Early Greek -Corax. The school to the law-court and the assembly. The four Verbal overthrown, and a democracy was established. One of | tion from the technical to the practical stage, from the the immediate consequences was a mass of litigation on rhetoric claims to property, urged by democratic exiles who had been dispossessed by Thrasybulus, Hiero, or Gelo. If, twenty years after the Cromwellian settlement of Ireland, an opportunity had been afforded to aggrieved persons for contesting every possession taken under that settlement in the ten counties, such persons being required to plead by their own mouths, the demand for an "art" of forensic rhetoric in Ireland would have been similar to that which existed in Sicily at the moment when Corax appeared. If we would understand the history of Greek rhetoric before Aristotle, we must always remember these circumstances of its origin. The new "art" was primarily intended to help the plain citizen who had to speak before a court of law. "Ten years ago," a Syracusan might urge, "Hieron banished me from Syracuse because I was suspected of popular sympathies, and gave my house on the Epipole to his favourite Agathocles, who still enjoys it. I now ask the people to restore it." Claims of this type would be frequent. Such a claim, going many years back, would often require that a complicated series of details should be stated and arranged. It would also, in many instances, lack documentary support, and rely chiefly on inferential reasoning. The facts known as to the "art" of Corax perfectly agree with these conditions. He gave rules for arrangement, dividing the speech into five parts,-proem, narrative, arguments (ay@ves), subsidiary remarks (Tapékẞaois), and peroration. Next he illustrated the topic of general probability (eikós), showing topic of its two-edged use: e.g., if a puny man is accused of assaulting a stronger, he can say, "Is it likely that I should have attacked him?" If vice versa, the strong man can argue, "Is it likely that I should have committed an assault where the presumption was sure to be against me?" This topic of elkós, in its manifold forms, was in fact the great weapon of the earliest Greek rhetoric. It was further developed by Tisias, the pupil of Corax, as we see from Plato's Phædrus, in an 66 art" of rhetoric which antiquity possessed, but of which we know little else. Aristotle gives the ikós a place among the topics of the fallacious enthymeme which he enumerates in Rhet. ii. 24, remarking that it was the very essence of the treatise of Corax, and points out the fallacy of omitting to distinguish between abstract and particular probability, quoting the verses of Agatho," Perhaps one might call this very thing a probability, that many improbable things will Gorgias. happen to men." Gorgias of Leontini, who visited Athens as an envoy from his fellow-citizens in 427 B.C., captivated the Athenians by his oratory, which, so far as the only considerable fragment warrants a judgment, was characterized by florid antithesis. But he has no definite place in the development of rhetoric as a system. It is doubtful whether he left a written "art"; and his mode of teaching was based on learning prepared passages by heart,diction (Aegis), not invention or arrangement, being his great object. The εἰκός. Tisias. Anti phon. The first extant Greek author who combined the theory with the practice of rhetoric is the Athenian Antiphon, the first on the list of the Attic orators. His works belong to the period from 421 to 411 B.C. Among them are the three tetralogies." Each tetralogy is a group of four speeches, supposed to be spoken in a trial for homicide. Antiphon was the earliest representative at Athens of a new profession created by the new art of rhetoric-that of the Aoyoypápos or writer of forensic speeches for other men to speak in court. The plain man who had not mastered the newly invented weapons of speech was glad to have the aid of an expert. The tetralogies show us the art of rhetoric in its transi As Antiphon represents what was afterwards named the "austere" or "rugged" style (avoτηpà ȧpμovía), so Lysias was the model of an artistic and versatile simplicity. But the tetralogies give Antiphon a place in the history of rhetoric as an art, while Lysins, with all his more attractive gifts, belongs only to the history of oratory. Ancient writers quote an "art" of rhetoric by Isocrates, but its authenticity was questioned. It is certain, however, that Isocrates taught the art as such, Isocrates. He is said to have defined rhetoric " as the science of persuasion" (στημny Telous, Sextus Empir., Adv. Mathem., ii. § 62, p. 301 sq.). Mathem., ii. § 62, p. 301 sq.). Many of his particular precepts, both on arrangement and on diction, are cited, but do not suffice to give us a complete view of his method. The poropía, or "theory of culture," which Isocrates expounds in his discourses "Against the Sophists and on the "Antidosis," was in fact rhetoric applied to politics. First came technical expositions: the pupil was introduced to all the artificial resources which prose composition employs (ràs idéas áráσas ais ó λóyos TUYXÁVEL xpwuevos, Antid., § 183). The same term (idea) is also used by Isocrates in a narrower sense, with reference to the to the "figures" of rhetoric, properly called oxýμara (Panath., § 