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things as the subjects or starting-points of our dis-
cursive thinking. Thus the forms of unity are manifold:
every act of intuition or thought, whatever else it is, is an
act of unifying.

by suppressing all the several notes in a tune. They are | not primarily concepts more general than all others in the sense in which animal is more general than man, but rather distinct methods of relating or synthesizing presentations. It is obvious that the whole field of consciousness at any Kant, though he accepted almost unquestioned the logic What is and psychology current in his day, has yet been the occa- moment can never be actually embraced as one. sion, in spite of himself, of materially advancing both, and unified becomes thereby the focus of consciousness and so chiefly by the distinction he was led to make between formal leaves an outlying field; so far unity may be held to imply and transcendental logic. In his exposition of the latter plurality. But it cannot with propriety be said that in a he brings to light the difference between the "functions of simple act of attention the field of consciousness is analysed the understanding" in synthesizing-or, as we might say, into two distinct parts, i.e., two unities, this (now attended organizing-percepts into concepts and the merely analytic to) and the other or the rest (abstracted from). For the subsumption of abc and abd under ab,—a, b, c, and d being not-this is but the rest of a continuum and not itself a what they may. Unlike other concepts, categories as such whole; it is left out but not determined, as the bounding To know two do not in the first instance signify objects of thought how-space is left out when a figure is drawn. ever general, but these functions of the understanding in unities we must connect both together; and herein comes constituting objects. In fine, they all imply some special to light the difference between the unity which is the form process, and into these processes it is the business of of the concept or subject of discourse and the unity of a psychology to inquire. But only the briefest attempt at judgment. The latter is of necessity complex; the former such inquiry is here possible. may or may not be. But in any case the complexity of To begin with what are par excellence formal categories, the two is different. If the subject of thought is not only tion of and among these with that which is the most fundamental clear but distinct-i.e., not merely defined as a whole but unity. and formal of all-How do we come by the conception of having its constituents likewise more or less defined—such unity? Amongst all the ideas we have," says Locke, "as distinctness is due to previous judgments. At any future there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there time these may of course be repeated; such are the anais none more simple than that of unity, or one. It has no lytical or explicative judgments of logic. As the mere shadow of variety or composition in it; every object our subject of discourse it is, however, a single unity simulsenses are employed about, every idea in our understand-taneously apprehended; the relation ascertained between ings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along it and its predicate constitutes the unity of judgment, a with it." And the like with painful iteration has been unity which is comprehended only when its parts are said by almost all English psychologists since. Such con- successively apprehended. sensus notwithstanding, to assign a sensible origin to unity is certainly a mistake,- -one of a class of mistakes already more than once referred to, which consist in transferring to the data of sense all that is implied in the language necessarily used in speaking of them. The term "a sensation" no doubt carries along with it the idea of unity, but the bare sensation as received brings along with it nothing but itself. And, if we consider sensory consciousness merely, we do not receive a sensation, and then another sensation, and so on seriatim; but we have always a continuous diversity of sensations even when these are qualitatively sharply differentiated. Moreover, if unity were an impression of sense and passively received, it would, in common with other impressions, be unamenable to change. We cannot see red as blue, but we can resolve many (parts) into one (whole), and vice versa.2 Unity, then, is the result of an act the occasions for which, no doubt, are at first non-voluntarily determined; but the act is still as distinct from them as is attention from the objects attended to. It is to that movement of attention already described in dealing with ideation (p. 61) that we must look as the source of this category. This same movement, in like manner, yields us temporal signs; and the complex unity formed by a combination of these is what we call number. When there is little or no difference between the field and the focus of attention, unifying is an impossibility, whatever the impressions received may be. On the other hand, as voluntary acts of concentration become more frequent and distinct the variegated continuum of sense is shaped into intuitions of definite things and events. Also, as soon as words facilitate the control of ideas, it becomes possible to single out special aspects and relations of

