detachments he had sent to Oxford. The Fairfaxes maintained themselves in the West Riding for a time, and Sir Thomas stormed Wakefield (May 20), taking 1400 prisoners. But he and his father were overpowered at Ardwalton Moor (June 30), and were obliged to take refuge in Hull. This was soon the only place in Yorkshire which remained to the Parliament, for Scarborough Castle had been betrayed by its governor, Sir Hugh Cholmley, in March. Hull itself had been nearly lost by the treachery of Sir John Hotham and his son, but they were arrested in time.

Essex had sent orders that the forces of the Eastern Counties should unite to relieve Lincolnshire, and if possible to lend a hand to the Fairfaxes in Yorkshire. In a skirmish at Grantham (May 13) Cromwell showed the quality of his regiment by routing a force twice as large as

314 Gainsborough.-Waller's plot.-Siege of Gloucester [1643

his own; and on reaching Nottingham he strongly urged that the 6000 men who had been brought together there should go on to Yorkshire. But local interests were too powerful. Lord Grey of Groby, who commanded the forces of the Midland Association, was anxious about his father's house near Leicester; and other leaders were afraid of exposing their own districts to raids from Newark. Towards the end of July, Cromwell and Meldrum went to the assistance of Lord Willoughby of Parham, who was holding Gainsborough against Newcastle's cavalry. They defeated this force and killed its commander, Charles Cavendish; but they found themselves in presence of the whole army of Newcastle, and were forced to abandon all Lincolnshire, except Boston.

A plot for a Royalist rising in London was brought to light at the end of May. It was reckoned that one-third of the population of the City was in favour of the King, while in the suburbs the proportion was much larger. The plot originated with Edmund Waller, the poet, but it was matured by Lord Conway, one of the peers who had remained at Westminster to further the King's interests. The Parliamentary leaders were to be seized, as well as the gates and the magazines; and a force of 3000 men, sent by the King, was to be introduced. A commission of array signed by Charles was held in readiness to legalise the enterprise. The discovery of this plot, together with evidence that the King was negotiating with the Irish rebels, enabled Pym to persuade both Houses to impose a covenant, binding all who took it to support the forces raised in defence of Parliament against those raised by the King, "so long as the Papists now in open war against the Parliament shall by force of arms be protected from the justice thereof." Charles met this step by a proclamation (June 20), declaring the Parliament to be no longer free, and all who abetted it in its usurpation to be liable to the penalties of high treason. In August both sides began to authorise impressment.

The advantage which Parliament enjoyed from command of the sea became most apparent when the fortune of war was most adverse. The time seemed to have come for the three Royalist armies to converge upon London, and carry out the King's plan of campaign. But the Cavaliers of Yorkshire were unwilling to go south while Hull remained a Parliamentary port; the men of Cornwall and Devon insisted on the reduction of Plymouth; and both places, being open to succour from the sea, were difficult to take. The Welsh, too, were uneasy about Gloucester, the only Parliamentary garrison in the Severn valley. That place, at all events, could be shut in; and the King was assured that Massey, the governor, could be gained over. He sat down before it on August 10. Parliament made the most of the breathing-time which these sieges afforded. Before the end of the month Essex was on his way to relieve Gloucester with 15,000 men, including some of the City. trained bands. A home-counties army was formed for Waller; and it was resolved that the army of the Eastern Association should be raised to 10,000 foot, and commanded by the Earl of Manchester.