2); sometimes, again, in a sense still more general, to the several branches or styles of literary composition (Antid., § 11). When the technical elements of the subject had been learned, the pupil was required to apply abstract rules in actual composition, and his essay was revised by the master. Isocrates was unquestionably successful in forming speakers and writers. This is proved by the renown of his school during a period of some fifty years, from about 390 to 340 B.C. Among the statesmen whom it could claim were Timotheus, Leodamas of Acharna, Lycurgus, and Hyperides. Among the philosophers or rhetoricians were Speusippus, Plato's successor in the Academy, and Iseus; among the historians, Ephorus and Theopompus. In the person of Isocrates the art of rhetoric is thus thoroughly established, not merely as a technical method, but also as a practical discipline of life. If Plato's mildly ironical reference in the Euthydemus to a critic "on the borderland between philosophy and statesmanship" was meant, as is probable, for Isocrates, at least there was a wide difference between the measure of acceptance Aristotle's Rhetoric. accorded to the earlier Sophists, such as Protagoras, and the influence which the school of Isocrates exerted through the men whom it had trained. Rhetoric had won its place in education. It kept that place, through varying fortunes, to the fall of the Roman empire, and resumed it, for a while, at the revival of learning. Aristotle's Rhetoric belongs to the generation after Isocrates, having been composed between 330 and 322 B.C. As controversial allusions sometimes hint, it holds Isocrates for one of the foremost exponents of the subject. From a merely literary point of view, Aristotle's Rhetoric (with the partial exception of book iii.) is one of the driest works in the world. From the historical or scientific point of view, it is one of the most curious and the most interesting. If we would seize the true significance of the treatise, it is better to compare rhetoric with grammar than with its obvious analogue, logic. A method of grammar was the conception of the Alexandrian age, which had lying before it the standard masterpieces of Greek literature, and deduced the "rules of grammar from the actual practice of the best writers. Aristotle, in the latter years of the 4th century B.C., held the same position relatively to the monuments of Greek oratory which the Alexandrian methodizers of grammar held relatively to Greek literature at large. Abundant materials lay before him, illustrating, in the greatest variety of forms, how speakers had been able to persuade the reason or to move the feelings. From this mass of material, said Aristotle, let us try to generalize. Let us deduce rules, by applying which a speaker shall always be able to persuade the reason or to move the feelings. And, when we have got our rules, let us digest them into an intelligent method, and so construct a true art. Aristotle's practical purpose was undoubtedly real. If we are to make persuasive speakers, he believed, this is the only sound way to set about it. But, for us moderns, the enduring interest of his Rhetoric is mainly retrospective. It attracts us as a feat in analysis by an acute mind-a feat highly characteristic of that mind itself, and at the same time strikingly illustrative of the field over which the materials have been gathered. urgent need which the citizen felt for this art was not when he had to discuss the interests of the city, but when he had to subordination of deliberative rhetoric, however unscientific, had defend (perhaps) his own property or his own life. The relative thus been human. Aristotle's next statement, that the master of logic will be the master of rhetoric, is a truism if we concede the essential primacy of the logical element in rhetoric. Otherwise it is a paradox; and it is not in accord with experience, which teaches that speakers incapable of showing even the ghost of an argument have sometimes been the most completely successful in carrying great audiences along with them. Aristotle never assumes that the hearers of his rhetorician are as oi xapíevres, the cultivated few; on the other hand, he is apt to assume tacitly-and here his individual bent comes out-that these hearers are not the great surging crowd, the oxλos, but a body of persons with a decided, though imperfectly developed, preference for sound logic. What is the use of an art of rhetoric? It is fourfold, Aristotle Uses of replies. Rhetoric is useful, first of all, because truth and justice rhetoric. are naturally stronger than their opposites. When awards are not duly given, truth and justice must have been worsted by their own fault. This is worth correcting. Rhetoric is then (1) corrective. Next, it is (2) instructive, as a popular vehicle of persuasion for persons who could not be reached by the severer methods of strict logic. Then it is (3) suggestive. Logic and rhetoric are the two impartial arts; that is to say, it is a matter of indifference to them, as arts, whether the conclusion which they draw in any given case is affirmative or negative. Suppose that I am going to plead a cause, and have a sincere conviction that I am might be urged on the other side; and this will give me a stronger on the right side. The art of rhetoric will suggest to