750

Operations in Brazil

[1621-35 (Hoorn and Friesland), and Groningen. The Amsterdam Chamber held four-ninths of the stock, the Zeeland two-ninths, and the other Chambers one-ninth each. The separate Chambers had their separate Directors, but the general administration of affairs was in the hands of a Committee of Nineteen, eight of whom were elected by the Amsterdam Chamber, four by that of Zeeland, and two by each of the other Chambers. The nineteenth director was appointed by the States General. The political character of the Company was further emphasised by the fact that the States General agreed to make an annual payment of two hundred thousand florins to the Company, only one-half of which was to rank for dividends. In the event of serious war the States General further covenanted to furnish the Company with sixteen vessels of war and four yachts, on condition that the Company furnished a similar fleet. The truce of twelve years between Spain and the Netherlands, which, so far as the colonies were concerned, had been no truce, expired in 1621, and the way was open to the new Company to strike at the heart of Spanish power. The decision to direct the attack upon Brazil was probably wise, though it was criticised by Usselincx, to whom the foundation of the West India Company was mainly due. (In other ways the constitution of the Company did not follow the lines advised by Usselincx. He was in favour of development by trade and colonisation and distrusted the aggressive policy which prevailed.) Brazil had been Portugal's most successful effort in colonisation; and, between the short-sighted jealousy of Spanish statesmen and the apathy of the Portuguese inhabitants under the new dominion, there were grounds for the expectation that an attack might meet with success. The first triumph of the Dutch, which is described in the preceding chapter, proved indeed delusive. San Salvador was taken in 1624 by a Dutch force under Jacob Willekens and Piet Hein, only to be lost the following year; and, though more than one attempt was made, San Salvador was never again a Dutch possession. To the north, however, their power gradually consolidated itself. Olinda, the capital of the captaincy of Pernambuco, was taken in 1630, and though for two years the Reciff off the mainland was the only Dutch territory, the defection of a mulatto, Calabar, from the Portuguese changed the complexion of affairs. The captaincies of Itamaraca (1633), Rio Grande (1633), and Parahiba (1634) were conquered, and by the close of 1635 most of Pernambuco was in the possession of the Dutch. In the first year of the Company its enormous expenditure was in great measure recouped by the spoils taken from the enemy. Thus, after Piet Hein's successful capture of the Spanish treasure fleet in 1628, described in the preceding chapter, it has been already noted that not less than between eleven and twelve million florins were realised from the spoil, which served to pay the shareholders a dividend of over fifty per cent. The vast scale of the Company's

1623-44]

Joan Maurice Governor of Brazil

751

workings may be gauged from the following figures. It is computed that between 1623 and 1626 it sent out no less than eight hundred and six vessels, with over sixty-seven thousand soldiers and sailors, and captured no less than about five hundred and fifty ships of the enemy. It did not war with the Portuguese colony alone, but destroyed Truxillo in Central America, and took the island of Curaçoa in the West Indies from Spain. Splendid as were these results they by no means pointed the way to commercial prosperity. The actual trade with Brazil amounted to very little, and it was decided to put things on a new basis by the appointment of a new Governor-General.

Hitherto the method of government in Dutch Brazil had been unsatisfactory. The military commander had been ineligible for the post of President of the Political Council, and the civil and military officers sent home separate reports, the one to the Directors of the Company, the other to the States General. Everywhere there was occasion for friction and misunderstandings. The appointment of

Count Joan Maurice of Nassau to the chief command, civil and military, was an attempt to mend matters. The seven years of Joan Maurice's government of Brazil (January, 1637, to May, 1644) may be considered as the high-water mark in the flood of Dutch colonial ascendancy. Hitherto the officers of the two Companies, though often very able men, had, as a rule, belonged to a low social class, and had been strongly imbued with the defects of their qualities. Count Joan Maurice of Nassau was by rank the superior of any of the viceroys of the haughty monarchs of Spain. Although contemporary gossip accused him of avarice, the best witness to his character is the esteem with which he was regarded by all classes, Portuguese no less than Dutch, in Brazil. His reputation stood so high in Portugal that it was seriously proposed, at the time of the restoration of the Portuguese independence, that he should be appointed commander-in-chief of the Portuguese forces in Brazil; by which means common action might have been secured against the Spanish enemy.