1 Essay concerning Human Understanding, II. xvi. § 1. "Wir können eines der hier gedruckten Wörter als Eins ansehen, indem wir eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Buchstaben doch in einem abschliessenden Acte zu einem Bilde vereinigen und es von den benachbarten Bildern trennen; wir können es als Vielheit ansehen, wenn wir auf den Uebergang von einem Buchstaben zum andern, jeden Schritt absetzend, achten" (Sigwart, Logik, ii. p. 41).

dicho

But, though a judgment is always a complex unity, the Law of extent of this complexity seems at first sight to vary as the form of synthesis varies. Formal logic, as we have tomy or duality. seen, by throwing the form of synthesis into the predicate has no difficulty in reducing every judgment to an S is P. But, if we at all regard the matter thought, it is certain, for example, that "It is an explosion" is less complex than "The enemy explodes the mine." The first answers one question; the second answers three. But as regards the more complex judgment both the process of ascertaining the fact and the language in which it is expressed show that the three elements concerned in it are not synthesized at once. Suppose we start from the explosion,-and changes or movements are not only apt to attract attention first, but, when recognized as events and not as abstracts personified, they call for some supplementing beyond themselves then in this case we may search for the agent at work or for the object affected, but not for both at once. Moreover, if we find either, a complete judgment at once ensues: "The enemy explodes," or "The mine is exploded." The original judgment is really due to a synthesis of these two. But, when the results of former judgments are in this manner taken up into a new judgment, a certain "condensation of thought" ensues. Of this condensation the grammatical structure of language is evidence, though logical manipulation-with great pains-obliterates it. Thus our more complex judgment would take the form"The enemy is now mine-exploding" or "The mine is enemy-exploded," according as one or other of the simpler An examination of other cases judgments was made first. would in like manner tend to show that intellectual synthesis is always-in itself and apart from implications-a binary synthesis. Wundt, to whom belongs the merit of first explicitly stating this "law of dichotomy or duality" as the cardinal principle of discursive thinking, contrasts it with synthesis by mere association. This, as running on ; the continuously, he represents thus-A-B-C-D

3 Wundt, Logik: eine Untersuchung der Principien der Erkenntniss, i. p. 53 sq.

Formal

categories.

synthesis of thought, on the other hand, he symbolizes by difference—where presentations seem absolutely or totally forms such as the following:

T

"The one so like the other

As could not be distinguished but by names had the same complexion and the same stature just as we say they had the same mother. This ambiguity in the word "same," whereby it means either individual identity or indistinguishable resemblance, has been often noticed, and from a logical or objective point of view justly complained of as " engendering fallacies in otherwise enlightened understandings." But apparently no one has inquired into its psychological basis, although more than one writer has admitted that the ambiguity is one "in itself not always to be avoided." It is not enough to trace the confusion to the existence of common names and to cite the forgotten controversies of scholastic realism. We are not now concerned with the conformity of thought to things or with logical analysis, but with the analysis of a psychological process. The tendency to treat presentations as if they were copies of things-the objective bias, as we may call it is the one grand obstacle to psychological observation. Some only realize with an effort that the idea of extension is not extended; no wonder, then, if it should seem "unnatural" to maintain that the idea of two like things does not consist of two like ideas. But, assuming that both meanings of identity have a psychological justification, it will be well to distinguish them and to examine their connexion. Perhaps we might term the one "material identity" and the other "individual identity," following the analogy of expressions such as "different things but all made of the same stuff," the same person but entirely changed." Thus there is unity and plurality concerned in both, and herein identity or sameness differs from singularity or mere oneness, which entails no relation. But the unity and the plurality are different in each, and each is in some sort the converse of the other. In the one, two different individuals partially coincide; in the other, one individual is partially different; the unity in the one case is an individual presentation, in the other is the presentation of an individual.

time, or localize or project them into the same place, a careful analysis shows only that we detect no difference of temporal and local signs respectively, in other words, have only special cases of comparison.