me what grasp of the whole situation. Lastly, rhetoric is (4) defensive. Mental effort is more distinctive of man than bodily effort; and "it would be absurd that, while incapacity for physical self-defence is Rhetoric, then, is corrective, instructive, suggestive, defensive. But a reproach, incapacity for mental defence should be no reproach." what if it be urged that this art may be abused? The objection, Aristotle answers, applies to all good things, except virtue, and especially to the most useful things. Men may abuse strength, health, wealth, generalship. وو The function of the medical art is not necessarily to cure, but to make such progress towards a cure as each case may admit. Similarly it would be inaccurate to say that the function of rhetoric was to persuade. Rather must rhetoric be defined as "the faculty of discerning in every case the available means of persuasion. Suppose that among these means of persuasion is Rhetoric some process of reasoning which the rhetorician himself knows to defined. be unsound. That belongs to the province of rhetoric all the same. In relation to logic, a man is called a "sophist" with regard to his moral purpose (rpoalperis), i.e., if he knowingly uses a fallacious syllogism. But rhetoric takes no account of the moral purpose. It takes account simply of the faculty (duvauis) -the faculty of discovering any means of persuasion. The "available means of persuasion," universally considered, The may be brought under two classes. (1) First, there are the proofs riores external to the art,—not furnished by rhetoric,-the "inartificial classified. proofs" (ǎTexvo TíσTEIS). Such are the depositions made by witnesses, documents, and the like. (2) Secondly, there are the Analysis. Rhetoric is properly an art. This is the proposition from Book I. which Aristotle sets out. It is so because, when a speaker persuades, it is possible to find out why he succeeds in doing so. Rhetoric is, in fact, the popular branch of logic. Now hitherto, Aristotle says, the essence of rhetoric has been neglected for the accidents. Writers on rhetoric have hitherto concerned themselves mainly with "the exciting of prejudice, of pity, of anger, and such-proofs, i.e., the agents of persuasion, which the art of rhetoric like emotions of the soul." All this is very well, but "it has nothing to do with the matter in hand; it has regard to the judge. The true aim should be to prove your point, or seem to prove it. Here we may venture to interpolate a comment which has a general bearing on Aristotle's Rhetoric. It is quite true that, if we start from the conception of rhetoric as a branch of logic, the phantom of logic in rhetoric claims precedence over appeals to passion. But Aristotle does not sufficiently regard the question What, as a matter of experience, is most persuasive? The phantom of logic may be more persuasive with the more select hearers of rhetoric; but rhetoric is not for the more select; it is for the many, and with the many appeals to passion will sometimes, perhaps usually, be more effective than the semblance of the syllogism. And here we seem to touch the basis of the whole practical vice-it was not strictly a theoretical vice-in the old world's view of rhetoric, which, after Aristotle's day, was ultimately Aristotelian. No formulation of rhetoric can correspond with fact which does not leave it absolutely to the genius of the speaker whether reasoning (or its phantom) is to be what Aristotle calls it, the "body of proof" (oμa TioTews), or whether the stress of persuading effort should not be rather addressed to the emotions of the hearers. This is a matter of tact, of instinct, of oratorical genius. But we can entirely agree with Aristotle in his next_remark, which is historical in its nature. The deliberative branch of rhetoric had hitherto been postponed, he observes, to the forensic. We have already seen the primary cause of this, namely, that the very origin of rhetoric in Hellas was forensic. The most itself provides, the "artificial proofs" (ěvtexvoi ríσteis). These are of three kinds :—(a) logical (Aoyish #loris)-demonstration, or seeming demonstration, by argument; (b) ethical (Oiky TlOTIS), when the speaker succeeds in conveying such an impression of his own character as may lead the hearers to put trust in him; (c) emotional (ma@nrikh Tloris), when the speaker works persuasively on the feelings of the hearers. It follows that, besides logical skill, the rhetorician should possess the power of analysing character, in order to present himself in the ethical light which will be most effective with his audience. He must also understand the sources of the emotions, and the means of producing them. Hence rhetoric has a double relationship. While in one aspect-the most important to it as an art-it may be regarded as popular logic, in another aspect it is related to ethics. And hence, says Aristotle, political science (TOMITIK) being a branch of ethical, as the citizen is one aspect of the man, "rhetoric and its professors slip into the garb of political science, (brodúetal To σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς), either through want of education, or from pretentiousness, or from other human causes. Aristotle now proceeds to analyse the first of the "artificial The proofs," the logical (Aoyikh TOTIS). Answering to the strict logical syllogism of logic, rhetoric has its popular syllogism, to which proof. Aristotle gives the name of " enthymeme" (voúunua). This term (from the verb évevμetodai, "to revolve in the mind "), means properly "a consideration" or "reflection." It occurs first in Isocrates, who uses it simply of the "thoughts" or "sentiments" with which a rhetorician embellishes his work (Tois ¿vovμhμaσi TрETÓνTWS 8Xov Tv Aбyov kатаTоikiλαι, Or., xiii. § 16). Whether the technical sense was or was not known before Aristotle, it is to The enthy meme. Suppression of The The him at least that the first extant definition is duc. He defines the enthymeme as a species of syllogism, namely, as "a syllogism from probabilities and signs" (ἐξ εἰκότων και σημείων). 