The first business of Joan Maurice was to make good the Dutch hold on the Province of Pernambuco. Porto Calvo was taken, and a Dutch fort named after Joan Maurice was erected on the north bank of the San Francisco River. The rebuilding of the new capital, Reciff, proclaimed the permanence of the Dutch dominion. At the same time Joan Maurice recognised the pressing need of Dutch or German immigration if these claims were to be made good. He obtained a revenue from the sale to Portuguese owners of the abandoned sugar plantations. The conquest of Elmina (1637) secured a Dutch depot for the traffic in slaves, without which the sugar industry could not be made profitable. In the same year the conquest of Siara and Sergipe del Rey extended the limits of Dutch Brazil. Meanwhile, in spite of these successes, there was another side to the shield. From the first Joan Maurice

752 Peace between Portugal and the United Provinces [1638-42

found himself crippled by the desire of the West India Company to limit expenditure. The fleet of thirty-two vessels, which had been promised him, dwindled to a force of twelve ships, and at no time had he more than six thousand European troops under his command. The desire for economy on the part of the Directors was of course reasonable. The financial position of the Company had become serious. It was not, however, reasonable that the Company should presume to direct the undertakings of their officer from home, a policy foredoomed to failure. The responsibility for the unfortunate attack, in 1638, upon San Salvador lay with the Directors, and the Governor-General's failure lowered his prestige in their eyes. Moreover in other ways the authority of the Company exercised a sinister influence. Joan Maurice, whose views were far in advance of his time, had allowed full and complete religious liberties in Dutch Brazil. On the complaint of the Protestant ministers he found himself compelled to curtail the public privileges both of the Roman Catholics and of the Jews, a change of policy which had most unfortunate results. On the other hand, the action of the States General in restricting the monopoly of the West India Company to the importation of slaves and war material, and to the exportation of dyeing woods, tended to the welfare of the colony. In this state of things, and while, in spite of their brilliant exploits, the hold of the Dutch over the northern portions of Brazil was still precarious, the revolution occurred (1640), by which Portugal recovered its independence. On the surface of things there was now no longer cause of quarrel between the Netherlands and Portugal. They ought rather to have become partners in a common enmity to Spain. In fact, however, the thirst for colonial expansion had become so strong that both in the East and in the West Portugal had become the Netherlands' real enemy. Accordingly, at the instigation and with the approval of the home authorities, the Governor-General, Joan Maurice, continued acts of hostility against Portugal. He sent out an expedition in 1641 which reduced St Thomé and San Paul de Loanda. The reduction of Angola was of importance, as about fifteen thousand slaves had been annually exported from thence to Portuguese Brazil. Joan Maurice advised that the African possessions should be under the control of the Brazilian Government; but the West India Company disregarded his advice.

In June, 1641, peace was at last made between Portugal and the United Provinces; but in the event it proved no obstacle to Dutch aggression. Under this treaty a truce of ten years was to take effect in the colonies. This provision, however, did not come into force until the ratification of the treaty by the King of Portugal had been transmitted to the Netherlands and published in Brazil. The news of the ratification did not reach the Netherlands till February, 1642; so that the Portuguese had no legal cause for complaint at the Dutch doings of 1641. In that year, besides taking Angola, the Dutch had also conquered the province

1637-54]