ณ

As regards the real categories, it may be said generally Real that these owe their origin in large measure to the an- categories. thropomorphic or mythical tendency of human thought,τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γινώσκεσθαι. Into the formation of these conceptions two very distinct factors enter-(1) the facts of what in the stricter sense we call "self-consciousness," and (2) certain spatial and temporal relations among our presentations themselves. On the one hand, it has to be noted that these spatial and temporal relations are but the occasion or motive and ultimately perhaps, we may say, the warrant for the analogical attribution to things of selfness, efficiency, and design, but are not directly the source of the forms of thought that thus arise. On the other hand, it is to be noted also that such forms, although they have an independent source, would never apart from suitable material come into actual existence. If the followers of Hume err in their exclusive reliance upon "associations naturally and even necessarily generated by the order of our sensations" (J. S. Mill), the disciple of Kant errs also who relies exclusively on "the synthetic unity of apperception." The truth is that we are on the verge of error in thus sharply distinguishing the two at all; if we do so momentarily for the purpose of exposition it behoves us here again to remember that mind grows and is not made. The use of terms like "innate," priori," "necessary," "formal," &c., without further qualification leads only too easily to the mistaken notion that all the mental facts so named are alike underived and original, independent not only of experience but of each other; whereas but for the forms of intuition the forms of thought would be impossible, that is to say, we should never have a self-consciousness at all if we had not previously learnt to distinguish occupied and unoccupied space, past and present in time, and the like. But, again, it is equally true that, if we could not feel and move as well as receive impressions, and if experience did not repeat itself, we should never attain even to this level of spatial and temporal intuition. Kant shows a very lame and halting recognition of this dependence of the higher forms on the lower both in his schematism of the categories, and again in correcting in his Analytic the opposition of sense and understanding as respectively receptive and active with which he set out in his Esthetic. Still, although what are called the subjective and objective factors of real knowledge advance together, the former is in a sense always a step ahead. We find again without us the permanence, individuality, efficiency, and adaptation we have found first of all within (comp. p. 56, b and d). But such primitive imputation of personality, though it facilitates a first understanding, soon proves itself faulty and begets the contradictions which have been one chief motive to philosophy. We The many vexed questions that arise concerning indi- smile at the savage who thinks a magnet must need food Rentvidual identity are metaphysical rather than psychological. and is puzzled that the horses in a picture remain for ever blentity. But it will serve to bring out the difference between the still; but few consider that underlying all common-sense two forms of identity to note that an identification cannot thinking there lurks the same natural precipitancy. We be established solely by qualitative comparison; an alibi or attribute to extended things a unity which we know only a breach of temporal continuity will turn the flank of the as the unity of an unextended subject; we attribute to strongest argument from resemblance. Moreover, resem-changes among these extended things what we know only blance itself may be fatal to identification when the law when we act and suffer ourselves; and we attribute further of being is change. But, while temporal and spatial de- both to them and their changes a striving for ends which terminations are essential to individual identity, they have, we know only because we feel. In asking what they are, strictly speaking, no individual identity of their own. how they act, and why they are thus and thus, we assimiWhen we speak of two impressions occurring at the same late them to ourselves, in spite of the differences which Comp. J. S. Mill, Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. § 11, and Examination of lead us by and by to see a gulf between mind and matter. Hamilton, 34 ed., ch. xiv. p. 306, note; also Meinong, "Hume-Studien Such instinctive analogies have, like other analogies, to be I., Wiener Sitzungberichte (Phil. Hist. C.), vol. ci. p. 709. confirmed, refuted, or modified by further knowledge, ie.,

Material

In material identity the unity is that of a single preidentity. sentation, whether simple or complex, which enters as a common constituent into two or more others. It may be possible of course to individualize it, but as it emerges in a comparison it is a single presentation and nothing more. On account of this absence of individual marks this single presentation is what logicians call "abstract"; but this is not psychologically essential. It may be a generic image which has resulted from the neutralization of individual marks, but it may equally well be a simple presentation, like red, to which such marks never belonged. We come here from a new side upon a truth which has been already expounded at length, viz., that presentations are not given to us as individuals but as changes in a continuum. Time and space-the instruments, as it were, of individualization, which are presupposed in the objective sciences-are psychologically later than this mere differentiation.

Indi

XX.