'probability" (eixós) is a general proposition, expressing that which usually happens, as, wise men are usually just.' sign" (onueîov) is a particular proposition, as, "Socrates is just." The "sign" may be fallible or infallible. If we say, ""wise men are just; for Socrates was wise and just," this is an enthymeme from a fallible "sign," the implied syllogism being "Socrates was wise; Socrates was just (onueîov); .. all wise men are just "; and here the "sign" is, in Aristotle's phrase, "as a particular to a universal," because from the one case of Socrates we draw an inference about all men. If, again, we say,—"Here is a sign that he is ill-he is feverish "; our enthymeme is using an infallible sign, the syllogism being, "All who are feverish are ill; he is feverish (onμetov); .. he is ill." Here, again, the "sign" is "as a particular to a universal." When the "sign" is thus infallible, it is properly called tekmerion (TEKμńpiov), the matter having been demonstrated and concluded (Tereрaσμévov)—“ for tekmar and peras mean the same thing ('limit') in the old language." Sometimes, again, the fallible sign is "as universal to particular," e.g., "Here is a sign that he has a fever -he breathes quick," the syllogism being, "Feverish men breathe quick; he breathes quick (onueîov);.. he has a fever," where a particular cause is unsoundly inferred from an effect (the "universal") which might have other causes. When Aristotle thus describes the enthymemo, or rhetorical syllogism, as dealing with "probabilities" and signs," he is describing its ordinary or characteristic materials, qua rhetorical syllogism. He does not mean to say that rhetoric cannot use syllogisms formed with other material. It would be hardly needful to point this out, were it not that, in spite of his own clear words, his meaning has sometimes been misunderstood. "The premises of rhetorical syllogisms," he says, "seldom belong to the class of necessary facts. The subject matter of judgments and deliberations is usually contingent; for it is about their actions that men debate and take thought; but actions are all contingent, no one of them, so to say, being necessary. And results which are merely usual and contingent must be deduced from premises of the same kind, as necessary results from necessary premises. It follows that the propositions from which enthymemes are taken will be sometimes necessarily true, but more often only contingently true.' Among the materials of the enthymeme, the "sign which is infallible (tho σημεῖον which is also η τεκμήριον) is so because it is to some necessary truth as part to whole. The be more Aristotle did not regard the suppression of one premiss in the statement as essential to the enthymeme. The syllogism, of which one pre- the enthymeme is merely a kind, was regarded by him "not in remiss not lation to the expression" ( οù πρós тdν čεw λóyov), but to the process essential. in the mind (¿Âλà πpòs Tòv év tŷ 4uxñì λóyov, Anal. Post., i. 10). As Sir W. Hamilton has justly said, he could not then have intended to distinguish a class of syllogisms by a verbal accident. distinction of the rhetorical syllogism, in Aristotle's view, was in its matter, not in its form. This is, indeed, made sufficiently clear by his own remark that the enthymeme may "often concisely stated than the full, or normal, syllogism (Rhct., i. 2). There is obviously no reason why the rhetorical reasoner should not state both his premisses, if he finds it convenient or effective to do so. Since, however, one of the premisses is often left to be mentally supplied, some of the later writers on rhetoric came to treat this as part of the essence of the enthymeme. It was then that the word ἀτελής was interpolated after συλλογισμός in Aristotle, Analyt. Prior., ii. 27, where the enthymeme is defined 23 συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων. Hence Quintilian says of the enthymeme (v. 10), "alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii imperfectum syllogismum vocant"; hence, too, Juvenal's “curtum enthymema.' The other branch of the "logical proof" in rhetoric corresponds example, to the induction of strict logic, and consists in giving the semblance of inductive reasoning by the use of one or two well-known examples. As Aristotle calls the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, so he calls the example (apddeyua) "a rhetorical induction." Thus if a man has asked for a body-guard, and the speaker wishes to show that the aim is a tyranny, he may quote the "examples' of Dionysius and Pisistratus. Aristotle