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illustrious contemporaries of Pericles say in regard to the effect of learning on him. It matters little to which we turn; but as we have quoted nothing yet from Xenophon, let us see whether his account of Pericles bears out any such charge as that the great statesman was arrogant or overbearing. Alcibiades," he says, "before he was twenty years of age, held the following discourse with Pericles, who was his guardian, and chief ruler of the state about laws. Tell me,' said he, Pericles, can you tell me what a law is ?' Certainly,' replied Pericles. Teach me, then, in the name of the gods,' said Alcibiades, 'for I, hearing some persons praised as being obedient to the laws, consider that no one can fairly obtain such praise who does not know what a law is.' You desire no very difficult matter, Alcibiades,' says Pericles, when you wish to know what a law is; for all those regulations are laws which the people on meeting together and approving them, have enacted, directing what we should do and what we should not do.' 'And whether do they direct that we should do good things, or that we should do bad things?' Good, by Jupiter, my child, but bad by no means.' And if it should not be the whole people, but a few, as where there is an oligarchy, that should meet together and enact what we are to do, what are such enactments?' Everything,' replied Pericles, which the supreme power in the state, on determining what the people ought to do, has enacted, is called a law. And if a tyrant, holding rule over the state, prescribes to the citizens what they must do, is such prescription called a law?' 'Whatever a tyrant in authority prescribes,' returned Pericles, is also called a law.' 'What, then, Pericles,' asked Alcibiades, is force and lawlessness? Is it not when the stronger obliges the weaker, not by persuasion, but by compulsion, to do what he pleases?' So it appears to me,' replied Pericles. 'Whatever, then, a tyrant compels the people to do by enacting it without gaining their consent, is that an act of lawlessness?' 'Yes,' said Pericles, it appears

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depend at least, if he is to be, as I think he ought to be, a well-qualified statesman (vir civilis)? What sort of eloquence can be imagined, indeed, to proceed from a man who is ignorant of the noblest subjects of human contemplatiom. (An hæc non frequenter tradabit orator? Jam de auguriis, responsis, religione denique omni, de quibus maxima sæpe in senatu consilia versata sunt, non erit ei disserendum si quidem, ut nobis placet futurus est vir civilis idem? Quæ denique intelligi saltem potest eloquentia h minis optima nescientis") Alas! to how many politicians of the present day, who wish to be regarded as statesmen, and who draw large salaries and larger perquisites, as such, does the latter query apply! Yet we boast of the wonderful progress we have made since the time of Pericles!!

to me that it is, for I retract my admission that what a tyrant prescribes to his people without persuading them, is a law.' But what the few enact, not from gaining the consent of the many, but from having superior power, should we say that that is force, or that it is not?' Everything,' said Pericles, which one man obliges another to do without gaining his consent, whether he enact it in writing or not, seems to me to be force rather than law.' 'Whatever, then, the whole people, when they are stronger than the wealthier class, enact, without their consent, would be an act of force rather than a law.' Certainly, Alcibiades,' said Pericles, and I, when I was of your age, was very acute at such disquisitions; for we used to meditate and argue about such subjects as you appear now to meditate.' Would, therefore,' said Alcibiades, that I had conversed with you, Pericles, at the time when you were most acute in discussing such topics.'"*

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The conduct of Pericles throughout this dialogue is that of a philosopher, who knows that, let one study as long and as carefully as he will, there are still many things of which he must necessarily be ignorant; not that of a pedant or braggart, who because he has learned a few things imagines, or pretends, that he knows everything. There is good reason to believe that Sir Isaac Newton had Pericles in his mind when he modestly observed, in reply to the encomiums of some friends, that he regarded himself only as a child gathering pebbles on the sea-shore, who, let him exert himself as he might, could never expect to secure more than a very small proportion of the immense whole. That Pericles was proud may indeed be admitted, but his was a sublime pride or grandeur of soul never surpassed, if equalled, by mortal man. His pride was in the greatness and glory of his country. His highest ambition was to see Athens tower above all other cities in whatever reflected honor on the human mind; and who that is acquainted with the history of the world will deny that it was fully realized?

What he accomplished for the Athenians might well seem fabulous if it were not attested by numerous witnesses whose testimony is beyond dispute. But supposing he had done nothing but to build such structures as he did, and give such encouragement to the fine arts, who could deny him a proud niche in the temple of fame? Be it remembered that no sooner did the people decide in his favor

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, Book I., ch. 11.

against his rival, Thucydides, than he commenced to realize his great project of conferring undying renown on Athens. His first work was to convert the suburb of the Piræus into a regular and beautiful city. He built a new wall nearly parallel to that built by Themistocles, in order to complete the system of defence which joined Athens to the sea. In a short time the Acropolis was covered with edifices that have never been equalled in magnificence. The famous Parthenon, the Odeon (a theatre for musical and poetical representations), and the Propylæa, were but the work of a few

years.