II

Causality.

by the very insight into things which these analogies have | mind which according to Hume constitutes the whole of our idea
To illustrate the nature of this impression
themselves made possible. That in their first form they of power or efficacy.
Hume cites the instant passage of the imagination to a particular
were mythical, and that they could never have been at all
idea on hearing the word commonly annexed to it, when "'twill
unless originated in this way, are considerations that make
scarce be possible for the mind by its utmost efforts to prevent
no difference to their validity,-assuming, that is, that they that transition" (op. cit., p. 393). It is this determination, then,
admit, now or hereafter, of a logical transformation which which is felt internally, not perceived externally, that we mis-
renders them objectively valid. This legitimation is of takenly transfer to objects and regard as an intelligible connexion
between them. But, if Hume admits this, must he not admit more?
course the business of philosophy; we are concerned only Can it be pretended that it is through the workings of association
with the psychological analysis and origin of the concep- among our ideas that we first feel a determination which our utmost
tions themselves.
efforts can scarce resist, or that we feel such determination under
no other circumstances? If it be allowed that the natural man is

As it must here suffice to examine one of these categories, let us take that which is the most important and central of the three, viz., causality or the relation of cause and effect, as that will necessarily throw some light upon the constitution of the others. To begin, we must distinguish three things, which, though very different, are very liable to be confused. (1) Perceiving in a definite case, e.g., that on the sun shining a stone becomes warm, we may say the sun makes the stone warm. This is a concrete instance of predicating the causal relation. In this there is, explicitly at all events, no statement of a general law or axiom, such as we have when we say (2) "Every event must have a cause," a statement commonly known as the principle of causality. This again is distinct from what is on all hands allowed to be an empirical generalization, viz., (3) that such and such particular causes have invariably such and such particular effects. With these last psychology is not

directly concerned at all: it has only to analyse and trace to its
origin the bare conception of causation as expressed in (1) and
involved in both these generalizations. Whether only some things
have causes, as the notion of chance implies, whether all causes are
uniform in their action or some capricious and arbitrary, as the
unreflecting suppose,-all this is beside the question for us.

One point in the analysis of the causal relation Hume may be
said to have settled once for all it does not rest upon or contain
any immediate intuition of a causal nexus. The two relations that
Hume allowed to be perceived (or "presumed to exist"), viz., con-
tiguity in space of the objects causally related and priority in time
of the cause before the effect, are the only relations directly dis-
cernible. We say indeed "The sun warms the stone" as readily as
we say "The sun rises and sets," as if both were matters of direct
observation then and there. But that this is not so is evident from
the fact that only in some cases when one change follows upon
another do we regard it as following from the other: casual coin-
cidence is at least as common as causal connexion. Whence the
difference, then, if not from perception? Hume's answer,1 repeated
in the main by English psychologists since, is, as all the world
knows, that the difference is the result of association, that when a
change ẞ in an object B has been frequently observed to succeed a
change a in another object A, the frequent repetition determines
the mind to a transition from the one to the other. It is this
determination, which could not be present at first, that constitutes
"the third relation betwixt these objects.' This "internal im-
pression generated by association is then projected; "for 'tis a
common observation that the mind has a great propensity to spread
itself on external objects."

The subjective origin and the after-projection we must admit,
but all else in Hume's famous doctrine seems glaringly at variance
with facts. In one respect it proves too much, for all constant
sequences are not regarded as causal, as according to his analysis
they ought to be; again, in another respect it proves too little, for
causal connexion is continually predicated on a first occurrence.
The natural man has always distinguished between causes and signs
or portents; but there is nothing to show that he produced an
effect many times before regarding himself as the cause of it. J. S.
Mill has indeed obviated the first objection epistemologically by
adding to constant conjunction the further characteristic of "uncon-
ditionality. But this is a conception that cannot be psychologi-
cally explained from Hume's premisses, unless perhaps by resolving
it into the qualification that the invariability must be complete and
"Uncondi-
not partial, whereupon the second objection applies.
tional" is a word for which we can find no meaning as long as we
confine our attention to temporal succession. It will not do to say
both that an invariable succession generates the idea, and that such
invariable succession must be not only invariable but also uncondi-
tional in order to generate it. We may here turn the master
against the disciple: "the same principle," says Hume, "cannot
be both the cause and the effect of another, and this is perhaps the
only proposition concerning that relation which is either intui-
tively or demonstratively certain" (op. cit., p. 391). Uncondition-
ality is then part of the causal relation and yet not the product of
invariable repetition.