next distinguishes the "universal " from the "special" Toro, topics, or commonplaces of rhetoric. The word Tóros, "place," means in this context "that place in which a proposition of a given kind is to be sought." The Toro, then, are classifications of propositions and arguments which rhetoric makes beforehand, with a view to readiness in debate. Cicero well illustrates the phrase "As it is easy to find hidden things when the place has been pointed out and marked, so, when we want to track out an argument, we ought to know the places, as Aristotle has called these seats, abodes, as it were, from which arguments are drawn. The The ་་ 1 On this interpolation, see Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 154. So a commonplace, or topic, may be defined as the abode of an argument (licct definire locum esse argumenti sedem; Cic., Topica, ii. 7). So elsewhere he describes the TÓTоt of rhetoric as "regiones intra quas venere et pervestiges quod quæras' "haunts in which one may hunt and track out the object of quest" (De Orat., ii. 34). The "universal commonplaces" (Kool universal TOTO) are general heads of argument applicable to all subjects and whatsoever-as, c.g., on the "possibility" or "impossibility" of special. anything. The special commonplaces (TÓTO Tv eldav, Rhet., ii. 22, more briefly called eton) are those which are drawn from special branches of knowledge, as from politics, ethics, &c. Here Aristotle observes that the more a rhetorician enters on the subject-matter of any particular science the more will he tend to pass out of the domain which properly belongs to the art of rhetoric. In that domain three provinces are distinguished. Deliber- The three ative rhetoric (ovμBouλeutikh) is concerned with exhortation or kinds of dissuasion, and with future time; its "end" (réxos)-that which rhetoric. it keeps in view, or its standard-is advantage (or detriment) to the persons addressed. Forensic rhetoric (dikaviкh) is concerned with accusation or defence, and with time past; its standard is justice or injustice. Epideictic rhetoric-the ornamental rhetoric of display" (TideIKTIKń)—is concerned with praise or blame, and usually with time present; its standard is honour or shame. 1. Let us begin with deliberative rhetoric, says Aristotle, and see Deliberawhat things a deliberative speaker ought to know. The subjects tive. with which, in a public assembly, he will have to deal are mainly these five (1) finance, (2) foreign war, (3) home defence, (4) commerce, (5) legislation. Under all these heads, he ought to be provided with some edn, or special commonplaces. Further, all his suasion or dissuasion has reference to the happiness of those whom he addresses. Hence he must be acquainted with_the popular notions of happiness which are actually prevalent. Here Aristotle gives a series of popular definitions of happiness, and a list of the clements which are generally regarded as constituting it. A similar analysis of "good" (ayatóv) follows. The scientific spirit of the rhetoric is strongly accentuated by the unscientific character of these and subsequent analyses. Aristotle never forgets that his rhetorician wants to know, not what a thing is, but what it is generally thought to be. There is nothing of cynicism or sarcasm in all this. He is simply going through his prescribed task. He is making rhetoric, as such, into a method. But suppose the question arises-"Of two good things which is the better?" Our deliberative speaker must be able to treat the "universal commonplace" of degree (uâλλov kal hтTOV). Then, he must also know something about the chief forms of government,democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, not as they are or should be, but as they are popularly conceived. 2. The ornamental rhetoric (ideIKTIK), which is taken next, Epideicis somewhat briefly dismissed. It might be conjectured, in ex- tic. planation of its place in the treatment-we should have expected it to come third-that Aristotle was the first writer who recognized it as an independent kind, and that he viewed it as an offshoot from the deliberative branch. The epideictic speaker must know what most men think "honour or "shame," "virtue" "vice. At this point a verbal distinction of some interest occurs-praise (Taos) implies moral approbation; but an comium (ykúμLov) is given to "achievements" (pya) as such. The most generally useful "topic" for the ornamental speaker is atenois (magnifying), - -as the rhetorical induction (apáderyμa) most helps the deliberative speaker, and the rhetorical syllogism (ἐνθύμημα) is most useful to the forensic. or " 3. In forensic rhetoric, we must begin by analysing injustice. Forensic. And first, "What are the motives and aims of wrong-doing?" Actions are either voluntary from habit, reason, anger, lust, or involuntary from chance, nature, force. In reference to the voluntary actions, it is needful to know the popular conception of pleasure. Secondly, "What is the character which disposes a man to do wrong, or which exposes him to suffering it?" These topics must be familiar, in a popular way, to the forensic speaker. He must also know the general grounds on which actions are classed as just or unjust. Actions must be considered, first, in reference to law, which is either special (dos), whether written or unwritten, the law of