For

And this is the more likely to occur, because there are many cases in which the same conduct may result either from the very highest motive, or from a base one; and then, those of the noblest character, and who are also cautious and intelligent, will judge from your general conduct and character which motive to assign; while those who are themselves strangers to the highest principle, will at once attribute your acts to the basest. example, if you shrink from some daring or troublesome undertaking which is also unjustifiable, this may be either from cowardice or indolence, or from scrupulous integrity; and the worse motive will be at once assigned by those who have no notion of the better. If you are tolerant in religion, this may be either from utter carelessness, like Gallio's, or from a perception of the true character of the Gospel: and those who want this latter, will be sure to attribute to you at once the other. If you decline supporting a countryman against foreigners when they have right on their side, or a friend against a stranger, this may be either from indifference to your country, or your friend, or from a strong love of justice; and those who have but dim views of justice will at once set you down as unpatriotic or unfriendly. And so in many other cases.

If, accordingly, you refuse to defend, or to deny, or to palliate, the faults of those engaged in a good cause, and if you are ready to bear testimony to whatever there may be that is right on the opposite side, you will be regarded by many as treacherous, or lukewarm, or inconsistent. If you advocate toleration for an erroneous faith, and protest against forcing, or entrapping, or bribing any persons into the profession of a true one, many will consider you as yourself either tainted with error, or indifferent about religious truth. If, again, you consider a seat in Parliament, or any other place you may occupy, or the power of appointing another to such a place, as a sacred trust for the public service, and, therefore, requiring sometimes the sacrifice of private friendship,-if you do justice to an opponent against a friend, or to a worse man (when he happens to have right on his side) against a better,-if you refuse to support your friends, or those you have been accustomed to act with, or those to whom you have a personal obligation, when they are about doing something that is wrong,-if you decline making application on behalf of a friend to those who would

expect you to place your votes and interest at their disposal, whether your own judgment approved of their measures or not,in these and other such cases, you will be perhaps more blamed or despised by the generality, than commended or admired. For, party-men will usually pardon a zealous advocate of their party for many great faults, more readily than they will pardon the virtue of standing quite aloof from party, and doing strict justice to all. It will often happen, therefore, that when a man of very great real excellence does acquire great and general esteem, four-fifths of this will have been bestowed on the minor virtues of his character; and four-fifths of his admirers will have either quite overlooked the most truly admirable of his qualities, or else regarded them as pardonable weaknesses.

You should guard, then, against the opposite dangers of either lowering your own moral standard to the level of some of your neighbours, or judging too hardly of them. Your general practical rule should be, to expect more of yourself than of others. Of course it is not meant that a man is to think over-highly of himself and 'despise others.' He is not to think his conduct better than others, only his capabilities. A man who feels himself capable of generous and exalted conduct (I do not mean, feels that he shall always act thus,-for who dares promise himself this?—but who feels that it is not beyond his conception, or unnatural to him), when he measures others by his own standard, and is disappointed with them, will remember that every man shall be judged according to that he hath, and not according to that he hath not.' He will feel that more is required of him, as being placed in a higher walk of duty, and will thus be even the less satisfied with his conformity to so lofty a standard. But though his frequent failures will humble him, yet as a fair and due sense of dignity, which arises from a consciousness of superior station, is not only right but needful, in a gentleman, a peer, or a king, to make them fill their stations gracefully; so it is here: that proper sense of his own moral dignity, is necessary for a great and generous disposition, if he would act up to his character. The excess thereof will be checked by habits of true piety, which cannot but make him feel his own littleness in the strongest manner; and by continually asking himself Who made thee to differ from another?' or, What hast thou that thou didst not receive?' he will be

guarded against despising his inferiors. For, generous and ungenerous pride are not only different (as all would allow), but, in most points, opposite: a man of the former character makes allowances for others which he will not make for himself; the latter, allowances for himself, which he will not for others he is ready enough to think that this, and that, is not good enough for him; but the other thinks a base action not good enough for him, and does not regard his superiority as a privilege to act in a manner which, in his view, would degrade him from it; and while doing the most generous actions himself, as things of course, he will make the readiest allowance for others' deficiencies. He will do good without calculating upon much gratitude; yet will be grateful, with most generous ardour, himself. To take any unfair advantages, or even to take all fair ones-to press his rights to the utmost to press close to the limits of what is wrong, and anxiously consider whether he may be allowed to do this, or omit that, he disdains, and would feel degraded by it. Of the virtues of such a man as this, the vulgar have indeed no perception.