Perhaps the source of this element in the relation will become
clear if we examine more closely the internal impression of the

1 Treatise of Human Nature, pt. iii., § xiv., "Of the idea of necessary connexion."

irresistibly determined to imagine an apple when he hears its name
or to expect thunder when he sees lightning, must it not also be
allowed that he is irresistibly determined much earlier and in a
much more impressive way when overmastered by the elements or
by his enemies? But further, such instances bring to light what
Hume's "determination also implies, viz., its necessary correla
tive, effort or action. Even irresistible association can only be
known as such by efforts to resist it. Hume allows this when he
says that his principles of association "are not infallible causes;
for one may fix his attention during some time on any one object
without looking farther" (op. cit., p. 393). But the fact is, we know
and to be carried where we would not, quite apart from the work-
both what it is to act and what it is to suffer, to go where we would
ings of association.

And, had Hume not confused the two differ

ent inquiries, that concerning the origin of the idea of causation and
that concerning the ground of causal inference or law of causation,
it could never have occurred to him to offer such an analysis of the
former as he does.

Keeping to the former and simpler question, it would seem that
when in ordinary thinking we say A causes this or that in B we
project or analogically attribute to A what we experience in acting,
and to B what we experience in being acted on; and the structure of
language shows that such projection was made long before it was
suspected that what A once did and B once suffered must happen in
like manner again. The occasions suitable for this projection are
determined by the temporal and spatial relations of the objects
concerned, which relations are matter of intuition. These are of
no very special interest from a psychological point of view, but the
subjective elements we shall do well to consider further. First of
all, we must note the distinction of immanent action and transitive
action; the former is what we call action simply, and implies only
a single thing, the agent; the latter, which we might with advan-
tage call effectuation, implies two things, i.e., a patient distinct
from the agent. In scientific language the agent in an intransitive
act is called a causa immanens and so distinguished from the agent
in effectuation or causa transiens. Common thought, however, does
not regard mere action as caused at all; and we shall find it, in fact,
impossible to resolve action into effectuation. But, since the things
with which we ordinarily deal are complex, have many parts, pro-
perties, members, phases, and in consequence of the analytic pro-
cedure of thought, there ensues, indeed, a continual shifting of the
point of view from which we regard any given thing, so that what
is in one aspect one thing, is in another many (comp. p. 56 c),
So it comes about that, when regarding himself as one, the natural
man speaks of himself as walking, shouting, &c.; but, when dis-
tinguishing between himself and his members, he speaks of raising
his voice, moving his legs, and so forth. Thus no sooner do we re-
solve any given action into an effectuation, by analytically dis-
tinguishing within the original agent an agent and a patient, than
a new action appears. Action is thus a simpler notion than
causation and inexplicable by means of it. It is certainly no easy
problem in philosophy to determine where the resolution of the
complex is to cease, at what point we must stop, because in the
presence of an individual thing and a simple activity. At any rate,
we reach such a point psychologically in the conscious subject, and
that energy
in consciousness we call attention. If this be allowed,
Hume's critique of the notion of efficacy is really wide of the mark.
Some, ,"2 he says, "have asserted that we feel an energy or power
in our own mind; and that, having in this manner acquir'd the
idea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we are not
able immediately to discover it.
But to convince us how
fallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider that the will,
being here consider'd as a cause, has no more a discoverable con-
nexion with its effects than any material cause has with its proper
effect. The effect is there [too] distinguishable and separable
from the cause, and cou'd not be foreseen without the experience of
their constant conjunction" (op. cit., p. 455). This is logical analysis,
not psychological; the point is that the will is not considered as a
cause and distinguished from its effects, nor in fact considered at

2 Hume here has Locke and Berkeley specially in view. Locke as a patient and acute inquirer was incomparably better as a psychologist than a man addicted to literary foppery like Hume, for all his genius, could possibly be. On the particular question, see Locke, ii. 21, 3-5.