Loss of Brazil by the Dutch

753

of Maranhão. They had further effectively occupied Sergipe del Rey, which had remained a waste since its conquest in 1637. But though within the letter of the law, these proceedings naturally exasperated the Portuguese. Already before the departure of Joan Maurice there were ominous signs of the coming storm. Peace having been made, the Company found itself compelled to practise economy, and were now ready to dispense with their powerful Governor, whom hitherto they had implored to remain in the colony. This decision, however natural, precipitated the crisis. Seeing that it had proved impossible to provide Brazil with a Dutch population, the only chance for the permanence of Dutch rule lay in enlisting the sympathies of the Portuguese inhabitants. A generous and excitable race had responded readily to the advances of Maurice's large-minded rule. Doubtless some took pride in the efforts which made Brazil a seat of varied culture such as it was not to become again till the time of its last Emperor: the note of progress proving in either case the swan-song of a dying régime. Moreover, the relations between Joan Maurice and the Directors were already strained. He complained bitterly of his treatment by them. A new Council of Finance had been instituted, which he affirmed usurped the entire control of affairs. They ignored the existence of Joan Maurice on the ground that no mention of him was made in their instructions. He recognised the seriousness of the situation, and believed that the only remedy lay in joining into one strong body the separate interests of the Dutch East and West India Companies. Unhappily the voices of the holders of East India stock were too powerful for any such measure to be within the range of practical politics, and events pursued their course till the final loss of Brazil in 1654. The expectations of shrewd onlookers may be gauged from the fact that at the time of Joan Maurice's departure a body of Jews abandoned Brazil and sought a new home on the Surinam River. The recovery of Portuguese independence had given a new meaning to resistance in Brazil, and disaffection grew apace. Economic considerations tended in the same direction. Joan Maurice had allowed the Portuguese to purchase plantations on credit; so that to them escape from Dutch rule would mean escape from financial obligations. In this state of things the Brazilian patriot Vieira found ready helpers in the work of rebellion. The formal orders of King John IV counted for little against the secret assistance of the Portuguese authorities at San Salvador. The failure of the Dutch fleet under Witte de With, which reached the Reciff in March, 1648, announced the doom of the Dutch dominion, though in fact a brave resistance was made for another five years. The Dutch historian of the proceedings of his countrymen in Brazil freely recognises that Brazil owed its emancipation from the Dutch rule to the same spirit of patriotism which inspired the Netherlands in their resistance to Spain.

C. M. H. IV.

48

754

Ralegh's second expedition to Guiana

[1617

The contrast between the methods of the Dutch and those of the English in dealing with the Spanish-Portuguese colonial empire was strikingly shown in the action respectively taken by them in South America. We have seen how the Dutch struck straight at the heart of Portuguese dominion, and, though failing, failed by the intrusion of a new force which in time would destroy both Spanish and Portuguese power in the New World. The melancholy story of Ralegh's second expedition to Guiana (1617) represents the most conspicuous English effort to be set against Dutch achievements. In his memorable Discovery of the Empire of Guiana (1596), Ralegh had clearly pointed out "a better Indies for her Majesty than the King of Spain hath any." He had boldly asserted: "That Empire, now by me discovered, shall suffice to enable her Majesty and the whole Kingdom with no less quantity of treasure than the King of Spain hath in all the Indies, East as well as West, which he possesseth." Guiana was "a country that hath yet her maidenhead, never sacked, turned nor wrought...... it has never been entered by an army of strength and never conquered or possessed by any Christian Prince." It was moreover so defensible that two forts at the mouth of the Orinoco would prevent the entrance of any hostile vessels. According, then, to Ralegh's original policy Guiana was to become an English possession, just as Peru belonged to Spain. The tragedy of the situation in 1617 lay in the fact that this empire-builder found himself cabined within the four corners of a squalid search for gold-mines. It does not follow that the forward policy of the inheritors of the Elizabethan tradition was right. Ralegh himself may be cited for the contrary view. At his trial, in 1603, he said: "I knew the state of Spain well; his weakness, his poorness, his humbleness at this time...... I knew that when before time he was wont to have forty great sails, at the least, in his ports, now he hath not past six or seven. . . . . . I knew his pride so abated that, notwithstanding his former high time, he was become glad to congratulate his Majesty and send unto him." It would be ridiculous to compare the bungling policy of James I or Charles I with that of the great French statesman; nevertheless time was in favour of their hesitating caution as it was of the far-seeing aims of Mazarin. But though much might be said for the policy of leaving the overgrown Spanish dominion to die, James' behaviour towards Ralegh is by no means therefore justified. There can be no doubt that the expedition of 1617 was first encouraged and then disavowed. It was notorious that there were Spaniards inhabiting along the Orinoco. The size of the fleet was such as to make it seem unlikely that a mere peaceful exploration was intended. Moreover Ralegh refused the Spanish ambassador's offer that, if he would undertake to go with only one or two ships, he should receive a safe convoy home for himself and the discovered gold. James allowed the expedition, then gave Gondomar detailed information with regard to it, and awaited the event. When the expedition had failed in its overt