He that assails error because it is error, without respect of persons, must be prepared for a storm from the party who were fanning him with the gentle breath of praise, so long as he had been dealing with the errors of the party opposed to them. They say with the rat to the mouse (in a ludicrous poem, on a house much infested with rats and mice, into which a cat had been brought),

'Said the other, this cat, if she murder a rat,

Must needs be a very great sinner,

But to feed upon mice can't be counted a vice;
I myself like a mouse for my dinner.'

'There are so many false points of praise.'

That censure and commendation should in so many instances be indiscriminate, can surprise no one who recollects how rare a quality discrimination is, and how much better it suits indolence, as well as ignorance, to lay down a rule, than to ascertain the exceptions to it.

The word 'macarize' has been adopted by Oxford men who are familiar with Aristotle, to supply a word wanting in our language. 'Felicitate' and 'congratulate' are (in actual usage) confined to events. A man is congratulated on his marriage, but not on having a good wife. And sometimes I envy you' is used, when it is understood that there is no envy in the bad (which is the proper) sense. I believe the French sometimes say 'Je vous en fais mes compliments.' It may be said that men are admired for what they are, commended for what they do, and macarized for what they have.

Of the praises that come of good wishes,' none have such influence as the daily droppings of domestic flattery—to use the word flattery in the sense of undue praise merely. Laudari a laudato viro is what every one would prize most; but other praises may make up in tale what they want in weight.

'Certainly moderate praise, used with opportunity, and not vulgar, is that which doeth the good.'

It is worth remarking that praise is one of the things which almost everyone must wish for, and be glad of, yet which it is not allowable to seek for as an end. To obtain the approbation of the wise and good, by doing what is right, simply because it is right, is most gratifying to the natural and allowable wish to escape the censure and claim the approval of our fellowcreatures; but to make this gratification, either wholly or partly our object to hold up a finger on purpose (and for that sole purpose) to gain the applause of the whole world, is unjustifiable.

A well-known writer acknowledged his having said what he did from a wish to be orthodox.' Now, such a wish-merely as a wish-is quite natural and allowable; for almost everyone would prefer being on the side of the majority; and this will of course be, by the majority, accounted orthodoxy. But he evidently meant that he was practically influenced by the wish,— that he acted with a view to the reputation for orthodoxy, and did not merely welcome it if it came spontaneously while he

was aiming simply at truth. And accordingly he had his reward, in becoming a great party-leader, and he abandoned truth.

'No man can serve two masters,' not because they are necessarily at variance, but because they are two, and do not necessarily draw the same way. Even worldly profit (Mammon) will often be secured by the same conduct as would be dictated by a regard for divine favour; for 'honesty is in general the best policy.' But sometimes the two will pull different ways; and then it is that it will appear which master a man is serving. The desire of truth must reign supreme, and everything else be welcomed only if coming in her train.

Deference for the (supposed) wise and good, and love of approbation, are two very distinct things, though in practice very difficult to be distinguished. The former may be felt towards those whom we never can meet with,—who perhaps were dead ages before we were born, and survive only in their writings. It may be misplaced, or excessive; but it is quite different from the desire of their applause or sympathy, or dread of their displeasure or contempt. A man's desire to find himself in agreement with Aristotle, or Bacon, or Locke, or Paley, &c., whether reasonable or unreasonable, can have nothing to do with their approbation of him. But when we are glad to concur with some living friends, whom we think highly of, and dread to differ from, then, it is very difficult to decide how far this feeling is the presumption formed by our judgment in favour of the correctness of their views, and how far it is the desire of their approbation and sympathy, and dread of the reverse. It is the desire of personal approbation, the excessive care concerning what is thought of ourselves, that we are bound so severely to check.

There is a distinction (alluded to above) between the love of admiration and the love of commendation, that is worth remarking. The tendency of the love of commendation is to make a man exert himself; of the love of admiration, to make him puff himself. The love of admiration leads to fraud, much more than the love of commendation; but, on the other hand,