These were scarcely finished when he commenced the restoration of the Temple of Erectheus. All were under the direction of the most eminent architects and sculptors, namely, Ictinus, Calicrates, Coraelus, Mnesicles, and others, all of whom were under the superintendence of Phidias. These various edifices, constructed within a space of twelve years, cost upwards of 3,000 talents, a sum equal to about $17,000,000. At first sight this might seem a large sum, but how small must it be considered when compared with the wonderful results it accomplished! However, no Athenian had to be taxed for it; the revenue alone, as managed by Pericles, was sufficient to meet all expenses, and leave a considerable surplus besides. The revenue, comprising the tribute of 600 talents paid by the allies of Athens, amounted to 1,000 talents (nearly $5,000,000). After deducting from this sum all that was necessary for the state, including the expense of building a large fleet for the Ægean Sea, the celebration of public fêtes, and the various embellishments of the city, already referred to, the annual surplus was such that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, it had amounted to 6,000 talents, a sum equal to about $30,000,000.*

Having thus briefly glanced at the character of Pericles as an orator, a philosopher, and a man of taste, we now proceed to consider him as a statesman; but let us premise before doing so, that in order to do him justice in any one of these capacities, especially in that of a statesman, a much

In order to comprehend these figures, it will be necessary to bear in mind that the whole population of Attica at this time was only as follows: Athenians, 300,000; Strangers, 45,000; Slaves, 365,000. Add to this the fact that the precious metals were nearly three times as valuable in the time of Pericles as they are at present; then some adequate idea may be formed of the public spirit of the Athenians.

larger space would be required than we can devote on the present occasion to all.

The Athenians had a very different idea of a statesman from that entertained by most persons at the present day. They made a very broad distinction between a statesman and politician. While they regarded the former as one whose mind was richly stored with multifarious knowledge, they regarded the latter as not necessarily possessed of anything worthy the name of knowledge. This is happily and amusingly illustrated in the plays of Aristophanes.

That the Romans entertained similar views in the golden age of their literature and mental activity, is everywhere obvious in their writings. For a proof of the fact we need only refer to Quintilian, one of the most reliable and judicious of writers. Quintilian considered oratory as essential to statesmanship, and held that, in order to be a perfect orator, one must combine the most extensive learning and culture with the strictest probity and integrity. If the mere forensic orator should possess these various qualifications, what should we expect from the statesman, who is supposed to be eloquent on every subject that has any relation to the welfare of the state, or the happiness of the people? Hence it is that the most eminent philosophers and jurists. of all ages are of opinion that neither poet, nor astronomer, nor mathematician, nor chemist requires so much accurate knowledge, or so many natural gifts, as a statesman.

We have already shown that Pericles possessed all the necessary qualifications according to the severest standard. But how did he use those qualifications? We have said in general terms that he proved a wise and good ruler to the Athenians. Now let us glance at some of the evidences of his statesmanship; let us see whether his conduct and acts were in general statesman-like. Towards the year 468 B. c., Pericles aided by Ephialtes commenced to oppose the existing oligarchy, at the head of which was Cimon, on the ground that the people were overtaxed, and that much more expense was incurred than the legitimate administration of the government required. The effect of his eloquence was such that Cimon was brought to trial; but the oligarchy having still a majority, he was acquitted. Soon after they voted in favor of sending an army, commanded by their chief, to aid the Spartans against their revolted helots. Pericles advised the ruling party against the imprudence of such a step, telling them that the Spartans would not thank them for their pains, but, on the

contrary, would be more likely to regard the act as an offensive interference in their domestic affairs. Cimon and his supporters were of the opposite opinion; and their chief argument was, that so friendly a manifestation on the part of Athens would have the effect of uniting the two cities more intimately to each other than they had ever been before. But the result proved still worse than Pericles had predicted. The Spartans sent back the auxiliaries, informing them, in language by no means complimentary, that their services were not required, and that they should have stayed at home until they were sent for. This annoyed and mortified the Athenians to such a degree that they immediately voted to ostracise Cimon. This virtually put an end to the oligarchy for the time; but those who most regretted the loss of their power, could not help admiring the wisdom and foresight of Pericles. All admitted that in giving his advice he was actuated by the noblest motives. Now (461), however, the popular party had a decided majority, and no sooner did Pericles get into power than he began to carry into execution his various projects of reform.

One of the first of these reforms was the establishment of trial by jury. We call attention to this the more particularly, because there is no opinion more generally entertained at the present day, both in this country and in England, than that the world owes the idea of trial by jury to our Saxon ancestors. No one, indeed, acquainted with history, would venture to make such an assertion; but it has been the boast of a certain class of newspapers, for twenty years past, that not only trial by jury, but almost every other political or judicial idea of any value, which we possess, had its origin in the woods of Scandinavia; whereas both Plato and Aristotle, as well as Thucydides, tell us about the Athenian juries. Plato would have jurymen in his Model Republic, for he remarks in Book XII., chap. 4, of his Laws: "Let it therefore be laid down as a law, that he who is about to act as a juryman shall take an oath as a juryman." In the third book of his Politics, and first chapter, Aristotle mentions the right of serving on a jury as one of the privileges of citizenship.*

"Our former description of a citizen," he says, "will admit of correction; for in some governments the offer of dicast and of a member of the general assembly is not an intermediate one; but there are particular persons appointed for these purposes; some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen or members of the assembly."