all. It is not a case of sequence between two separable impressions; for we cannot really make the indefinite regress that such logical distinctions as that between the conscious subject and its acts implies. Moreover, our activity as such is not directly presented at all: we are, being active; and further than this psychological analysis will not go. There are, as we have seen, two ways in which this activity is manifested, the receptive or passive and the motor or active in the stricter sense-(comp. p. 44) and our experience of these we project in predicating the causal relation. But two halves do not make a whole; so we have no complete experience of effectuation, for the simple reason that we cannot be two things at once. We are guided in piecing it together by the temporal and spatial relations of the things concerned. Hence, perhaps, some of the antinomies that beset this conception. In its earliest form, then, the so-called necessary connexion of cause and effect is perhaps nothing more than that of physical constraint. To this, no doubt, is added the strength of expectation-as Hume supposed-when the same effect has been found invariably to follow the same cause. Finally, when upon a basis of associated uniformities of sequence a definite intellectual elaboration of such material ensues, the logical necessity of reason and consequent finds a place, and so far as deduction is applicable cause and reason become interchangeable ideas.1 Object. The mention of logical necessity brings up a topic already inciivity of dentally noticed, viz., the objectivity of thought and cognition genthought. erally (comp. pp. 55, 77). The psychological treatment of this topic is tantamount to an inquiry into the characteristics of the states of mind we call certainty, doubt, belief-all of which centre round the one fact of evidence. Between the certainty that a proposition is true and the certainty that it is not there may intervene continuous grades of uncertainty. We may know that A is sometimes B, or sometimes not; or that some at least of the conditions of B are present or absent; or the presentation of A may be too confused for distinct analysis. This is the region of probability, possibility, more or less obscurity. Leaving this aside, it will be enough to notice those cases in which certainty may be complete. With that certainty which is absolutely objective, i.e., with knowledge, psychology has no direct concern; it is for logic to furnish the criteria by which knowledge is ascertained.

objective determination. As Dr Bain puts it, "The leading fact
in belief.. is our primitive credulity. We begin by believing
everything whatever is is true" (Emotions and Will, 3d ed., p.
511). But the point is that in this primitive state there is no act
answering to "believe" distinct from the non-voluntary attention
answering to "perceive," and no reflexion such as a modal term
like "true" implies. With eyes open in the broad day no man
says, "I am certain there is light": he simply sees.
He may by
and by come absolutely to disbelieve much that he sees-c.g., that
things are nearer when viewed through a telescope-just as he will
come to disbelieve his dreams, though while they last he is certain
in these too. The limits of this article forbid any attempt to deal
specially with the intellectual aspects of such conflicts of presenta-
tions (comp. p. 62) or with their resolution and what is meant by
saying that reason turns out superior to sense. The consistency
we find it possible to establish among certain of our ideas becomes
an ideal, to which we expect to find all our experience conform.
Still the intuitive evidence of logical and mathematical axioms is
psychologically but a new form of the actual; we are only certain
that two and two make four and we are not less certain that we see
things nearer through a telescope.3