particular places and communities, or else universal (kowés), the law of nature. The second question about an "unjust" action is whether it hurts an individual or the community. The definition of "being wronged" (àdikeîoba) is, "to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent." Further, the definition of a particular offence (ypauua) sometimes raises a legal issue. A man may admit an act, and deny that it corresponds to the description given of it by the accuser, It is needful, then, to know the definitions of the principal crimes. It may be noticed that Aristotle here anticipates a topic which played a large part in the later rhetoric. The contested issues which he calls àμpio ßnthoeis The (Rhet., iii. 16) were the ordreis (constitutiones or status) of later "issues," days. Thus the issue as to the proper definition of an offence, to which he refers here (Rhet., i. 13), coincides with the later The rhetorical induction, had been rather cursorily treated there, and ample" σTáσis oρikh. The distinction between justice and equity (76 | the "logical proof" given in bk. i. ch. 2. The "example," or "The ex Síkaιov and Tổ ÉTIEKés) is noticed. Equity is "a kind of justice, but goes beyond the written law," as in the Ethics (v. 10) equity is said to be a corrective of the law, where the latter fails through generality,-.e., through the lawmaker's inability to frame a general rule which should precisely fit the circumstances of every particular case. True to his conception of a method, Aristotle next applies "the topic of degree" to injustice,-as, in an earlier chapter (Rhet., i. 7) he had applied it to the idea of good." The analysis of the three branches of rhetoric-deliberative, TEXVOL epideictic, forensic-is now finished. In the closing chapter of TiOTELS. his first book, Aristotle briefly considers and dismisses the "inartificial proofs," the means of persuasion, that is, which arise from inatters external to the art itself, though the art uses them. These, having regard to the actual circumstances of his time and country, he declares to be five: (1) laws; (2) witnesses; (3) evidence given under torture-Báoavos; (4) documents; (5) oaths, meaning chiefly treaties between states. With regard to (3) it may be remarked that the rhetorical theory of torture in the ancient world was, that a person under torture will tell the truth because it is his interest to do so. This is stated, e.g., in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, xv. § 1. Among the Attic orators, Isæus gives his emphatic adhesion to this view (Or., viii. § 12). On the other hand, the common-sense view of the matter is very well put by another Attic orator, Antiphon, in his speech De Cade Herodis (§§ 31-33), when he remarks that "in the torturers is the hope of the tortured." "So long, then," Antiphon proceeds, as the slave felt that his prospects in slandering were hopeful, he was obstinate in the calumny; but, when he saw that he was to die, then at last he told the truth, and said that he had been persuaded by the persecutors to slander me." It would have been interesting if Aristotle had given some indication of his view on this, his third, átexvos #lotis; but he simply accepts it as a fact of his day, and, taking it along with the rest, gives a number of general arguments which may be used on either side, according as the particular Texvos míoтis is for us or against us. Here the first book ends. Book II. The ἠθικὴ πίστις. The use of yvwual, or general moral sentiments, next claims The use attention (ch. 21). These are of two classes-those which are self- of yvua. evident, and those which, not being so obviously true, require some confirmatory comment (eríacyos), as when Medea says that no sensible man should allow his children to be exquisitely educated, because it makes them fastidious and unpopular. Such maxims with an "epilogue" are, in fact, virtually enthymemes. Apropos of yvwua, Aristotle remarks that spurious generalization is particularly useful in the utterance of bitter complaint (e.g., frailty, thy name is woman"). Then it is often effective to controvert received maxims, e.g., "It is not well to 'know oneself'; for if this man had known himself, he would never have become a general" (ch. 21). Some precepts on the enthymeme follow. The rhetorical reasoner On the must not have too many links in the chain of his argument; and use of he must omit those propositions which his hearers can easily the enthysupply. Also, it is highly important to know the special topics meme. (et) from which enthymemes can be drawn in each subject. The enthymeme is either (1) deKTIKÓ, demonstrative, establishing a point, or (2) exeуKTIKóv, refutative, destroying a position by a comparison of conflicting statements (Tò Tà avoμonoyobμeva ovd yev). Aristotle now gives (ii. 23) an enumeration of classes or heads of argument (ἐνθυμηματικοί τόποι) from which enthymemes can be constructed. These apply nominally to all three branches At the beginning of the second book, Aristotle returns to the of rhetoric, but in fact chiefly to the deliberative and the forensic. "artificial proofs " (EVTExVoi Tíores)-those which rhetoric itself The demonstrative enthymeme is almost exclusively treated, since provides. Of these, the logical proof has already been in part the refutative form can, of course, be