Presentation of Self, Self-Consciousness, and Conduct.
The conception of self we have just seen underlying and
to a great extent shaping the rest of our intellectual furni-
ture; on this account it is at once desirable and difficult
to analyse it and ascertain the conditions of its develop-
ment. In attempting this we must carefully distinguish
between the bare presentation of self and that reference
of other presentations to it which is often called specially
self-consciousness, "inner sense," or internal perception.
Concerning all presentations whatever-that of self no less
than the rest-it is possible to reflect, "This presentation
is mine; it is my object; I am the subject attending to
it." Self, then, is one presentation among others, the
Emotion and desire are frequent indirect causes of subjective result, like them, of the differentiation of the original
certainty, in so far as they determine the constituents and the
continuum. But it is obvious that this presentation must
grouping of the field of consciousness at the moment-"pack the
jury" or "suborn the witnesses," as it were. But the ground of be in existence first before other presentations can be re-
certainty is in all cases some quality or some relation of these pre-lated to it. On the other hand, it is only in and by means
sentations inter se. In a sense, therefore, the ground of all certainty
is objective-in the sense, that is, of being something at least directly
and immediately determined for the subject and not by it. But,
though objective, this ground is not itself-at least is not ultimately
an object or presentation. Where certainty is mediate, one judg
ment is often spoken of as the ground of another; but a syllogism is
still psychologically a single, though not a simple, judgment, and
the certainty of it as a whole is immediate. Between the judgment
A is B and the question Is A B? the difference is not one of content
nor scarcely one of form: it is a difference which depends upon the
effect of the proposition on the subject judging. (i.) We have this
effect before us most clearly if we consider what is by common con-
sent regarded as the type of certainty and evidence, the certainty of
present sense-impressions whence it is said, "Seeing is believing."
The evident is here the actual, and the "feeling or consciousness
of certainty is in this case nothing but the sense of being taken
fast hold of and forced to apprehend what is there. (ii.) The like
is true of memory and expectation: in these also there is a sense
of being tied down to what is given, whereas in mere imagination,
however lively, this non-voluntary determination is absent (comp.
p. 63) Hume saw this at times clearly enough, as, e.g., when he
says, "An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea
that the fancy alone presents to us." But unfortunately he not
only made this difference a mere difference of intensity, but spoke
of belief itself as "an operation of the mind" or manner of
conception that bestowed on our ideas this additional force or
vivacity." In short, Hume confounded one of the indirect causes
of belief with the ground of it, and again, in describing this ground
committed the forepo porepor of making the mind determine the
ideas instead of the ideas determine the mind. (iii.) In speaking
of intellection he is clearer: "The answer is easy with regard to
propositions that are prov'd by intuition or demonstration. In
that case, the person who assents not only conceives the ideas
according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin'd to con-
ceive them in that particular manner" (op. cit., p. 395). It has been
often urged-as by J. S. Mill, for example-that belief is something
"ultimate and primordial." No doubt it is; but so is the distinc-
tion between activity and passivity, and it is not here maintained
that certainty can be analysed into something simpler, but only
that it is identical with what is of the nature of passivity-

of such relations that the conception of self is completed.
We begin, therefore, with self simply as an object, and
end with the conception of that object as the subject or
"myself" that knows itself. Self has, in contradistinction
from all other presentations, first of all (a) a unique in-
terest and (b) a certain inwardness; (e) it is an individual
that (d) persists, (e) is active, and finally (f) knows itself.
These several characteristics of self are intimately involved;
so far as they appear at all they advance in definiteness
from the lowest level of mere sentience to those moments
of highest self-consciousness in which conscience approves
or condemns volition.

The earliest and to the last the most important element in self- Self and what we might perhaps term its root or material element-is that the body. variously styled the organic sensations, vital sense, cœnæsthesis, or somatic consciousness. This largely determines the tone of the

3 See BELIEF, vol. iii. p. 532.

4

A large, though certainly diminishing, school of thinkers would entirely demur to such a proposal. "This personality," says one, "like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable . . . it can be analysed into no simpler elements; for it is revealed to us in all the clearness of an original intuition" (Mansel, Metaphysics, p. 182). Such an objection arises from that confusion between psychology and epistemology which we have met already several times before (as, c.g., in the case of space, p. 53, and of unity, p. 79). The fact is that a conception that is logically "simple and immediate," in such wise as to be underivable from others, and therefore indefinable, may be-we might almost say will be-psychologically the result of a long process of development; for the more abstract a concept is, i.c., the more fundamental in epistemological structure, the more thinking there has been to elaborate it. The most complex integrations of experience are needed to furnish the ideas of its ultimate elements. Such ideas when reached have intellectually all the clearness of an original intuition, no doubt; but they are not therefore to be coufounded with what is psychologically a simple and immediate presentation. It was in this last sense that idealists like Berkeley and Kant denied any presentation of self as much as sceptics like Hume. Self is psychologically a product of thought, not a datum of sense; hence, while Berkeley called it a "notion and Kant an idea of the reason," Hume treated it as a philosophical fiction.