inferred from the other. A discussed (i. 2). He therefore turns to the "ethical" proof. The chapter (24), answering to the treatise on fallacies in logic (rep speaker's character may be so indicated by his speech as to pre- σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων), is devoted to the fallacious (φαινόμενον) possess the hearers; and this result depends chiefly on three enthymeme, of which ten "topics" are explained and illustrated. things. He should make them feel that he possesses (1) Próvnois Another chapter is given to the two general types of Avous, or -intelligence; (2) åperń--virtue; and (3) euvola-good-will to refutation (ch. 25), viz., (1) direct counter-argument (rò aviov them. Aristotle then proceeds to furnish the speaker with the λoyleσea), opposing one enthymeme to another; (2) objection to materials for seeming intelligent and good, referring for these to a particular point in the adversary's case (rò évíoraolai). The his previous analysis of the virtues (i. 9). As to the means of second book then concludes with some supplementary remarks, seeming friendly, these will be furnished by an analysis of the meant, seemingly, to correct errors made by previous writers on affections (mán). Here we are already on the boundary line rhetoric (ch. 26). between the "ethical proof" and the third of the ĕVTEXVOL TÍσTELS, the "emotional proof." In regard to each affection (rátos), we TONTIK have to see (1) what it is; (2) what things predispose men to it; πίστις. (3) the objects and conditions of its manifestation. The next ten chapters of the second book (2-11) are accordingly devoted to an analysis of those emotions which it is most important for the rhetorician to understand:-viz. (1) anger, and its opposite, mildness; (2) love and hatred; (3) fear and boldness; (4) compassion, envy, emulation; (5) shame and shamelessness; (6) gratitude (xápis); (7) righteous indignation (véueois). But, in appealing to these various emotions, the speaker must have regard to the general character of his audience, according, e.g., as they are young or old, rich or poor, &c. Hence it is necessary to know the characteristics of the various periods and conditions of life. Aristotle therefore delineates the chief traits of the young, of the old, and of men in their prime; of the well-born, the rich, and the powerful. With regard to the well-born, he makes a remark which seems equally true of the rich: "the possessor of good birth is the more ambitious; for all men, when they have got anything, are wont to add to the heap" (ch. 12-17). The analysis of the "ethical" and the "emotional" proof is now finished. The The κοινοὶ τόποι. or After a concise retrospect, Aristotle passes to the treatment of a In his first two books Aristotle has thus dealt with invention Book III. (euperis) the discovery of means of persuasion. In the third book he deals with expression and arrangement (λégis and ráğis). The subject is prepared by some remarks on the art of delivery (Srókρiois), Delivery. which Aristotle defines as the management of the voice. "It is the art of knowing how to use the voice for the expression of each feeling, of knowing when it should be loud, low, or moderate, of managing its pitch-shrill, deep, or middle-and of adapting the cadences to the theme." Aristotle says nothing on gesture or play of feature, which Cicero and Quintilian recognize as important. He includes them by implication, however, in saying that the art of delivery, whenever it is reduced to method, "will perform the function of the actor's art," adding that "the dramatic faculty is less a matter of art than of nature. But verbal expression, at least, is clearly in the province of art, and to that he now turns. He deals first with diction (λés) in Diction. the proper sense, as concerned with the choice of words and phrases. The first excellence of diction is clearness (σapveia), which is attained by using words in their proper sense (kúpia). Next, the diction must be "neither too low nor too grand, but suitable to the subject." In prose (ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις) there is less scope for ornament than in poetry, though in the latter, too, much depends on the speaker or the theme. And here Aristotle remarks that Euripides was the first poet who produced a happy illusion by taking his words from the language of daily life (ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου), With a view to adorning prose, and giving it "distinction" (the term which best represents Aristotle's phrase ξένον or ξενικὸν ποιεῖν), nothing is more important than the judicious use of metaphor. Aristotle admits that "the art of metaphor cannot be taught": but he gives some sensible hints on the subject, and on the use of epithets. The poet Simonides, he tells us, when the winner of a mule race offered him a small fee, declined to write an ode on "halfasses," but, when the price was raised, sang "Hail, daughters of windswift steeds." The perceptions which made the best Greek prose so good are illustrated by Aristotle's next chapter (iii. 3) on vxpá, "frigidities, ""faults of style." He traces these to four Metaphor, Prose chief sources, the use of tawdry or ungainly compounds (da bróμara), the use of rare or obsolete words (yλâtrai), and infelicity of epithet or metaphor. A simile (elkov) is a metaphor with an explanation (λóyos): e.g., in speaking of Achilles, "he sprang on them like a lion is simile; "the lion sprang on them" is metaphor. Simile is less available than metaphor for prose, being more poetical. The 'proportional" metaphor mentioned here requires a passing comment. Aristotle used the term "metaphor" (uerapopa) in a larger sense than ours. He meant by it "any transference of a word to a sense different from its proper sense. Thus he can distinguish (Poct., c. 21) four classes of metaphor:-(1) from genus to species," as when vessel" means ship"; (2) from species to genus, as when "the lilies of the field" stand for "flowers" generally. These two kinds are not what we call "metaphors," but are examples of the figure which was afterwards named "synecdoche." Aristotle's third class of metaphor is (3) "from species to species," under which head come almost all familiar metaphors, as to "scent a plot,”—the generic notion, "find out," being common to the special terms, "scent" and "detect"; (4) then lastly there is the "proportional" metaphor (aváλoyov), when A is not simply compared with B (on the strength of something obviously common to both), but A's relation to C is compared with B's relation to D. To call old age "the evening of life" implies that old age is to life as the evening to the day. Obviously a "proportion" of this kind is implicit in the metaphors of Aristotle's third class; but in the fourth class proportion is expressly indicated by the mention of the second term ("life" in our example). is best suited to the epideictic branch of rhetoric, since the latter is From expression we now pass to the other subject announced at Arrange- The first four chapters having thus dealt with expression in the narrower sense of diction (xétis proper), Aristotle devotes the next Compo eight (iii. 5-12) to composition, which would be properly called sition. ouveris. After remarks on the first requisites-grammatical correctness, and purity of idiom (rò éλλnview)—we have some hints on "dignity" of style (oykos). "Propriety" (rò πрéπоv) is defined as depending chiefly on three qualities:-(1) expression of the feelings which it is desired to move in the hearer; (2) fitness to the character and position of the speaker; and (3) congruity with the level of the subject. A certain" rhythm" (Svouós), or harmonious movement, should be sought in prose; but this must not be so precise as to give the effect of metre. The elements of rhythm are rhythm. "times," i.e., in writing, long or short syllables, the short syllable being the unit. Here, following the early writers on music (comp. Plato, Rep., 400 B), Aristotle recognizes three "rhythms": (1) the "heroic" or dactylic, which is in the ratio of equality, sinco or 1:1; (2) the iambic or trochaic (~ ~), which has the ratio of 2 to 1; (3) the pronic, which has the ratio of 3:2. Of these, the heroic is too grand for prose; the iambic is too commonplace, being the very cadence of ordinary talk (aùth dotiv ǹ Xégis TŵV TOXXŵy); the trochee is too comic. The preon remains. It is the best rhythm for prose, since it will not, by itself, produce a metrical effect (uânλov Aavedver). The "first" pæon (-~~~) is most suitable to the beginning of sentences, the "fourth" pæon (~~~~) to the close. Rhythm having been attained, a framework is supplied by the period (replodos). A "compact" or periodic style (KαTEσTраμperiodic evn és) is so called in contrast with that "running" style style. (elpouén és) which simply strings clause to clause, having no necessary end until the thought is finished," and is unpleasing because it is unlimited; for all men wish to descry the end." The periodic style pleases for the opposite reason, because the nearer always fancies that he has grasped something and has got something defined. The period may consist of several parts or members (@λa), or it may be "simple," forming a unit (apexhs, μονόκωλος). The rhetorical use of antithesis is then noticed in its application to the period. Two kindred figures are also mentioned,-parisosis, a parallelism of structure between clauses of equal length, and paromoiosis, a resemblance in sound, when the last (or first) word of one clause has an echo, as it were, in the same place of the next clause. The Vivacity. Two chapters (10, 11) are now given to the sources of vivacity in The menes Aristotle's Rhetoric is incomparably the most scientific work which exists on the subject. It may also be regarded as having determined the main lines on which the subject was treated by nearly all subsequent writers. The extant treatise on rhetoric entitled 'Propun πрòs 'Aλéέavdpov was undoubtedly by Anaximenes of Lampsacus, and was The Rheprobably composed about 340-330 B.C., a few years before toric of Aristotle's work. The introductory letter prefixed to it is Anaxia late forgery. If the treatise of Anaximenes is compared with that of Aristotle the distinctive place of the latter with Aris in this field becomes clearer. Anaximenes, who knew the totle's treatise of Isocrates, and could profit by all the preceding Greek "arts," is, for us, the sole representative of technical rhetoric before Aristotle, and probably represents it at its best. We miss the intellectual power, the grasp of principles, and the subtle discrimination which belong to XX. -65 compared |